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G O D

THE CREATOR AND LORD OF ALL

BY

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CHAPTER XVII

PROVIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT IN RELATION TO REDEMPTION

THE Bible teaches that all who are justified and finally saved from sin and condemnation are eternally chosen by God, according to his foreknowledge, unto obedience and salvation through Christ in sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth. This is the doctrine of election as set forth in the Bible.¹

In this chapter we must ascertain the true significance and the reasonableness of the doctrine.

I. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DOCTRINE. — In ascertaining this significance we must recur to definitions already given. God's providential government and his providential purpose refer to the same reality. The former is his action in time realizing his archetypal idea of the universe so far as that action is the ground, immediate or remote, of the actuality of events. The latter is his purpose in eternity to realize this archetype by his action in time, with the knowledge of all that will come to pass as the result, immediate or remote, of his thus acting. Election is God's eternal purpose in respect to the redemption of men from sin. Therefore, in ascertaining the significance of God's election of sinners to obedience and salvation through Christ, we have simply to ascertain on what action of God the redemption of any sinner from sin essentially depends.

¹ 2 Thess. ii. 13; 1 Pet. i. 1, 2; see also Matth. xx. 16; John vi. 37; xv. 16, 19; xvii. 2, 9; Acts xiii. 48; xxii. 14; Rom. viii. 28-30; 1 Cor. i. 27, 28; Eph. i. 4-11; iii. 10, 11; 1 Thess. i. 4; v. 9; those who live in Christian love are frequently called God's elect; Matth. xxiv. 24, 31; Mark xiii. 20; Luke xviii. 7; Acts ix. 15; Rom. viii. 33; xvi. 13; Col. iii. 12; 2 Tim. ii. 10; Tit. i. 1; 1 Pet. ii. 9; v. 13; 2 John i. 13; Rev. xvii. 14.

1. God's election of sinners to obedience and salvation has significance in the fact that the redemption of any person from sin depends on God in the generic sense in which everything depends on him as the creator, and as determining the constitution of all created beings and the circumstances and conditions under which they severally exist.

2. God's election has a higher significance in the fact, already noticed, that God's purpose of sin is negative, a purpose not to do otherwise than he does to prevent it or to reclaim from it; while his purpose of holiness is positive, a purpose to do all that perfect wisdom and love permit or require to bring all persons to live the life of universal love. Here is a more specific sense in which the redemption of the sinner depends on the action of God.

3. The election has a still higher significance in the fact that redemption, considered in its unity and continuity as a whole, is the work of God, self-moved by his own love, in the exercise of his own prevenient grace, seeking men to redeem them from sin and condemnation antecedent to any action of sinful men seeking God. It is being done in fulfilment of God's eternal purpose to realize in the universe the archetypal ideal of his own wisdom, being moved thereto by his love. The revelation made throughout the Biblical history is that it is God who first seeks man, not man who must first seek God and propitiate him. This is distinctive of Christianity and is the glad tidings of the gospel. The love which God reveals in redeeming men from sin is eternal, as strong before man existed as afterwards, moving God to create and evolve the universe, and glowing unchanged on every creature as it comes into being.

This is exemplified in the whole history of redemption. After Adam and Eve had sinned, it was not they who sought God. They fled from him. It was God who in his prevenient grace sought them, called them back to himself, and while pronouncing their inevitable condemnation and punishment, received them again, penitent it must be supposed, as his worshipers. This is the evident representation of the narrative; for they and their sons were accepted worshipers of God, except Cain and such as he, who wilfully forsook God and lived in wickedness. And here, immediately after man's first sin, was the beginning of God's action in human history seeking men to redeem them from sin,

while they were alienating themselves from him. And so it continued. It was not Abraham who came out from among the heathen to seek God, but God who sought Abraham among the heathen and called him to come out. And because Abraham trusted and obeyed he obtained God's favor. In all the history of Israel, it is God who first seeks Israel, delivering them from Egypt, recalling them from their backslidings to his service, forgiving them until seventy times seven. This is the point of Paul's argument in the ninth, tenth, and eleventh chapters of the Epistle to the Romans. He is not discussing the personal election of individuals. He is reasoning against Jews who expected the kingdom of the Messiah to be the Jewish state with universal dominion and the perpetuation everywhere of the Jewish ecclesiastical polity and its forms of worship. He shows that from the beginning of their history it was not Israel that chose and sought God, but God who chose and sought Israel. He recognizes the fact that Israel was chosen by God as the special medium of his revelation of himself in his work of redemption and the establishment of his kingdom in its preparatory stages. He justifies the rejection of them as a people from this peculiar position and office, because the Jews had rejected their promised Messiah when he came. But Paul does not present this as the only justification of their rejection. To rest it on this alone would have implied that if the Jews had not rejected Christ their political dominion and ecclesiastical polity would have been perpetuated and made universal under the Messiah's reign. In addition to this, Paul shows that the Jewish theocracy was intended as only a preparatory stage in the establishment and advancement of the Messiah's kingdom; that the Old Testament itself recognizes the spiritual kingdom, within the political and ecclesiastical organization, distinguished by "the righteousness which is of faith;" "they are not all Israel who are of Israel;" and he cites as an example the seven thousand men in Elijah's day who had not bowed the knee to Baal. He further shows that the Old Testament declares that the kingdom of God as it had existed under the Jewish theocracy is to pass at the coming of the Messiah into his universal spiritual kingdom into which Gentiles are to be called on equality with the Jews; and that this is accordant with the original and essential idea of the kingdom. And he proceeds to show that by this passing away of Judaism

and the calling of the Gentiles, God is to advance his kingdom to the realization of his archetypal ideal of it as a universal kingdom in the conversion to Christ and the gathering into his kingdom both of Gentiles and Jews. "If their fall is the riches of the world and their loss the riches of the Gentiles, how much more their fulness. . . . A hardening in part hath befallen Israel until the fulness of the Gentiles be come in; and so all Israel shall be saved" (Rom. xi. 12, 25, 26).

And when God came to men in Christ it was not because men sought him, turning from their sin, but it was God in his free and sovereign grace coming to men in their sin to save them from it.

And not only is this so, but men could not even have had any knowledge of God, unless God first by his own action had in some way revealed himself to them.

This priority of divine grace is always recognized by the prophets, by the apostles and by Christ. It is the shepherd who is represented as going out on the mountains to seek the sheep, not the sheep that seeks the shepherd; for it had wandered away. The prodigal did nothing to awaken compassion in his father's heart. He simply cast himself on the fatherly love which had yearned for his return during all his course of folly and of sin. So our Lord says: "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten son." John declares: "Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us. . . . We love him because he first loved us." And Paul says: "God commendeth his own love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us."¹ No man by any action of his own can get the start of God's love to him. God in his grace revealed in Christ is compared to the light of the sun, pouring itself into every opening, restrained only by opaque bodies which obstruct it, and most of all by the world itself when it rolls its bulk between us and the sun and shrouds us in night. Unless God were already graciously disposed, the sinner by his own action could no more make him gracious than he could kindle sunbeams in the sun.

The significance of God's election, as set forth in the Bible, has its foundation in the fact that the work of redemption in its unity and continuity as a whole is the work of God; and that he is self-moved thereto by his own eternal and unchanging

¹ Luke xv. 4-32; John iii. 16; 1 John iv. 10, 19; Rom. v. 5-11.

love and guided therein by his own perfect wisdom. He is not moved thereto by any antecedent action of man seeking God's grace.¹ In this sense his grace to men is sovereign grace.

4. The scriptural doctrine of election has its highest significance in the fact that every sinner, who is saved, is renewed or regenerated by God in the Holy Spirit in the exercise of God's prevenient grace. The work of redemption in its personal application to individuals is the work of God, of his own self-moved love seeking man to turn him from sin to God by the offers, influences, and agencies of redemption, antecedent to and independent of any action of man seeking God's redeeming grace, —

grace, that finds her way,
The speediest of thy winged messengers,
To visit all thy creatures, and to all
Comes unprevented, unimplored, unsought. — MILTON.

The Holy Spirit with his illuminating and quickening influences does not come to a man because the man has already accepted Christ and repented of his sins; but he comes to the sinner in his sins to convince him of sin and quicken him to accept Christ and forsake sin. His gracious coming with the influences of redemption is not conditioned on any previous act of the sinner seeking God. And the Bible teaches that the Christian life and its growth in sanctification is by faith; and so is a continuous recognition of dependence on God's Spirit dwelling and working within the soul. Through the whole Christian life it is God who quickens and leads, the man who is quickened and follows. Thus the regeneration and sanctification of the man depend for their actuality on the action of God. Therefore they come under the providential government of God and are included in his providential purpose.

Here, then, is a real and important significance in the scriptural doctrine of election. The difficulty, if there is any, is not in God's election, but in the fact that God's Spirit quickens men to newness of life and new obedience and that the entire Christian life is by faith in God's ever prevenient grace. When we think of God's Spirit influencing a sinner to turn to Christ in repentance we call it regeneration. When we consider this agency of God in any man as eternally purposed we call it

¹ Ephesians ii. 8-10.

election. The quarrel, if one has any, is with the fact that man is quickened to spiritual life and sustained in it by the Spirit of God; it is not with the fact that God eternally purposed so to do.

It is sometimes objected that the only election in the Bible is of nations to gospel privileges, — not of individuals to faith, repentance, and salvation. The election of Israel is recognized in the Bible. But an examination of the scriptural teachings shows that the election is not usually to gospel privileges, but to obedience, sanctification and salvation; and that the language commonly precludes the reference to nations and can be explained only as referring to individuals.

II. REASONABLENESS OF THE DOCTRINE. — The scriptural doctrine of election, understood in its true significance, commends itself to us as reasonable.

1. It is simply a special application to God's action in redemption of the doctrine of God's universal providential government and purpose. All God's action is included in his providential government, inasmuch as it is the immediate or remote ground of the actuality of events, and all beings and events depend for their actuality, immediately or remotely, on the action of God. And all God's action implies his eternal purpose. Redemption and its results cannot be left out. No rational person can attain his right character and development except as he is willingly receptive of the gracious influence of God. No sinner can return to God and begin the new life except as he willingly receives God's grace and follows the drawing of his love. Christ reveals God's gracious action in redemption and his readiness to receive every sinner that yields to his drawing and accepts his grace.

2. Christian consciousness attests the truth of the doctrine. Every Christian ascribes his conversion, his justification, his new spiritual life, to God. The language of Christian piety is, Not unto us, not unto us, O Lord, but unto thy name give glory. The worship of the Christian church in all ages acknowledges the same.

“ Jesus sought me when a stranger
Wandering from the fold of God.”

Prayer, thanksgiving, and praise are in their distinctive meaning the expression of the Christian's consciousness of dependence

on God and faith in him as the source of all spiritual good. The difficulties respecting election in theological speculation are not felt in Christian living. No one in the actual Christian life and work feels his dependence on God and on God's calling and election, or his faith in God to be a hindrance to his own freedom and power. On the contrary, in his deepest sense of dependence and his strongest faith he most fully attains his real freedom and his greatest power. It is then he says with Paul, "I can do all things through Christ who strengtheneth me." In our processes of logic we try to construct the two into unity in a mechanical way, as if by mortise and tenon, and we find difficulty. But in the processes of spiritual life we find none. We lay hold of God's hand extended to us in redeeming grace, and at the touch we feel the thrill of a new life quickening all our spiritual energies, and exert our highest spiritual powers vitalized, upheld, and guided by his divine hand. Thus Christian consciousness attests both God's election and our own free and responsible action as joint agencies in the beginning and the continuance of the Christian life and work.

3. The scriptural doctrine of election in its true significance commends itself to reason, because it recognizes and emphasizes man's dependence on God. Thus it is essential to any true philosophical conception of man's relation to God or of a sinner's reconciliation to him. Man is at once a free agent and dependent on God. Both facts must have full weight in any just conception of man's relation to God. The doctrine of election emphasizes man's dependence.

This is essential because man is created and finite, and God is the absolute Being, the creator. All action of finite beings is either reception or production, and the reception must precede the production. God alone can produce without having previously received. The creature's receptive action is necessary on account of his limitation and dependence. His productive action is the result of his power, freedom, and moral obligation. Hence the distinction of faith and works. Faith is the receptive action expressing the sense of dependence and trusting God; its natural language is prayer and worship. Work is the productive action, the putting forth of the energies working with God in our own sanctification and in the advancement of his kingdom, in life and work quickened and sustained by his grace

through trust in him. Also, as a sinner, man must trust in God for forgiveness and for spiritual quickening and growth. And the offers and influences of redemption are not received by man passively as water is received by a cistern, but by the free consent of the will trusting in God. Thus God's election of men to salvation through faith, obedience, and sanctification by the Spirit commends itself as reasonable both because man is a creature and because he is a sinner. The doctrine thus asserts God's sovereign right to the confidence and trust, the obedience and service, of all his rational creatures.

4. The doctrine commends itself as reasonable in its recognition of man's free will in its full significance.

The scriptural doctrine of election recognizes man's free will and his real agency in determining his own character and destiny. Men are not chosen to salvation irrespective of their own action and character. They are chosen in Christ to "be holy and without blame before him in love"; "unto obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Christ"; "through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth"; "to be conformed to the image of his son"; "to go and bring forth fruit." And the whole tenor of the biblical teaching assumes man's personal responsibility for his action and character, his freedom to choose or refuse Christ and his service. "Whosoever will let him take the water of life freely"; "Ye will not come to me that ye may have life."

And the scriptures teach that the action of men under the gracious action of God in redemption, whether they accept or reject his grace, is foreknown by God and considered in his eternal purpose; "Elect according to the foreknowledge of God"; "Whom he did foreknow he also did predestinate"; "Him being delivered up by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God."¹ The Bible represents God's purpose and foreknowledge as distinguishable in thought, but in fact inseparable, co-existent, and eternal. It enters into no speculative explanations of the relation and harmony of the two. The important point is that God's purpose is not caprice or fate, but a rational and intelligent purpose. He eternally knows all that is possible in a system grounded in perfect reason and constituted according to perfect wisdom and love, and he knows all that is actual in it as an immediate or remote consequence of his own action. It is

¹ 1 Pet. i. 2; Rom. viii. 29; Acts ii. 23.

in the light of this knowledge that he sees the archetypal world-idea which expresses the thought of his wisdom in the action of his love. If a rational and omniscient being is at the basis of all things, it is certain that his purpose must be eternal in the light of his knowledge, and must take account of the foreseen action of his creatures. In the actual government of the world, after it has been created, God's action is sometimes conditioned on the action of his creatures. Otherwise, he cannot bless the righteous, nor forgive and bless the penitent, nor punish men for sin. In other words, if God's action is never conditioned on the action of his creatures, a moral system and moral government are impossible. So far as his action is conditioned on the action of his creatures, so far his purpose to act is conditioned on his foresight of the creature's action.

This is exemplified in regeneration. God's work of redemption in Christ as a whole, and his gracious coming to men in the Spirit with the offers and influences of redemption, are of his own self-moved love seeking sinners in their sin, unconditioned on any previous act of the sinner seeking God. But God's acceptance, justification, and salvation of the sinner are conditioned on the sinner's faith and repentance. The Bible never says to the sinner, Trust in Christ and repent, and God will send his Spirit to you and will give you a new heart. But it says, Trust in Christ and repent, and God will forgive your sins and justify you freely by his grace. The Spirit, coming in God's self-moved, prevenient grace, strives with the sinner to bring him freely to trust in Christ and so to repent of sin. Faith and repentance are willing acts of man yielding to the influence of the Spirit. Justification is the act of God promised on condition of faith and repentance. Thus man by his own free action under the influence of God's Spirit determines his own character and destiny.

The same is true of sanctification. The Christian's sanctification is progressive by his own faith which worketh by love under the influence of the Holy Spirit dwelling in him.

While justification and all the privileges involved in it are conditioned on the man's action, this is not incompatible with the absoluteness of God; for this condition is not brought on God from without by any power independent of him; but by his own free act in his perfect wisdom and love he subjects himself to it by creating and sustaining the universe. The man as well as the

moral system and the universe depend on God for their existence ; and God's whole action in redemption is self-moved and self-originated.

It is evident, therefore, that the Bible recognizes both the divine agency and the human as essential in the salvation of a sinner from sin and condemnation. Without God's grace to man and his divine agency in redemption, not only would man's agency be unavailing, but he would go on in sin making no effort to win God's favor. On the other hand, without man's freely concurring action, all God's action in redemption would not avail to save him. When the sinner turns to God in repentance, it is to God already graciously disposed to receive the penitent and already seeking the sinner with offers and influences of redemption to draw him to himself. In that act of turning to God in penitence, the man becomes a worker together with God. But when the sinner has persisted in sin and is lost in endless alienation from God, God has exhausted the resources of wisdom and love to save him, and the sinner has resisted all the heavenly influences. The divine agency has been freely and fully exerted in his behalf, but the man has not only not concurred with it, but has exerted all his energies in antagonism to it.

A prominent objection to the doctrine of election has always been that it is incompatible with free-will.

This objection has been founded on misapprehensions. It is of no force against the scriptural doctrine as it has here been presented. It has rested on a misapprehension of God's sovereignty as an arbitrary almightiness unregulated by the truths, laws, and ideals of reason ; on a misapprehension of the will as power only, overlooking the fact that the essence of free-will is that it is a power acting in the light of reason, and therefore self-directing and self-exertive ; on a misapprehension of moral freedom as possible only so long as the will is characterless and indifferent. It has rested also on the error that God's election and his providential purpose are executed by the direct efficiency of his almighty power, — not by acting through the agencies operating in the universe according to the laws of their being, but passing over them entirely.

The objection has arisen also from a sort of Epicurean or deistic exclusion of God from the universe, as if he were something foreign from it instead of being immanent in it, from which it is

inferred that any influence of God's Spirit on man must be an infringement on his free agency. Whereas man's normal condition is that of union with God dwelling in him by the gracious influences of the Holy Spirit. The essence of sin is man's wilful alienation of himself from God in self-sufficiency. God is man's spiritual environment. "In him we live and move and have our being." Apart from his environing us with divine light, love, and quickening we cannot live and thrive and bear fruit spiritually, any more than a plant can live without its environment of sunshine, air, moisture, and soil and all cosmic agencies. It is only in union with God that any man realizes his true freedom, power, wisdom, and perfection. No one can enter into the spirit of Christianity till he rids himself of this miserable jealousy of God's influence on the human spirit, and cordially enters into the Saviour's doctrine that the Spirit of God acting in and on the human spirit becomes the principle of a new and spiritual life, and learns to say with Paul: "I live; and yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me" (Gal. ii. 20).

It is objected that man in his finiteness cannot withstand the almighty power of God. This is true. But God does not convert souls by almightiness. Having created moral agents and constituted them in a moral system, his action on them in his moral government will always be accordant with their constitution as rational free agents under moral government and law. "I drew them with cords of a man, with bands of love" (Hos. xi. 4). Man in his dependence and seeming littleness face to face with the almighty and infinite God, is free to obey or disobey his commands, to accept or refuse the offers of his grace. He is not overpowered and crushed by the greatness of God; but standing free in the presence of God, the man's own greatness is revealed. He knows himself, a rational free spirit in the likeness of God and admitted to communion with him. It is indeed a startling thought that a man can withstand God; that God may exhaust the resources of his wisdom and love in influencing a sinner to return to him and begin the life of love, and the sinner may resist them all. But this power of resisting God's love is inseparable from the essential idea of a free moral agent and a system of free agents under moral government. It calls attention to the sublime reality and the solemn responsibility of free agency, and to the grandeur of the fact that God is a spirit administering moral government,

under the law of universal love, over innumerable persons rational and self-directing like himself, who are objects of his righteous love, whom he draws by all the influences of wisdom and love to trust and serve him in universal love like his own, whom, if they consent to receive his grace, he is instructing, disciplining, and educating in the life of faith and love to the full development of all their spiritual capacities and powers. But every one of them, by the very fact that he is a rational person under God's moral government, is able to trust and follow or to resist the influence of God's redeeming grace, and has the responsibility of deciding his own character and destiny.

And because God's purpose respecting men takes cognizance of their foreseen character, election in the Bible signifies God's approval of those who live in faith and love, and his complacency and delight in them on account of their character. In this sense they are called his elect, his chosen. Accordingly, Clement of Alexandria says, "All men having been called (of God), those who willingly obey are named the elect."¹ In God's actual treatment of men in his government of the world, he expresses, as to all who come to Christ and therein turn from sin to holiness, his approval and complacency. "The Lord delighteth in his saints." "The Lord hath set apart him that is godly for himself" (Ps. iv. 3). "They shall be mine in that day when I make up my jewels." And the same approval and complacency are recognized by the inspired writers in his purpose by calling them his elect, his chosen ones, in whom on account of their right character he delights.² In the same way Christ, spoken of as foreordained and foretold, is called "elect, precious."³

In setting forth man's freedom the doctrine also recognizes the fact that man has rights which God always respects. God violates no right of a creature by the limitation of its finite constitution.⁴ He does no wrong to a stone in not making it a plant, nor to a plant in not making it an animal, nor to a brute in not making it a man, nor to a man in not making him an angel. And a sinner has no claim on the ground of his own merits to forgiveness and

¹ Stromata, I. xviii. 9.

² Malachi iii. 17; Isa. xlii. 1; xlv. 4; lxxv. 9, 22; Mark xiii. 20; Acts ix 15; 1 Pet. ii. 9; Rev. xvii. 14.

³ 1 Pet. ii. 4, 6; Luke xxiii. 35.

⁴ See "Self-Revelation of God," pp. 299-306.

the privileges of the children of God. But God owes a duty to himself and to his own law of love. He is under obligation to act in a manner worthy of God; to act towards every creature in perfect wisdom and love.

Because God's action is always conformed to the law of love, which is the eternal law of reason, he is under obligation to deal with man in righteousness and good-will. The teaching of some theologians that God is under obligation to deal with men in righteousness but not in benevolence is contrary to scripture and to reason and true philosophy. Righteousness and benevolence are the two essential aspects of the love which the law requires. An attempted benevolence not exercised in righteousness would be destructive not only of all law but also of all true good having real worth as estimated by the standards of reason. And an attempted righteousness without benevolence would be a Draconian tyranny destructive not only of all good but of the law of love itself; for the love which it requires by the exclusion of benevolence would be eviscerated and dead. God is under obligation to the law of love eternal and immutable in himself, the absolute Reason, to deal in righteousness and benevolence with every rational creature, whether sinful or holy, mature or infantile with moral character not yet developed. And because man, rational like God, is under the same law of love, he stands in the presence of God and appeals to the universal law: "Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?" Man has the right under the eternal law of love to be treated by God in equity, with righteousness and good-will. For example, he has a right to be exempt from accountability for what it was never in his power to do or to prevent, and for sins committed ages before he was born. The doctrine also brings into clear light the fact that, because God's law is the law of perfect reason and requires universal love, and because it is the law which the God in Christ himself obeyed on earth and vindicated in suffering and death in fidelity to it, therefore sinners are wholly unreasonable and without excuse in their sins and without any claim of merit before God. Therefore the sinner can only cast himself on the sovereign mercy of God. Therefore, in setting forth God's sovereignty as exercised under the law of love which he commands his creatures to obey, the doctrine vindicates God's just rights in relation to man, shows the reasonableness of his commands and the unreasonableness of man's sin, and so all the world stands guilty before God.

5. The true significance of the doctrine may be further elucidated by contrast with a false doctrine of predestination and election which has been widely prevalent. This doctrine, with the doctrines logically inferred from it, is in brief as follows.

God has eternally elected some definitely designated persons to salvation and has justified these persons in his eternal purpose or decree; the number elected is definitely fixed and cannot be increased or diminished; they are chosen by God without any foresight of faith or repentance, or good works, or perseverance, or any right character of these persons as condition or reason moving him thereunto. And all other persons, for the glory of his sovereign power, God eternally purposes to pass by and leave in sin and ordains them for their sin to condemnation forever.¹

As God has appointed the elect unto glory, so he has foreordained all the means thereunto. He sends his son into the world to make atonement for the elect and for them alone.

Man lost his free will in the Fall, and thereafter all men are both unwilling and unable to return to God; they are under a necessity to do evil, slaves to the devil and their own lusts. The vindication of God's right arbitrarily to elect some and to pass by others rested on the doctrine of original sin. Man had his probation as a race in Adam and fell in him. After the Fall the human race is one "mass of perdition" (*massa perditionis*), all alike under deserved condemnation. Therefore, it was argued, when God of his own sovereign will elects some to salvation he does no wrong to the others whom he passes by and leaves under the condemnation which for their sins they deserve.

Having thus made atonement limited to the elect, God sends his spirit to regenerate these elect persons and no others. The regeneration is wrought by an act of almighty power, by irresistible grace. Grace itself came to denote God's power instead of his favor or gracious disposition. The Spirit of God may come with enlightening influence to the non-elect, convincing them of sin, but it never exerts on them the regenerating energy which none on whom it is exerted can resist and without which none can be saved. This irresistible grace is given only to the elect.

¹ "That there is an election and reprobation of infants no less than of adults, we cannot deny in the face of God, who loves and hates unborn children." (Acta Synod. Dort. Judic. 40.)

And having thus regenerated the elect God keeps them by the same irresistible grace so that they can never fall away.

This form of the doctrine of predestination and election, with the doctrines logically derived from it, is incompatible with free will, and with moral law, a moral system, and moral government. It has often been explicitly asserted that free will was lost in the Fall. The doctrine has been commonly associated with determinism, denying that a man determines by will the ends for which he acts and the exertion of his powers, and teaching that the will itself is determined by the strongest motive. Its logical basis is the fundamental error that arbitrary and almighty will unregulated by reason is supreme. This doctrine, with its necessary sequences, has been variously modified in the course of theological thought through the ages. Elements of it and tendencies of thought originated in it still survive. Its deepest root, the conception of the supremacy of will unregulated by reason, is by no means eradicated but is still sprouting up into theology. All doctrines of God's sovereignty springing from this root logically involve the denial of free will and moral government. It is some erroneous form of the doctrine of election against which the common objections are urged. These objections are of no force against the scriptural doctrine rightly understood.¹

¹ Browning pictures this false doctrine of election in its practical influence as presented by Johannes Agricola in Meditation : —

There's heaven above, and night by night
 I look right thro' its gorgeous roof;
 No suns or moons tho' e'er so bright
 Avail to stop me; splendor-proof
 I keep the broods of stars aloof:
 For I intend to get to God,
 For 'tis to God I speed so fast,
 For in God's breast, my own abode,
 Those shoals of dazzling glory passed,
 I lay my spirit down at last.
 I lie, where I have always lain;
 God smiles as he has always smiled;
 Ere suns and moons could wax and wane,
 Ere stars were thunder-girt, or piled
 The heavens, God thought on me his child;
 Ordained a life for me, arrayed
 Its circumstances every one
 To the minutest; ay, God said
 This head this hand should rest upon
 Thus, ere he fashioned star or sun.

The truth underlying the extravagant doctrine of unconditional election which has been described, is the great fact that it is God who first seeks man in redemption, not man who first seeks God, — and that this is true both of God's redemptive action as a whole and of his approaches to individuals by his word and his Spirit to draw them to himself. Through lack of discrimination, theologians

And having thus created me,
 Thus rooted me, he bade me grow,
 Guiltless forever, like a tree
 That buds and blooms, nor seeks to know
 The law by which it prospers so ;
 But sure that thought and word and deed
 All go to swell his love for me,
 Me, made because that love had need
 Of something irreversibly
 Pledged solely its content to be.
 Yes, yes, a tree which must ascend,
 No poison-gourd foredoomed to stoop.
 I have God's warrant, could I blend
 All hideous sins as in a cup,
 To drink the mingled venoms up ;
 Secure my nature will convert
 The draught to blossoming gladness fast ;
 While sweet dews turn to the gourd's hurt,
 And bloat, and while they bloat it, blast,
 As from the first its lot was cast.
 For as I lie, smiled on, full-fed
 By unexhausted power to bless,
 I gaze below on hell's fierce bed,
 And those its waves of flame oppress,
 Swarming in ghastly wretchedness ;
 Whose life on earth appeared to be
 One altar-smoke, so pure — to win,
 If not love like God's love to me,
 At least to keep his anger in ;
 And all their striving turned to sin.
 Priest, doctor, hermit, monk grown white
 With prayer, the broken-hearted nun,
 The martyr, the wan acolyte,
 The incense-swinging child, — undone
 Before God fashioned star or sun !
 God, whom I praise, how could I praise,
 If such as I might understand,
 Make out and reckon on his ways,
 And bargain for his love and stand,
 Paying a price, at his right hand.

ROBERT BROWNING: *Men and Women*, Poetical Works, vol. v. pp. 229-231. London, 1882.

have applied this great truth to the election of the individual so as logically to involve the denial of justification by faith. For in this application of the doctrine of unconditional election, the man's faith would not be a real condition of his justification; it would be merely docetic, an illusion and sham.

On the other hand, we have had denials of God's election so one-sided and ill-considered as to involve the overlooking of God's free and sovereign grace seeking man to redeem him from sin, not moved thereto by any antecedent action of man seeking God, the exaltation of man to practical independence of God, the magnifying of God's fatherly love to the exclusion of his sovereignty, law, and government, and the denial of God's universal providence.

III. THE IDEAL AND THE REAL. — The objection is urged that we present only the ideal, not the real; that we present what God's government ought to be, and what it is reasonable to expect it to be; but that this ideal is not realized in the real, and is incompatible with the actual facts in the constitution and evolution of the universe, and in the constitution and history of man. The ideal is that God in universal love does all that perfect wisdom, righteousness, and good-will require or permit, to realize the highest ideal of perfection and well-being possible in a finite universe and a moral system of finite free agents, and this both for every individual and for mankind in society. But it is said that the real does not accord with this ideal; children are born in the slums of great cities, their environment shutting them out from the knowledge of God and his revelation in Christ, and from all influences to right living, and fraught with influences predisposing them to vice, and themselves with innate propensities to evil inherited from vicious ancestors; men existed for long ages in savagery, some remains of which still linger on earth; the majority of mankind are still non-Christian; and even where the people are nominally Christian, the progress of Christian civilization is far from complete. This objection is presented forcibly by Herbert Spencer, in an article in the "Fortnightly Review" (1895): "After nearly two thousand years of Christian teaching and discipline, how near are we to that ideal life which Christian leading was to bring us to? What must we think of the sentiment implied in the saying of a glorified prince, repeated by

a popular Emperor, lauding 'blood and iron — a remedy which never fails?' Among the peoples who socially insist on duels, what advance do we see toward the practice of forgiving injuries? Or, turning from private to public transactions, what restraint do we find upon the passion of international revenge — revenge by the great mass insisted upon as a duty? How much moralization can we trace in the contrast between the practices of savages, whose maxim in their inter-tribal feuds is 'Life for life,' and the practice of Christian nations, who in their dealings with weak peoples take as their maxim, 'For one life, many lives?' Toward the foretold state when swords shall be beaten into ploughshares, how much have we progressed, now that there exist bigger armies than ever existed before? And where are the indications of increased brotherly love in the doings of Christian nations in Africa, where, like hungry dogs round a carcass, they tear out piece after piece, pausing only to snarl and snap at one another?" This, it is said, is the real, which silences all argument from the ideal. This objection is urged against our conception of God's providential government, and also against the vindication of God in reference to the existence of sin and evil in our theodicy. The answer is that the realization of the divine ideal in the finite is necessarily progressive; that the Christian ideal commends itself as reasonable to all right-minded persons; and that, though the ideal is not yet fully realized, we trace in fact progress toward its realization in the history of Christianity through the ages until the present time.

1. The Ideal is the fundamental Reality. If by the ideal the objector means merely the subjective thought of the individual, the objection might be valid. But in the theistic argument the ideal denotes the rational conception or archetype of something constituted in exact conformity with the immutable principles and laws of reason. The inventor of the watch must have formed the ideal of a watch as possible to be realized. He determines according to the eternal laws of mechanics of what material it will be possible to make it, and what must be the shaping and combination of the same necessary to realize the ideal. He cannot realize the ideal by any shaping and combination of clay or soft wood, nor with the appropriate materials except as they are shaped and combined in accordance with the laws of mechanics. When the watch has been made in exact accordance with these

laws, the inventor has realized his ideal. This ideal existed in his mind before it was realized in the watch. It could never exist as a real watch if its ideal had not first existed in the mind of the inventor, and then been realized by a competent artificer. In this sense we may say that the fundamental reality of the watch was its ideal, thus pre-existing and progressively realized. In a similar sense we may say that the fundamental reality of the universe is its archetypal ideal thus pre-existing in the mind or reason of God, and progressively realized by him in the constitution and evolution of the universe in exact accordance with the principles and laws of reason. The physical is the manifestation of the spiritual, the spiritual is not the manifestation of the physical. If we admit the validity of the intuition of reason in which we know principles of truth, laws of right, ideals of perfection and well-being, which are norms regulative of thought and power, and standards of worth and well-being, we must admit the existence of God, the absolute Reason, in whom these principles are eternal. They are of no validity as mere impersonal abstractions, but only as eternal and concrete in God the absolute Reason, all whose action is by his eternal free determination in harmony with them, and therefore they are concrete in the constitution and evolution of the universe. If we admit the validity of the rational intuition of these principles, in which the light of the eternal Reason shines in our own consciousness, we have a valid basis for a scientific knowledge of the universe. "In thy light we see light" (Psalms xxxvi. 9). Otherwise science, and in fact all human knowledge, are baseless and unreal, and universal skepticism is the necessary issue. It follows that the ideal has an independent basis in reason underlying and regulating the constitution and evolution of the universe, and this is the necessary postulate for any scientific knowledge of the universe. In this sense the ideal is the fundamental reality essential to any scientific knowledge of the real or factual.

Admitting this, our proper course is to examine the actual constitution and evolution of the physical universe and the constitution and history of man. Science declares the progressive evolution of the physical system in accordance with the principles and laws of reason, and in the progressive realization of a rational ideal; it discovers also in all races of men, the recognition of rational principles of truth and laws, and in the great majority of them

immense progress from savagery to civilization and to the realization of rational ideals. When we find some facts seemingly incompatible with this progress, we are not justified in denying the supremacy of reason in the development of the physical system and in the progress of man. We assume that unexplained facts are intelligible, and that in the further progress of knowledge man will see that they are in harmony with reason and with the progressive realization of its ideals. Thus waiting for further light we have confidence in God that in the progress of knowledge man will discover that all God's works and ways are in harmony with and progressively realizing the highest ideals of perfection possible to be realized by God's righteous and benevolent action in a finite universe and in a moral system of rational free agents.

2. That the ideal and spiritual is the fundamental reality and has an independent basis in reason is implied in the objection itself. The objector sits in judgment on the constitution and evolution of the universe and the constitution and history of man, and declares that they fail to realize the ideal. Therein he himself assumes that there is a standard by which he can criticise the actual universe and its history and judge what is according to rational truth and law, and what is in conflict with them, what realizes the rational ideals of perfection and well-being and what falls short of such realization. In the very statement of his objection he implies that there is a supreme and universal standard of truth, right, perfection, and well-being and that he, as a rational person, knows that standard of reason and thus participates in the light of absolute Reason, eternal in God. Thus assuming that Reason is at the basis of the universe, he is bound to expect that the evolution of the universe and the progress of man will be regulated by the truths and laws of Reason and will be progressive toward the realization of its ideals. His objection refutes itself.

3. In assuming that Reason is fundamental and that further progress in knowledge will show the reasonableness of God's action where it is not now apparent, theism is in close analogy with science. All science rests on the postulate that the universe is scientifically constituted and evolved. Science began with observing facts and trying to account for them on scientific principles; that is, to ascertain their accordance with the principles

and laws of reason and their tendency to realize its ideals and ends. It is the aim and endeavor of science to construct a scientific theory of observed facts by showing how they can be accounted for and explained to reason. The primitive theories are now seen to be fantastic, but they were the best attainable with the limited knowledge and development of men at the time. So, from age to age, with the advancement of human knowledge and development, old theories have given place to new ones. This has been inevitable because man's knowledge of the universe must be incomplete and progressive. The history of theism is closely analogous. Man from the beginning came in sight of the absolute Being revealed in the universe and has constructed theories as to what he must be. The primitive theism was no more erroneous than the primitive science. Like the science of man, his theism has been clarified and developed with his advancing knowledge and development. And this rectification of errors and dropping of false theories in theism is no more an evidence that it is not true and that man has no true knowledge of God than is the similar process in science an evidence that science is not true and that man has no knowledge of the universe. With the elimination of error and the supplementing of defect, both theism and science carry on with them the truth already discovered, and thus from generation to generation both in theism and in science true knowledge increases. And in the enlargement of scientific knowledge we discover a larger revelation of God and data for a larger knowledge of him and a more profound reverence.

Scientists from the beginning have assumed that every phenomenon in the universe is scientifically intelligible and explicable. When they observe facts which they cannot account for and explain to the reason, they never assume that they are essentially unreasonable and scientifically inexplicable. They always assume that they are intelligible and that with larger knowledge and further development man would be able to understand and explain them. Theism has always rested in precisely the same position. Where the theist has observed facts which seem not compatible with the reign of perfect reason in good-will regulated in wisdom and righteousness, he does not assume that they are essentially irreconcilable with reason; but that in the advancement of knowledge and progress of man they will be accounted for as in harmony with reason and with the progressive realization of God's archetypal ideal

of perfection and well-being. In this the attitude of the theist is the same with that of the scientist. He continues to trust in God, as the scientist in the face of all difficulties and mysteries continues to trust in reason and science.

4. Reason sees, not only that the rational ideal eternal in God is the fundamental reality, but also that the realization of it in the finite and the revelation of God therein must be progressive. The absolute Spirit cannot make a complete revelation of himself and exhaust his resources within any limits of space and time. If, from this necessary principle of reason, we look out upon the actual universe, we find that, in fact, it has been progressively evolved from homogeneous nebulous matter to its present complexity, order, and sublimity. And the progress is discovered to be by epochs: the beginning of motion revealing mechanical force; then, in ascending grade, chemical affinity, vegetable life, sensitive life, rational self-determining persons. Physical science is unable to account for the existence of the homogeneous matter, or for the beginning of motion, or for the beginning of life, or for the coming-in of rational self-determining persons, without recognizing a spiritual power above the universe causing its existence and evolution. For the solution of its own inevitable problems it is compelled to rest on theism. God ever immanent in the universe causes and directs its evolution. When it is evolved in a lower stage so as to be capable of manifesting and sustaining beings endowed with power of a higher order, God from his exhaustless resources individuates such beings in the universe. When he thus causes rational self-determining persons to exist, no finite beings of a higher order can be created, because such persons are in the likeness of God; and God cannot bring into existence a being of a higher order than himself. Thereafter the evolution of finite rational persons begins and goes on forever.

In the evolution of these we must notice two important differences from the evolution of the physical system. It is not the evolution of new species of higher order crowding out inferior species, while the individuals perpetuating the species perish. It is the development of every individual person to realize his ideal perfection and well-being, — a development as complete as the finiteness and the self-determining power of each individual permit, — and to be continued forever. For persons, in the likeness of God as spirit once brought into being, and under his gracious

influences coming into harmony and union with him in the life of love, will never cease to exist. Death is only an epoch in their evolution to their highest possible perfection and well-being.

The other peculiarity distinguishing evolution in the moral system, which is the sphere of rational persons, from evolution in the physical system is that the evolution is no longer exclusively by force, under the law of the survival of the fittest, the stronger overpowering and crowding out the weaker. It is by moral and spiritual influences, through which God is educating and developing personal spirits like himself; or, after they have sinned, redeeming them from sin and renovating them to the life of love in harmony and union with himself. And because rational persons are self-determining, these influences may always be resisted. Here, however, in analogy with the evolution of the physical system, the evolution is progressive by epochs. The individual is to grow in grace and knowledge, and the kingdom of God is to grow, first the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear.

A common and fatal error in recent attempts to harmonize evolution with Christian theism is that these two essential differences in the mode of the evolution of the personal from that of the impersonal are entirely overlooked. The inference is that the evolution of the individual Christian and of the kingdom of Christ is effected only on the principle of the survival of the fittest, which, without further explanation, would be understood to mean that it is advanced by resistless force. It is possible that a living body like that of man might be the product of evolution after animal life through the creative power has begun, although the missing link, the anthropoid animal, has not yet been found. But it is not possible that rational self-determining persons should be the product of materialistic evolution or be developed to spiritual perfection without the intervention of God.

Here it may be noticed, that not only is man's knowledge of the significance of God's revelation of himself already made, progressive, but the revelation itself is progressive, in the constitution and evolution of the physical universe, in the constitution of man, and in human history culminating in Christ and perpetuated in the Holy Spirit.

Therefore, the objection that the ideal is not realized in the real is not valid, because the realization is progressive and, there-

fore, incomplete. It is as if one should enter the workshop of the inventor of the watch, where as yet he had only gathered his materials and partly shaped them and they were lying confusedly on the work-bench, and should object that the real contradicted his ideal. In fact, in every hour of his working, he is making progress toward its full realization. It should also be noticed that, according to the teaching of Mr. Spencer and other evolutionists, the evolution of the universe is accordant with the type of vital growth, not of mechanical construction. Therefore, God's revelation of himself in the progressive realization of his archetypal ideal in the finite universe, is not according to the analogy or type of mechanical construction, but of vital organic growth. He is ever infusing energy into the finite as the cosmic forces act on the vital germ of an acorn and continuously develop it by vital processes of growth into a majestic oak. This is also the type by which Christ illustrates the growth of his kingdom by the growth of wheat through its successive epochs, and of each individual, in union with him in the spiritual life, by the vital organic union of a branch with the vine. His kingdom grows by the continual divine quickening and developing of rational beings into communion and union with himself in the life of universal love.

5. The objection recurs in a more specific form, — that while the rational ideal presents the law of universal love, the real discloses the actual prevalence of the law of competition, every one selfishly aiming to prevail over every other. Here the truth is overlooked that, according to the normal constitution of man, the two principles, sometimes designated the altruistic and the egoistic, are complementary, not antagonistic and reciprocally exclusive. They are both included in the Christian law, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and thy neighbor as thyself. This requires us to love ourselves, but equally to love our neighbor, and in subordination of both to supreme love to God. Accordingly reason approves of both. Man acts instinctively in self-preservation, self-exertion, and self-development. It has been taught by philosophers that the radical impulse in human nature is the impulse to self-exertion. Every one is constitutionally impelled to put forth his powers in action and to assert himself in their exercise. This appears in the infant learning to use its limbs and organs; it is the impulse of the child to play, an impulse which continues active through life, for play is simply the

exertion of our powers for the mere pleasure of exerting them. This self-exertion with self-assertion is essential to self-development and even to self-preservation. It is in itself right and reasonable. If it were suppressed, men and women would degenerate. All theories of communism and socialism, if legitimately carried out, would cause degeneration. Men and women educated to be cared for, fed, and clothed by others, to have their line of work and the whole employment of their time prescribed, would be educated in perpetual babyhood, to be provided for, nursed, tended, and directed by others. They would become weaklings and puppets. It is by putting forth their energies that they are developed to true manhood and womanhood.

On the other hand, the evil of selfish competition is that the impulse to self-preservation, self-exertion, and self-assertion has been permitted to act alone, unmodified by equal love to other men and supreme love to God. Thus it becomes selfish egoism. The result is that every man is an Ishmael, his hand against every man, and every man's hand against him. Here, again, men degenerate, and true progress becomes impossible.

Therefore, man must obey the Christian law of universal love in its large, roundabout comprehensiveness, uniting the egoism and the altruism as complementary manifestations of right character in subordination to supreme love to God. So only does man put forth his powers in harmony, exert his energy to the utmost, insure his own development to his highest perfection and well-being, and at the same time accomplish the greatest and best results in promoting the progress of the kingdom of God and the true progress and welfare of society.

Here the principle of the survival of the fittest is seen to be still in force. For the fittest, the most fully developed, the most powerful in influence, is he whose character is most accordant with the Christian law of love in all its comprehensiveness, and he is the one whose moral perfection and well-being are insured forever.

It is evident, therefore, that the prevalence of selfish competition, isolated from love to one's neighbor and from supreme love to God, is due to man's sin, to his wilful deviation from the normal line of his development. It is not unreasonable to suppose that through the race-connection selfish competition and selfish indulgence of appetite and passion through all generations have

weakened and perverted man's moral constitution. Thus this very contrast of the ideal with the real in human history is due to the sin of man. It is not chargeable on God nor is it any argument against Christian theism. On the contrary, it reveals the fact of man's sinfulness and need of redemption as set forth in the Bible, and the fact of redemption as there set forth as worthy of God, who does all that divine love can do, consistently with wisdom and righteousness, to deliver men from sin and to restore them to their normal character, development, and condition in harmony and union with God in the life of universal love.

If now we revert to the fact of evolution, we perceive that even in the evolution of the physical system the principle of competition in the struggle for one's own existence does not stand alone. We find altruistic impulses in the lowest savagery. We find the same in animals in their service to other animals, in the nurture and care of offspring, in union for mutual satisfaction and helpfulness in flocks and herds, and in many ways in which brutes express satisfaction in the society of one another and mutual sympathy and helpfulness. And everywhere the cosmic forces of the universe sustain and develop both animal and vegetable life. Every growing lily, every blade of grass, is ministered to by the sun, by the ocean, which sends up water into the air, by the air and its winds, by electricity, by chemical affinity. And each plant has the service of all the cosmic forces as completely as if it were the only one. For so of all God's gifts, like the sunshine and the air, each individual has all while detracting nothing from any other. These are types in the physical sphere pointing forward to the altruistic element in the love required in the spiritual sphere.

We may perhaps be justified in tracing the analogy further. Man acquaints himself with the laws regulating the action of electricity, light, heat, the force of gravity in a waterfall, the elasticity of steam, all the mechanical, chemical, and vital forces, and controls and directs them to serve him in doing his work. It is only as he does this that he subdues and possesses the earth and its forces and insures his own progressive development and civilization. The difficulties he encounters and the energy put forth in surmounting them are necessary to his progressive realization of the highest ideal of his power, perfection, and well-being. If God did everything for men and instead of them, leaving them noth-

ing to do for themselves, they would never be anything but overgrown babies. Thus it is continually becoming more and more evident that, whatever the privation and suffering, the difficulty and struggle incidental to attaining the result, the earth and all its forces and resources are designed for the use, service, and development of rational self-determining persons, and so to the advancement of the kingdom of God and the realization of the highest ideals of perfection and well-being. Accordingly the Bible begins in the first chapter of Genesis with declaring God's appointment of man to be the lord of nature and to subdue it to his own service and use ; and it closes with the vision of the new earth with its powers and beauties developed for the blessed abode of men. It also teaches that this subjection of all things to rational ends is to be completed only in connection with the revelation of God in Christ and the development of his kingdom (Heb. ii. 7-9). In view of what has been accomplished in the past, we can hardly assign a limit to the control of the forces of nature which man may acquire in the future.

We may also trace an analogy of God's moral government with his revelation of himself in the forces of nature as they act independently of their control by man. Electricity, in its ordinary and continuous action unseen and unnoticed, is always energizing beneficently through all nature. But under given conditions it becomes a thunderbolt. And all its power of beneficence lies in the fact that it is a power of such a character that it becomes a thunderbolt when its ordinary quiet circulation is disturbed. The sun with its light and heat and its unseen actinic energy quickens and sustains all life and energy and makes the earth habitable ; but its rays when concentrated are a consuming fire ; and its power to bless is precisely the power which, when concentrated, consumes ; if it could not be a consuming fire, it would have no power to warm the earth and make it habitable. The atmosphere is the supporter of life and health ; but disturbed in its currents it becomes a devastating tornado ; and it would have no beneficent power if it had not the power under given conditions to become a tornado. .

This is analogous with the moral system. Its fundamental law is the law of love, in accordance with which the universe is constituted and evolved and all God's providential government is administered. If any man lives according to this law, all things

in the universe work together for his good. If any one disregards this law and lives in self-sufficiency, self-will, self-seeking, and self-glorifying, nothing in the universe works for his good; all things work together for evil to him. And it is precisely because love is supreme, and the universe is constituted under the law of love, that everything works evil for the supremely selfish, and there is no place nor time in the universe in which any person who does not live the life of love can be blessed. Here we must recognize free will. God's love fills the universe as sunshine fills noonday. His grace beams even on sinners. But it cannot bless any one who does not in loving trust in God open his heart to receive the gracious love and so in responsive love renounce self and sin. The sunshine as it comes from the sun is good and full of blessing. But its power to bless is conditioned on the receptivity of the soil on which it falls. If it falls on a soil cultivated and sown with good seed, and so prepared to receive its quickening, it quickens the seed to grow and bear fruit. If it falls on the desert of Sahara it only intensifies the burning heat of its barren sand; if it falls on a putrid swamp it only brings out its pestilential miasma. So it is with the infinite love of God. If it falls on one who trustfully receives it and follows its gracious influence, it abides in him, quickening him to all the beauty, blessedness, and spiritual power of the heavenly life of love. If the person refuses and resists the drawing of the divine love, he only confirms himself in his selfishness and sin, and makes himself incapable of participating in the life of love and of realizing his true perfection. It is only in this sense that "God is a consuming fire" (Heb. xii. 29; Deut. iv. 24). Because the universe is constituted and evolved under the supreme and unchangeable law of love, and because God is love, it is impossible for any one to realize perfection and well-being except by union with God in the life of love.

6. Our knowledge of the real shows actual progress toward the realization of a higher ideal in the evolution of the physical system, in the creation and constitution of man, and in his historical development. Christ is the centre of the progress of man, first in preparation for his coming, and then issuing from him under the ministration of the Holy Spirit. We trace the development of spiritual life from him, and with it the progress of civilization in the increase of knowledge and in inventions enlarging man's control of the powers and resources of nature. And

since Christ this progress has been pre-eminently among the Christian peoples. The ideal which, through the revelation of God in Christ, we have of the possible development of society and its transformation into the kingdom of God under the reign of universal love is not yet realized. Yet there has been wondrous progress toward its realization, — and never more marked than in the century now drawing to its close. This is conspicuous in the progress in science and in industrial inventions and arts, giving men command of the resources and powers of nature, more and more verifying the biblical representation that God has appointed man as the lord of nature to take possession of its resources and to command the service of its forces, opening in industrial pursuits a sphere of achievement demanding the exercise of man's highest powers and attainments and so making industrial labor honorable, and opening in it a sphere for the noblest moral and spiritual character in the service of man in the life of love. Great progress has also been made in the moral and spiritual development of man. Such, for example, is the progress in the recognition and maintenance of the rights of man, not resting on rank but inherent in the raw material of humanity, the establishment of constitutional governments by representatives of the people, the abolition of feudal serfdom in Russia, the abolition of negro slavery throughout all Christendom, the decline of the warlike spirit, the disposition to settle international differences by arbitration, the looming up of the idea of a federation of all nations, the general turning of attention to the right methods of charity and correction and to the right treatment of men and women employed in work for wages, and the many associations in this and other Christian nations, not only local but national and international, for the relief of the suffering and needy, for the correction of abuses, for the spread and increased efficiency of education, for the right solution of the problems of sociology, and the right applications of the teaching of Christ and the Christian law of love in all its bearings to the life of the individual and the family, and to the institutions, laws, and usages of society. And in the furtherance of these great ends of Christian beneficence we may notice the immense amount of money given by the wealthy for the promotion of education and other great interests of humanity, the large contributions yearly made by the people for Christian missions at home and abroad and for

innumerable beneficent enterprises, the growing demand for Christian unity, and the decay of bigotry, intolerance, and persecution.

If an intelligent person from some other planet had visited the earth when it was inhabited by beings of no higher order than such monsters as the ichthyosauri or plesiosauri, he might have argued that the real was incompatible with the ideal and that the earth could not be the creation of a wise and beneficent God. Professor Moses Stuart used to say of the geological theories of his day, that he did not believe that the time ever was when God reigned over nothing but bullfrogs. We now know, from observation of the progress actually made, that such a supposed visitor from another planet in those geological periods would have been justified in recognizing the fact that God's self-revelation in the finite must be progressive, — that the ideal is from epoch to epoch being more fully realized in the universe, and that wherein he could not see the ideal realized, he could trust in God that he was doing and would continue to do all that wisdom, righteousness and good-will require and permit, to realize the highest ideal of perfection and well-being possible in a finite universe and in a system of finite rational and self-determining persons. And wherein we now see that the ideal is not realized in the real, we are justified in trusting God that it is in the process of progressive realization. And it is our privilege and duty to be workers together with God in promoting its realization by the advancement of his kingdom and bringing in the reign of universal love. This agency of man is essential in the advancement of God's kingdom. It is impossible in the very nature of a moral system, without the willing co-operation of free agents in it, for God to develop it, either in the progressive realization of the perfection of individuals and of society, or in extending his kingdom among all peoples. And this is another factor in the answer to the objection. The realization on earth of the ideal is hindered, not only by the wilful sin of men in resisting the gracious influences of God and opposing the progress of his kingdom, but also by the failure of true Christians to exert their energies for the advancement of God's kingdom in the wisest methods, with the purest self-consecrating love and the highest efficiency.

7. The scriptures recognize this temporary discrepancy between the ideal and the real and explain it as consistent with

God's loving, wise, and righteous purpose progressively realizing the ideal. They recognize the principles that man's knowledge of God as the absolute Being can never be complete; that God's revelation of himself in the finite must be always progressive and never complete; that man in his free agency has resisted God's redeeming grace and deviated from the way of his normal development; that, even when men are born of the Spirit, they are not developed at once to perfection of character, but must grow in the grace and knowledge of the God in Christ and in spiritual life and power; and that God in dealing with men makes allowance for their constitutional limitations and their unavoidable environment, and "if there be first a willing mind, it is accepted according to that a man hath and not according to that he hath not" (2 Cor. viii. 12). Therefore, in view of unresolved difficulties and the as yet incomplete realization of the grand ideal, we are to rest in perfect peace having our minds stayed on God, accepting the assurance of Christ, "What I do thou knowest not now, but thou shalt understand hereafter" (John xiii. 7).

CHAPTER XVIII

SPECIAL PROVIDENCE

WE have already ascertained that God has constituted and is governing the universe according to the principles and laws of reason and for the realization of the ends of perfect wisdom and love ; and that all these ends are to be realized in the kingdom of Christ continuously existing and growing on earth and passing onward to its full and never-ending glory in the heavenly and immortal state.

It is now to be shown also that God has so constituted and is governing the universe that all things in it work together for good to every one who trusts God and, being united to him by faith, is living the life of universal love in obedience to the law of God. This is the doctrine of Special Providence. God's providential care of every such person is special in the sense that it insures that all things shall work for his personal good ; and that thus he is justified in the confidence, not merely that God orders all things in wisdom and love for the general good in the advancement of his kingdom, but also so that all things which come to pass under the divine providential government, and whatever may befall him in doing his duty, will surely promote his true well-being.¹ This is special providence in the only sense in which the Bible recognizes it or in which it has any reasonable significance.

1. The good promised is the true good estimated by reason according to its unchanging norms as having real worth, as being an object of pursuit and a source of enjoyment worthy of a rational being. It is true well-being, as distinguished from happiness or enjoyment from whatever source, measured only by

¹ Rom. viii. 17, 28-39; 1 Cor. iii. 22; 1 Pet. iii. 12, 13; Psalm i.; xxxii. 10; lxxxiv. 11; xci.

quantity as to duration and intensity, which Hedonism presents as the ultimate object of all human action.

First, the good promised is the essential good. This consists in the perfection of the person in moral character, — in the right and harmonious development of all his powers and susceptibilities and their normal exercise, — in his consequent harmony with God, with himself, and with the constitution and laws of the universe, and the happiness incident thereto.

It is, secondly, the relative good.¹ The doctrine of special providence is that, to the man thus in harmony with God, with himself, and with the constitution of the universe, all things are relative good. That is, all circumstances and conditions, all possessions and privations, all events whatever, being met by him in faith in God and love to God and man, are means or occasions of his coming into closer union with God by faith, of his forming and confirming right character by right action, of the normal development of all his powers and capacities and so of insuring his true well-being. Paul testifies, “we know that all things work together for good to them who love God.” Here, then, is a position in which, when a man attains it, all the powers of the universe converge on him to bless him. Lay hold of God’s redeeming grace and put yourself in union with him and all the agencies in the universe will serve you. Paul says, “As much as in me is, I am debtor both to Greeks and to Barbarians, both to the wise and to the unwise.” Let a man acknowledge and pay this debt and all that is in the universe will work together to serve him. Christ announces the law: “He that will be great among you let him be your servant;” greatness for service, and greatness by service. Become a servant of men in the spirit of Christ and you are exalted to the mastery and possession of the universe. As Christ came as a servant and was exalted to reign, all who serve in the spirit of Christ are exalted to reign with him. This is the highest sense in which man is lord of nature; and, as the writer of the epistle to the Hebrews explains, this lordship is perfectly attained by man only in and through Christ,² in self-renouncing service like his. This is “the secret of Jesus”: “He that findeth his life shall lose it, and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it.” The doctrine, therefore, implies no

¹ Philosophical Basis of Theism, pp. 271-278.

² Heb. ii. 6-18.

divine guarantee that the Christian man shall gain wealth, or office, or popularity, or fame, nor that he shall be exempt from privation or suffering, from reproach or persecution, from sickness or death. It guarantees only that meeting these aright he is more and more "filled with all the fulness of God" and disciplined, educated, and developed to the perfection of his own being and the fulness and harmony of his own powers. If the man is tempted to sin, his resistance of the temptation sharpens his spiritual discernment and trains him to spiritual firmness and strength. If he is persecuted unto death it only makes him more like Christ and glorifies him in the noble army of the martyrs. Death, in whatever form it comes, only crowns him with glory, honor, and immortality. So Paul, in that passage in which Christian faith and hope reach their most triumphant utterance, enumerates all the powers of evil that can afflict or oppose the Christian man, and declares that they cannot separate us from God's love in Christ.¹ Accordingly in the Epistle to the Hebrews the fact that Christians endure affliction and sorrow painful to bear is fully recognized, — but only as God's chastening in which his special providence is strongly affirmed. "All chastening seemeth for the present to be not joyous, but grievous; yet afterward it yieldeth peaceable fruit unto them who have been exercised thereby, even the fruit of righteousness."² The doctrine is that in doing his duty in faith and love nothing can harm a person, but all things work for his good. "Who is he that will harm you if ye be zealous of that which is good?"³

We have already seen the significance and importance, in theodicy and in the right conception of God's government, of the fundamental fact that the universe was not completed at a stroke in its creation, but is always being evolved by God ever immanent in it in the progressive expression and revelation of his eternal wisdom, love, and power. Now from the point of view of God's special providence we see the significance and importance of this fact in explanation of the life and history of man. On earth man enters on a life full of opportunities for attaining true and everlasting well-being. If he accepts God's grace offering to quicken, guide, and sustain him in using these opportunities, the earth becomes to him a school in which God is disciplining, training, and educating him to the formation and

¹ Rom. viii. 28-39.

² Heb. xii. 1-13.

³ 1 Pet. iii. 13.

confirmation of right character, to effective working with God in the advancement of his kingdom, to the normal development of his powers and capacities, and so to his true well-being. And this is to be consummated after death in the life immortal, in his growing richer in the acquisition of the imperishable treasures of heaven, in his complete harmony and union with God in perfected faith and love fixed in confirmed character, in the perfect and harmonious development of his powers and capacities, in scope for their full and normal exercise in achievements in the service of God and of God's creatures, and in perpetual advance in the knowledge of God. And God will forever be perpetuating the energy of his love and enlarging its scope in the progress of his kingdom and thus more and more revealing his glory in unnumbered worlds and successive æons forever. All this is real, although to be accomplished in ways dimly known to us. "Now are we children of God, and it is not yet made manifest what we shall be. But we know that, if he shall be manifested, we shall be like him; for we shall see him as he is."¹ Thus death is no longer "the king of terrors"; Christ has conquered death, and the Christian triumphs over it in him. Death is not an evil and that great objection to the goodness of God is decisively answered. Looking out on God's action from our finiteness, we see presented to the divine mind the alternative either at the beginning to fill this small planet with all the people it can nourish and let them live on it forever, or to people it with successive generations of men. The limitation here is not in God but is the finiteness inseparable from created being. If this life were all of man's existence it would be difficult for us to decide which side of the alternative should be chosen. But, in view of immortality and the opportunities for everlasting well-being which this life presents, it is plain that the existence of successive generations makes it possible to insure the higher good and the more full revelation of the wisdom, love, and power of God. Instead of a single generation living on earth forever, God brings in a continual influx of new life; he makes the earth a school to quicken, educate and fit for a higher life and work; he freely admits to its privileges all who are willing to put themselves under his discipline and instruction; and when the course of education which he prescribes for each one is completed, the pupil is graduated,

¹ John iii. 2.

and the day of his death is the commencement of his higher life, which is life everlasting. If God had filled the world with people who never die, it would be like a college magnificently endowed, into which one class only was to be admitted, the members of which were to remain there in their pupilage always. But the kingdom of God beginning on earth, perpetuated after death in the life everlasting, and continually increased by the multitudes passing into it from successive generations, is the sum of all finite perfection and good and the end which God is continuously and progressively realizing in the history of the world. This kingdom of God, with its perpetual influx of new life, flowing on and over into the eternal abode of the blessed, is the river of life, described in the Bible, springing up in the fountain opened by Christ for sin and uncleanness, flowing forth from under the threshold of the Sanctuary, widening and deepening as it rolls on, — fed, as Christ intimates, by the living water springing up in every Christian heart and flowing forth unto everlasting life, — appearing at last in the Paradise of God as the river of the water of life, with not merely one tree of life guarded from all approach, but trees of life along both its banks, always full of fruit and with leaves for the healing of the nations.¹

A third point to be noticed is that the good guaranteed in special providence is positive good, not a mere warding-off of evil or deliverance from it. Christian love transforms privation, suffering, and all opposition and temptation by the powers of wickedness into good, as the sun transforms what falls into it into fuel increasing its own light and heat.² Paul says “in all these things we are more than conquerors.”

Fourthly, the Christian trusting and serving God in love is, in all conditions and all work, conscious of the approval and complacency of God and blessed in the very exercise of love and in

¹ Zech. xiii. 1; Joel iii. 18; Ezek. xlvi. 1–12; John iv. 14; vii. 38; Rev. xxii. 1, 2.

² Professor Young, of the College of New Jersey, says the sun gives heat enough to melt fifty feet of ice over its whole surface in a minute, nearly a foot in a second. One foot of ice over the sun's surface would make a cylinder of ice nearly two and a half miles in diameter reaching from the earth to the sun. This column, if propelled into the sun with sufficient rapidity, would all be melted in one second. And it would not only be melted but decomposed in the intense heat, supporting the combustion and feeding it with fuel. (*Christian Philosophy Quarterly*, Jan. 1882, p. 18.)

the very act of trusting and serving him. It is not merely that he looks forward to future blessedness in heaven, nor that he calculates the effect of his present trials as education and discipline for future development and well-being. He is blessed already. He has in his heart "the peace of God which passeth all understanding." In prosperity he accepts all acquisitions as gifts of God's grace. In adversity he accepts privation and suffering as the chastening of a loving father.

"Behind a frowning providence
He hides a smiling face."

It is better that the providential event frown, while the smile is on the father's face, than that the brightest smile of prosperity be on the event if the father's face frowns. Before we rejoice in our acquisitions we should consider whether they come with God's blessing. And the Christian is blessed in his christian work, rejoicing to be counted worthy even to suffer for Christ's sake. Thus the Christian is, in an important sense, independent of outward events. Nothing can separate him from God's love in Christ Jesus our Lord. He is going to heaven with heaven in his heart. For in heaven, "All that life is love."

2. In giving and withholding good in his providential government God individualizes and discriminates on the basis of character.

To him who by faith in God has come into his normal union with God, who is willingly receptive of his gracious influence and is thus living in faith and universal love, God in his providential government brings good and only good. This, as we have seen, is the scriptural doctrine. It is implied in God's moral government, which awards evil as punishment to evil-doers and good to those who are good. It is implied in the subordination of providential government to moral. It is implied in the nature of the good, essential and relative, as already explained.

To the persisting sinner all things work together for evil. Nothing can bring blessing to him. The very enjoyment which he has in sin is a curse to him because it entices him to continued sin and inflames his sinful desires and passions. The gratification of his wishes, the success of his plans, only feed the fires which consume him. He is like a bomb-shell, which, though it rises so high and draws the wondering gaze to its brilliant flight, yet carries in itself the burning elements of its own destruction.

The universe being constituted as it is, there is in it no place and no time in which it is possible for any one persisting in sin to be blessed, to attain any real good, to realize well-being in a life of selfishness.

It follows that nothing can bring essential evil on a person except his own sin. The assurance that all things work together for good is limited to those who love God, and thus forsake sin. The person's own sin is thus excluded from the all things which work for his good. All other things may work for his good. His sin is excluded, set apart by itself as the only essential evil, which is not good in itself and cannot become even a relative good to him who commits it, — which is evil in itself and in all its outcome, — which debars the sinner from all true good, and transforms into relative evil even the good itself which he touches or which touches him, — which is in him and to him evil and only evil continually.

When opportunity was given to Midas to ask and obtain from Jupiter the one thing which he most desired, he asked that everything he touched should be turned into gold. He obtained a fatal gift which doomed him to starvation. So every desire of a heart ruled by selfishness is for a fatal gift which dooms its possessor to spiritual starvation and death. On the contrary, the Christian finds in self-renouncing faith and love the divine talisman which turns whatever he touches and whatever touches him, not into gold, but into spiritual life, power, and blessedness.

Here, again, we see that God in his providential government and purpose recognizes the real agency of man in effecting results, and conditions his own action on the action of man.

The doctrine of special providence emphasizes the fact that, in all God's providential government from beginning to end and through and through, he individualizes and discriminates among persons on the basis of character in the award of good or evil. It shuts out the sentimentality which is offended at the thought that God treats the righteous any differently from the wicked.

Here an objection is urged that God maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust. This objection, however, is valid only against conceptions of God's providential government the falsity of which has been exposed. God recognizes the real agency of man determining his own destiny to good or evil. God in his self-

moved and universal good-will sends the sunshine and the rain on the evil and on the good. But they determine for themselves what use they will make of his gifts. So in redemption God seeks to draw men to himself in love, and his grace is free to all. But whether or not his redeeming love will secure the renewal and well-being of any person depends on the person's own action, accepting, trusting, and following God's gracious influence, or refusing and resisting it. Special providence implies discrimination as to character. It insures the true good to every one who lives the life of universal love, and withholds it from every one who lives in supreme selfishness.

3. In God's providential government, good or evil is brought on a man by the agency of himself and of the other second causes acting under laws fixed in the constitution of the universe, and not merely by the immediate efficiency of God's will.

The universe is a system of things working together in the realization of the ends of divine wisdom and love. In a large and complicated system of machinery, as in a cotton mill, all the wheels and cogs, all the levers and bands, are working together to accomplish the end for which the whole machinery was made. So long as any wheel or other part of the machinery remains in its proper place doing its appropriate work, all the machinery — the great wheel which moves the whole, and all the parts which transmit and apply the power — is working together to move it in its proper course and to propel it in its appropriate work in accomplishing the design of the whole. But if any wheel, or cog, or lever gets out of place, then it becomes an obstruction and all the machinery combines to crush it or cast it out. The spiritual system is analogous to this. If a man is in his proper place working in harmony with the universe to promote the great design of the creator, all the powers of the universe work together to help and bless him in his appropriate work. But if he is out of his proper place, if, isolated in selfishness, he is working against the designs of God's wisdom and love in his kingdom, then all the powers of the universe combine to crush him and cast him out. And this is the scriptural conception. When Paul says "All things work together for good," he does not speak of agencies acting in isolation, but of all things working together in the unity of a system for a common end, and of course working together against whatever hinders or obstructs them.

It follows that God does not interrupt the course of nature and the fixed order and law of the universe in order to bring good to one and evil to another. Whatever comes from God is the expression of perfect wisdom and love. It is good. It is full of the possibilities of blessing. But whether it brings good or evil to the person to whom it comes, depends on his reception, or his resistance and rejection, of it. The same love which is quickening and cheering to him who accepts it with an answering love, is "a consuming fire"¹ to him who refuses and resists. And the agencies which are the media through which good comes from God to the righteous are the same through which evil comes to the wicked. It may come to the wicked man through the medium of wealth and honor; and "the prosperity of fools shall destroy them." Or it may come through adversity, and he will curse God. But whether prosperity or adversity befalls the righteous, he so receives it in the love that trusts and serves that he finds hidden in it good and the blessing of God. Here also nature presents analogies. The nerves when rightly used and in health are the source of pleasure; abused by a drunkard they cause the horrors of delirium tremens. And in our spiritual constitution, the conscience — the nerves of the moral being — when obeyed is the source of the highest joy in the consciousness of well-doing, and to the sinner the source of the most terrific suffering in the agony of remorse. Riches justly gained and beneficently used are full of blessing; covetously and unjustly gained and used, "their rust shall eat your flesh as it were fire."² To a persistent sinner the universe itself is the prison of hell from which he cannot escape; go where he will in it all its powers are working together against him for evil. To one who trusts and serves God in love the universe is the heavenly home, — for all its powers work for him for good. And the same glowing love of God makes heaven or hell, according as men receive it in answering love or resist it in self-sufficiency, self-will, self-seeking, and self-glorifying.

Therefore God does not stand outside of the universe, trying to get into it a blessing or a curse extraneous to its constitution. But the constitution of the universe is itself the expression and revelation of the truths and laws, of the norms of perfection and good, of the archetype of wisdom and love eternal in God. And

¹ Heb. xii. 29.

² James v. 3.

God is immanent in the universe, active in all its evolution and delivering his blessing and his curse through its agencies in accordance with its constitution and laws.

It follows that God's blessing and his curse each carries in it the service of all the powers of the universe concentrating their energies on its fulfilment and execution. God's blessing is not the voice of an aged man trembling into the air with a mere "Wish you well," or even a prayer, "God bless you, my child." When God blesses, "underneath are the everlasting arms" which carry in them for our support all the powers of the universe. And his condemnation carries in it the same powers, working evil to the sinner.

4. Every one who trusts and serves God in Christian love is justified in believing that he is personally under God's special providential care.

This is implied in the essential idea of religion that man comes into communion with God; that every person by his worship and service may obtain for himself individually God's protection, guidance, and blessing. Christianity, while recognizing the organic unity of the human race and the union of men in the family, the state, and the church, emphasizes more than any other religion the individual personality of men in their relation to God. Every one who will may be justified on condition of his own personal faith, may enter into his closet and commune alone with God, and his body becomes the temple of God, dwelling in him in his Holy Spirit. Thus God's special providential care of every Christian, causing all things to work together for his personal good, is of the essence of all religion and is especially emphasized in Christianity.

Accordingly this individualizing care is prominent in the biblical revelation of God. "Cast all your care on God: for he careth for you." "Like as a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them who fear him." God's special care of every one who trusts him is declared to be like that of a mother caring for her child. It is more, for "the mother may forget, yet will not I forget thee"; "how much more shall your father who is in heaven give good things to them who ask him." God is compared to a shepherd, taking the lambs in his arms and gently caring for each sheep according to its needs. Christ compares himself to a shepherd calling every one of his flock by name.

This last expression, "he calleth them all by name," is full of significance. A man knows very few of his fellow men so that he can call them by name; and of brutes only a few of his domestic animals. Were he obliged to know every man, and brute, and plant, and every inorganic thing by a special proper name, the language could never be learned, and all thought and knowledge would be overwhelmed. But man is able to group resembling objects together and give them a common name, collecting them as it were in bundles and binding them with the name. Then it is possible to think and speak of these groups, passing the bundles, as it were, from hand to hand. Thus man can acquire and communicate knowledge of the universe and of all things in it, so far as they come under his observation. This is a manifestation of the greatness of the human mind. But as compared with God, man's strength is weakness. God knows everything in its individuality and peculiarity as well as all things in their relations and unities, and all unities in the universe. And as his knowledge of men is individualizing, so also is his providential government. "He calleth his own sheep by name and leadeth them out." And this knowledge and care extend to the most minute events. The giving of a cup of cold water for Christ's sake shall not pass unnoticed or unrewarded; and every idle word that man shall speak he shall give account thereof in the judgment.

God's special providence caring for the individual is also in accord with reason and sound philosophy. It is not, as is often supposed, contradictory to God's universal government under law. On the contrary, God's government cannot be universal unless it extends to all particulars, and it cannot be moral unless it discriminates among rational beings as to individual personal character. God's care for individuals in his special providence is simply his universal government in its application to rational beings individually and personally, discriminating among them as to their voluntary union with God or alienation from him and the character and action implied therein. And in exercising this care of them he acts on and through second causes in accord with their constitution and with the laws eternal in the divine Reason and fixed in the constitution of the universe.

The good which, in consequence of a person's loving trust and service of God, comes to him through second causes according to the constitution of things, is as real an expression of God's

favor and special providential care, as it would be if brought upon him by the immediate efficiency of God. And the evil which a person brings on himself thus, in consequence of his sin, is as real an expression of God's displacency and condemnation. The common error that this cannot be true, springs from overlooking the fundamental fact that God transcends the universe, and has given it its constitution and laws from the principles eternal in the divine reason. The discrimination on the basis of character is inwrought by God into the constitution of the universe. And the thought and purpose of his wisdom and love, which he has fixed in the constitution of things, do not cease to be his thought and purpose when they come to expression in the universe itself. The sunshine which warms us does not the less come from the sun and reveal it, because it has come millions of miles through the ether. From the beginning, God has imprinted the thought of his wisdom and the purpose of his love in his world-idea, as if on a scroll rolled up and sealed with many seals. As it is unrolled in the creation and from epoch to epoch successive seals are broken, it is revealing line by line the thought and purpose of God.

“God is Law, say the wise : O soul, and let us rejoice.
For if he thunder law, the thunder is yet his voice.”

The universe does not roll its bulk between us and God, as the earth rolls between us and the sun and brings the night. It does not hide God ; it reveals him, a God near at hand, not afar off ; who is not far from every one of us ; the God immanent in the universe, in whom we live, and move, and have our being.

It has been shown that God in his special providence insures good to the person who is in union with him in the love that trusts as well as serves. The good is awarded to a person on the basis of love, which begins and continues as a loving trust in God, and works as loving service of God in doing good to men. There is an analogy to this in the natural life of man. His power reaches its highest efficiency only when he avails himself of the powers of nature, and acts in harmony with its laws. This is exemplified in the multiplication of human power in the use of nature's forces through machinery. It is exemplified also in the ordinary course of human life and enterprise. Life is full of opportunities. Failure of success is very often due to the fact

that, when opportunity is presented, the person is not ready to improve it. But the man of forecast and enterprise forms his plan and boldly pushes forward to execute it. Opportunities present themselves, and he is ready to avail himself of them. By his wisely directed energy he himself creates opportunities, opening outlets for the forces waiting to come to his aid. He sets up his battery, and the lightning comes to serve him; he bores the earth, and the hidden springs well up; he smites the rock, and the pent-up water gushes forth. Thus the course of events favors him; unexpected forces work with and for him, and he succeeds.

“Winds blow and waters roll
Strength to the brave, and power and deity.”

People begin to speak of the man's peculiar “luck.” The man himself begins, like Bonaparte, to believe in his star; he thinks himself a man of destiny. But his luck, his star, his destiny, is only his own skill and energy in seeing the opportunities of his condition and of the course of events, and uniting his energies with forces which help the accomplishment of his design. As Emerson says, he hitches his wagon to a star. On the contrary, it is a saying as old as Sophocles, “Fortune never helps the man whose courage fails.”

So, in the moral and spiritual sphere, man attains his highest spiritual power only as he unites himself with God by accepting his freely-offered grace and working with him in trusting and serving love. The forces and laws of nature are non-moral. They give their aid and direction to the man who works with them in the accomplishment of his immediate design, whether he is doing good or evil. Therefore he may be working with them and they with him for his own ruin. But in the spiritual sphere, when a man hitches his wagon, not to a star, but to God who made the star and appointed to it its laws, then he works with God and God works with him, and insures his highest power and efficiency and his true well-being. And thus coming into union with God, he is in harmony with God and with the powers and laws of the universe. Even if he fail in a particular enterprise, his spiritual power is developed and ready for the other work, and his well-being is secured. When a Christian, having faith in God, enters on a bold enterprise for the advancement of Christ's kingdom, he finds opportunities opening, auxiliaries working with him,

heavenly influences preceding and attending him, more than he had ventured to expect. The history of the introduction and spread of Christianity, of the Protestant Reformation, of the abolition of negro slavery, and in fact the whole history of Christ's church, exemplify this truth. The early missionaries to the South Sea Islands reported wonderful instances of God's providence in preparing the natives to receive the gospel, and giving success to their work. If the missionaries had not gone to the islands, the opportunities might have existed, but no one would have been there to improve them. But it is reasonable to suppose that God, who by his Spirit had led the missionaries to the islands, had prepared the opportunities for them, and that both were contemplated together in his eternal purpose. A great general said he had always observed that Providence is on the side of the strongest battalions; another is reported to have given the order: "Trust God and keep your powder dry." These are often repeated, as if implying that God's providence has nothing to do with determining events. But the true doctrine of God's providential government and purpose affirms the reality of human agency and the necessity, in order to its highest efficiency, of using the powers and resources of nature in conformity with its fixed laws. This is strikingly illustrated in the shipwreck of Paul. That every one in the ship should be saved was not only predestined but foretold. Yet the result depended on human skill and effort. For when the sailors were about to leave in the boat, Paul said, Except these abide in the ship, ye cannot be saved.

A man exerts his highest power when he acts in spontaneity, not when he is conscious of struggle and conflict. In learning to speak, or to read, or to handle tools, or to play on a musical instrument, the learner must go through a period of conscious effort before he acquires mastery of what he is learning, so that he acts spontaneously. But the spontaneous action evinces a skill and power immeasurably above that of the learner's laborious exertion. When a person unites himself with God in trusting and serving love, he is strong with God's strength; he is in harmony with himself, with the universe, and with God; he is hindered by nothing within or without himself in working together with God. All things work together with him and for him. And besides this, since God is love, the person whose character is love is "a partaker of the divine nature." And love is spontaneous

in its service. The person no longer acts consciously constrained by a command from without. The law is written on his heart. The love which the law requires has become character, the force impelling all his action. It is his delight to do God's will. In doing duty because commanded by an outward law he is moral. In trusting and serving God he is divine. In him truth and law are transmuted into life. They are taken up into love and have become his vital force. His action in serving God has become spontaneous and powerful as are the processes of life. How quietly the acorn sends its white and delicate shoot through the incumbent soil, how majestically the immense weight of the tree is lifted up and spread into sturdy boughs and crowned with leaves, and how strong it stands wrestling with the winds! And what a studying and planning, what a straining and creaking and pounding, if men had tried to do it mechanically. Such is the spontaneous but mighty power of life. Analogous is the spontaneous, majestic might of Christian love trusting and serving God and man, which is spiritual life, quickened and sustained by God. And in this way God's special providential care of the Christian insures the development of his highest spiritual power and perfection, and his true well-being.

5. While special providence does not exclude God's immediate interpositions nor his miraculous action, it does not, as is often supposed, consist wholly of these. Such an interposition of God with an immediate fiat of his will is no more necessary in his special providence than it is in the movement of every particle of dust blown by the wind. But the direct interposition of God even in a miracle undoubtedly occurs in accordance with law. When, in the process of evolution, matter is prepared to be the medium for a higher revelation of God in it, the revelation is made. So, in the spiritual sphere, miracles mark epochs in the development of God's kingdom when a new and special revelation of God was both needed and prepared for. Here we recognize the subordination of the physical system to the spiritual, and therein the harmony and co-operation of the two in the progressive realization of God's world-idea. This, perhaps, is exemplified in the case of Herod. For his self-sufficiency and contempt of God an angel smote him and he was eaten of worms¹ — the highest of God's creatures and the lowest working to-

- Acts xii. 23.

gether to punish him for his sin. If we knew his whole history we should probably find that his sins of the spirit had prepared him for the smiting from the spiritual sphere, and his sins of the flesh had equally prepared him to be eaten of worms.

Any conception of God's special providence which limits it to his immediate interposition, isolated from his progressive revelation of himself in the constitution of the universe and the action of all things in it under law, puts special providence in contradiction to God's universal government. In its logical issue it requires a God who is arbitrary and almighty will unregulated by law, and thus makes the reign of God incompatible with the reign of law. This is exemplified by Mr. Hamerton, who represents the reign of divine love as incompatible with the reign of law.¹ His whole discussion rests on the false conception of God as an arbitrary and almighty will outside of the universe and acting in it only by direct interruption of its constitution and laws. His line of thought is the one commonly presented by those who regard theology and science as antagonistic and incompatible. But it rests on extremely superficial views both of theology and science, and is of no force whatever against Christian theism rightly understood. The reign of wisdom and love is not incompatible with the reign of law. On the contrary, it is essential to the reign of law.

What are regarded as special interpositions of providence, and even miracles, are always accordant with law. God is immanent in the course of nature in the physical system. In this uniform course of nature we ordinarily take little notice of the continuous action of its tremendous energies. Electricity, for example, courses through all nature, continuously quickening life and growth; but we notice it only in its occasional and exceptional

¹ "The philosopher says, 'If you are prudent and skilful in your conformity with the laws of life, you will probably secure that amount of mental and physical satisfaction which is attainable by a person of your organization.' The priest holds a very different language. The use of the one word, love, gives warmth and color to his discourse. He says, 'If you love God with all your soul and with all your strength, he will love and cherish you in return and be your true and tender father. He will watch over every detail and every minute of your existence, guard you from all real evil, and at last he will welcome you to his eternal kingdom.'" Philip Gilbert Hamerton, "Human Intercourse," Essay iii., "Priests and Women," p. 178; see also Essays xiv. and xv.

revelations of itself, as in lightning, or as evoked by man in his electric machinery. But its exceptional manifestations are as really accordant with law as is its uniform and unnoticed energizing. The change is not in the nature or the laws of electricity, but in the conditions under which it acts. So in the spiritual sphere God's energy acting in love as moral influence is all-pervasive ; it is universal good-will regulated in its exercise by wisdom and righteousness in conformity with the eternal principles and laws of reason and for the realization of its archetypal ideal. In this, its uniform action, it is little noticed. It is in the great epochs of God's historical revelation of himself, in miracles, in the coming of Christ, in what we call special interpositions of providence, that it attracts attention. But in the epochs, the miracles, the special interpositions, God's action is accordant with law as really as the uniform divine action which attracts less attention. The difference is not in the essence of God's love nor in the laws in accordance with which he exercises it, but in the varying conditions of the finite universe in its progressive evolution and in the different stages of human development and the varying characters and actions of rational, self-determining persons.

The same principle is true in respect to man's availing himself of God's gracious energy in redeeming men from sin. The cosmic forces of light, heat, electricity, gravitation, chemical affinity, and the like are always energizing, and always available for special service under the direction of man. But man must first acquaint himself with their nature and the laws of their action, and provide the conditions and instrumentalities through which the forces can act and be directed to the special service required. The human agency does not supersede the laws, but only directs the cosmic agencies in a determinate line of action in accordance with these laws. These cosmic energies are always waiting to serve man whenever he is thus willing and prepared to avail himself of their service. So it is in the moral and spiritual sphere. God is ever present, energizing in the fulness of his redeeming love to renovate men to the life of love and to quicken and guide them in it to their highest efficiency in working to bring all men to participate in that life. In successive epochs God has revealed himself to men, pre-eminently in Christ, the Sun of Righteousness rising on the world with healing in his

beams (Mal. iv. 2), and in the Holy Spirit perpetuating the work of God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself. God is everywhere and always present in his redeeming grace, willing to receive every one whom he can induce to return to him, and to act in him with gracious spiritual influences for his complete renovation and development, and with him and through his agency for the advancement of his kingdom. But every man must know God's grace, and supply in himself the conditions in accordance with which God, in conformity with the eternal principles, laws, and ideals of the moral system, can exert this divine energy in him for his renovation, development, and perfection, and through him for the advancement of his kingdom and the reconciliation of the world unto himself. Electricity is all-pervading, and wherever a man sets up a battery according to its laws the electric power presents itself and serves him. So God's influences are all-pervasive, encompassing us like the sunshine, the atmosphere, gravitation, electricity. Christ commands us to enter into our closet and shut the door and pray, alone with God alone; and he assures us that God will hear and answer. And wherever one sets up his closet and in penitential and loving trust opens his heart to receive God's gracious influence, he finds it available for his service; the Spirit with all the energies of redeeming love works in him and he avails himself of the divine light and energy of the indwelling Spirit, working with him for his own sanctification and development and for the advancement of the kingdom of God. Thus he attains his greatest efficiency in the Christian life and work, analogous to his increased efficiency in work in the physical sphere by getting control of the cosmic forces and compelling them to work with him and for him in his service.

This is a striking exemplification of God's special providence, working with each individual who intelligently and willingly avails himself of the proffered divine power and resources, both in the physical sphere and the spiritual, in his endeavor to attain his own most complete development and his greatest efficiency in promoting the progress and well-being of mankind.

6. The true conception of God's special providence shows the need of caution in interpreting the providential significance of events.

Special providence does not insure deliverance from any par-

ticular temporal privation and suffering nor the acquisition of any particular temporal gain. God is not so impoverished as to reward men for their loving trust and service with money or fame or any earthly good, or to punish the wicked with the loss of them. There is, indeed, in the distribution of temporal gain and loss an analogy to special providence in the fact that a temporal good is gained and a temporal evil avoided by conformity to the natural laws pertaining to the case. If one knew all the laws of health and could always conform to them, he would be exempt from sickness, so far as his constitutional organization derived from his ancestors would permit. There are laws of industry, frugality, temperance, and self-control, conformity with which promote thrift; and such conformity will be far more effective than strikes and intimidation designed to force the acquisition of gain in disregard of these laws. But these laws pertain only to outward action. They do not open the fountain of the new spiritual life and character in the heart. Therefore, a man, in schemes of wickedness, may act in the conformity with the natural laws essential to his success. On the other hand, men are as yet to a great extent ignorant of the natural laws of living, and science itself has yet much to discover; being members of society and of that great organic whole, the human race, men are subject to evils coming on them from others, as in the spread of contagious diseases and in the opposition of the wicked; and they are exposed to cosmic power and convulsions, like lightning, earthquakes, and tornadoes; for all these reasons, they are liable to privation and suffering notwithstanding their best endeavors to avoid them. Hence the success attained by conformity with these natural laws does not prove God's approval and blessing of the successful man, nor insure that his success will promote his true good, nor does his failure prove God's displacency and condemnation. Therefore, alike in temporal prosperity or adversity, we must look beyond the sphere of nature to the higher realm of spirit, to which nature is subordinated, in order to see God's special providence in its true significance.

The providential significance of a single event can be rightly apprehended only in its relation to God's whole progressive revelation of himself in the universe. This is always progressive, commensurate with the powers, susceptibilities, and relations of the beings that are objects of his action, or agencies through

which he acts, and accordant with the constitution and laws of the universe. There is always danger of forgetting that God's universal purpose is unrolled line by line, and so of trying to interpret the single line presented at the moment to the eye as if it were the whole record. Some Scotch Covenanters, under persecution and hiding from the dragoons, took refuge in a cave. The dragoons, coming soon after, saw the narrow entrance, but seeing a spider hanging in its web before it they concluded that no one could have entered it so recently, and passed on. The Christian might naturally interpret the event as signifying that God by his immediate interposition had appointed this spider to fortify the cave and mount guard over it, and, therefore, no human power could break through and enter in. But it is likely, if it had been robbers fleeing from justice who had taken refuge in the cave just at the same time, the spider would have woven its web all the same, and have been equally effective in protecting them from the officers. It is said the life of Mohammed was once saved in a similar way by the discovery of an undisturbed bird's nest. And we know that many Christians have been persecuted and have died as martyrs with no interposition of God to save them. But God by his Spirit has enabled them to glory in the tribulation, to rejoice in being counted worthy to suffer for Christ's sake, and to die like Paul triumphant in the consciousness of fidelity, achievement, and victory in the past and glory opening before him in the life everlasting (2 Tim. iv. 6-8).

7. God in his special providence administers the government of the universe, so far as it is related to the earth and man, in the interest of his kingdom, so as to insure its progress and its ultimate triumph in the reign of righteousness and good-will on earth and, when the earthly history of man shall end, in its completion in the unseen world and its perpetuation in ways not definitely revealed to us in the heavenly glory forever. The kingdom of God comprises all perfection and good for man. His special providential care of all who serve him in love is merely the application in details to individuals of his providential purpose to establish his kingdom. In caring for the flock and fold, the shepherd cares for every sheep and lamb. In caring for the family, the father and mother care for every child.

And every one who is working for the advancement of this kingdom knows that he is working with God, and that nothing of

all his labor and self-denial is wasted. The same is true of every effort to accomplish particular and subordinate ends necessary in the progressive transformation of human society into the kingdom of God. In the conflict with intemperance and licentiousness, with despotism and slavery, with injustice and oppression, with dishonesty and fraud, with covetousness and worldliness, the Christian reformer has no assurance that his particular measures for promoting the reform are approved by God and will have his blessing, but he knows that God is working with him for the moral reformation which he is seeking to effect in the advancement of the universal reign of righteousness and good-will. He is, therefore, fearless, knowing that, whatever the appearance to the dim-sighted who never look beyond what seems politic for immediate personal or partisan advantage, the powers that are for him are more than those that are against him. "One with God makes a majority."

Here, also, it is true that God's providential purpose is accomplished through the agency of second causes and in accordance with the constitution and laws of the universe. He must seek, for citizens of his kingdom, rational free agents who may accept or refuse his grace, and he must advance it through the agency of men who unite themselves with him by faith, and work with him for its advancement. Hence the kingdom can be established only progressively, in real conflict with the powers of evil. Hence there are hours of the power of darkness when wickedness seems to prevail over love. But the Christian works inspired by the assurance that the kingdom will triumph and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. He may die without the sight; but he shall see it and rejoice. And blessed is he who in this divine work is faithful unto death.

PART IV.

GOD THE LORD OF ALL IN MORAL GOVERNMENT.

CHAPTER XIX.

MORAL CHARACTER DEFINED PSYCHOLOGICALLY.

IN the study of ethics, it is necessary to begin with clear and exact psychological definitions of what constitutes moral responsibility and moral character. Through neglect of this, ethical writers are often involved in indefiniteness and obscurity of thought, fail to mark the exact limits of moral responsibility and the exact bounds of ethical science, do not clearly apprehend the matter of which they are to treat and the right methods of treating it, and thus fall into errors. Often a correct psychological definition is all that is necessary to solve a perplexing ethical problem or to bring to a definite issue a long-continued controversy, or to correct a wide-spread error. And because theology and ethics are inseparably connected, correct psychological definitions are in the same way essential to clear thinking on many theological topics. I, therefore, begin the investigation of God's moral government with the necessary psychological definitions.

In "The Philosophical Basis of Theism," I have given the definitions of the will and its freedom necessary to determine the elements and bounds of moral responsibility, and the distinctive characteristics of personality.¹ We come now to the ethical application of those definitions and the principles involved in them, which was there merely indicated in a few lines. Before proceeding, we must recall some of those definitions and prin-

¹ Chap. xiv., xv., xvi., pp. 345-427.

ciples, because they mark the true lines of thought in the investigation of ethics and the moral government of God.

The will is the power of a person, endowed with reason and susceptible of rational motives and emotions, to determine the ends to which he will direct his energies and the exertion of his energies. This definition of the will implies its freedom. The freedom of the will is in the fact that the person is enlightened by reason and susceptible of rational motives and thus is self-determining, both as self-directing and self-exerting. A will, therefore, is a person's power of self-determination ; every being enlightened by reason and susceptible of being influenced by rational motives has this power, and is a rational, self-determining, free agent under moral government and law, and morally responsible for his actions and character. This is the distinctive characteristic of personality. Persons are thus distinguished from all other beings that exert or convey causal energy. The latter are designated as irrational and impersonal. Persons alone, who are enlightened by reason and susceptible to rational motives and emotions, are free moral agents ; they alone are subjects of God's moral law, can obey or disobey it, and are morally responsible for their actions and character.

The word "freedom" is used with other meanings and applications. To distinguish it from these the freedom essential to moral agency, as here defined, may be called moral freedom.

One example of a different use and application of the word may be called physical freedom. The word is used to denote freedom from constraint and restraint by force or by any necessity which the person has not the power to escape or resist, if he will. Skeptics confound this physical freedom with moral freedom. They argue that man has not moral freedom because his power is limited by his constitution and environment. If this is the only meaning of the freedom of the will, then the Almighty alone is free. Some have pushed the argument even to this extreme, denying that God is free, because he did not create himself, and therefore his constitution as the absolute is something "given." The absurdity of this was shown in Chapter III. of the preceding volume. But man's moral freedom is totally different from physical freedom. It is man's power to determine the ends for which he will act and to exert his energies within the sphere of his constitutional endowments and his necessary environment.

As to his constitution, instead of being limited by it as merely sensuous, it is his constitution as a rational, self-determining person in the likeness of God, the absolute Reason, the eternal Spirit, which exalts him to this freedom. "There is a spirit in man and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth him understanding" (Job xxxii. 8). He erects himself above himself so far as he is sensuous, he looks beyond his physical environment. The most profound reality in man is that he is spirit. His environment is not physical alone, it is spiritual. "In God we live, and move, and have our being" (Acts xvii. 28). We endure "as seeing him who is invisible" (Heb. xi. 27). "We look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen; for the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal" (2 Cor. iv. 18). Paul and Silas, with their feet fast in the stocks and in the midnight darkness of "the inner prison," "prayed and sang praises unto God" (Acts xvi. 24, 25). No power could abridge the freedom of their wills in the supreme choice of God. They retained their spiritual power and freedom and beheld the glory of their spiritual environment. The argument of the skeptic has no force except on the basis of sheer materialism. It assumes, as Comte expresses it, that man must cease to regard himself as the lowest of the angels and be content in knowing that he is only the highest of the brutes, having no power or susceptibility differing in kind from those of the brutes. Even as to man's physical constitution and environment, he has a wide range of power both in developing his own powers and susceptibilities and in changing his environment or in modifying it by gaining knowledge of the laws and command over the powers and resources of nature.

With physical freedom may be included civil or political freedom, — the freedom of the people from the control of a despot or a despotic aristocracy enforcing the decrees of arbitrary will by overpowering force. This freedom is not essential to moral freedom and responsibility; nor does the freedom to choose their own rulers and to enact their own civil and criminal laws release the people from the moral obligation as individuals to obey the law of God, and collectively to see that laws are enacted and government administered in accordance with the eternal principles and laws of Reason and of God, so far as they can have knowledge of them.

Freedom is used in a third meaning, sometimes designated in philosophy Real Freedom. This exists when a person's right character is so completely developed in the life of love that he experiences no opposition to right action from within himself. All his intellectual beliefs, his appetites, desires and affections, and his habits have been brought into complete harmony with the requirements of God's law, and he always does right in the spontaneity of love. This is the freedom spoken of in the Bible as deliverance from the bondage to sin under the dominion of the lower propensities of human nature and of sinful character and habits. As Christ said, "If the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed" (John viii. 34-36). This real freedom is not essential to the moral freedom of the will and is not to be confounded with it. It can exist only in those perfected in right moral and spiritual character, and denotes the harmony, spontaneity, and blessedness of such a character.

Freedom is used also in a fourth meaning, designated in philosophy Formal Freedom. In the controversies respecting free will it has sometimes been maintained that it is essential to a free determination that antecedent to the determination the will must be in a state of indifference. This has been called the liberty of indifference. But when a person chooses the end or object of action he forms character. Thereafter the will is never in a state of indifference; it is a will already characterized. Formal freedom, therefore, is the state of the will antecedent to the first moral act of free determination, when the will is as yet characterless in infantile immaturity. Formal freedom, therefore, is not to be confounded with moral freedom and is not essential to moral agency. It has no existence after that first moral action and the beginning of moral character.

Another principle which was established in "The Philosophical Basis of Theism" is that the will is not determined by the strongest motive, but that under the influence of various motives in every act of will the person is self-determining.

Another principle is that the function of the will as self-determining is twofold. It is self-directing and self-exerting. The self-directing determination I call choice; it is the determination of the end or object to which to direct the energies. The self-exerting determination I call volition; it is the determination which exerts or calls into action the energies in the direction of

the object chosen.¹ I choose a day's wages as the object to the acquisition of which in preference to anything else I will direct my energies. Then I take my tools and exert my energies in successive volitions in doing the work. A choice is an abiding determination. My choice of wages abides as a determination all day. My choice of God as the supreme object of trust and service may abide as a determination forever. A volition on the contrary is transient or ictic, ceasing with the exertion it calls forth.

We further distinguish choices as supreme and subordinate. A subordinate choice is the choice of some object to be acquired and used for an ulterior end. The supreme choice is the determination of the supreme end or object to which all the energies are to be directed.

These are some of the definitions and principles pertaining to the freedom of the will and the basis of man's moral obligation and responsibility in the volume referred to, which I assume as guiding our investigation of their ethical significance and application under the moral government of God.

I recur here for a moment to the first of these definitions, because it is the fundamental principle and has been very often overlooked. It is that the freedom of the will arises from the fact that man is endowed with reason and susceptible of rational motives and emotions, and thus is able, as it were, to erect himself above himself, to determine his objects and exertions in the consciousness of rational principles, laws, and ideals and of rational motives and emotions allying him with the spiritual, the eternal and the divine, over against the sensuous impulses and the instincts of his lower nature, allying him with the brutes. Therefore, he is not ruled helplessly by the instincts of nature, but is self-determining in moral freedom. He is distinguished

¹ Plato recognizes this distinction of choice and volition. "Socrates: Do men appear to you to will that which they do, or do they will that further object for the sake of which they do that which they do, — for example, when they take medicine at the bidding of a physician, do they will the drinking of the medicine, or the health for the sake of which they drink? Polus: Clearly the health. Socrates: And when men go on a voyage . . . they will to have the wealth for the sake of which they go on a voyage. Polus: Certainly. Socrates: And is it not universally true? If a man does something for the sake of something else, he wills not that which he does, but that for the sake of which he does it." ("Gorgias," 467.)

from all other agents that exert or convey energy by being self-directive and self-exertive in the light of reason.

Kant has recognized the fact that rationality is essential to will and its freedom. "The will is a kind of causative power in living beings so far as they are rational . . . Only as belonging to the world of reason does man call his causative power a will. . . Everything in nature operates according to law. But only a rational being has the power of acting in conformity with the idea of law, that is, on principle; in a word has will."¹ Hence he calls the will the practical reason. But this conception of the will is robbed of its practical significance by his separation of the phenomenal reality from the noumenon or thing in itself. Hence he teaches that the phenomenal or empirical ego is merely a series of phenomenal states of consciousness and is completely under necessity. "In regard to man's empirical character there is no freedom. . . If it were possible for us to have so deep an insight into a man's way of thinking, evinced in both outward and inward acts, that every minutest motive to them should be known, as well as all the outward occasions influencing them, we could calculate his conduct for the future with as much certainty as an eclipse of the moon or sun."² Yet, according to Kant, man is rational and therefore free. But it is the noumenal ego, the unknowable thing in itself that is so. Kant distinguishes two kinds of causation, causation in the sphere of the rational or "intelligible," and in the sphere of the phenomenal or empirical. Because man is reason he acts causatively in the former of these spheres and thus is a free and self-determining agent. In the sphere of the empirical or phenomenal he acts under necessity; because every phenomenon in time must be dependent on and determined by some antecedent phenomenon. The reason is the noumenon, the unknown thing in itself. As an organ of the universal it does not act in time. He says: "Pure reason, as a faculty of the purely intelligible, is not subject to the conditions of time. The causality of reason in its character of the purely intelligible does not begin; it does not begin at a certain time by producing an

¹ *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, Abschnitt iii., Werke, Rosenkranz ed. vol. viii. pp. 78, 87, 36.

² *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*, Transc. Dialektik, 2tes Buch, II. sect. ix., iii.; *Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft*, Theil I., Buch 1, Hauptstück 3. Werke, Rosenkranz, viii. p. 230.

effect. If it did so it would itself become subject to the law of phenomena in nature, which determines them in the uniform sequence of a series of causes and effects in time. It would cease to be freedom, and become itself a phenomenon of nature." According to this theory, man's freedom consists in the one act of the noumenal ego in a timeless state of determining the whole series of conscious phenomenal acts in time. The totality of his actions considered as a unit is free; but each conscious act in time is a phenomenon determined by an antecedent phenomenon, therefore done, not freely, but under necessity. Thus we are brought to the contradiction that the same man determines his whole action in free will and yet is under necessity in every act. But Kant says further: "Reason is present and the same in all human actions and at all times. But it does not itself exist in time, and therefore does not enter on any state in which it did not exist before. It is, relatively to new states or conditions, determining, not determinable." Because he regards its determining action to be unconditioned in time, he is at liberty to suppose it present at all times and freely determining the man in every act. Thus in every act the man is free, because he determines it in the light of reason. We may conceive of this in two ways. We may suppose it means the pre-existence of the human soul. Man's action and character in this life were determined by him by his own action and character in a previous existence. But if the man thus pre-existed and acted, as a finite individual person, his acts must have been in time, and, therefore, according to Kant, under necessity. Then we must look behind this pre-existence itself to a noumenal ego unconditioned in time. But only the absolute Reason exists thus. It follows that the action, character and destiny of every man has been unchangeably determined by the causative action of the absolute Reason, which is also present and determining in every one of his actions. Thus all freedom disappears under the resistless determinations of the absolute Reason, which does not differ in practical significance from resistless fate.

These contradictions, in which Kant is inextricably involved, arise from that separation and exclusion of the noumenon or thing in itself from the phenomenon, which vitiates all Kant's philosophy. The noumenal ego is separated from the ego of consciousness; it is an unknowable thing in itself. If this fundamental error is eliminated from his philosophy, the rational or

noumenal ego is no longer excluded from the phenomenal ego of consciousness, but fills it and reveals itself in it in all the phenomena of consciousness. The person, being himself reason, perceives all phenomena in the forms of reason as well as in the forms of sense. He perceives himself in the forms of reason as well as in the forms of consciousness; and in the form of consciousness he perceives himself revealed as reason and free will. Then Kant's conception of free will as inseparable from reason becomes essentially the same with that which I have presented. Reason is present in every act of will, giving the light without which a free choice is impossible; present also in the abiding supreme choice which gives character to every subordinate choice and every volitional exertion. And human reason, being in the likeness of the divine, perceives truths and laws, as well as ideals of perfection and well-being, which are eternal and immanent in God, the Absolute Reason.

This conception of the will is radically different from one which has been widely prevalent, which regards the will as power having only the single function of exertive volition, and therefore is shut up to defining freedom of the will in terms of power only, as power to the contrary. It avoids the ambiguities and perplexities in which the discussion has commonly been entangled, and gives a solid and comprehensive basis for moral responsibility and for a clear-cut definition of moral character.

In the examination of God's moral government the first topic to be considered is The Psychological Definition of Moral and Religious Character, which is the subject of this chapter. It is to be considered first, because indefinite or erroneous thought respecting it has been the occasion of much controversy.

The question is: Does religious and moral character consist in the state or action of the intellect, or of the sensibilities, or of the will?

This has often been confounded with another and different question: Did man's religious consciousness originate as an intellectual belief, as a feeling, or as a determination of the will? This latter is a question of anthropology, and must be answered by a study of the facts of the historical development of man.¹

¹ See a full discussion of this question in Voigt's "Fundamental Dogmatik," pp. 55-80. See also my "Self-Revelation of God," pp. 86-95, and 345-402.

The answer would seem to be that the religious consciousness in its origin includes belief, feeling, and voluntary determination, and it is only in reflective thought that they are discriminated. They may be presumed to be all present in every religious act. The same question may be asked respecting the moral consciousness, and the same answer may be given. The confounding of this question, respecting the historical origin of man's religious and moral consciousness, with the one which is to be answered in this chapter has occasioned much perplexity in the discussion.

Much perplexity has also arisen from erroneous conceptions of the will and its freedom. The exposition of the will already referred to is the clue to guide us through the labyrinthian mazes of discussion and controversy respecting moral freedom, responsibility, and character.

Morality is distinguishable from religion. But the law of love is the one and only standard both of moral character and of religious. Religion cannot be complete without taking up all morality into itself; morality cannot be complete without love as well as duty, without love to God as well as love to man. The religious service of God is the doing of duty to men in universal love; duty to men is rightly done only as loving service to God. Therefore the psychological definition of moral character and of religious will be the same, since the same principles apply to both. Matthew Arnold's definition of religion as morality lit up with emotion is totally inadequate. Religion recognizes the moral law as the eternal and universal law of God. As Kant puts it, it is the recognition of every duty as required in the law of God and done as a service to him. We cannot have the unity of a moral system without God, the universal and supreme Reason, progressively realizing in the universe the eternal rational archetype of all possible perfection and well-being in the exercise of perfect and universal love and in strict accordance with the eternal principles and laws of Reason.

I. CHARACTER IN THE WILL. — Moral character psychologically defined is, primarily, the choice of the supreme object of trust and service, of which the subordinate choices and the volitions are the expression or manifestation; secondarily it is the state of the intellect and of the sensibilities, and the habits of action, so far as formed or modified by previous voluntary action.

1. Moral character is possible only as determined by the will. A person forms his own moral character by the free determination of his will. The range of moral character is commensurate and coincident with that of free will. Man is morally responsible only so far as in the exercise of his own free will he determines what he does and what he becomes and is. Man's moral character is commensurate with his moral responsibility and thus with the action of his free will.

Moral character is distinguished from particular volitional acts as an abiding disposition or preference, an abiding determination of the person in which he directs his volitional acts and which is manifested or revealed in them as the abiding and directing bent, disposition, or preference of the person. Moral action and moral character are possible only as determined in the exercise of free will.

This accords with the common moral consciousness of mankind. As President Edwards well expresses it: "An evil thing being from a man or from something antecedent in him is not essential to the original notion that we have of blameworthiness; but it is its being the choice of the heart; as appears by this, that if a thing be from us and not from our choice, it has not the nature of blameworthiness according to our natural sense. When a thing is from a man in that sense that it is from his will or choice, he is to blame for it; so far as the will is in it blame is in it and no farther. Neither do we go any further in our notion of blame to inquire whether the bad will be from a bad will; there is no consideration of the original of that bad will, because according to our natural apprehension, blame originally consists IN IT." This is in accordance with the teaching of Kant: "There is nothing in the world, and we cannot conceive of anything out of the world, which can be held to be good without qualification, except a good-will . . . This good-will is good, not on account of its effects or its fitness to accomplish any given end, but simply in itself, as a right choice or purpose. Even if the good-will is unable to carry its purpose into execution, still the good-will would remain, and would have its worth in itself, like a jewel which glitters with its own lustre."¹

Moral character, as an abiding voluntary disposition or prefer-

¹ Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, erster Abschnitt, pp. 11, 12, 13, ed. Rosenkranz.

ence, is distinguished from what is inherent in the nature or constitution. The universal moral consciousness of man forbids the belief that a person is morally responsible for what is born in him. He can no more be responsible for what is born in him than he is for being born. This common consciousness is expressed by Shakespeare : —

“Some vicious mole of nature in them,
As in their birth, wherein they are not guilty,
Since nature cannot choose his origin.”

And Aristotle says : “It is plain that whatever belongs to nature is not in our own power, but exists by some divine cause in those who are truly fortunate.”¹ Men are born with different temperaments, capacities, and powers. Man’s free will cannot transcend the limits of his organization and constitution. But within those limits he can control and regulate his constitutional powers and propensities, he can repress or develop them, he can determine their lines of action ; thus he can form himself as he will. What a man becomes by this self-determining action, as distinguished from what he is by birth and constitution, is his character. The fundamental voluntary determination, preference, or disposition which dominates in this self-formation is his moral character in its primary and deepest significance.

2. It follows that the acts and processes of the intellect are not in themselves moral acts and do not constitute moral and religious character.

Rational intelligence is a condition prerequisite to moral action and character. One cannot be sinful or guilty in transgressing a law of which, through no neglect or fault of his own, he is totally ignorant. One cannot even be a free agent without the rational intelligence which enables him to take cognizance of moral law. Without this one cannot do wrong any more than a bird does in eating our cherries. But the acts and processes of the intellect are in themselves non-moral. The perception of an outward object, the consciousness of one’s own existence, a creation of imagination, a process of reasoning, have in themselves no moral character. The mere knowing that two and two make four is not in itself a praiseworthy act of virtue. Even the knowledge of the moral law and the approval of it by the reason, while they are characteristic of moral agency, do not of themselves constitute

¹ Nichomachean Ethics. Bk. X. chap. ix. 6.

moral character. The transgressor may approve in his conscience the law which he violates.

“*Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.*”

Virtue does not consist in knowing and approving the better course, but in voluntarily pursuing it. Vice consists in voluntarily pursuing the wrong course while knowing and approving the right.

The same is true of religious character. All religion presupposes a belief in a god. But the mere belief, without voluntary service rendered to the god and the feelings involved in it, would not be religion nor constitute religious character.

Among us the doctrine that either moral or religious character is primarily knowledge or any intellectual act or process has little currency. It found more acceptance in the Greek philosophy. Socrates taught that righteousness and every other virtue is wisdom. His meaning seems to be, not merely that virtue will insure the highest good and, therefore, that to be virtuous is both wise and prudent, but also that if any man knows what is beautiful and just and good he will choose it above all other things, while those who do not know this will not attempt to be virtuous or if they do will miss it.¹ Thus the evil in man is not sin but merely ignorance. He does not need a change of heart or will; he needs only education, enlightenment, so as to know what is truly the right, the beautiful, and the good; then he will certainly choose it. A tendency to the same type of thought appears in other schools of Greek philosophy, accompanied sometimes even in the same author with different and higher ethical conceptions. Aristotle, on the contrary, refers virtue and vice to the will. He teaches that it is not sufficient to know what virtue is, but to possess and practise it. He recognizes the free will as the basis of moral responsibility even when vice by long indulgence has so attained the mastery that the man finds it seemingly impossible to resist temptation to it. But he declares that man's highest happiness and well-being are in intellectual action and philosophical meditation. He says that sensuous pleasure is a happiness which any one, even a slave, may enjoy, — though no one allows that a slave has any claim to happiness or well-being, as indeed he has no claim to the real and highest life. The activity

¹ Xenophon's “*Memorabilia*,” Bk. III., chap. ix. 4 and 5.

of the intellect insures the highest happiness; because intellectual activity, as in the study of philosophy for example, is the exercise of that which is highest in man; it gives the most continuous happiness; its pleasures are the most pure and stable; it has its end in itself and seeks no result beyond itself, and is, therefore, self-sufficient and self-satisfying; it implies leisure, freedom from care, and all the elements commonly making up the idea of a happy man. In it is the germ of immortality; for, though little in bulk, the intellect surpasses all the other powers in dignity and capacity; it seems to be each one's own very self. In meditation is the blessedness of the gods; they have no occasion for buying and selling, for work and business like man's; they are blessed in meditation or contemplation alone. Here he presents a conception of the gods very like that of Epicurus, or of Carlyle's deist, — a god who having made the universe as a machine and set it in motion, is occupied ever after only in seeing it go.¹

In like manner some of the German philosophers identify religion with knowledge. J. G. Fichte teaches that religion is never practical and was never intended to influence our life. Pure morality is enough for that, and it is only a corrupt society that has to use religion as an impulse to moral action. It gives the man a clear insight into himself, answers the highest questions, and thus imparts to us a complete harmony with ourselves and a thorough sanctification to our minds. It needs no argument to prove that a mere intellectual assent to the idea of God presented by this philosophy is not religion.

The practical tendency of the belief that either moral or religious character is primarily of the intellect is evil. It tends to substitute intellectual culture for moral and religious development, the wisdom of man for the law of God, prudence for duty, interest in science and art for trust in God and love to God and man, and thus to obliterate the very ideas of law, of duty, and of the eternal distinction of right and wrong. Thus it tends to restrict the possibility of virtue and the service of the true God to the cultured few, trained by instruction in philosophy in some portico or academy, or initiated into the mysteries of an esoteric religion. It cannot proclaim the privilege of every one who will to trust in God and live in communion with him, and the obliga-

¹ Nichomachean Ethics, Bk. x., chaps. 9, 7, 8.

tion of all to obey the universal law of love, conformity with which is free to every person in every condition and every grade of culture and will transform him into the likeness of God who is love. Thus it issues in exclusiveness and caste. Even Aristotle, in his eloquent exhibition of the dignity and happiness of philosophical meditation, does not recognize the promotion of any interest of mankind by the study, but only the enjoyment of the student himself in the enthusiasm of his own thinking. On the contrary he presents it as an excellence of intellectual activity that it has no end beyond itself. He makes no allusion to the life of universal love in trust in God and service to God and man, and the development of the man thereby to his highest perfection, well-being and blessedness. In Aristotle's praise of meditation, withdrawn from the active life of the world and dissociated from all promotion of the interests of mankind, as constituting the highest and most blessed life, we seem to see a type of thought similar to that which has led Buddhist devotees to the life of asceticism and meditation in the hope of becoming a Buddha, the Enlightened.

This tendency to substitute culture for virtue and religion, to restrict the highest moral and religious development and well-being to the cultured few, and so to introduce caste into the moral and religious life and to consign the many to hopeless inferiority and separation from the true God, is inherent in the Hellenism which Goethe, Schiller, Carlyle, Matthew Arnold, and others would thrust into our civilization as a substitute for Christianity. If thus thrust in, it would thrust out the all-pervading idea of the supreme, inviolable, divine law of love binding on all alike, the consciousness of the duty and privilege of all to obey God's law, and the consciousness of God's love to all, revealed and made an abiding power of spiritual renovation in Christ and his Spirit of holiness, and seeking to draw all men away from sin and evil to be like God in the life of universal love.

3. The sensibilities or feelings are essential to moral and religious character as motives to the will and as emotions resulting from its action; but in themselves they are non-moral, neither right nor wrong. This is true not only of the appetites and the natural or instinctive desires and affections, such as acquisitiveness, the desire of esteem, curiosity, anger, parental and filial love, but also of the distinctively rational susceptibilities, the

scientific, moral, æsthetic, and prudential motives and emotions, the feelings connected with self-respect, the sense of honor and worthiness, and the religious feelings.

The feelings are essential prerequisites to moral and religious character as motives to action, without which man would never act. He would starve to death because he would feel no motive to eat. If we could conceive a being of pure intelligence without feeling, it would merely know without any interest in knowing or in anything known. It would feel neither pleasure nor pain, joy or sorrow, desire or affection. It would never act, for it would have no motive to act. And susceptibility to the distinctively rational motives is essential to any free moral action. If man were susceptible only of natural appetites and instincts, he could never rise above them to the consciousness of the higher motives and interests of the rational and spiritual life. He would be like the brutes, impelled by the instincts of nature with no power to rise above and control them.

But while the feelings are essential prerequisites to moral action and character, they are not in themselves moral action or character, and moral character cannot be predicated of them.

This also is accordant with universal moral consciousness. The range of feeling is not commensurate with the range of free determination and moral responsibility. One cannot blame himself for being hungry, unless it is in consequence of his own wilful neglect. All the feelings belong to man's nature or constitution. They are not directly subject to the will; they will not come and go at the word of command. They rise instinctively in the presence of the objects which call them forth. We cannot fill our souls at will with joy or sorrow, with hope or fear, with pity or anger. Therefore the feelings cannot in themselves constitute moral or religious character. We are conscious of moral responsibility in them only so far as we have determined their action by our own free wills.

The belief that moral character is primarily in the feelings practically tends to evil. It gives no basis for a supreme and universal moral law and the immutable distinction between right and wrong. It issues in substituting sentiment for duty, — in sentimental admiration of the criminal and sympathy with him, instead of indignation at his crime, sympathy with his victim, and reasonable, righteous, and firm support of the law and of the order of

society, — in gush of feeling instead of self-sacrificing love and its wisely-planned, steadfast, and painstaking service.

The belief that religion is primarily an excitement of the sensibilities, natural or rational, has analogous evil practical tendencies. These evils are apparent in the history of mysticism, which is the name by which this type of religion is designated.¹ This type of religion appears in many and widely different forms. It appears in the intense and lofty aspirations and the ecstatic emotions of a true though one-sided piety, — in the animal excitement of heathen worship, as in the prophets of Baal leaping and shouting and cutting themselves with knives, — in ignorant and noisy, and sometimes brawling and ferocious fanaticism.² Here also belong the phenomena of leaping, whirling, and dancing, of swooning and falling, of babbling, of convulsions, of epidemics of howling like wolves, crowing like cocks, mewing like cats, occasioned by intense religious excitement; phenomena of this type have appeared in all ages and in many religions.³ And it is the same type of religion which appears in worship in which the æsthetic predominates, in architecture, music, vestments, processions, elaborate ritual, and all the solemn pomp and ceremony of worship. It is the same in the naturalistic religion of those who

“Worship nature in the hill and valley,
Not knowing what they love.”

These all, exceedingly different as they are in form, are manifestations of the same type, the religion which is primarily the excitement of the feelings. The brawling vulgarity of fanaticism and the refined æstheticism of the pantheist are the same in kind, a religion of the feelings, which may be fully developed without any change of will. These excitements may reach the highest pitch, they may be æsthetic or sympathetic emotions of which Christ himself is the object, and yet manifest no right religious character. A striking instance is Rousseau's famous panegyric of Christ.⁴ Another remarkable example is Handel. In composing the oratorio of the “Messiah” he would burst into tears. A friend coming in when he was setting to music the

¹ *Self-Revelation of God*, pp. 122-127.

² As in the English Bryanites; *Life of Mr. Hawker, Vicar of Morwenstowe*, pp. 184-189.

³ Tylor, “*Primitive Culture*,” vol. ii. pp. 379 f.

⁴ *Émile*, livre iv., pp. 369, 370; ed. Firmin Didot frères, 1862.

words, "He was despised and rejected of men," found him sobbing. His servant, bringing in his chocolate, sometimes found him weeping as he composed. He said of his feelings in composing the "Alleluia chorus": "I did think I did see all heaven before me and the great God himself." And yet at that time he is said to have been passionate, intemperate, profane, and ungodly.

This prevalence of religious excitability in various forms among all races of men and in all ages is emphatic evidence that man is constituted with religious susceptibilities, so that his soul instinctively cries out for God. There are no human susceptibilities by awakening which man can be wrought to more intense excitement than the religious. Witness the enthusiasm of confessors and martyrs, of missionaries, of workers in all the varied spheres of Christian work, and the exalted spiritual blessedness of Christians in communion with God. The objection is not to appealing to the feelings, but to exciting them merely to flame up in their own heat, instead of stimulating to genuine Christian work and expending themselves in that, — or to unwisely directing them when aroused. Therefore the aim of preaching is not merely to enlighten and convince the intellect, but by this to awaken man's susceptibilities to moral and spiritual motives and emotions. It appeals to his interest in truth; it seeks to arouse his moral and religious susceptibilities; it addresses the æsthetic feelings, as in holding up to his admiration the beauty of Christ's life of love or in appealing to his own aspirations to realize ideals or to advance to larger attainments, a fuller development, a more complete possession and mastery of all his powers, to a higher and better life; it appeals to his fears and to his hopes, to his prudence, to his sense of what is noble and worthy of a rational man. Nor must the appeal be confined to the rational and spiritual feelings. It may be addressed also to the natural or instinctive desires and affections. If some of the young people are becoming unusually interested in seeking God, it is legitimate to use the sympathy of young friends, the enthusiasm and inspiration of a great assembly, the impetus of a popular movement as means of reaching and awakening the moral and religious feelings. And we are not to depend upon preaching alone. Singing and music touch the heart with religious impressions, and worship in all its forms expresses and inflames spiritual affections. It is legitimate also to address the spiritual in man through the eye as well as through

the ear. Church architecture is not to be neglected. Use may be made of flowers, vestments, whatever may make the worship attractive, arrest attention, add to the solemnity of the service and touch the spiritual feelings. In baptism and the Lord's supper our Lord recognizes the need of bringing God and his truth to the heart through the eye and the other senses as well as through the ear in the ministry of the word. And the churches properly make auxiliary arrangements, like Sunday school picnics and church sociables, not intended for direct religious influence, but to promote more intimate acquaintance among those who are identified with the congregation, to attract others and bring them under the influence of the church and its ministrations, and so indirectly to increase its spiritual power. The fear of excitement in religion is often indiscriminating and excessive. The churches at present have more to fear from indifference and spiritual stupor than from excitement.

The regulative principle is that all forms and auxiliaries of spiritual worship and work be really instrumental in awakening spiritual feeling, increasing spiritual power and widening the reach of spiritual influence. When Luther was told that one of the Protestant clergy preached in a surplice, he said, "Let him wear two if he preach Christ." There must be spiritual faith and love enough to vitalize all these forms and instrumentalities and make them wings to bear the soul to heaven. The danger always is of substituting the auxiliary and the instrument for the spiritual feeling and life it was intended to evoke, of resting in the form and the ceremonial and the ritual, instead of rising by it to communion with God and being quickened by it in spiritual life and power. The people may worship the beautiful and costly church edifice more than they worship God; the architect in realizing his æsthetic ideal may have made the building a failure as an audience room, and so, entirely unfit for the end for which it was intended as a house for the ministry of the word; admiration of fine music may crowd out devotion; sociability may be substituted for religion; ceremonial and ritual may take the place of spiritual worship.¹

¹ Augustine, speaking of his delight in music and in the singing in the church, expresses a fear, which he himself says was "over anxious," lest it was mere pleasure in the music instead of devout praise and worship of God. "At other times, shunning over-anxiously this deception, I err in too great strictness, and sometimes to that degree as to wish the whole melody of sweet music which is used with David's Psalter banished from my ears

The impression that religion consists primarily in emotion creates in many a morbid demand for it. It will not come on demand. Failure to attain a satisfactory intensity of anguish for sin, such as some converts have reported, leads some to give up seeking God and often beclouds the hope and disheartens the action of Christians. The demand is for an impossibility; for so soon as the person should begin to feel the desired distress he would immediately rejoice and be very glad. Failure to attain the joy, rapture, ecstasy, which some have experienced, leads to discouragement and gloom, or to violent attempts to arouse feeling; so that mere animal excitement is sometimes mistaken for extraordinary religious experience. A minister said to a man shouting in a prayer-meeting, "Are you as happy as your shouting indicates?" The man replied, "No; I am shouting in order to get happy." One is not to make direct efforts to get up feeling, any more than to put on a pleasant smile or a sorrowful expression on the face, or to shed tears. We are not to seek the exhilaration of religious ecstasy merely for our own enjoyment of it, so that it becomes a sort of spiritual intoxication. Its proper outcome is the quickening of our energies in loving service to God and man. If we trust God and are serving him in righteousness and good-will to men, devoting our energies to the advancement of Christ's kingdom, we may leave our feelings to their own spontaneity.

4. The conclusion is that moral responsibility, moral action, and moral character are of the will. They exist only within the range of what the person freely determines by the will.¹ Hence

and the church's too; and that mode seems to me safer, which I remember to have been told me of Athanasius, bishop of Alexandria, who made the reader of the psalm utter it with so slight inflection of the voice, that it was nearer speaking than singing. Yet when I remember the tears I shed at the psalmody of the church in the beginning of my recovered faith; and how at this time I am moved, not with the singing but with the things sung, when they are sung with a clear voice and modulation most suitable, I acknowledge the great use of this institution." (Confessions, Bk. X. xxxiii. 49, 50.) Fine poetry may quicken the spiritual feeling. It may also displace devotional hymns. The late Rev. Dr. Muhlenberg, himself sometimes charged with excessive ritualism, said: "Keble has written the 'Christian Year.' But the whole School has never produced, as Wesley did, one great hymn of the Christian people."

¹ As Novalis says, "Character is a completely fashioned will"; and James Martineau says, "Character consists, so far as it is good, in right choice." (Study of Religion, vol. ii. p. 57.)

virtue and vice, holiness and sin, are properly said to be voluntary. But the word voluntary has two applications. It is applied to the determinations of the will themselves. A choice or volition is a voluntary act. It is applied also to acts and states resulting from the determinations of the will. When a person throws a stone, the muscular action results from a determination of the will, and so is called a voluntary act. When one sets himself to read a book or to investigate a subject, the intellectual action results from a determination of the will, and so is said to be voluntary. All intellectual opinions and prejudices, all states of the intellect as disciplined, cultivated, and well-informed, or as undisciplined and ignorant, all excitement of feeling and all permanent excitability or torpidity of feeling, and all habits of action physical or mental, so far as resulting from the determinations of the will, are said to be voluntary and the person is held responsible for them.

5. Moral character is voluntary in both these applications of the word. It may, therefore, be distinguished as character in its primary and in its secondary meaning. Primarily, moral character is the fundamental determination of the will, the supreme choice, directing all the energies to their supreme object, and manifested in the subordinate choices and the volitional acts; secondarily, it is the state of the intellect and sensibilities, and the habits of action, as formed or modified by the person in the action of his own free will.

II. CHARACTER IN ITS PRIMARY MEANING. — Moral character in its primary meaning is the supreme choice, manifested and expressed in subordinate choices and volitions accordant with it. It is the choice of the supreme object of the person's entire voluntary action.

1. The object of the supreme choice must be a person or persons. It must be in the sphere of personality. We find two spheres of objects that may be chosen. The one is objects to be acquired, possessed, and used; this is the sphere of the impersonal. The other is persons to be trusted and served; this is the sphere of the personal.

It is evident that the object of a supreme choice, whether the choice be right or wrong, cannot be in the sphere of the impersonal, of any object or product, material or immaterial, to be

acquired, possessed, and used. For always the further question must arise, For whom do you seek to acquire it, for yourself or for another to possess and use it? It must be the object of a subordinate choice, because it is the choice of an object for an ulterior end. But a person is never to be chosen as an object to be acquired, possessed, and used. He is an end in himself to be trusted and served, the trust and service being according to wisdom and righteousness, in conformity with the principles and laws of reason, and for the realization of its ideals of perfection and well-being. Accordingly Kant teaches that personality is the realm of ends, and this is one of his important services in bringing ethics back to the Christian standard. Our Lord teaches that the sum of all worldly values is not equal to the worth of a man (Matth. xvi. 26). He has a dignity and worth above all price. Persons being in the likeness of God are never to be acquired, owned, and used. It follows that every choice or determination of an object to which the energies are to be directed, is really in its full significance the choice of a person or persons as the ultimate object to which the action is directed by the self-determination. The object of the wrong supreme choice is self. The object of the right supreme choice is the whole sphere of personality, yourself, your neighbor as yourself, — that is, your fellowmen equally with yourself so far as they come within the reach of your influence, — and God as supreme. This whole sphere of personality as the object of all our activity is declared by Christ to be the supreme end: “Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness,” that is, the transformation of all human society into the kingdom of God, bringing men into harmony, union, and cooperation with God in realizing in the moral system the highest ideal of perfection and well-being, in accordance with the eternal principles and laws of reason. And because the right supreme choice is of persons, Christian ethics does not consist in abstractions, but deals with persons in the concrete. This is seen in the Christian law of love. It requires supreme love, not of property, office, or fame: not, as many ethical writers have taught, of happiness, of truth, of virtue, of holiness, not even of love itself, the *amor amoris* of some of the old divines, but of persons, of yourself equally with your neighbor, and of both yourself and your neighbor in subordination to supreme love to God. Christian ethics does not evaporate in abstractions, but holds us fast to the

love of persons. It recognizes the greatness of man and the sublimity of his life as a worker with God in universal good-will, regulated in its exercise by wisdom and righteousness in conformity with the truth and law of reason eternal in God, to bring ourselves and all men into union with him, and to transform the whole realm of personality into the kingdom of God.

If now it is asked in what action the supreme choice will manifest itself, the question has already been answered. All human action is either receptive or productive, taking in or putting forth. When one seeks to obtain or receive something from a person, himself or another, for his own possession and use, it is an act of trust. When putting forth his energies to produce something for a person, himself or another, it is an act of service. When we choose a person as the supreme object of our action, the action in which it is manifested will be trust and service. If one chooses self as his supreme object, he will trust himself in self-sufficiency and self-glorifying, and serve himself in self-will and self-seeking. If he chooses himself, his neighbor as having equal rights with himself, and God as supreme, he will trust and serve them. The particular acts of trust and service to particular persons in particular circumstances must be determined, in wisdom and righteousness, by each person for himself. But every particular act will be such as, according to the person's best judgment, will be most effective in advancing the kingdom of God, and so progressively realizing the highest ideal of perfection and well-being.

A finite being must receive before it can produce. God alone can produce without having previously received. This is a law of all animal and vegetable life, and of all inorganic bodies exerting motor force. The same is a law of the free action of finite personal beings. In personal beings the reception is not passive, like a cistern receiving water, but is free action. The person in the consciousness of dependence and need freely trusts himself or some interest of himself to another to manage it for him, or to give him guidance and help in the management. Thus by his own free action he receives help from the person trusted. The receptive action, considered as actively committing an interest to another, is called trust. Thus a sick person trusts his life to a physician and receives his care; a mother trusts her child to a nurse, a man trusts his money to a company in whose capital he invests it. This receptive action is necessary on account of man's

finiteness, dependence, and insufficiency. Human society exists only by continuous reciprocal trust and service. On account of man's dependence on God, his right character can begin only in faith, — that is, in trusting himself and all his interests for time and eternity to God, and thus willingly accepting his grace, freely offered to all who trust him. His Christian life begins in trusting the God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself.

The productive energy corresponds to man's power and freedom. As exerted for some person, himself or another, it is properly called service. The products of energy thus exerted in the service of a person may be material, as food, clothing, wealth of every kind; or immaterial, as learning, skill, physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual development. These are all products to be got, possessed, and used by some person. Within this sphere of what can be got, possessed, and used, the highest and ultimate object of choice should be well-being, or the good estimated by reason as having true worth; and all products, material or immaterial, which are the legitimate means of getting this well-being, are rightly chosen as relative good.

Therefore the object of the supreme choice must be a person or persons. The object of the right supreme choice is God in his relation to all personal beings in the moral system; or, it is God and all rational beings in their real relations in the unity of the universal moral system. By this choice all the person's energy, receptive and productive, is directed, as trust and service, to God as supreme, and to our neighbor as ourselves in our common relations to God in the universal moral system. In the wrong supreme choice a person chooses himself as the supreme object of trust and service. Thus he alienates himself from God and his neighbor, and directs his energies into a life of self-sufficiency, self-will, self-seeking, and self-glorifying.¹

2. The supreme choice, and it alone, combines the essentials of moral character in its primary meaning, as psychologically defined. These are freedom, continuity, unity, and spontaneity.

In the first place, it combines the two essentials, permanence, or continuity, and freedom. Character is distinguished from volitional acts as a continuous, abiding disposition which expresses itself in the action. The natural temperament, disposition, and affections are abiding and continuous. But as inherent in the

¹ Philosophical Basis of Theism, pp. 357-359, and 266-278.

nature or constitution they are not free. Therefore they cannot be in themselves moral character. Freedom is also essential to moral character; therefore character in its primary meaning must be the character of the will. The volitional acts are free acts of will, but they are not abiding and continuous. They cannot constitute moral character. A choice is at once continuous and free. Thus it constitutes character as at once continuous and free. It carries freedom through and through the character; it is free in its origin and in all its continuance and manifestations; for it is in its essence a free choice or elective preference of the will. By continued action it may become so fixed as to be a sort of second nature; yet even then it is still free choice. Choice alone can combine these two elements of moral character, freedom and continuity.

On account of its continuity a choice is not always present in the consciousness; and the same is true of natural temperament and disposition. But whenever the object chosen is thought of in contrast with an object that would displace it, the person is conscious that it is his own free choice. And it will continue so until in his freedom he chooses another object instead of it. For the same reason it is not essential to a choice that the person remember the moment when he first made it. A Christian may not remember the moment when he first chose God in Christ as his supreme object of trust and service. It is sufficient that he is conscious that God is the object of his supreme choice now. One does not remember the precise moment in his childhood when he first became aware of moral obligation and duty, and made his first responsible and moral determination. From the darkness and mystery of his beginning he gradually emerges into the clear consciousness that he is under moral law. He cannot tell the first moment of moral consciousness any more than of the dawn. But he knows it now, as he knows the daylight after the sun is risen. He does not always think of the choice which determines his actions any more than of the daylight when he is working by it. But whenever he thinks of it, it presents itself in the full light of his consciousness as his own present free choice.

Another essential of moral character is unity. There must be some supreme and dominant determination which gives unity to action as well as continuity, while always preserving the moral

freedom. There may be a unity springing from natural temperament or disposition. We speak of the ruling passion. But in this case the person is driven by the instincts and impulses of nature. He drops into brute life, — as a tiger by nature ravens in blood, a sheep crops the grass. There must be a ruling determination which is continuous and dominant and at the same time free. This must be a choice of the will. It cannot be a choice of any object to be acquired, owned, and used; for all these choices are in their essence subordinate. It can only be the supreme choice of a person or persons as the supreme object of all the energies, receptive and productive, in trust and service. This determines the direction of all the energies and thus insures unity as well as continuity and freedom.

A fourth essential element of moral character is spontaneity. Under the impulse of instinctive appetites, desires, affections, and passions of his nature one acts spontaneously. He follows his bent. He needs no constraint to compel him to seek what he desires, nor restraint to repel him from what is repulsive. But this spontaneity in itself is without freedom. It is the same in kind with that of the brutes in following their natural instincts. It is not a spontaneity of character but of nature. Because character is primarily choice it has a similar spontaneity; for choice in its essence carries in it preference for the object chosen. A volition is free, but it does not of itself create spontaneity. Even if it is an immanent purpose, an abiding resolve to do something, still, in itself and aside from the choice which it expresses, it is merely a person's determining to perform an action or a series of actions, not the choice of the object sought in the action nor of the person for whom he seeks it. If volitional acts as distinguished from choice are all that the moral law requires, it would demand only a perfunctory obedience to the categorical command of law in isolated acts. Such a determination would strike none of the deeper springs of human action; it would lack both spontaneity and continuity; it would express only the sense of obligation, perhaps only the fear of punishment constraining to duty; it would not constitute character. But a choice is a preference for the object chosen. Even a subordinate choice of something to be acquired, possessed, and used implies a preference for the chosen object, not a mere arid purpose to do something. It manifests itself in willing and eager effort to get the thing chosen. And the

supreme choice is an elective preference for the person chosen and issues in willing and earnest trust and service. If there were no command and no penalty for disobedience, the person choosing God as the supreme object of active energy spontaneously and willingly trusts and serves him. His language is: "Lo! I come; I delight to do thy will, O God." It is always a pleasure to render service to one we love. An impenitent sinner chooses self as the supreme object of trust and service and delights in every service he can render to himself. And when one chooses God as the supreme object, there are an analogous spontaneity and pleasure in his service. In the supreme choice a person establishes a character above nature and controlling and directing nature; a spontaneity united with freedom. Then he follows the bent of his character as spontaneously as he follows the bent of his nature. His character may at first be in conflict with propensities of nature disordered by sin. But as it becomes fully developed, all the impulses of nature are trained and directed into harmony with it, and his trust and service are rendered without consciousness of constraint or restraint. The fear of penalty and the constraining sense of duty and obligation disappear from his consciousness, lost in the earnestness and joy of his choice of God, as the starlight is, not extinguished, but absorbed and lost to sight in the full light of the sun. His character, thus developed, has become second nature; the law has become written on his heart; he willingly and joyously follows his ruling choice, conscious only that he is acting according to his own strongest preference.

It is evident, therefore, that these four essential elements of moral character, freedom, continuity, unity, and spontaneity, are found in the choice of a person or persons as the supreme object of trust and service, and in no other mental act or state of a personal being. The conclusion is inevitable that this and this alone is moral character in its primary significance.

3. The love required in the law is itself a choice. It is the choice of God as the supreme object of trust and service and of our neighbor as, in our common relation to God, equally with ourselves the object of trust and service. The choice is itself the love. This choice of God and of our neighbor as ourselves certainly implies the devotement of all the energies to them in trust and service. It, therefore, carries in it the trustfulness and self-

devotement characteristic of the love required in the law and of all true love. We have seen that the supreme choice carries in it all the distinctive qualities of character in its primary meaning as psychologically defined. We are now to see that, as the supreme choice of God and of our neighbor as ourselves, it is itself the confiding and self-devoting love required in the law, and takes up all the essential characteristics of a right character as ethically defined.

Because the love is required by the moral law, it cannot consist of mere knowledge or feeling, for they are not under the immediate control of the will and cannot constitute character in its primary sense. It must, therefore, be referred to the will. But love, as moral character, cannot be a mere volition. It must, therefore be a choice or elective preference. The word "love" is used with a great variety of applications. One is said to love an apple, his children, popularity, money, and many other things. Setting aside these, which are mere affections, desires, or even appetites of nature, and discriminating from them the love required of rational persons as the essence of moral character by the law of God, we see that, defined psychologically, it is a free choice of a person or persons as the object of trust and service. It is also to be noticed that this love is required by the law as the essence of all right moral character, as the supreme and dominant principle of all right action. "On these two commandments," love to God as supreme and to our neighbor as ourselves, "hang all the law and the prophets." "Love is the fulfilling of the law." Love, therefore, is the supreme choice which is moral character in its primary sense, and which finds expression in all actions and gives to them moral character. It is a fundamental error of some writers on ethics that they regard love as one of the many virtues, instead of recognizing it as itself the essence of all right character, which manifests itself in the various specific virtues, and gives them their character as virtues. Love is universal good-will regulated in its exercise by wisdom and righteousness; that is, in accordance with the principles and laws of Reason eternal in God, for the realization of its ideal of perfection and well-being. Because the universe is constituted and evolved in accordance with these principles and laws, it is impossible for love to realize perfection and well-being otherwise than in accordance with them, however great the power it directs and controls.

The love implies good-will to all, seeking to promote perfection and well-being. In what the perfection and well-being consist must be determined in righteousness ; that is, in accordance with the eternal principles, laws, and ideals of Reason. And in what specific acts in any given case the good-will is to be exercised, that is, what acts of trust and service are in any case due to the person or persons who are the objects of good-will, must be determined by the best judgment of the person exercising the good-will in view of all the facts in the case and in accordance with the same eternal principles, laws, and ideals, — that is, in righteousness. In both of these ways, the good-will implied in love is exercised in righteousness. In recognizing the specific virtues, we simply indicate the ways in which it is right for a person actuated by Christian love to seek, and possible for him to attain any real perfection and well-being either for himself, or for other individuals, or for mankind.

The doctrine that the love of God and our neighbor is a choice of the will, does not deny the existence of feeling preceding, accompanying and following it: It only distinguishes it from them. It draws a sharply defining line of psychological definition between these accessories and the moral choice in its naked essence. This choice, like all others, is preceded by motives, impulses from the life of nature, and rational motives, scientific, moral, æsthetic, and religious, motives of prudence and of the sense of honor and worthiness. But these are motives only, not the choice or determinations of the will. And the choice of God as the supreme object of trust and service brings in its train a heavenly host of penitential sorrows, of spiritual aspirations, hopes, courage, and joys. In the popular apprehension, these feelings are included in the love and even regarded as the essence of the love. Ask a person what love to God is, and as likely as not he will say it is delight in him. But delight in God is not love ; it is a feeling in which love is manifested. If we speak with exactness, this and other emotions of the new spiritual life are not the love, but consequents and manifestations of love. In fact, these feelings are various in kind ; they are fluctuating and changeful ; they come and go, and, therefore, cannot be the love which is the essence of right moral character in its continuity and unity. If from love we abstract these accessory feelings, commonly included in it in the loose popular conception, and fix our attention on it as constituting

the very gist of moral character, we see that it is the choice of God as the supreme object of trust and service and of our neighbor as equally with ourselves an object of trust and service in our common relations to God. In fact, popular language itself implies, underlying the lack of exact analysis, a real recognition of the fact that love, when thought of as moral character, is regarded as, in its inmost essence, a choice of the will. Why else are love and its contrary so commonly designated as *good-will*, and *ill-will*, as *bene-volence* and *male-volence*?

This choice has also all the essential elements of love in its true significance. It is the positive essence of love, that which constitutes it love and by which it is distinguished as love from every other mental act and character. Certainly, one's choice of a person as the supreme object of trust and service must be love. The person whom one thus chooses, to whom he freely trusts his interests and himself and whom he willingly and by preference serves, must be the person whom he loves supremely. If the person whom he chooses as the supreme object of trust and service is other than himself, then the choice is in itself his renunciation of himself as his supreme object, and is the self-renunciation, self-sacrifice, self-devotement, which is the essential characteristic of all true love. If this conception of love is lost, then love sinks into a natural desire or affection, a longing for something to be acquired, possessed, and used. Love to a person becomes no other than "a desire to have the person present, to possess and to enjoy him."¹ The person is not loved, is not chosen as the object of trust and service, but is only desired as needed by the lover for his own use and enjoyment. It becomes only a form of self-love. Thus the essential significance of love as manifesting itself in trusting and serving the person loved is forgotten, and the Greek *ἔρως* takes the place of *ἀγάπη* in its Christian significance. Then a person's love to God becomes the person's own selfish desire to have God on his side to use his almightiness, wisdom, and love in saving him from hell and making him blessed forever. It is the desire to use God in the service of self. And not only is choice itself, as expressed in trust and service, the positive essence of love, but it has also, as we have seen, the characteristics of continuity, unity, and spontaneity, and in addition the element of moral freedom which the natural affections have not.

¹ H. P. Tappan's definition in "Review of Edwards on the Will," p. 18.

In the life of the spirit, love to a person is the free choice or elective preference of the person as the object of trust and service. In the sphere of the natural or animal life love is an instinctive impulse, desire, or affection. It cannot rise higher, because it cannot transcend the sphere of nature in which it belongs. But a man, though implicated in nature, is also a rational person; therein he transcends nature and is supernatural. Love, as exercised by a person towards a person rational and free like himself, rises above the sphere of nature and its instincts and is a free choice or elective preference. It rises even to God and may choose him as the supreme object of trust and service; or the person may choose himself as supreme object of all his energies, and therein refuse and reject God. And a person is rightfully the object of trust and service; he is never to be acquired, possessed, and used. In declaring that the love required in the law is a free choice, we only recognize the fact that man is a personal spirit transcending nature, and that love exercised by a person to a person must rise above the sphere of the life of nature and all its instincts, and above the sphere of objects to be acquired, possessed, and used, to the sphere of the spiritual system, to persons to be trusted and served. And here is exposed the error of those who hold that love is an affection, — that is, a feeling, not a choice of the will, — and therefore argue that if the love required in the law is a choice, then compassion, lust, parental and filial affection, all instinctive desire, must also be choices. It exposes the fact that their theory, that love is only an affection, allows no distinction between instinctive impulse and moral character, and logically debases the spiritual in man into the natural, and so identifies the spiritual with the natural. A clear recognition of the distinction of the natural from the spiritual in man requires the corresponding distinction between the love which springs instinctively from the nature, though beautiful as a mother's love, and the love which is exercised by the human spirit towards God and man.

4. The theological doctrine that the love required in the law is an affection, and not a choice, is erroneous as a doctrine and dangerous in its practical tendency. It is the doctrine that moral and religious character is primarily feeling, and thus is refuted by all the arguments against that doctrine already presented. It gives no psychological basis for distinguishing moral character

from what is born in us as nature or constitution ; nor for distinguishing the love, which is commanded by the law as a duty and is itself moral character in its primary meaning, from the instinctive affections common to man and the brutes. It marks no psychological distinction of man's love to God or God's love to man from a cow's love to her calf or a dog's love to its master. This doctrine has been widely prevalent from very early times. It has been recently presented in its least exceptionable form by Canon Barry in a lecture on "The Theology of the Affections."¹ Love, he says, as realized in a Christian life is an affection for persons only, primarily for God. "Modern thought, probably under the guidance of Christianity, has certainly outgrown the old pagan notion of love as a merely instinctive and irrational force in man." "It begins in mere instinct ; and this instinct is plainly akin to the instinct of brute creatures, and may assert itself without any relation, or even in antagonism, to the dictates of reason and conscience . . . But while these things are true, it is equally true that love is capable of being so impregnated by reason, as to assume the form of a settled rational principle in the soul, and to prove itself one of the strongest and most continuous of the forces which rule society. . . . It may begin in the instinct of natural and social affections, but is capable of rising, as it does rise every day, into a lofty rational principle." But the very supposition that an instinctive affection, akin to those of the brutes, can itself be elevated into rational principle, confounds all psychological distinctions, and obscures, if it does not even obliterate, the distinction between spirit and nature, between a rational free person and a brute. If we are to preserve this essential distinction, without which both morals and religion would be impossible, moral and religious character cannot be primarily in the instinctive affections of nature, but only in the qualities, powers, and activity distinctive of man in the likeness of God as rational, free, personal spirit. It must be, therefore, in its primary and essential meaning, the choice by a rational free person of the person or persons who shall be the supreme object of all the energies in trust and service. An instinctive affection of nature, however developed, can never transcend its own essential nature ; it must always remain a natural or instinctive affection. It is only as determined and regulated by the will that the man has in its exercise moral char-

¹ "Natural Theology," The Boyle Lectures, 1876, chap. viii. pp. 272-306.

acter; and this is therefore character only in its secondary sense. Accordingly this writer, in describing the rise of the natural affection of love into a rational principle, fails in the attempt, and is continually falling back into the original conception of a natural and instinctive affection. He sees that Christian love is more and other than natural affection, but his inadequate psychological theory that love is an affection or feeling, and therefore denying that moral character is primarily choice, makes it impossible for him either to define clearly or to hold steadfastly the significance of Christian love as transcending all instinctive natural affections. Thus he identifies love with sympathy; declares that "love cannot endure without reciprocity;" it can go forth only in response to love; in the object of one's love there must be "a true likeness of nature shown by the pursuit of common objects, the belief in common truths, the love of common principles." "Where no sympathy is, love cannot last. After vain and often pathetic attempts to imagine sympathy, it will sink into despairing indifference or perhaps turn into contempt and hatred." The necessary inference is that love is limited to the feeling of complacency, that a righteous man cannot love the unrighteous; that God himself cannot love sinners, who do not reciprocate his love and are at all points morally and spiritually in antagonism to him. We almost hear again the terrific words of Edwards in his famous sermon entitled "Sinners in the Hand of an Angry God," and his strong assertions that God "hates" them and has them "in the utmost contempt." But God's fullest revelation of his love is his love to sinners, as he comes into humanity in Christ and abides among men in the Holy Spirit seeking them in their sin to save them from it (John iii. 16; Rom. v. 7, 8). And the highest manifestation of Christian love by men is in the self-sacrificing love of Christians to sinners to save them from sin and reconcile the world to God. Complacency and displacency are feelings incidental to Christian love, because it is supreme love to God and is regulated in its exercise in conformity with God's eternal truth and law. But love, as the determination of the energies by the free choice of the will to persons as the objects of trust and service, and so to the development and extension of the kingdom of God, may co-exist with either complacency or displacency toward the person served. The more repulsive the character of the person served the greater the self-sacrificing love that seeks to serve

and save him. The psychological definition of the love required in God's law as self-determination in free choice is the only definition consistent with the possibility of love to sinners co-existing with displacency toward them. Another inference must be that love, as identical with sympathy, and demanding reciprocity, cannot have "any reference to the little world within;" that is, self cannot be the object of love; and this, notwithstanding the law explicitly commands the love of self on equality with love of the neighbor. Hence this author also finds himself obliged to treat love as not commanded by the law, and to put it into antithesis, and even into antagonism, to duty and righteousness. "Love cannot be fostered by law." This conception of love as an affection, and not a choice, has been a source of false conceptions of the law, and of the antagonism of justice and love and of law and grace, which have been widely current in the churches. But the law requires love, and therein reveals and declares that God is love as really as does his redemptive action in Christ; and God's grace in Christ is the revelation of God's law of love, and of his earnestness in bringing men into harmony with it in love, as really as the law itself; and love is the one all-comprehending duty required in the law. And from identifying love with natural affection he comes to the surprising conclusion that "the extension of the area of affection simply dilutes its power." How greatly diluted, then, must be the universal love required in God's law! The author even speaks of love as "perhaps the best means of softening, purifying, and ennobling the moral nature of man"; apparently forgetting that, as Christ presents it, the command to love God and our neighbor is not a means nor a single statute among many, but it is the law in its universal principle on which all particular commands and duties depend. Thus, in his attempt to elevate a natural affection into the love which the law requires as the essence of all moral character, the love is continually lapsing from the form of "a settled rational principle in the soul," which he would have it assume, and revealing itself in its original and unchanged essence as a natural affection. The author clearly sees and labors to prove that Christian love must be action and character in accordance with reason. He says, "The power of love is in itself a spiritual and moral power." But his psychological conception of it as an instinctive affection developed, at every step vitiates his argument and destroys its force.

Thus this lecture on "The Theology of the Affections" exemplifies the insuperable difficulties and the unavoidable ambiguity inseparable from the development and application of the common doctrine that the love required in the law and revealed in Christ is an affection of the feelings and not a rational free choice of the will; they are difficulties and ambiguity inherent in the false psychology underlying the doctrine and not to be escaped by the ablest treatment of the subject. And in its practical tendency this error is a bar to preaching man's duty to love God so as to make him feel his guilt for his spiritual insensibility and lack of love to God, and his obligation at once to turn to God in repentance for sin and love to God and man.

The advocates of the doctrine that moral character in its primary meaning is an affection, not a choice, commonly regard the exertive or executive volition as the only function of the will. Then, because they must see that character in its continuity, unity, and spontaneity, must be something deeper than these volitions, they are obliged to exclude it from the will altogether; and they assert that it is an affection of the feelings. From this point of view, it is evident, that, in addition to the difficulties already pointed out, this doctrine is incompatible with free will, and logically issues in the doctrine of necessity in the form known as determinism: that the determinations of the will are not caused by the person himself in the exercise of his free will, but by the motive or impulse which at the time is strongest. A volition is not in itself a complete determination. In it the person does not determine the object and direction of his energies, but only exerts them in the direction of the object already determined. But the supposition here in question is that the object to which the energies are to be directed is determined, not by the person himself in his own free choice, but by his feelings, by natural or constitutional affections back of the will and independent of it. Thus the ends to which a person directs his energies are determined not by him in his own free choice, but for him in his nature or constitution. The doctrine in words allows the man the power of volition. But in fact it implies that the man does not determine even his volitions, but that they are determined by the motive or impulse of nature which at the moment is the strongest. Thus the doctrine necessarily lapses from the conception of a man as a rational free spirit in the likeness of God,

to the conception of man as necessarily driven by the impulses of nature in the likeness of the brutes. His only freedom is physical freedom, the freedom from external constraints and restraints, a freedom possessed by every brute which runs at large as really as by man, and regarded by materialistic, pantheistic, and agnostic deniers of free will as the only freedom predicable of man.

Equally necessary would be the inference that the will of God is not free. His love would be a mere feeling of complacency, a natural affection. He would no longer be the absolute Reason energizing in free will. He becomes a great Nature (*Gross Natur*), acting under necessity for the satisfaction of wants. Thus the necessary logical inference from the doctrine is that necessity pervades the universe and there can be no free will either in God or in any finite being.

While those, who have held this psychological definition of character as an affection of the feelings and not a determination of the will, have not accepted all the inferences logically deduced from it, it has been the psychological basis for widely-accepted and baneful erroneous doctrines.

Some German theologians have held that God must be the cause of himself; whatever he is, he must have made himself such; otherwise his essence or constitution would be something given him or imposed on him and would limit and condition him. Thus they fall into pantheistic lines of thought, — that God must be pure action (*actus purus*); that, in the Absolute, being is the same as nothing; the absolute becomes the “abyss” of nothingness. This objection has already been considered; but from our present point of view we may give an additional answer. This refined speculative difficulty must arise from a false conception of God’s essence or constitution as a mere nature, making God a Great Nature necessarily unrolling in seeking to satisfy wants. Such a nature would be a limitation of God and bring him under conditions. But no reasonable being can think of God as limited and conditioned by being the absolute Spirit, eternal Reason energizing freely with almighty power; for thus we ascribe to him, not the limitations of a nature, but the perfections of Spirit wherein he is above nature. These are the essence of God, without which the absolute would have no positive contents, but would be mere action without an agent, an adjective without a noun, a being identical with nothing. The assertion that God creates

himself, conveys no intelligible meaning. The absolute Being is not an effect. But God as absolute Reason and Will is essentially active. He eternally knows the archetype of all truth, right, perfection, and good within himself; he is progressively realizing it in the universe; and his love is his eternal choice in harmony with his eternal reason to realize in the universe, and pre-eminently in the moral system, all that is true, right, perfect, and good, so far as possible in a finite universe and a moral system of finite free and rational persons. Thus in his eternal free choice he eternally creates his own character and by his own eternal free choice determines what he is as the God who is Love. Therefore if we regard God as Spirit and not as nature, and his love as his eternal free choice, the difficulty is removed and the only true sense, in which God causes himself to be what he is, becomes evident.

The same erroneous psychological conception of character as an affection is the basis on which rests the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas that God infuses habits and character into the soul, — a doctrine which in various forms has been widely prevalent. He effects in men holy dispositions without their action; he infuses into men the theological virtues, faith, hope, and charity, and the seven spiritual gifts, wisdom, understanding, knowledge, counsel, fortitude, fear, and the moral virtues. He argues that as God can impart a holy disposition to a person at birth, so he may also in conversion and in any emergency of temptation. But it is because he regards a holy disposition as an affection and therefore not psychologically distinguishable from the natural disposition born in a man, that he can speak of a natural disposition as holy or argue from it that a new character may be infused into a man in conversion. He argues that God can infuse right character into a man without the man's action, because God "can produce the effects of second causes without the second causes themselves."¹ This argument also derives its force from the assumption that the love to God required in the law is a natural affection not distinguishable from the nature which is born in us. It does not follow that God can cause a choice of a free agent without the action of the agent, — for this would be absurd.

The same psychological error gives a basis for the doctrine that God regenerates a sinner by an act of almighty power, without

¹ Summa Theologiae, pars prima secundae, Q. 52, A. 4a.

which man is impotent to accept the offers of the gospel and return to God in penitential and loving trust. This has led theologians to conceive of the grace of God itself as almighty power and to call it irresistible.¹ So Canon Mozley says: "The question of divine grace is a question of divine power. Grace is power. That power whereby God works in nature is called power. That power whereby he works in the wills of his reasonable creatures is called grace." He also alludes to the doctrine of Aristotle that habit and character are formed by action, and declares that the medieval doctrine of the infusion of habits by divine power "was an important modification of the Aristotelian doctrine, which rested too exclusively on acts as the cause of habits. . . . The idea of the divine power, which was not fully embraced by the pagan philosopher, was brought out by the true religion, and applied to the moral as well as to the physical world, to the department of the will as well as to that of matter."²

Another error which finds a psychological basis in this conception of moral character as primarily an affection is the doctrine that a man is born a sinner and guilty of Adam's sin. The doctrine that character is primarily a choice is consistent with the facts of the generic unity of mankind and the powerful and evil influence on the individual from his connection with the race. But it does not permit the belief that a man is a sinner before he has sinned.

Ethics, not less than theology, has been vitiated by indefiniteness of thought and positive errors arising from the lack of exact and correct psychological definitions. These are essential to any right and definite conception of moral responsibility, action, and character, and of the exact bounds of the sphere of ethical science. Through neglecting these definitions, or accepting incorrect ones, ethical writers have often not clearly perceived the bounds of their science and the matter of which it distinctively treats,

¹ "In his battle with Erasmus, Luther affirmed in almost reckless language the impotence of the human will. God's agency was asserted to be the universal cause. His will was declared to be subject to no law, but to be the foundation of right. Predestination was declared to be unconditional and to include as its objects the lost as well as the saved. 'By this thunderbolt,' he said, 'free will is laid low and thoroughly crushed.'" Prof. George P. Fisher, D.D., LL.D., "History of Christian Doctrine," pp. 292, 293.

² The Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination, pp. 302, 274.

excluding what does belong to it and including what does not. Some, for example, recognize the will as the power of volition only, and therefore limit moral character to isolated duties done in obedience to rules regarded as categorical imperatives; thus duty and obedience to law are brought into antagonism to love. Others, seeking an ethics less arid and giving room for the continuity, unity, and spontaneity of character, regard the moral character as consisting in love, but treat the love as itself identical with a natural disposition or affection, and so as one among many of these affections. Thus by their neglect of accurate psychological distinctions they place moral character outside the range of voluntary determination and moral responsibility and thrust it from the legitimate sphere of ethical science. And as a necessary consequence they make it impossible to harmonize their ethics with the law of Christ, which enjoins love, not as one affection among many, but as itself the right moral character in its primary meaning, inspiring, determining, and characterizing moral action in all its ramifications. For the same reason, while there is agreement that man is a free, responsible moral agent and bound under obligation to obey the universal law of love, there is not agreement among ethical schools of different types in the psychological definition of what free will essentially is, of what constitutes a person morally responsible, and what are the exact boundaries of responsible moral action; of what the love is which the law requires, and what are the essentials of moral character. Some regard the will as only power acting in caprice. Others rightly hold that man's free will is his power, in the light of reason and susceptible of the influence of rational motives, to determine both the objects to which he will direct his energies and the exertion of the energies thus directed; thus its determinations are both directive and exertive. And then the deniers and critics of this type of ethics misconceive it as implying that the reason itself is man's only power of determination, and, because reason in its distinctive function can only think, know, and discriminate, but cannot determine, exert, or direct man's causal energy, therefore this type of ethics excludes all real free will whatsoever. Under this misconception of the doctrine Martineau presents as conclusive against this type of ethics an argument totally irrelevant. "Were moral ideas resolvable into rational, right would be a kind of truth and virtue would be constituted by assent. . . . The

sense of duty could never belong to a mere thinking being. . . . Truth necessitates assent. Duty does not necessitate obedience.”¹

Moral action is also presented, not merely as obeying a rule or categorical imperative, but as directed to an end. Then action, in the methods best adapted to attain the end, becomes obligatory. An obligation of this sort Kant calls an hypothetical imperative. But the end itself is very commonly conceived as something to be got, possessed, and used ; and this generalized is called The Good. Here, again, is an ethical system irreconcilable with the law of Christ. For, as we have seen, the ultimate end or object to which the activity of trust and service is determined or directed by the choice, and on which it must ultimately terminate, is always, not something to be acquired, possessed, and used, but a person or persons to be trusted and served. And Christ declares that the object of love required in the law is not wealth, knowledge, happiness, good, nor anything to be acquired, possessed, and used, but God and your neighbor and yourself, persons to be trusted and served.

Differing from all these, Mr. Sidgwick has given to the public a volume on the “Methods of Ethics” in which he declares in the outset that he has no definite opinion as to what a free will is and does not consider an answer to the question essential to ethical science. “I cannot therefore accept that identification of free will with practical reason which lays the transcendental fact of free will at the foundation of ethics. Indeed I hold, with many English moralists, that it would be quite possible to compose a treatise on Ethics which should completely ignore the free will controversy. . . . Although it seems to me that the question of the freedom of the will, in its fundamental and general aspect, has no bearing upon what is intrinsically good for man, or ideally right and reasonable in human conduct, I think it has a special and limited connection with ethics which it is highly important to consider. . . . The freedom of the will presents itself to me as an unsolved problem ; a subject on which, therefore, I am obliged to confess that I have really no knowledge, because I have no consistent thought. There seems, therefore, to be no general connection between systematic ethics and the disputed question of the

¹ Martineau, “Types of Ethical Theory,” vol. ii. p. 421 ; see also Sidgwick, “Methods of Ethics,” p. 45.

freedom of the will ; . . . a question standing merely in a special and very restricted relation to systematic morality.”¹

But the definition of free will and of moral character which I have given, presents a clear conception of free will as man's power of self-determination, both directive and exertive, essential in his constitution as rational, personal spirit in the likeness of God ; and a clear conception of moral character as having all the elements of character and yet within the range of moral responsibility and free will, and pervaded through and through with free determination and constituted character by it. Thus all confounding of moral character with natural affection, disposition or temperament of nature is precluded. And the range of ethical science is exactly defined as coincident with that of moral responsibility, or, what is the same thing, with the range of the determination of the will, both directive and exertive, and including the state of the intellect and of the sensibilities so far as formed or modified by the action of the will. Also the distinction is sharply defined between persons chosen as objects of trust and service, and things, qualities, skill, or objects of any kind chosen as objects to be acquired, possessed, and used. And it is made clear that the choice of the latter must always be subordinate to the choice of the person for whom they are acquired and by whom they are to be possessed and used. And it is evident that the choice of a person as the object of trust and service must be love to that person in the full significance of the word ; and the choice of God as the supreme object of trust and service must be the love with all the heart and mind and strength required in the law. In the sphere of objects to be got, possessed and used, the object of the highest choice is the good. It is seeking for every man his true and highest well-being. This consists for every man in the perfection of his being, his consequent harmony with himself, with his fellow-men, with the course of the universe, and with God, and the happiness involved therein. The good is all included in the kingdom of God. This is the sum of all human perfection and good ; and its advancement and triumph is the progressive realization of the true well-being of man.

The objection has been urged that the doctrine that the love required in the law is a choice, and not an affection, is incompati-

¹ The Methods of Ethics, Bk. i., chap. v. pp. 45, 57.

ble with the constitutional religiousness of man. The answer is that the doctrine not only does not deny man's constitutional religious intuitions and susceptibility to religious motives and emotions pertaining to his idea of a divinity, but it affirms that a man could not have any religious character if constitutionally destitute of them. There would be in him no susceptibility to any motives to religion which could be awakened to induce him to a religious life nor any idea of a God which would make religion intelligible to him. He would be constitutionally as incapable of religion as is any brute. The relation of the constitutional religious susceptibilities to character is analogous to that of the appetites, of all instincts and propensities of nature, of all instinctive desire of knowledge, and of moral motives and emotions. The character for which a man is responsible is not in these, but in man's voluntary determination of his action and the end for which he acts in these several spheres. The same is true in the sphere of religion. Man's constitutional instinctive religious motives and emotions exist and present themselves in consciousness. His character for which he is responsible consists in his determination of his energy under their influence. The argument of the objector is merely the reassertion of the proposition which he would prove, that all character is an instinctive affection, and that man's will is determined by the strongest motive, not by himself freely in the light of reason. Ulrici, on the contrary, arguing that the conscience in man cannot be regarded as the voice of God, says that free will is impossible if a command of God is imprinted clearly and fixedly in the constitution of man.¹ But man's constitutional religiousness is merely his constitutional powers and capacities which make him capable of knowing God, susceptible to the influence of motives to trust and serve him, and capable of receiving God's gracious communications and influences. At the same time the man is free to choose or refuse God's offered grace, to choose God or himself as the supreme object of trust and service. In man's rational constitution the law is revealed to him and in his conscience and moral and religious susceptibilities obedience to it is urged upon him. But it is not imprinted on his heart and life in right moral character and action till by his own free self-determination he makes it the law of his life and consents to the gracious influence of the

¹ Gott und der Mensch, vol. i. pp. 693, 694.

Spirit of God ever seeking to win him to conformity with the law in the life of love. Thus the constitutional capacities are distinguished from the character which the man forms by his own free determination and action. So the moral constitution of man, whereby he is capable of moral ideas and responsibility, moral motives and emotions, and which in this sense may be said to be the voice of God declaring his law in the man's consciousness, is distinguished from his own free action in obeying or disobeying it and the character which he thus freely forms. It is an argument for the doctrine that the love required in the law is a choice, that it sharply defines this distinction between constitution and moral and religious character. It is only the error that this love is an affection which gives plausibility to the objection that, if man is constituted a moral and religious being, he is no longer a free agent, but his action and character are determined for him fixedly in his nature ; or to the converse form of it, that, if moral and religious character is primarily a choice, man must be destitute of a moral and religious constitution.

It may be supposed by some that the close connection here assumed between religious and moral character is an unwarranted enlargement of the sphere of ethics by including religion in it or by identifying religion with morals. But the psychological definition of moral character which has been given seems to give a clear and decisive answer to the vexed question as to the relation of religion to morals. Religion, as the general name of man's consciousness of relation to a divinity manifested in various forms in the religions of the world, has a significance extending beyond the distinctively ethical. But if ever religion in its lowest development existed separate from morals, it is certain that in its normal development it recognizes its relation to morals ; and that the true religion taught by Christ includes moral character. The love to God and man, in which religion essentially consists, is a free choice. As such it is moral character, involving duties both to God and man. Ethics, therefore, must treat of duties both to God and man. It cannot set forth man's duties to man and his moral character in relation to man in their true significance, except as it recognizes man in his relation to God, declares his duty to trust and serve God in supreme love and thus declares his moral character involved therein. The subject matter of ethics must be Love, as the authoritative requirement of the eternal

and universal moral law, — love of God as the supreme object of trust and service, and of our neighbor as, equally with ourselves in our common relations to God, the object of our trust and service. Only thus can ethics exhibit the essential positive principle of right moral character, its essential freedom throughout its continuance, though it should continue forever, and its continuity, unity, and spontaneity. Therefore, as there can be no truly developed religion without morality, so there can be no rightly developed morality without religion.

Another objection has been urged, that, if moral character is primarily man's free choice, it would imply that he is independent of God and able to form a right character without any gracious influence from God. Here, both in urging the objection and in replying to it, there has usually not been a clear perception of the facts in the case. The objection is founded on the fact that moral character is declared to be primarily a free choice. But this declaration implies no independence of God but only the power of self-determination essential to the existence of a free agent. The objection applies with equal force against free will in any exercise of it whatever. It would logically lead to the conclusion recently avowed by a French writer: "If there were a single free being in the universe there would no longer be any God." But, while man is a rational free person, as created and finite he is always dependent on God. His normal condition is that of union with God. Religion in its essence is communion with God. This implies communication from God to man as well as reception by man from God. Man cannot even have any knowledge of God except as God first by his own action reveals himself to him; as he can have no knowledge of the sun except as it first acts and reveals itself. A man cannot realize the highest possibilities of his own being, either in his self-development to his own perfection or in worthy and efficient work, except as God is with him and he is a worker together with God. It is the glad tidings of Christianity that God in redemption is seeking man to redeem him from sin and draw him back to union and communion with himself; and always it is God who first seeks man, not man who first seeks God. God so loved the world that he was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself; antecedent to any right action of man God comes to him with the offers and influences of redeeming grace, proclaiming, "Who-

soever will, let him come." The doctrine that man's love to God is a free choice is in no contradiction to these great truths of the gospel. It simply makes the point that it is by the man's own free choice, if at all, that he yields to the divine influence, willingly accepts the grace offered in the gospel and receives into his soul the heavenly influences which are seeking admission to quicken, enlighten, and sustain him in the spiritual life of love. In this free act receptive of God's grace the man begins the new life. Thenceforward in continuous trust in God he goes on in the Christian life in free and willing service, receiving always by his own free will the divine influence of the now indwelling Spirit.

The doctrine that moral character is primarily free choice is further confirmed by the fact that those who deny it and define moral character psychologically as an affection, find insuperable difficulties in the speculative unfolding and the practical application and use of their theory, and are obliged to seek some higher principle by which to modify it. They, therefore, distinguish the love required in the law from a natural disposition or affection by recognizing in or with it the presence and control of a rational principle; if they conceive of moral character as in its beginning a natural disposition or affection, still in its exercise it has in some way been developed into a rational affection. They call it rational spontaneity, which is only a translation of the *lubentia rationalis* of the older theology. Some have flattered themselves that in this way the question of free will in the moral character has been entirely eliminated; for, the love of God not being an act of will, but a rational spontaneity, the question of free will has nothing to do with it. This phrase involves the admission that moral character must combine spontaneity and rational direction. A natural disposition or affection or instinct is spontaneous in its action. But a spontaneity, which does not imply a choice between two nor a conscious power to choose either, is a mere instinctive spontaneity of nature. It is the spontaneity of brutes as well as of man. It is the spontaneity ascribed to man by materialists and pantheists and positivists who deny man's moral freedom and responsibility. Perceiving this, these theologians qualify the spontaneity of moral affections as rational. The significance of this can be only that the spontaneity is rationally directed. But rationality is precisely that which, qualifying

power, constitutes it free will. It implies that the spontaneity is rationally directed ; and man's self-direction or self-determination is the prime function of free will. The problem is how to define moral character psychologically so as to include the two qualities of spontaneity and rational direction which both parties find actually to exist as essential in it. They cannot both be included in a natural disposition, instinct, or affection, because it cannot rise above itself and rationally direct itself without ceasing to be a mere affection of nature. They are both seen to be essential in free choice so soon as the will is recognized as having the power of choice as well as of volition, of self-direction as well as self-exertion. The free choice of a person as the object of trust and service is in itself an elective preference which carries in it spontaneity ; at the same time it is freely self-directive or self-determining in the light of reason. And this is the only possible rational spontaneity which constitutes a psychological basis for the right conception of moral character.

5. Character as the supreme choice is acted out and expressed in the subordinate choices and volitional acts in harmony with it. The choice of any object to be acquired, possessed, and used is necessarily subordinate to the choice which determines the direction of the energies to a person or persons as the object of trust and service. A subordinate choice is therefore not a complete determination, but is the acting out and expression of a preceding and dominant choice. So also a volition is never a complete determination, but is the actualization and expression of a preceding choice. If one chooses self as the supreme object of trust and service, his choice of wealth or of any object of acquisition, and all his volitional exertion in getting and using it, are the acting out and expression of this supreme selfishness. If he loves God as supreme and his neighbor as himself, his subordinate choices and volitions will be the actualization and expression of this supreme love in acts of trust and service. "He who hath my commandments and keepeth them, he it is who loveth me . . . If a man love me he will keep my word."¹ Therefore the subordinate choices and the volitions, as the actualization of the supreme choice, are properly included in moral character in its primary meaning. And it is not supposable that supreme choice can exist an appreciable time without any corresponding

¹ John xiv. 21, 23.

subordinate choice or volition. Actions speak louder than words. In thought we distinguish the supreme choice from its manifestations, but they are not appreciably separated in fact. The choice carries in it the direction of the energies to the person chosen and its actualization is immediately present at least as a purpose to act in the direction determined by the choice. It will be acted out in distinct acts of trust and service as opportunity is given.

Therefore a volitional action is not moral character in itself, but the acting out of moral character already formed, acting in the direction already determined. Choice aims the gun; volition only pulls the trigger. Hence the same volitional exertion may be right or wrong, according to the supreme choice which it expresses. The same is true of an immanent purpose or resolution to do something; and it is true of a subordinate choice to acquire something for possession and use. One may subject himself to severe self-denial, out of mere miserliness. One may choose learning and education in preference to wealth in order to gratify personal ambition. One may read the Bible and pray and go to church and deny his desires in many ways to save his soul from hell; and he may think he has chosen God as his supreme end in order thus to be saved. But if this is all, his supreme object of trust and service is still himself.

But the choice of God as supreme and our neighbor as ourselves as the object of trust and service is right in itself and not as the actualization and expression of anything anterior to or above itself. And this alone is right moral character in itself. It can never be wrong under any circumstances or conditions. And without this nothing can be right moral character. Thus the ethics of the New Testament amplifies Kant's conception of the good-will as good in itself and gives it contents. Man, self-determining in the light of reason, rises above the sphere of getting, possessing, and using, and sees himself with all his fellow-men in the unity of the moral system in their common relations to God. He sees his range of choice rising and widening into the sphere of personality, the realm of ends, where the activity of getting and using is transcended and ennobled by the activity of trusting and serving. Here he is to choose between himself as the supreme object of trust and service, and God with himself and his fellow-men as having before God equal rights

in the unity of the moral system. When the man chooses the latter, then he, already constituted in his rational, free personality in the likeness of God, rises also in moral character into God's likeness. That choice is itself love. And God is Love. Universal love like that of God is right character in itself and finds actualization and expression in all the subordinate choices and volitional acts and vitalizes them with the same divine character. Then we see that all the well-being of man is included in the kingdom of God and its advancement. Then the man seeks to acquire all good for the possession and use of man in trust in God and in his service in the advancement of his kingdom. Kant says that even if the good-will should altogether lack the means of carrying out its purpose by its utmost striving and nothing should be accomplished, yet the good-will would remain bright in its own goodness. This is true. But, according to the ethics of the New Testament, failure is impossible. The good man may fail to succeed in a particular benevolent enterprise. But he cannot fail to realize the highest possibilities of his own being nor of winning imperishable good for man. Even those who bear the sad but glorious name of Reformers before the Reformation, the martyrs and confessors, all Christian men and women who under whatever discouragements have been faithful workers for Christ, have not failed to advance the kingdom of God and the reign of truth, righteousness, and love.

It follows that the moral character of an act is not determined by its motive. This error is a necessary inference from determinism. If the motive determines the will, and the man does not determine, then the moral character of the act must be referred to the motive. But according to the true doctrine the man determines his own character in his supreme choice, which is actualized and expressed in his subordinate choices and his volitional acts. The moral character of these is therefore determined by the supreme choice which is moral character in its primary meaning.

It is objected that this implies that the end justifies the means, — that it is right to do evil that good may come. But love includes both righteousness and benevolence. It is not unregulated benevolence seeking good at random. It is benevolence always regulated by law and exercised in righteousness. Even what the good is which is possible for man, is determined by the principles

and laws of reason.¹ If one loves God and his neighbor, he must not take any method of rendering service which is contrary to eternal truth and law. In serving one man, he must not violate the rights of another. In serving God, he must not violate the just rights of any man, as, for example, in offering a human sacrifice. There are principles and rules regulating conduct recorded in the Bible, like the Ten Commandments; there are principles and laws ascertained by the experience and observation of men, embodied in common sentiments of morality, in the common law, and in civil statutes, which are guides to right action and must be considered in the exercise of benevolence. Men are bound to educate themselves to right moral discrimination in selecting their methods of doing good.

6. The definition of moral character which has now been given is the only true psychological basis for the doctrine of the New England Theology that sin and holiness are free voluntary actions; and it is necessary for the consistent exposition and intelligent apprehension of that doctrine. The great work of this theology has been to vindicate the freedom of the will, to ascertain the range and bounds of moral responsibility, and to define what constitutes moral character. It has always maintained that the range of moral responsibility is commensurate with that of free will, and that all moral action and character are voluntary. But it has presented different psychological conceptions of voluntariness. The elder Edwards in his philosophical writings refers moral character to the will. A volume designed for popular reading he entitled "A Treatise Concerning Religious Affections." Yet he begins it with this definition: "The affections are no other than the more vigorous and sensible exercise of the inclination and will of the soul." He has not formally distinguished between choice and volition. But he evidently includes among the determinations of the will that which I have defined as choice. In fact, he seems sometimes to resolve all the acts of the will into it: "Whatever names we call the act of the will by, — choosing, refusing, approving, disapproving, liking, disliking, embracing, rejecting, determining, directing, commanding, forbidding, declining, or being averse, a being pleased or displeased, — all may be reduced to this of choosing. For the soul to act voluntarily is evermore to act electively."

¹ Philosophical Basis of Theism, pp. 271-281.

Some have held that the love required in the law is an affection produced by a volition. The love is regarded as an affection. But moral action and character must be voluntary. They recognize volition as the only function of the will. Therefore, holy love can be voluntary only when caused by a volition. But this is contrary to all experience and observation. Affections do not arise at the word of command ; they are not created by volitions. One cannot by a volition create in himself a warm, loving affection for the painted chief of a tribe of cannibals. This theory is also inconsistent with itself as well as with the common moral sense of man. It implies that the moral character is in the affection, while the volition causing it would be without moral character. If to escape this inconsistency it is said that the volition causing the affection of holy love is itself holy, then we have the absurdity that the holy moral character precedes its own existence and creates itself.

Dr. Emmons taught that moral character consists solely of atomistic volitions. Hence, because a volition is a simple act and cannot be divided nor mixed with aught else, a man in a right volition is perfectly holy with no mixture of sinful character, and in a wrong volition he is totally sinful with no mixture of right character. A Christian's growth in grace would be only the less frequent interruption of right acts, in which man is perfectly holy, by wrong ones, in which he is totally sinful. This has sometimes been called the doctrine of simplicity of moral action. It needs no refutation. In preserving the freedom of moral character, it leaves no place for continuity, unity, spontaneity, or any other element essential to the idea of moral character. It does not distinguish character from the acts which manifest it. It excludes character altogether. In fact, it comes near to excluding the person and his personality, leaving nothing but a series of isolated actions without an agent. Dr. Emmons was supposed by many to have pushed his theory to this extreme. To combat this supposed error, President Dwight preached a sermon in the chapel of Yale College, published in his theology under the title, "The Soul of Man not a Series of Ideas and Exercises." Dr. Emmons also taught that God caused by his own immediate action all the volitions of men, the wrong not less than the right. "He exerts his agency in producing all the free and voluntary exercises of every moral agent, as constantly and fully as in pre-

serving and supporting his existence. It is as demonstrably certain that God exerts his agency in upholding all things as that he exerted his agency in creating all things." "He has always been forming vessels of mercy and vessels of wrath from the beginning of the world to this day; and he is now exercising his powerful and irresistible agency upon the heart of every one of the human race and producing either holy or unholy exercises in it." ¹ It is a curiosity in the history of thought that a man of his type of education, belief, and character should have taught doctrines so nearly identical with agnosticism, which regards the human mind as merely a series of states of consciousness, and with pantheism, which recognizes no real agency except that of God.

The common arguments against the doctrine that sin and holiness are voluntary, have been urged against one or another of the defective forms of it. They are of no force against the doctrine rightly defined.

III. CHARACTER IN ITS SECONDARY MEANING. — Moral character in its secondary meaning as psychologically defined, is the state of the intellect and of the sensibilities or feelings, and the habits of action, so far as formed or modified by voluntary action. Therefore, a person, ever after his free moral action begins, is morally responsible and has moral character, right or wrong, in every exercise of the intellect and of the sensibilities and in every habitual action. This is evident for the following reasons.

1. While the states of the intellect and sensibilities and the facility of action acquired by practice have no moral character in themselves but are non-moral, neither right nor wrong, moral character is induced in them by the free action of the will in forming and modifying them.

In his intellectual action a person by his free will directs his attention to particular objects of observation and investigation and to particular topics of thought; he selects the books he will read and the lines of study he will pursue; he subjects himself to processes of education and discipline. Thus the knowledge and the development of intellectual power which he attains are due to his own voluntary self-determination and self-direction. While there are constitutional diversities of talent and genius, superiority

¹ Works, vol. iv. Sermon 28, pp. 383, 388.

of knowledge and of intellectual resources and power is largely created by the person's own diligent and wise direction and exertion of his own powers. Bulwer says, "Purpose is the marrow and backbone of genius." Buffon said, "Genius is a long patience." Though these definitions are more striking than discriminating, there is still an important truth in them. In like manner ignorance and defective intellectual development may be due to the person's own wilful neglect of opportunities and exertion. His errors and prejudices may be due to opposition of his will to the truth. The law of the association of ideas is beyond the control of the human will. But if in a person's mind everything is associated with the vulgar, the sensuous, and the obscene, his own chosen familiarity with such things may have created the association of ideas. It may only show that "his heart is as fat as grease."¹

By the free action of his will a person inflames his natural appetites and desires into unnatural excitability, — as the appetite of a drunkard, the all-absorbing passion of the gambler, and the miser's consuming eagerness to hoard. Even novel-reading may generate an insatiable desire for excitement and mental intoxication destroying all interest in reading for the acquisition of knowledge and culture. By voluntary action the innocent and healthful natural propensities and even the rational and spiritual susceptibilities may be left undeveloped or deadened into torpidity. Accordingly Paul mentions "without natural affection" among the characteristics of extreme depravity.² On the other hand, by his own free action one may develop the natural affections to their normal state and in his choice of God bring all the rational and spiritual motives and emotions into action and develop them all into harmony with each other and with the supreme choice. Thus the man with all his diversified powers and susceptibilities, becomes like a well-ordered commonwealth, developing all its powers and resources in harmony and peace under the rule of righteous and beneficent law.

Habit is a facility in an action or a series of actions and a proclivity to it acquired by voluntary practice. Such is the facility in playing on a musical instrument, in extemporaneous speaking, in an accountant's addition of figures, and the proclivity is

¹ Psalm cxix. 70.

² Rom. i. 31; 2 Tim. iii. 3.

exemplified in numberless ways of acting which have become secondarily automatic and which one finds it exceedingly difficult with the utmost care and pains to avoid. Habit is often not clearly distinguished from character. So Thomas Aquinas uses *habitus*. Modern theologians frequently use the word in a way implying that it is the essence of character; for example, they speak of moral and spiritual growth as if it consisted essentially in forming habits. But habit is only one of the aspects of character in its secondary sense. As a mere facility and proclivity it is non-moral; it is neither right nor wrong. A habit belongs to moral character only because it has been formed by free acts of the will in continued practice.

2. In every impulse of the feelings and proclivity of habit constituting a motive to action, the person freely determines whether to yield to it or resist it; in every intellectual process and conclusion, which has any practical bearing on the life, the will either consents or opposes.

In the sphere of the intellect the action of the will appears both at the conclusion and in the process of investigation. When a conclusion of any investigation has been reached, if it has any practical bearing on life, the person by his free will either consents to it and thus brings his action and life into harmony with it, or he opposes it and lives in disharmony with it. When one has become convinced that he owes a particular service or duty to his neighbor, he must in the exercise of his free will either consent to it and render the service due or oppose it and refuse to render the service. And in any process of investigation, the result of which has any practical bearing on the interests of the investigator or on the well-being of man, the consent or opposition of the will has an important influence on the assent or dissent of the intellect. It may constitute a bias for or against an opinion or conclusion. Or it may constitute the fairness and openness of mind which come from willingness to receive the truth, whatever it may be. And because truth and duty, truth and right character, are always in harmony, he whose will is right with God, the eternal Reason perfect in wisdom and love, is always in an attitude more favorable to the discovery and reception of truth than that of one whose will is fixed in selfishness in opposition to God, the universal Reason, the absolute Truth, Wisdom, and Love. A refined woman is a better judge of cleanliness than a savage in

his wigwam ; a pure person is a better judge of purity than one steeped in the stews of licentiousness ; one who delights in the beautiful is a better judge of beauty than one who is indifferent to it ; an honorable man has the keenest perception of what is honorable and what is mean ; an honest man is the best judge of what is honest as distinguished from fraud ; a virtuous man best knows what virtue is ; and the man who trusts and serves God in supreme love is the best qualified to understand spiritual and religious truth and to discriminate between it and error.¹

This exposes the falsity of the doctrine that total indifference whether any belief is true or false, whatever its practical influence, is the only condition of fair and candid investigation. This error implies that in investigating any subject one must hold as uncertain all which he has supposed himself to know ; must strip himself of all the beliefs which he has lived by, and begin *in puris naturalibus* of intellectual savagery as if he had never known anything. He must put aside as a prejudice any belief which he may have in favor of the law of gravitation, or of the fact that the earth revolves on its axis, or of the moral truth that love is better than malignity. And because he must be always in this knowing nothing attitude it implies that there is nothing to be known. But true intellectual progress is possible only from knowledge to knowledge. The error implies also that there is no true reason in the reality and constitution of things for preferring virtue to vice, or God and your neighbor as yourself, rather than yourself as the supreme object of trust and service. It is only on this supposition that indifference to the practical bearing of beliefs can be a condition essential to the knowledge of truth. If there is reality in the constitution of the universe which is a reason for preference, then he who chooses God and his neighbor as himself as objects of trust and service, is in a condition more favorable to discovering and rightly apprehending the truth than one who chooses self as his supreme object. And according to the principle that like knows like, the one who loves God and all men is the one who is most like God ; for God is love ; and therefore he is one who knows God best. And here, again, the demand for indifference as the essential prerequisite of knowledge implies the impossibility of knowledge. For indifference is justifiable only on the supposition that one proposition is no more true than

¹ John vii. 17 ; 1 Pet. ii. 1, 2 ; 1 Cor. ii. 14, 15.

another, and that there are no unchangeable truths and laws, no reality in the universe on which human well-being depends.

And on the principle that it is a condition prerequisite to candid investigation of truth that the mind be defecated from all interest in its practical bearing, it becomes impossible to attain the knowledge of anything in its true significance. For the universe exists in the unity of a system in which everything is interacting with everything in the unity of the whole. Professor Du Bois says: "The physicist tells us, and tells us truly, that when I simply raise my hand I introduce a disturbance into the vast mechanism, the effects of which extend — must extend — through the whole solar system. . . . That single act we trace back to motion of brain particles. These motions obey my will. By will I raise my hand. To will matter responds. At the bidding of my will the universe is changed."¹ The physical system is in the most intimate correlations with man. Every discovery of science is a guide to invention in giving man control over the powers and resources of nature. Aluminium when discovered was not supposed to be of practical use. But now, if some cheap way of extracting it can be discovered, it promises to revolutionize structural mechanics, and even, as the more sanguine anticipate, to bring in the age of aluminium to succeed the ages of stone, bronze, and iron. One who does not learn the possible practical uses of a substance and applications of a force, has but a very defective knowledge of it. The Baconian advancement of science was not due to his theory of induction, which in fact is no longer recognized by scientists as the true method of scientific discovery. It was due rather to his directing attention away from abstract speculation to the practical uses of knowledge.

We live, also, in the moral system bound in unity under the law of universal love. Here the unity and interaction of all persons in the moral system are closely analogous to the unity and interaction of all bodies and forces in the physical system. The law of love assumes that the action of every person, even of a little child, is to reach up to God and abroad to every rational being to remotest space and through all time. Every being in his moral character and action is putting forth influences which pulsate outward and onward through the moral system. "There is joy in heaven over one sinner who repenteth." A good influence exerted on a

¹ Science and the Spiritual, p. 15.

child in the slums of a city to-day may result in a life of faith and love and blessedness to the child forever, and to innumerable others influenced by the child himself, and to multitudes influenced for good by these others and by those whom they shall influence, in ever increasing numbers forever. In this moral system, to be ignorant of the practical duties and relations which bind persons to each other and the reciprocal practical influences which they exert on each other, is to be ignorant of all that constitutes it a moral system. To be indifferent to these practical relations, duties, and influences is a sin against the fundamental and universal law of love which binds the system together in unity. And because a right moral character consists primarily in universal love, he who does not love God and his neighbor has never known in experience what a right moral character is. He can know it only as a theory. He is as incapacitated for forming a right judgment in moral and spiritual questions as a blind man is for judging of colors or a deaf man for judging of music, knowing only theoretically the laws of light which he has never seen, and of sound which he has never heard.

Under any excitement of the sensibilities the person in the exercise of free will either yields to it or resists it. Thus he is responsible for his action.¹

The same is true of habit. One is under no necessity of acting according to the influence of a habit. He freely consents or resists. It is by consenting and acting accordingly that the habit is strengthened. And by resisting, it may be weakened and its power ultimately broken.

Even if a person follow an impulse thoughtlessly, he does not cease to be morally responsible for doing so. Under whatever impulse of feeling or habit, he can never divest himself of his rationality, nor of his moral freedom and responsibility, nor of his consequent obligation to choose and act aright, nor of his moral character in his action. Even a mother in the exercise of that most beautiful, amiable, and beneficent affection, maternal love, cannot rightfully give herself up to the care and enjoyment of her child with no recognition of the relations of herself and her child to God and man in the moral system, and to the duties incident thereto. And the consciousness of this finds expression in the common language of men. They are wont to say

¹ 1 Cor. x. 31; Matth. v. 28; Eph. iv. 26.

a man has given himself up to the dominion of an appetite or a desire.

It is evident, therefore, that a person is morally responsible, not only for states of intellect and sensibilities, and habits of action formed or modified by his own free action, but also, at every moment when under their influence, for his own free determination consenting to or resisting it. In preaching that the sensibilities and the intellectual activities are non-moral, and have no moral character in themselves, we must not so preach as to imply that the man is without moral character in any of them. For we see that the man has moral responsibility, obligation, and character through all the ramifications of intellect, feeling and habit, and in every act under their influence. So Paul, selecting an appetite apparently the furthest possible from moral and spiritual life, commands: "Whether ye eat or drink, or whatever ye do, do all for the glory of God." So our Lord declares man's moral responsibility and God's exact note of it in the minutest actions. "Whosoever shall give to drink unto one of these little ones a cup of cold water only, in the name of a disciple, verily I say unto you, he shall in no wise lose his reward." "And I say unto you that every idle word which men shall speak, they shall give account thereof in the day of judgment."¹ Thus the minutest voluntary action is weighty with moral responsibility; and may be ennobled and glorified as the expression and actualization of Christian love.

This brings us to the sphere of minor morals; it is properly so called as recognizing obligation to act in Christian love even in little things. The ancients used the same word to express morals and manners. It is evident that politeness and good manners come within the sphere of morals. Politeness in its essence consists in studying to insure the comfort and pleasure of those who are in company with us. It is carrying out the law of Christian love in the minor amenities and courtesies of life. But there has arisen a tacit conventional agreement as to what is agreeable in social intercourse, conformity with which constitutes good manners. These conventionalities of society are not to be disregarded, for they are the safeguard which society has established against inconvenience, and against rude and offensive behavior. It is the duty of a Christian, and especially of a Christian min-

¹ 1 Cor. x. 31; Matth. x. 42; xii. 36.

ister, not only to be “kindly affectioned” toward all, which is the root of real politeness, but also to have good manners ; so that he may not express his kindly spirit in offensive ways, as the donkey in the fable did when it began to frisk and jump on his master in imitation of the dog.

One is responsible even for his looks and his tones of voice. A life of temperance and industry, conformed to the laws of health, develops the body to its best. Habitual benignity and nobleness of spirit beam in the face and give tone and modulation to the voice. Sensuality and other vices imprint bestiality and brutality on the face and form.

But in the sphere of minor morals there is danger of morbid self-consciousness and introspection. If in company one is consciously governing his behaviour by rule, he is inevitably stiff and awkward ; his hands and his feet are in his way and he does not know what to do with them. Analogous must the effect be if in every little act of minor morals he is in like manner consciously hemmed in by the prickly hedge of rules. Hawthorne said of an acquaintance : “ His conscientiousness seems to be a kind of itch keeping him always uneasy and scratching.” And if in these acts one brings to mind all the solemnities of the last judgment and thinks that his eternal destiny depends on doing it just right, it crushes the freedom and ease of life. We must rather cherish the spirit of Christian love to all, in little things as well as great, and form habits of action, so that in all these matters of minor morals we shall act aright spontaneously. In fact we come to act thus spontaneously in the greater deeds of Christian love, when once the character is completely developed and fashioned. Action in the spontaneity of love is ethically of a higher order of character than doing duty under the sense of imperative obligation. So the spontaneous good manners of one trained from childhood in the best society are superior to those of one consciously striving to behave genteelly.

IV. BEGINNING OF MORAL CHARACTER. — By free moral action a person emerges from the non-moral condition of infancy and acquires moral character ; and by his continued moral action, either right or wrong, this character is progressively developed till his supreme choice becomes confirmed and fixed, so that no moral influence will ever induce him to choose the contrary.

Every child originates his moral character when, in the light of reason and under the influence of rational motives, having knowledge of the distinction of right and wrong and being conscious of moral obligation and duty, he makes his first free choice in conscious obedience or disobedience to moral law. A child is born a rational being with rational, moral, and spiritual powers and susceptibilities potential in his constitution, but not yet developed to conscious activity. For some time after birth only the animal life of the organism is revealed. The infant is incapable of knowing God and the distinction between right and wrong. Consequently it is without moral and religious character, incapable of rational, free moral action, and without moral responsibility. The personal spirit is hidden in the organism, like the germ in a seed which in its appropriate environment is about to shoot forth and grow into a tree. When with the growth of the child the rational and moral powers and susceptibilities potential in its constitution are developed into conscious action, then its moral responsibility and character begin and its personality is revealed.

Theologians have often failed to mark accurately the distinction between constitution or nature, and moral character. Many have taught that the nature born in a child is itself sinful. But this identification of moral character with nature annuls all real significance both of moral character and moral responsibility and obligation. Others have used language implying that an infant at birth has no rational, moral, and spiritual constitution, — is not in fact a personal being, but creates its own moral constitution in its first rational and free moral action. Professor James F. Ferrier says: "I have no moral nature before the distinction of right and wrong is revealed to me. My moral nature exists subsequently to this revelation. At any rate I acquire a moral nature, if not after, yet in the very act which brings me the distinction. The distinction exists as an immutable institution of God prior to the existence of our minds. And it is the knowledge of this distinction which forms the prime constituent, not of our moral acquisitions, but of our moral existence." Some go so far as to imply that a man does not become a personal spirit until he is regenerated by the Spirit of God. Others teach that the child is born into a probation in which he determines by his own action whether he shall become a personal, immortal spirit or sink out of being. If he loves, trusts, and serves God, God will make him an immortal

spirit. If he lives in sin, he will never become a rational, living, immortal spirit. But certainly one not already constituted with the potential powers and susceptibilities of a personal spirit cannot be thus on probation. For he would be a mere animal with no power to know God and moral obligation and law, and therefore with no capacity of free will to do right or wrong, to choose God or to refuse him as the supreme object of trust and service. But if we clearly distinguish nature or constitution from character, it is evident that an infant is born with the constitution of a rational, personal being, and that it is his moral character, and not his nature or constitution, which he originates by his own free action.

It may be impossible to determine the precise moment when a child originates its moral character. Its moral development cannot begin by presenting to it the law of universal love. The moral ideas contained in that law must first be attained. And this must be accomplished by attending to detailed precepts rather than to the general principle of the law. The consciousness of moral obligation, of right and wrong, of law and duty, must be awakened and developed by commands and prohibitions of particular acts, — as the commands of a parent to a child. The idea of love must be unfolded in the application of the law of love to particular persons in specific acts. The knowledge of moral relations and of membership in a moral system must be attained in the intercourse of the child with persons of the family who come into immediate communication with it. The family is its world.¹ Thus moral feelings and ideas precede the distinctively religious in the consciousness of the child and prepare the way for the knowledge of God and the higher spiritual apprehension of the law of love. Yet the child is susceptible of the knowledge of God and welcomes it at a very early age. A little boy, whom at bed-time his mother had taught for the first time to pray to God, was overheard, after she had left the room, saying over and over, "I like God." This early receptivity of the idea shows that man is constituted with religious susceptibilities and needs the knowledge of God for his moral development. When the child has attained the knowledge of God, he can intelligently and consciously choose or refuse God as the supreme object of trust and service. But it may be that the will in obeying or dis-

¹ See "Phil. Basis of Theism," pp. 209, 210.

obeying merely moral precepts takes a religious character into itself either of selfishness or of love. God may see love in the child's heart accompanied with very little clear conception of what God is. A little German girl, who was making a cradle-quilt for the child Jesus which she expected to put over him at Christmas, may have been actuated by a genuine love. If so, when she had passed beyond her childlike conceptions and attainments to a truer notion of the God in Christ, she would find herself ready to trust and serve him.

So, in the ruder stages of society, men needed for their moral development and progress commands and rules enforced by authority. As the parent in ruling the children develops their moral susceptibilities and ideas, so in the primitive patriarchal government man was morally developed by the ruler's specific commands and laws. Some anthropologists insist that this was a necessary step in the progress of man beyond the reign of mere power to accept the reign of law in its higher and benign significance as recognizing the rights of man. So the biblical representation is that God began the moral and religious education of the first man and woman by subjecting them to a specific prohibition.

V. DEVELOPMENT AND CONFIRMATION OF CHARACTER. — When a person has thus originated his moral character, he develops and confirms it by continued voluntary action in the direction determined by the choice. This is effected in various lines.

1. The supreme choice itself is strengthened and confirmed both by volitional action in accordance with it and by a clearer and larger comprehension of its significance.

It is continually strengthened and confirmed by volitional action. Men differ in strength of will. One is known as a person of a very strong will, of great strength of purpose. Another is known as of feeble will, irresolute and vacillating. So in the same person there may be a progressive increase of strength of will through persistent acting in accordance with its determination, surmounting all difficulties and resisting all opposition that would deter and all temptations which would entice to a contrary determination.

The supreme choice is also confirmed by clearer and larger comprehension of its real significance. At first an infant follows

its natural instincts and impulses like a little animal. The higher rational and moral powers and susceptibilities give no sign of their influence or presence. It is a grand epoch when first the idea of duty and of the law of God breaks into the mind of a child, sends into his animal life of nature and of sense the first gleam from the higher realm of spirit, awakens his spirit to action and gives him his first glimpse of his spiritual powers and susceptibilities and of his relations to God and the spiritual system. In that epoch, as from the heights of our maturity we see it, the spirit of the child comes forth from the darkness and mystery of birth and takes command of the restless natural appetites and desires, like Jesus coming from the darkness of the night on the turbulent sea and taking command of the waves and the storm. But in his first free moral act the child does not see its grandeur; he is not even aware that it is an epoch in his life; he knows very little of its real significance. His moral powers and susceptibilities have begun to assert themselves in his consciousness. He has been taught, it may be, that God exists, and that it is his law which he is required to obey. His reason, his conscience, and all the higher elements of his constitution take sides with the requirement. But he knows very little of what God is, of what he is himself, of what the moral law and the moral system are, and of what are his own relations to it. Hence his first moral choice is comparatively unintelligent and feeble. It pertains to some particular duty and to the little circle of home and friends that as yet constitutes the whole of his known world, with only the dimmest apprehension of the love which the law requires and of the wide range of duty to God and to all moral beings in the universal moral system. Therefore the measure of his moral responsibility, of his good or ill desert, must be in proportion to the immaturity of his character. And, so gradual is the development of reason, of free will and the rational susceptibilities, it is as impossible to note precisely the beginning of moral responsibility and character, as it is to note the first moment of the dawn. How grand an event is the rising of the sun, how great the change from night to day. And yet the first scarcely distinguishable ray of the dawn is as really of the day and not of the night, as really the opposite and contrary of darkness, as is the noon-day light.

If the child's first moral choice is wrong, it is merely a continued following of the impulses of nature, though now with the

consciousness of not doing right. He does not recognize it in its real significance as the choice of self as the supreme object of trust and service. He does not feel the strength of the motives, nor see the significance of the reasons for obeying, trusting, and serving God. But as, in advancing to maturity, he more and more sees these reasons and motives in their true significance, if he persists in disobedience, by continued resistance his will is strengthened in his dominant choice. It is also true that in the same way his sinful character is more and more revealed to himself as well as to others. Thus seeing his sinfulness he may yield to God's gracious influence drawing men to himself, and turn with penitence to God and choose him as the supreme object of trust and service. This act of turning to God may be the only change of the supreme choice during the person's life and indeed during his immortal existence. It may easily, therefore, assert itself strongly in the consciousness at the moment when the new choice is made; if not it will reveal itself afterwards in the new life. The converted man may be unable to identify the precise moment when the new choice was made, on account of mistaking occasional incidents of the choice for its essentials, mistaking the real character of his own experience.

If, through the instruction and loving Christian nurture of parents and the influence of God's spirit, the child's first moral choice is right, he has the same inadequate conception of its significance, and is at the time scarcely conscious of it as a supreme and dominant choice. As, when the first moral choice is wrong, the child simply continues to follow his natural impulses, — so, when it is right, it is accordant with the impulses and motives of the newly-awakening moral and spiritual powers, and continues its supremacy, sustained by them. Thus it acts with the spontaneity and continuity of a constitutional affection. The child is scarcely conscious of it as a deliberate choice or purpose to do duty, but rather as his spontaneous acting-out of his inmost disposition. He becomes conscious of it as a deliberate choice or self-directing purpose mainly in resisting temptation to sin and in surmounting obstacles and opposition from within or without to doing right. So Joseph said: "How can I do this great wickedness and sin against God?" And Nehemiah said: "So did not I, because of the fear of God."¹ This world is God's

¹ Gen. xxxix. 9; Neh. v. 15.

school for discipline, education, and development; and the probation inseparable therefrom comes inevitably on every person who is born into the world and becomes a moral agent in it. If the child who has made his first moral choice right, advancing to maturity, overcomes all opposition to right-doing, surmounts all difficulties, resists all temptations, sometimes is overpowered and yields, yet through God's grace recovers himself and returns to God, he becomes more and more aware of his own personal powers, duties, and privileges, and of his relations to God and man in the moral system, and thus his love to God and to his neighbor as himself becomes more and more intelligent and steadfast.

2. In the development and confirmation of character the choices themselves exert a protensive influence, that is, an influence reaching forward in time, on subsequent determinations and actions.

This must be so, because a choice, while always free determination, is also abiding. It constitutes character. As such it throws forward a continuous influence on subsequent determinations. It has been shown that a man, in his volitional exertion of power, does not make a complete self-determination, but only expresses a determination already made in a choice. The choice directs the energies to their object. The choice, therefore, as character more or less abiding, exerts an influence forward on action, analogous to that of a constitutional motive. The character is continually expressing itself in action.

The same must be true because a choice implies spontaneity of action. The action is not by constraint but from choice. The person does spontaneously what he desires to do. While choice is continuous and free, so long as it is the person's choice, it is his own elective preference. Thus its influence on the action is analogous to that of a natural affection or any constitutional motive. It may be called an affection of the spirit analogous to the instinctive natural affections,—the former are the free choice of the spirit, the latter are constitutional impulses or affections. Man on his spiritual side creates his own affections. The love which the spirit exercises is the free choice of a person as the object of trust and service.

In both these ways moral character in its primary meaning throws an influence forward on all action and tends to perpetuate

itself. The supreme choice directs all the energies to its chosen object and expresses itself in the subordinate choices and the volitional action. The subordinate choices direct the energies to the acquisition, possession, and use of objects in the line of the supreme choice. And the volitional action forms habits in the same line and so confirms the character. So long, therefore, as a man continues to choose an object, his choices exert a protensive influence to induce action in accordance with themselves, and so to perpetuate and confirm the character.

3. Character is developed and confirmed by its reaction on the constitutional motives, eliciting or suppressing, intensifying or stupefying, regulating and modifying them.

The question has been often asked whether the will has any power to elicit, modify, or determine the motives influencing it. To the determinist, believing that the motive causes the determinations of the will, this question is of vital moment; because to him the only remaining possibility of any moral freedom is in some supposed power of the will over the motives. But the supposition would be for him the absurdity that an effect causes its own cause. The true psychological definition shows clearly that moral character reacts on the motives, and explains the manner and extent of the reaction. It has been shown that choice, in its continuity and spontaneity as character, exerts a protensive influence, analogous to the motive influence of the constitutional desires and affections. We are now to consider the fact that choice, as moral character in its primary meaning, reacts on the appetites, desires, and affections themselves, and on all other constitutional susceptibilities which are motives to action, and elicits or suppresses, intensifies or stupefies, modifies and regulates them.

This fact was noticed in the discussion of moral character in its secondary meaning. The supreme choice may intensify a natural propensity or desire; and then is itself strengthened by the person's continued action under the morbid intensity which by his own free choice he has created. In this way a natural propensity may be strengthened into a ruling passion to which the gratification of all other desires may be sacrificed. For example, acquisitiveness is a natural propensity. When one, who chooses self as his supreme object of trust and service, has chosen wealth as the object to be acquired, possessed, and used as his

chief good, for his selfish gratification, then his selfishness enters like a demon into this innocent natural propensity and infuriates it into the ruling passion. He concentrates all his energies on its gratification and spares himself no sacrifice or self-denial to gain the wealth desired. If it takes the less common form of the desire of hoarding, the miser surpasses all other ascetics in the rigor of his self-denial. If the selfish person seeks his gratification or highest enjoyment in sensual indulgence, the appetite, fevered by continued stimulus and maddened by the selfishness which has entered into it, overmasters all other motives, takes possession of the man, and draws him all his life long in the slough of sensuality. A brute, unless perverted by human training, never has a ruling passion. Its instincts are equally developed according to the law of its being. In man, under the stimulus given by his own free will, any appetite or desire may blaze up and wrap the whole being in its flame. But it can do this only if the person of his own free will stimulates it to mastery and makes himself its slave. In further exemplification of the reaction of character on the constitutional motives another important fact should be mentioned. By a life of sin the moral and spiritual susceptibilities are deadened, and the moral and spiritual discernment dulled. But when, under the gracious drawing of God's Spirit, the sinner returns to God and so renounces self as his supreme object of trust and service, then his moral and spiritual susceptibilities have been awakened, and by his own free choice he has determined in accordance with them. Then the new choice in harmony with these motives reacts on them with a heavenly, vitalizing, and invigorating influence, and they are gradually developed to their normal strength. Thus a person's free choice, whether right or wrong, reacts on his motives and develops them more and more in accord with itself.

4. It follows from what has now been established that a person is able by his free choice to determine to a great extent the sources of his happiness and of his interest in life, and thus the influence of his environment upon him.

The sources of possible enjoyment and of interest in life are determined for every creature by its constitution. A brute can have only those enjoyments of which its organization makes it capable. A lamb cannot find pleasure in ravaging in blood, nor a tiger in eating grass. And from the infusoria through all the ascending

grades to the most intelligent dog, the greater and more varied the powers of the organism, the greater and more varied are its sources of enjoyment. Man is, like the brute, limited by his constitution. But to him, endowed with reason and free-will, are opened also the sources of enjoyment in the sphere of personality; and his environment is not merely, like that of the brute, the physical system, but also the spiritual system in which he is related to God and all personal beings under the universal law of love. He has in common with the brute the pleasures of sense and the enjoyment of natural affections and desires. He is capable, as the brute is not, of joy in wickedness, in the worldly and the devilish. He is capable also of blessedness in the exercise of love like that of Christ. In this wide range and variety of sources of happiness, many of them conflicting and incompatible, he is able to choose the objects or ends of his action. Thus, while the ends of a brute's action and the sources of its enjoyment are determined for it entirely in its nature, the ends of man's action and the sources of his happiness are largely determined by him in his own free choice.

Parental affection is from the beginning potential but inactive in the constitution of man. At the birth of the first-born, it awakens and reveals itself in the consciousness. It opens to the parent new sources of enjoyment, new interests in life, new objects of action, a new sphere of enterprise and energy, a new world in which to live. The birth of the child is a new birth of the parent. In like manner, every natural appetite, desire, and affection opens its own peculiar sphere of interest and action. Each has its own peculiar object, and thus is a source of enjoyment peculiar to itself. Without some appetite, desire, or affection fastening on the object, the person would be incapable of enjoyment or interest in it. One cannot enjoy eating unless he has an appetite for food. Thus man is many-sided. In these various and multiplied susceptibilities, he comes in contact with his environment at many points, and feels it and therein feels himself on many sides. He feels his own many-sided life in contact with his environment. Poor, indeed, would a man's life be, little would he be aware of his many powers and capacities, little would be his interest in life and the stimulus to exertion, if he were susceptible of only one motive, the desire of happiness in the abstract.

Here, from a new point of view, we see the analogy of a free choice in its spontaneity with a natural desire or affection. Every new choice, fixing the preference on some object, opens a new source of enjoyment and of interest in life. One travels abroad, visits the great galleries, educates and develops his æsthetic taste, or he engages in business, or he identifies himself with a political party, or he devotes himself to some enterprise of moral reform. In each case he opens to himself new sources of enjoyment and of interest in life, a new sphere of enterprise, a new world in which to expatiate. He is like an organ with many stops, which he opens and closes at will.

In addition to this, a man in the exercise of his free will wakens or suppresses, intensifies or deadens, modifies or regulates, his natural appetites, desires, and affections. So far as he does this, he opens or closes sources of happiness and interest in life. He may shut himself up for his enjoyment to a supine life of sensuous luxury and self-indulgence, like the three Apicii. He may make himself capable of enjoyment in "plain living and high thinking," — like President Edwards, living among the Indians in Stockbridge, to whom he was a missionary, and where he often was without the common necessaries of life, and there writing some of the philosophical works which have made him famous, and yet so attached to the Indians and his work among them that he shed tears on leaving them to become President of the college at Princeton.¹

¹ Dr. Samuel Hopkins is another example of the simplicity of life of the earlier eminent divines of New England, and their contentedness in it through the elevation of their thought and their earnestness in their work. His earlier ministry was in a small frontier parish of some thirty families, where he lived in poverty. He was, says a biographer, "very temperate in his diet, breakfasting and supping on bread and milk, from a bowl containing about three gills, never varying from that quantity." A later biographer in a recent public address quoted from an original letter in his possession, written in Salem, certainly not at that time a city given to luxurious living: "I find the ministers around Salem and in the eastern part of Massachusetts are great eaters and drinkers. They drink cider; and I must say they are awfully sunken creatures." Dr. Channing says of him: "He was an illustration of the power of our spiritual nature. In narrow circumstances, with few outward indulgences, in great seclusion, he yet found much to enjoy. He lived in a world of thought above all earthly passions. . . . It has been my privilege to meet with other examples of the same character, — with men who, amid privation, under bodily infirmity, and with none of those materials for enjoyment which the multitude are striving for, live in a world

When one choice or one natural desire or affection is contrary to another and incompatible with it, if the first is in possession and mastery of the soul, the second can become a source of enjoyment only by extruding the first. Ye cannot serve God *and* Mammon. A miser bent on hoarding, or a covetous person bent on selfish acquisition, cannot comprehend how there can be any enjoyment in Howard's benevolent expenditure. To him there is no good in it; the very thought of it pains and repels him. So long as a person prefers anything to its contrary he cannot see that the contrary is a good or in any way desirable. A sinner chooses as good what is really evil. So long as he prefers it to its contrary, he regards it as his good and its contrary as evil. This blindness is recognized by Christ, "Except a man be born anew he cannot *see* the kingdom of God." He cannot even see it. Till he chooses God in the new love, he does not see the kingdom of God as the sum of all that is true and right and perfect and good for man; he sees it rather as the embodiment of evil. He is repelled from it; he is in antagonism to it. Thus he falls under the woe of the prophet: "Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness." Milton represents Satan as discovering this, when in despair he cries, "All good to me is lost; evil, be thou my good." This necessity of expelling the old and sinful choice or affection by the new, our Saviour illustrates by the parable of the strong man armed keeping his goods securely in his house until a stronger than he comes and dispossesses him.

So long as a person continues in a choice or preference, he is shut up by it to its object as the source of his enjoyment to the exclusion of its opposite. The opposite may be really the true good; but he does not choose it. He prefers the contrary; and to it he is shut up by his choice as his good. When Christianity was introduced into the Netherlands, a Friesland chief came to the missionary to be baptized. But when the spiritual character of the Christian heaven was explained to him, he was incapable of seeing any good in it, and went away saying in disgust, "I would

of thought and enjoy what affluence never dreamed of, — men having nothing and yet possessing all things, — and the sight of such has done me more good, has spoken more to my head and heart, than many sermons and volumes. I have learned the sufficiency of the mind for itself, its independence of outward things." (Works, vol. iv. pp. 352, 353.)

rather feast with my ancestors in the halls of Odin than live forever in your starveling Christian heaven." Herodias had the offer of whatever she would choose, to the half of the kingdom. And all the good which her revengeful hate permitted her to see in that large offer was the bloody head of the prophet who had rebuked her for her sin. Nero had the whole western world at his command to suck its sweetness as one would suck an orange. And all the enjoyment which his character made it possible for him to find in it were the bestial pleasures of sensuality, the ghastly joy of cruelty, and the joy of an immeasurable vanity and self-conceit. Satan cheats men with the offer of all the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them ; but never tells them that all the joys which they can get therefrom are only those which their own selfish preferences and desires can absorb in their stinted measure and saturate with their own vileness. Thus a sinner is shut up to the objects of his own choice and desire as the sources of his happiness. Hence a selfish person remaining such would be miserable in heaven, for all that life is love. It is not so much that a sinner is cast out of heaven, as that he casts heaven out of himself by the selfishness which excludes the love which constitutes the life and blessedness of heaven. It is not so much that the sinner is cast into hell, as that, by his self-sufficiency, self-will, self-seeking, and self-glorifying, he kindles the fire of hell in his own soul. There is, therefore, a true philosophy in the words which Milton puts into the mouth of Satan in his address to the sun :

"Me miserable! which way shall I fly
 Infinite wrath and infinite despair?
 Which way I fly is hell; myself am hell;
 And in the lowest deep a lower deep
 Still threatening to devour me opens wide,
 To which the hell I suffer is a heaven."

Since, then, every new affection and every new choice opens new sources of enjoyment, and of interest in life, how great must be the change when a sinner under the drawing of God's Spirit renounces self and chooses God as the supreme object of trust and service ! What new sources of joy are opened, what a new world in which to expatiate ! Under the reign of selfishness, the whole horizon of his life, action, and interest encompassed only what he could grasp within his own arms and hug to his own bosom. But when the love of God and man begins, that little firmament

bursts and the real heavens appear opening on and up to God ; that little horizon expands and the sphere of his interest, enterprise, and joy is wide as the reign of God's righteousness, the kingdom of his redeeming grace. He is interested in all whom God in Christ loves and, in advancing his kingdom of redemption, is a worker together with God. This change may be called emphatically the new birth, the entrance into a new life. The man is born of God. How paltry then the objects of his former pursuit, the sources of his former joys, appear. He says with Paul : "What things were gain to me, these I have counted loss for Christ."

Thus man by his own free choice determines the sources of his enjoyment and of his interest in life. He determines the influence of his environment upon him. He may almost be said to create for himself, by God's grace, a new world in which he lives, by the direction he gives to his love.

It is a common saying that a guilty conscience makes a man a coward. It even finds terrors in harmless things. The fleeing thief thinks "each bush an officer." It is an ancient story that Ibycus, dying under the hands of murderers, appealed to some cranes, the only witnesses of the crime, to avenge him ; and that the murderers were detected because, when in a theatre, seeing cranes flying over, one of them exclaimed, "The cranes of Ibycus !" probably thinking they had come to accuse them of their crime. The murderer sees unearthly apparitions created by his own conscious guilt.

"The fiends in his own bosom fill the air
With kindred fiends that drive him to despair."

But the thought which I have been presenting is more than this. It is that the real impression made on a person by his real environment is largely determined by his own choices, desires, and affections. The change in his receptiveness within effects a corresponding change in the impressions received from without. Nature smiles with the cheerful and glooms with the sorrowful. Her beauties are hidden from the anxious and perturbed spirit. "All is marvelous for the poet ; all is divine for the saint ; all is great for the hero ; all is wretched, miserable, ugly, and bad for the base and sordid soul."¹ The heroic spirit is stimulated by obstacles, opposition and danger. Because "there are many ad-

¹ Amiel's Journal, Feb. 5, 1853.

versaries," Paul stays in Ephesus. Joshua and Caleb did not see in Canaan the Anaks and the impregnable cities which filled the eyes of their less courageous companions. A woman coming from her room in the morning in the first joy of her new-found hope in Christ exclaimed, as she looked through the window into the sunshine, that the very chips in the yard seemed to be praising God. The new heart of trust and love is enough of itself to create the new heaven and the new earth.

Persons sometimes excuse their wrong-doing on account of the violence of temptation. But there is a question back of that: How came they to be subject to the temptation? Why are the doors open to the entrance of temptation on that side of their being and closed on the other? One comes to an opening in the side-walk descending to a room whence issue the voices of profaneness and ribaldry and the smell of intoxicating drink; and the temptation is so strong he cannot resist. The next person passing it is disgusted, and flees from it as from a by-way to hell. John Eliot was sorely tempted to extravagant beneficence. Once when paying him a part of his salary, the treasurer tied up the money in a handkerchief with many hard knots, so that he might not give any of it away before reaching home. But on his way Eliot called on a poor widow who was ill; and as he was leaving proposed to give her some of the money for her immediate needs. But finding himself unable, after all his efforts, to untie the knots, he gave it to her handkerchief and all, exclaiming, "I see that Providence evidently intended you should have the whole." Why was the temptation to beneficence so irresistible to him, and the temptation to profligacy and squandering in self-indulgence so irresistible to another? Thus a person is to a great degree responsible for being tempted. We get a deep insight into a person's character when we know what his great temptations are.

5. The development of right character issues in spontaneity of action, excluding the consciousness of constraint and restraint. In this development a person starts from the spontaneity of nature and issues in the spontaneity of free choice. In this choice he determines or directs all his energies to a person or persons as the supreme object of trust and service. This self-direction or self-devotement persists, not merely as an intention or purpose commanding reluctant trust and service, but as a free

choice or preference making the trust and service free and spontaneous. This self-devoting free choice or preference is the moral or spiritual love as distinguished from a natural affection or disposition. When the character is perfected, the action which expresses this love is as free from conscious constraint or restraint, is as completely spontaneous, as is the action under the impulse of an instinctive affection or desire. This is commonly expressed by saying that the character has become a second nature. It is what in ethical philosophy is called Real Freedom, in distinction from the freedom of the will essential to moral responsibility and character. It is "the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free" (Gal. v. 1). "If the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed" (*ὄντως*, in reality, John viii. 36). In this perfect conformity of character and action with the law in willing obedience, the law itself is seen to be "the perfect law of liberty" (James i. 25 ; ii. 12). Accordingly it is true of the child of God that "his delight is in the law of the Lord." "O how love I thy law! It is my meditation all the day." "I delight to do thy will, O my God; yea, thy law is within my heart." Thus God's covenant with those who devote their lives to him in loving trust and service is fulfilled, "I will put my law in their inward parts and write it in their hearts" (Psalm i. 2 ; cxix. 97 ; xl. 8 ; Jerem. xxxi. 33).

That this must be so is a necessary inference from the description of character and its development already given.

The development of a right character must issue in the complete spontaneity of love to God as supreme and to one's neighbor as himself. When the supreme choice has gained its full mastery by resisting and overcoming evil and the subordinate choices and the volitional action are in harmony with it, — when the choices, by reacting on the natural appetites, desires, and affections, intensifying the torpid and reducing the excessive, have brought them all to their normal strength in subordination to the supreme choice, and thus into harmony with one another, — when thus man has opened to himself all the true sources of enjoyment and interest in life and quenched all desire for those which are illusive, — then all the energies and susceptibilities of his being move in harmony with his supreme choice and with each other; all, like tributary streams, flow into and swell the deep and strong current of his love.

This is real freedom.¹ The carrying-out of his love into action is hindered by nothing within himself; all his powers and susceptibilities are penetrated, vitalized, and harmonized by love. He is in harmony with God, following joyfully the drawings of his spirit and delighting to do his will. He is in harmony with the universe, and all its agencies help and serve him; all things work together for his good. Fear is cast out by perfect love. The sense of duty waits in the background, always anticipated by love, which waits not for the categoric imperative of the law. The love is like the motor force in machinery; the sense of duty is the great balance-wheel, perpetuating the motion if the moving force slackens. But in the perfected character there is no occasion for it to assert itself in the consciousness, for love always gets the start of it. A spirit thus perfected in love has changed, as it were, its centre of gravity; it gravitates upward toward God. It says with the angels:

“In our proper motion we ascend
Up to our native seat; descent and fall
To us is adverse.”

All right action becomes spontaneous and unconscious like the processes of life.

’Tis as easy now for the heart to be true
As for the grass to be green or the sky to be blue;
’Tis the natural way of living. — LOWELL.

Both in the body and the spirit the healthy processes of life go on in unconsciousness. The healthy have no consciousness of the circulation of the blood; only when ill does one feel his pulse. Like the life-blood, love flows through the whole spiritual being, vitalizing, organizing, developing it and bringing all into harmony under the power of love; and so spontaneously that it does not attract the person’s attention to himself. Thus are Christ’s words found to be true, “My yoke is easy and my burden is light”; and in exerting our utmost energy in doing his work we find rest. Thus is fulfilled God’s promise of the new covenant: “I will put my law in their inward parts and in their heart will I write it.”

This spontaneity of real freedom is compatible with free will. This has been denied by eminent theologians at different periods

¹ Philosophical Basis of Theism, pp 386–389.

in the history of the church. It has been maintained that when a person has attained this complete development of character, when he does right in the spontaneity of perfect love, and his character has become a second nature, then he ceases to be a free agent and thenceforward acts under necessity. Rothe says that if such a character should be formed, the person would have taken a fate into his will. It has been said: "The highest and the perfect state of the will is a state of necessity; and the power of choice, so far from being essential to a true and genuine will, is its weakness." Then virtue in the heavenly state could be no virtue, because it had ceased to require effort and choice.¹ This error can arise only from the conception that the only freedom of the will is the freedom of indifference and its only function is isolated ictic volition. It implies that after every volition the will, in order to remain free, must return to entire indifference as between right and wrong or any objects of choice, and so must remain always characterless. It implies that if a person has acquired a character having influence on subsequent action, he has impaired his freedom; and should he have developed his character to perfect love he would have destroyed the essential powers and susceptibilities of his personality by which he is constituted a free responsible agent. But according to the true definition of the will and its freedom, moral character is, in its primary meaning, a continuous free choice, and every element of personality and free agency exists unimpaired in the most completely developed character and its most entire spontaneity. This so-called second nature cannot be incompatible with freedom and personality, for it is itself the free choice by which, resisting and overcoming all opposition, the free spirit in man has vitalized, organized, and unified all his powers and susceptibilities in the spiritual life of love, — has advanced, without losing the moral freedom which is the basis of moral responsibility, to real freedom which is freedom in its highest perfection, and has acquired complete possession and command of his whole being, not overmastering it by conscious intention and command,

¹ Kant says: "Virtue is constantly progressive, and yet it has always to begin anew. . . . Were the exercise of virtue to become habit, the agent would thereby lose his freedom" (*Metaphysics of Ethics*, Trans. p. 216). But because he recognizes moral character as of the will, he ought to say that it always is beginning anew in the continuity of free choice; and that its spontaneity and continuity are always in freedom.

but changing it in the deepest springs of its action so that he acts in the spontaneity of love.

On the other hand, it has been held that man has no free will except real freedom. Theologians have failed to note the distinction between moral freedom and real. To this indefiniteness of thought respecting what constitutes a free will is due the wide prevalence of the doctrine that man lost his free will in the Fall, and of the preaching that a sinner has no more power to repent and turn to God than a dead man has to rise from the grave.

The correct psychological definition of free will and of moral responsibility and character takes away all foundation from both these errors.

In the spontaneity of real freedom a person attains his perfect moral and religious character, and his greatest moral and spiritual power. It is often thought that moral power and moral merit are greatest when there is most consciousness of effort, struggle, and conflict in doing right. But certainly when one, with the choice between right and wrong before him, is in doubt which to choose, and can resist the temptation to do wrong only with a painful struggle, his will must be weaker in its determination, farther from being perfected in right character, than his who does not hesitate in suspense for a moment, but chooses and acts right, not only without the consciousness of a struggle, but with delight. Canon Mozley says the merit of the former is the greater, because with a weaker will and a greater struggle he resisted the temptation, which the latter did not even feel. But the contrary is true. Man's strength of will and insensibility to temptation are for the most part the result of his own continued free action. The one who did right spontaneously had either never sunk in evil so deeply as the other, or, by faithful adherence to the right in resistance of temptation, he had already developed his choice of God to greater strength and brought all his lower propensities more into subordination to it. Therefore he has both the stronger determination of will and the greater moral merit and worth. If we deny this, we must suppose, with Canon Mozley,¹ that the more the will confirms itself in the right choice, the more it loses its freedom and falls under necessity, and therefore the less its moral merit and worth. The necessary inference must be that when the moral character becomes perfected in real freedom, and

¹ The Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination, pp. 63, 69.

does right without conscious effort in the spontaneity of perfect love, it will cease to have any moral character, merit, or worth. But it is evident from our whole course of thought, that excellence of moral character, moral and spiritual power, and moral merit and worth are all greatest when, through the full development of love, the spontaneity of action is most complete, and the consciousness of the constraint of obligation and of difficulties and effort in the action is least. Happiness in one's work is a powerful tonic. Interest and enthusiasm in it are motor-forces of immense power. In such enthusiasm we find the fulfilment of God's promise: "They who wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength; they shall mount up with wings as eagles; they shall run and not be weary; they shall walk and not faint."¹

Self-forgetfulness accompanies the highest energy in every sphere of action. Spontaneity of action is a mark of health. It is only when health fails that one feels his pulse and begins to notice the action of his vital organs. The same is characteristic of the highest energy. In the mightiest exertion the whole thought concentrates on the work, in self-forgetfulness. It is a mark of the highest skill acquired by training and education. In learning to walk, to read or write, to use a tool, to play on a piano, the first efforts are self-conscious, painstaking, and laborious, with many mistakes and constant revision, correction and repetition. But when the art is acquired, the action becomes spontaneous and almost automatic. Self-forgetfulness marks also the greatest concentration of the powers. A person intently studying any subject or doing any nice and complicated work is said to bury himself or to lose himself in what he is doing. The same spontaneity and self-forgetfulness appear in the highest excitement of the feelings, in courage, hope, enthusiasm. So, in the moral and spiritual life, character must be developed by discipline, practice, training, education, with introspection and revision, with many mistakes. But the issue of the development must be in the self-forgetful spontaneity of love. Thus a man has his highest excellence of character and puts forth his highest moral and spiritual power when, in the spontaneity of love, he is least conscious of himself in doing it. Accordingly our Lord said: "When thou doest alms, let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth." He does not mean, Keep your good deeds secret from others, but,

¹ Isaiah xl. 31.

Keep them secret from yourself, by the greatness of the love, the enthusiasm of interest, with which you do them.

Here is the significance of those times when a solemn sense of the presence and power of the unseen and spiritual world pervades a whole community, — of those lofty flights of devotion, those great enthusiasms for humanity, those seasons of ecstatic communion with God with which God at times glorifies the life of a Christian. In our mortal bodies we cannot continue a long time on these exalted planes of spiritual life. But they reveal to men the divine that is in them, and the reality and significance of their high privilege as the children of God. As a dark metal, set on fire by a chemist, becomes luminous as it burns, and by the color of its flame reveals through the spectroscope its likeness to an element in the sun, so in these glowing ecstasies of the spirit which sometimes illuminate man's earthly life we see his soul aflame with the glories of heaven and discover his likeness and kinship with God. In these the Christian gains more of the love which is the life-force of the spirit. And in all prayer, searching the scriptures, meditation on divine things, a man is collecting himself for his spiritual work, opening his soul to receive God's love which feeds the springs of love in his own soul; and these springs of love flow from him to bless the world with the water of life.

Therefore real freedom, when it shall be attained, is not a resting and basking in blessedness poured on the passive recipient from without. It is the most intense and powerful action of all the energies in the spontaneity and joy of perfect love. The Christian conception of it is in the strongest possible contrast with the Nirvana of the Buddhist, in which not activity alone, but personality itself are lost in reabsorption into the absolute.

6. The development of a wrong character issues in a spontaneity of selfishness; but with important differences from the development of a right character. It is not real freedom.

The constitutional powers may be developed and strengthened by a life of wickedness so far as their mere exercise can do it; the intellect may become more keen, the thought more vigorous, the will more persistent. So the muscles may be developed by the exercise of a pugilist as really as by the strokes of a blacksmith; keenness of perception, sharpness of cunning, skill and dexterity, may be developed by swindlers and robbers, the powers of a

great general may be developed in wars of ambition and conquest. And in a life of wickedness the moral character is more and more confirmed in sin.

Here the process of development of a wrong character is analogous to that of the development of the right character. The supreme choice of self is gradually strengthened ; the subordinate choices and volitional action fall into line with it ; the natural appetites, desires, and affections are penetrated, perverted, and disordered by it. The intellect also is beclouded and misled. All sin rests on falsehood. The supreme choice of self can be justified only on assuming as true the fundamental lie that the person is himself the source and centre of the universe and that all things exist by and for him and are bound to serve him. Thus acting continually on the basis of falsehood, his understanding is darkened and he is given up to believe lies. His spiritual discernment is dulled ; his conscience is seared ; he becomes less and less conscious of restraint by his higher and spiritual powers. He gravitates toward evil. He rushes eagerly downward in the way of wickedness ; his "steps take hold on hell." Thus his selfishness becomes more and more preponderant and dominant ; his sinful action is less and less obstructed from within himself and goes on in the spontaneity of his supreme choice of self as the supreme object of trust and service.

But he can never attain in the life of selfishness to that simplicity, unity, and harmony of life which is called real freedom and in which his dominant choice is not obstructed from within himself. He must always be in conflict with his reason and conscience, and with all the higher moral and spiritual powers and susceptibilities ; for these, however dulled, can never be extirpated nor cease to witness against him in his sin. And his natural appetites, desires, and affections, being not regulated and harmonized, but perverted and disordered by his supreme choice of self, are in conflict with each other, rending his soul with contending desires. The name of the evil in him is always Legion. And besides being in conflict with himself, he is in conflict with God and with the constitution and on-going of the universe. And he is in conflict with his fellowmen ; for when a man is supremely selfish every other person stands in his way. Therefore a sinner can never attain to real freedom. "The wicked are like the troubled sea ; for it cannot rest, and its waters cast up mire

and dirt. There is no peace, saith my God, to the wicked" (Isa. lvii. 20, 21). On the contrary, because he gives himself up to follow his natural desires, the lowest in him gains the mastery over the highest; and because some one appetite, desire, or affection becomes the master passion, in conflict with all the other desires and leading them captive in its train, the sinner is properly said to be in bondage to sin. And this conflict of passions and this servitude to sin are the consummation of the sinful character. But in all this slavery to sin the man's personality, his moral freedom and responsibility remain. His moral character in its primary meaning, his selfishness in all its manifestations, is still his own free choice or preference; and all the powers and susceptibilities which constitute him a personal free agent remain. By no course or degree of sin can a man extinguish his personality; for that would be to annihilate himself. And only he who creates can annihilate.

7. As the result of this development, moral character is ultimately confirmed and fixed, so that no temptation, motive or moral influence of any kind will induce the person to change it by a new supreme choice.

This is not a physical or constitutional disability to do otherwise. It is mere fixedness of free choice, and of the moral character, which consists primarily in the choice, and which, in its secondary meaning as the state of the intellect and the sensibilities and the habits of action, has been determined by the person's own free choice and volitional action. In a person whose character is thus fixed, reason, free will, susceptibility to rational motives, all the constituent elements of personality, remain.

That character must eventually become thus fixed is a necessary inference from the idea of character and its development which has been set forth. If a person has made the right supreme choice and acted in agreement with it till the trust and service have become spontaneous, the inference is inevitable that no moral influence will ever induce him to reverse it. With a character not yet confirmed he has already resisted and overcome all the moral influences to evil which have tempted him whether by enticement or by opposition. All his beliefs, susceptibilities and choices, and all his habits of action are in harmony with one another and with his supreme choice. By the choice of higher ends and the development of the nobler capacities he has expelled

all desire for the pleasures of sin ; they can no longer tempt him ; he has lost the capacity for enjoying them. His whole being gravitates toward God ; all his interest and enthusiasm centre on God and his kingdom and on the realization in it of all that is true, right, perfect, and good. The Spirit of God is dwelling in him and quickening and inspiring in him the life of love. He is also working in harmony with the constitution of the moral system and of the universe. He is in harmony with God's archetypal ideal of the universe and is working with God in its realization. Thus his character in its highest development is confirmed and fixed and no moral influence will ever induce him to change it.

On the other hand, the person who persists in the supreme choice of self till his trust and service of self have become spontaneous, ultimately confirms and fixes his character in sin, so that no moral influence from the divine wisdom and love will ever induce him to renounce self as the supreme object of trust and service in the choice of God with all his heart and his neighbor as himself as the object of his love. He began his wrong course of life not yet hardened in sin by resistance of God and all influences to a right life. But as he has gone on, God has brought to bear on him every influence which divine wisdom and love permit and require, to induce him to love God with all his heart and his neighbor as himself. All these influences the sinner has resisted. In thus resisting God and persisting in sin he may have developed the constitutional powers and capacities of his personality to great strength. But in doing this he has also confirmed and fixed his moral character in selfishness, which is the essence of sin, so that all the moral influence which divine wisdom and love permit and require to be brought on him will fail to induce him to repent of sin and turn to God in love and obedience. This accords with our Lord's teaching respecting the sin which "shall not be forgiven, neither in this world nor in that which is to come." It is the continued resistance of God's Spirit until the sinner has confirmed his sinful character so that no moral influence will induce him to change it. The final sentence, "Depart," only declares the completeness and consummation of the alienation and separation from God and all true perfection and well-being which the sinner himself has been through all his life wilfully and diligently effecting.

But there is a difference between the persistence or perseverance of the sinner and the persistence or perseverance of the saint. The insurance of the perseverance of the latter in the life of love rests not only on the confirmation of his character by continued acts of trust and service, but on the influence of the indwelling Spirit and the ever environing love of God, quickening, inspiring, guiding, and sustaining him in the right spiritual life. The man is in his normal condition of union with God and working together with him. The divine and the human agencies, both indispensable to his realizing his normal perfection and blessedness, are united and working together for this end. Thus his perfected Christian character of faith and love, of righteousness and good-will, has in it an element of the divine, the unchangeable, and the eternal. It is Christ in him the hope of glory; he "by the power of God is guarded through faith unto salvation" (1 Pet. i. 5). But the sinful character even in its consummation and fixedness has in it nothing of the divine or the eternal. It belongs to the finite; it can never transcend the finiteness of its finite author. It is the sinner himself who chooses himself as the supreme object of trust and service, who by his continued selfish action consolidates his selfishness into fixed character insensible to all motives to a life of faith and love. In so doing not only is there no divine influence moving him thereto, but he is acting in resistance to the ever environing influences of God's wisdom and love and of the Holy Spirit drawing him to the life of faith and love. And even after his sinful character is confirmed and consummated, these same heavenly influences continue to environ him, ready always to touch and move him to a right life, did not his own fixed character make him insensible and inaccessible to them. For God, as he is revealed in Christ, is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever. His redeeming love, his compassion and graciousness, can never cease. He is always ready to receive as a returning prodigal every one for whom Christ died, if he would return. It is only the sinner's own wilful opposition to God and to all good, fixed in a confirmed sinful character, which keeps him forever away. Thus sin, from its beginning through all its action and development and in its final consummation in fixed and consummated character, has in it and is sustained by nothing that is divine. In its essence it is finite and its author finite, rejecting all that is

true, right, perfect, and good, standing in resistance of God and of the never-ceasing influence of his wisdom and love.

VI. NATURAL AND MORAL ABILITY. — I add a brief explanation of natural and moral ability, — a distinction which has played an important part in our theological controversies, though now seldom spoken of. President Day says: “In no department of theology has the confusion of tongues been more complete than in the use of the terms *can* and *cannot*, *ability* and *inability*. Throughout entire campaigns of metaphysical warfare there has been little else than a dexterous brandishing of weapons furnished by this ambiguous phraseology.”¹ With our more exact definitions of the will and of moral character, we may hope to clear the distinction from ambiguity and to present the truth which is in it freed from obscurity and misapprehension.

1. The real distinction in its legitimate application is this. A person has natural ability to cause an effect when he has faculties adequate to cause it under existing circumstances. If the person voluntarily exerts these faculties he causes the effect. If he exerts them in a particular way without premeditated and voluntary purpose as to the effect, he still causes the effect, — as when one injures himself by accidentally running against a post or discharging a pistol. If he does not exert his powers to produce a proposed effect, his natural ability to do it remains unchanged. Natural inability implies that, with whatever voluntary exertion of the faculties under the given circumstances, the person is unable to effect the proposed result. Thus natural ability or inability exists independently of the determination of the will to exert or not to exert the powers. One who has natural ability to cause an effect if he will, continues to have the same ability if he will not.

Moral ability is simply willingness to exert the faculties and cause a proposed effect. It is the determination of the will to do it. Moral inability is unwillingness to exert the powers and cause the effect.

¹ “Inquiry respecting the Self-Determining Power of the Will,” p. 95. The dissatisfaction with this confusion of thought found expression in the popular mind in the doggerel formerly very familiar :

“You can and you can’t;
You will and you won’t;
And you ’ll be damned if you don’t.”

Thus two antecedents are necessary in order that a person may effect a proposed result. One is his possession of faculties adequate to effect the result under the given circumstances; the other is the determination to exert his faculties in order to effect it. The absence of either of these antecedents insures that he will not effect the result. Therefore in popular language the words *can* and *cannot* are used to express the presence or absence of either of these necessary antecedents.

This usage of *can* and *cannot* is common in all languages, and expresses the common consciousness of men. Dr. Erasmus Darwin, having carelessly left his medicine-case after calling on a patient, asked a little boy to run to the house and get it. The boy said he was too tired to run. The doctor handed his gold-headed cane to the boy and told him he would lend him a horse to ride on. Whereupon the boy cantered away in great glee. On his return the doctor said, "You told me you were too tired to run." The boy replied, "I can't run as fast as I can till I have a horse to ride on." A little boy, being told to do something, said, "I don't want to." Being told that he ought to want, he replied, "But I can't want to." These childish utterances show that this use of the words *can* and *cannot* is perfectly natural. And it is because it is so that it prevails in all languages and literatures. It expresses the common consciousness as to the two necessary antecedents of human action which theologians recognize, and try to define in the distinction of natural and moral ability. By this usage of *can* and *will*, *cannot* and *will not*, difference in conscious fixedness of purpose is indicated. If one is asked, Will you do this? and answers, Yes, I *can* do it, it indicates consent of the will in a low degree, in which the person is conscious of scarcely more than the mere power to do it. I *will* do it, indicates stronger determination. But if the reply is negative, I *cannot* do it, it indicates the consciousness of fixed and unchangeable unwillingness. A less fixed determination is indicated by, I *will not*. A mother asked to forsake her child would not say, I *will not*, but, I *cannot*.

This usage of the words is found in the Bible. It appears in speaking of secular affairs; as, "Joseph's brothers hated him and could not speak peaceably unto him." It appears also in speaking of man's spiritual life: "The carnal mind is enmity against God; it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can

be.”¹ There is no more reason for insisting that passages like these declare that man has no natural ability to serve God, and has lost his free will in sin, than for drawing the same inference from the language of a merchant when he says he cannot sell an article of goods for less than he has asked.

The distinction has thus far been defined in its legitimate application to man's efficient action, his exertion of his energies. One has not strength to lift two hundred pounds; or he has not intellectual power and development adequate to solve an intricate problem of calculus. The hindrance here is constitutional or natural. He cannot, if he exerts his power to the utmost. Another has the requisite physical or intellectual power, but does not choose to lift the weight or solve the problem. The hindrance here is not constitutional or natural; it is unwillingness. Hence the former is called natural inability, the latter moral.

2. The distinction is illegitimately applied to the determinations of the will itself. It is said, True, one has ability to effect a result if he will; but has he the ability to *will* to effect it? It is chiefly in attempting to make this application of the distinction that the confusion of thought has arisen.

In this application of it, one's natural ability to will would denote simply the fact that man is a personal being constitutionally endowed with reason and free will; that he is self-determining, both self-directive and self-exertive. So far all is plain.

But the moment moral ability or inability to *will* is asserted, the confusion of thought begins. This assertion is incompatible with the true conception of the will. Moral ability to will would be willingness to will. This carries us at once to the old theory that determination of the will is caused by some act antecedent to the determination, and is not the immediate act of the man determining. Then the *reductio ad absurdum* used by Edwards is applicable, that, if the will is self-determining, every act of the will is caused by a preceding act of will, and so on to infinity. Then we should be driven to the determinism of Edwards, that the determination of the will is caused by the motive, and is not the immediate act of the man himself. If the will is rightly conceived as the person or ego determining, in the

¹ Gen. xxxvii. 4; Matth. xii. 34; Acts iv. 19, 20; x. 47; Gen. xix. 22; Mark vi. 5; John v. 44; vi. 44, 45, 65; Rom. viii. 7.

light of reason and susceptible to the influence of rational motives, both the object and the exertion of his energies, then willingness to will and unwillingness to will become phrases without meaning. Moral ability or inability to will is, therefore, an illegitimate application of the distinction and can issue only in confusion of thought.

The predication of moral ability and inability of the will itself is also a blind attempt to define freedom of the will in terms of power only, without reference to reason and the susceptibility to rational motives and all the essential characteristics of a personal spirit. The result is that freedom of the will, defined in terms of power only, must be defined merely as the power of contrary choice. The futility of this attempt is evident in the definition itself, which is only an attempt to distinguish power from itself and choice from itself. This implies that the power of contrary choice is the same with the power of choice. And this becomes evident when we examine the supposed power to the contrary. This power to the contrary can exist only before the choice is made. In the moment of determining or choosing it is impossible to choose the contrary, because it would be choosing two contrary things at the same moment. After the determination or choice is made a reconsideration and reversal of it would be a new choice, requiring for itself an antecedent power to the contrary. Thus the power of contrary choice is precisely the same with the power of choice ; it is simply the power to determine between two or more objects of action, or between exerting and not exerting the energies. When we remember a choice already made we are aware that we might have chosen the contrary. It is only in this remembrance that the power of choice is thought of as a power of contrary choice ; thus it is only in such a remembrance that the idea of the power of contrary choice originates. A choice must be made of one before it is possible to think of the choice of another as a contrary choice.

3. Natural ability is ability in its primary and proper sense. Moral ability is ability in a secondary, qualified sense ; it is rhetorical rather than logical. President Edwards says : " It must be observed concerning moral inability in each kind of it, that the word inability is used in a sense very diverse from its original import. . . . In the strictest propriety of speech a man has a thing in his power, if he has it in his choice or at his election ;

and a man cannot be truly said to be unable to do a thing, when he can do it if he will. It is improperly said that a person cannot perform those external actions which are dependent on the act of the will, and which would be easily performed if the act of the will were present. And it is in some respects more improperly said that he is unable to exert the acts of the will themselves, because it is more evidently false, with respect to these, that he cannot if he will; for to say so is a downright contradiction; it is to say he cannot will if he does will. And in this case, not only is it true that it is easy for a man to do the thing if he will, but the very willing is the doing; when once he has willed, the thing is performed and nothing else remains to be done. Therefore, in these things to ascribe a non-performance to the want of power or ability is not just, — because the thing wanting is not a being able, but a being willing. There are faculties of mind and a capacity of nature and everything else sufficient, but a disposition, — nothing is wanting but a will.”¹

4. A right understanding of this distinction enables us to comprehend in our thought the truth and to exclude the errors on both sides of the controversy.

On the one side, in emphasizing moral inability, it was said that, whatever may be the natural powers of man, he is so sunk in sin that they are not available for his use, and of himself he will never exert them in repentance and turning to God; that we only deceive him, if we preach his natural ability to repent, and delude him into a fatal self-confidence; that, therefore, it is better to preach only man's inability to turn from sin and his entire dependence on the sovereign grace of God. When I was a pastor, a distinguished college president preached to my people explicitly that a sinner has no more power to repent than a dead man has to rise from the grave. This involves the denial of man's likeness to God as a personal spirit, of his rational free agency, his moral responsibility, and his blameworthiness as a sinner. These facts thus denied are asserted and vindicated by those who emphasize man's natural ability.

On the other side, in emphasizing natural ability, it has been preached that nothing but his own unwillingness prevents any sinner from returning to God in faith and repentance, and that it is as easy for him to do so as it is for one who is walking to turn

¹ Edwards on “The Will,” part i. sect. iv.

about and walk in another direction. But this style of preaching overlooks two momentous facts.

It overlooks the real significance of willingness and unwillingness. It has been shown that character itself is fundamentally the supreme choice of the will; that it is strengthened by continuous action in accordance with it; that it infuses its influence into the intellect, the feelings, and the habits of action, and that thus the character becomes developed and confirmed. The change in a sinner turning to God is the change of this fundamental and supreme choice thus consolidated into character and ramifying into the intellect, the motives and emotions, and the habits. It is a gross misrepresentation to describe this fundamental change as no more than a volitional external action, like turning over the hand or accepting an offered book. The important truth vindicated in the assertion of man's natural ability is, that however a person's character is developed and confirmed either in sin or in holy love, he never loses his free will nor ceases to be a rational free agent, self-determining and responsible for his actions and his character. Another fact often overlooked in emphasizing man's natural ability is the dependence of every personal being for his spiritual development and growth on God who is his spiritual environment. We have seen that man's normal condition is in union with God, and that man cannot enter into this union unless God is graciously disposed to receive him, and so first seeks him with influences to induce him to come. But the man is not passive in receiving God's grace. It is not poured into him without any action on his part. He comes into union with God by freely yielding to the divine drawing, and opening his heart in trust in God to receive his divine influence and to follow it. This receptive act of trust or faith is the free act of the man; it is the condition on which God's gracious influences become effective to bless him. And he has natural ability to trust in God and so to receive continuously the enlightening and quickening influences of the Spirit of God dwelling in him. It requires no strength to surrender, but only the consciousness of weakness. But even to surrender is a free act.

Here we see the truth of the doctrine that a man of himself cannot come to God. But it has been held in connection with two momentous errors. One is that the impossibility of man's returning of himself alone to God rests on his lack of power to do

so ; whereas it arises from the simple and obvious fact that God was not moved by any right action of man to come in Christ reconciling the world to himself, but moved by his own universal love to come to men while they were yet sinners ; and if any man is to be reconciled to God and to be received into union with him, the necessary presupposition must be that God is antecedently gracious and seeking to draw the man to himself. Therefore no man of himself alone can come to God and be accepted of him. But the glad tidings is that God is already seeking all men in his redeeming grace, and whoever will may come. The other error was in the doctrine of God's unconditional election of some to salvation and his preterition or reprobation of others, entirely irrespective of any act or character of the man. Whereas the truth is that God's love encompasses every person like the sunshine, and whosoever will may accept it freely. No man can come to Christ unless the Father draw him. But it is equally true that Christ, when he is lifted up, draws all men unto him.

Theology has not, as many seem to imagine, created the distinction of natural and moral ability, and is not responsible for its existence. It has attempted to define accurately the distinction which really exists, which is recognized in the Bible and in all languages and literatures, and is necessary to any complete and consistent conception of moral agency and of the formation of moral character.

CHAPTER XX

THE REAL PRINCIPLE OF THE LAW

IN the last chapter moral character is defined psychologically. It is now to be defined ethically; that is, as related to and required by law. We are to examine the law itself to ascertain what it is. Here two questions arise. The first is, What is law in its essential idea and significance? What constitutes it law, and what is the ground or reason of the obligation to obey it? The other is, What does the law require? The answer to each of these questions may be expressed in an essential and comprehensive principle. The principle which is the answer to the former of these questions may be called the formal principle of the law, — that is, the principle formative or constitutive of it as law. The principle which is the answer to the latter may be called the real principle of the law, as declaring the essence of the requirement of the law, and therefore the essence of all right character.

The formal principle is, What is true to reason is law to will; or, A rational being ought to act reasonably. When we have ascertained that God exists, the absolute Reason, and that in him all truth and law, all ideals of perfection and good, are archetypal and eternal, then we know that law was never created by any fiat of arbitrary almightiness, nor by any enactment of unregulated and capricious will, but that it is eternal in the divine Reason; and that the universe is the progressive realization, by the action of the divine will in love, of this eternal archetype of the divine Reason. Then the formal principle of the law is that the principles eternal in the divine Reason are law to every rational being; or, Every rational being ought to obey God.

Thus the ultimate ground of the authority of law and of moral obligation to obey it is eternal in God, the absolute Reason. It

is said by some that the ground of authority and obligation is in the constitution of things ; and by others that it is in the rational and moral constitution of man. But these propositions are true only in the sense that the constitution of the universe is itself the expression of the mind of God ; and the rational and moral constitution of man is in God's likeness. They are not the ground of authority and law, but the revelation through which we trace authority and law back to their eternal seat in God.

The other question is as to the real principle of the law : What does the law require? The law or standard of right is eternal in God. But how are we to find out what it requires? This can be ascertained only through God's revelation of himself. Man finds it first revealed in his own reason and conscience, in which God speaks, as it were, in the human soul. As soon as man knows himself in a moral system, he knows that he has no right to live for himself alone, but that he owes duties to others ; that they have rights and interests which he is bound to respect. Accordingly in all literature and history we find more or less clear recognition of obligation to regard the rights of others and to act according to the law of love. And pre-eminently God reveals his law of love in Christ, "the outshining of the Father's glory and the very image of his substance," the exponent to us under human limitations and conditions of the heart and mind of God ; and in all God's revelation of himself establishing his kingdom on earth, culminating in Christ and the outpouring of the Holy Spirit, as recorded in the Bible.

The real principle of the law is declared and exemplified by Christ. It is : Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy might ; and thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.

Ethics must answer both of these questions ; and there have been various theories in answer to each. I refer the reader to the "Philosophical Basis of Theism" for an examination of the idea, significance, and reality of law, and of several of the theories pertaining to this department of ethics.¹ In this and several following chapters I shall answer the question, What does the law require or command?

It has been debated whether ethics is a legitimate topic in

¹ Chap. viii. pp. 180-226. See also chaps. iii., iv. and "God's Right to Sovereignty" in chap. xiv. of volume i.

doctrinal theology. But I cannot conceive of a system of doctrinal theology which leaves out all exposition of the law and moral government of God, a knowledge of which is essential to the right understanding of every theological doctrine. And I cannot conceive of a system of ethics intelligently and rightly developed, which leaves out the law and moral government of God, which are the foundation of all true ethics and are the life and heart of all right morality. If a man denies the existence of God, his own rational and moral constitution remains, he still has intuitive perception of right and wrong, and the knowledge of moral ideas and distinctions, of obligation, duty, and law. Therefore he can construct a system of theoretical and practical ethics. But in denying God he denies the absolute and universal Reason, the fundamental reality which makes a true and complete moral system possible. Therefore, on the basis of this denial, the theory of ethics must be superficial and inadequate, because it leaves out that which gives their deepest significance to the ideas of right and wrong, of obligation and duty, and which gives the only real *rationale* of moral law and government. And the practical ethics must be fragmentary and defective, because it lacks that which alone gives the real principle of the law, the true essence and vitality of moral character, and the comprehensive unity and completeness of moral duties.

But it is not necessary in theology to examine the details of duties belonging to practical ethics. I shall confine myself to an exposition of the real and essential principle of the law from which all particular precepts and duties are to be developed, and to an indication of the various lines of its development in its various aspects and applications. In considering the distribution of duties to particular persons I shall present principles regulating the determination of duty rather than specific duties in detail.

I. THE REAL PRINCIPLE OF THE LAW. — The requirement of the law is expressed in a principle of which all commandments of specific duties are different aspects and applications.

1. This characteristic of the law is essential to the true idea of moral character and action.

The virtues and virtuous acts cannot be comprehended under a general name, nor be included in a class as virtuous or right, unless there is some quality common to them all whereby they are virtuous and right.

Some common quality of all virtues is essential to the existence of moral character. Without it the unity and continuity essential in the very idea of character would be wanting, and character would be impossible. It would give place to isolated acts. Then morality would be disintegrated into a multitude of disconnected and piecemeal duties. The spontaneity essential to right character would also be wanting, and ethics would recognize only the rigid obligation of duty.

Moreover, since the same outward act may be right or may be wrong, the essence of right action and character cannot be anything distinctive of the outward act; it must be the inward ruling choice of the person.

Therefore there must be a real principle of the law declaring what is the essence of all virtues and of all right action, by common participation in which they are all virtuous, — declaring what is the inward and abiding action, state, or disposition of a person which must vitalize all virtues and all right actions and be manifested or expressed in them in order to constitute them virtuous and right.

The reality of this common element of all the virtues, and of the real principle of the law requiring them was recognized by the ancients. Cicero says: "The virtues are so connected that all are participants of all nor can they be separated from one another." "Virtue is the same in God and in man."¹ Plato says in the "Meno": "Though the virtues are many and various, there is one common idea (*εἶδος*) belonging to them all, whereby they are virtues." The same is the teaching of James: "Whoever shall keep the whole law and yet stumble in one point, he is become guilty of all." The precepts of the law rest on the real principle, like pearls on a string. If the string is broken at any point, the pearls are scattered and the necklace ruined. It matters not in what outward act a person renounces God and chooses self as the supreme object of trust and service, — in that act he breaks the law and effects the fatal alienation of himself from God.

2. It is not sufficient to say that the common quality of right action and character is that they are conformed to the law; for this is only saying that all right action and character are right. It does not declare what the law requires as its real and essential

¹ De Finibus, lib. v. 23; De Legibus, lib. i. 8.

principle. It is an attempt to construct a theory of ethics from the formal principle of the law alone. Various ethical systems rest on this error. Kant reduces virtue to the doing of naked duty out of reverence for the law, and purified from all emotion. "I am so to act as to be willing that the maxim regulating my conduct should become a universal law." "Every action is right and just, the maxim of which allows the agent's freedom of choice to harmonize with the freedom of every other person according to a universal law."¹ Aristotle makes virtue to be the mean between two extremes; for example, frugality is the mean between avarice and prodigality. Bishop Butler teaches that the virtuous character consists in the harmony of all the powers of man under the supreme authority of conscience. Rev. W. D. Ground says that "all the other virtues are contained in justice";² but justice denotes merely conformity with law and rendering to all their dues, without defining what the law requires and what is due in obedience to it. These are examples of attempts to construct an ethical theory on the formal principle of the law alone. They declare merely that the essence of a right act or character is its conformity with the law, without informing us what the law requires. They necessarily imply that moral action must consist in the perfunctory doing of isolated and piecemeal duties.

Such an absolute authority which declares no fundamental and essential principle of law, but calls on the subject to obey its arbitrary behests without questioning, whatever they may be, would be no more than a resistless and almighty will; and submission to it would degrade man to a slavish obedience and crush the nobler elements of manhood. The government would be a despotism and its subjects would be slaves. So, under despotism in the lower types of civilization, we read of the slave kissing the hand of the master who was strangling him, and of men, arrested on false accusations, not daring even to deny it, and in fact crushed into stolid indifference to their fate.³

3. The real principle of the requirement of the law is declared by our Saviour in the law of universal love. Its significance is

¹ Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, ed. Rosenkranz, pp. 22, 47, 66, 79; Prakt. Vernunft, p. 141; Die Metaph. der Sitten, Theil I. "Einleitung in die Rechtslehre," § C.

² Structural Principles of Spencer's Philosophy, p. 302.

³ Noiré, "Die Welt als Entwicklung des Geistes," pp. 405, 406.

further disclosed in his personal life, character, teaching, and work. And in the humiliation, suffering, and death, and in all his work as the God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, he has revealed, not only its significance in its practical application, but also as law absolute, unchangeable, inviolable, of supreme and universal authority, eternal in the divine Reason and regulative of the divine action in the constitution and development of the universe. This law requires universal love; the object of the love is God as supreme and our neighbor as ourselves; psychologically defined, the act of love is the person's own free, abiding, and dominant choice of the object to which his energies shall be devoted; and it is manifested in trust and service of the persons loved.

This love is to extend to all God's rational creatures and is to be actively manifested so far as they are our neighbors; that is, so far as they come within the reach of our influence and action. All true ethics consists in unfolding the various aspects and applications of this love and the specific duties involved therein.

It is a defect of many ethical systems that they are not developed from the real principle of the law, and do not even recognize it as such. They, therefore, can present only a multitude of disconnected duties, to be done perfunctorily under the sense of obligation without the spontaneity of love. Even love is often presented, not as the vitalizing spirit of all right character, but as itself one among many isolated virtues. It is not uncommon for both moralists and theologians to imply, and sometimes even to assert that justice is excluded from love and even in conflict with it. Such disintegration of moral law and moral character is logically impossible, when once it is thoroughly understood that Christ's law of love is the real, essential, and all-comprehending principle of the moral law.

II. CLASSIFICATION OF THEORIES.—Having now distinctly recognized the fact that the law is given in a real, essential, and all-comprehending principle, the question before us is, What is this real principle of the law? The psychological definition of moral character as primarily the supreme choice makes it possible to present the question in a still more exact form: What is the object of a right supreme choice? Thus the question is cleared of much which is irrelevant and which has commonly confused

the discussion of the requirement of the law, and we are enabled to define and classify the possible ethical theories in answer to the question as now stated.

There may be two answers to this question : First, The object of the right supreme choice is something to be acquired, possessed and used. Secondly, The object of the right supreme choice is a person or persons to be trusted and served. Under one or the other of these all possible answers to the question as now stated are included. The ethical theories in answer to the question are, therefore, all included in these two classes.

The first class admits two possible subdivisions. All which may rightly be chosen to be acquired and possessed, either for one's self or another, may be comprehended in the Good. The Good, estimated by the standards of reason as having true worth, must comprise both character and happiness. It consists in the perfection of the being and the happiness resulting. A theory of ethics may present either of these separate from the other as the object of the right supreme choice. Thus we have two possible subdivisions of the first class : those which declare that the object of the right supreme choice is happiness, measured only by quantity as to duration and intensity, and those which declare that the object is right character, virtue, or holiness, chosen for its own sake. In the Greek philosophy these two were represented respectively by Epicureanism and Stoicism.

The first of these subdivisions may itself be divided into two. The first of these declares that the object of the supreme choice is the happiness of one's self ; the second declares it to be the maximum of happiness for all. Thus we find three subdivisions of the first class.

There can be no subdivision of the second class. In this the Christian ethics stands alone.

We have now this tabulation of the several classes : —

Class I. — Theories that the object of the supreme choice is something to be acquired and possessed :

1. Egoistic Hedonism or the Self-love Theory, that the object of the right supreme choice is the happiness of the person himself.

2. Universalistic Hedonism or Utilitarianism, the theory that the object of the right supreme choice is the maximum of happiness for all.

3. The theory of rectitude, that the object of the right supreme choice is right character, or holiness chosen for its own sake.

Class II. — The Christian ethics, that the object of the right supreme choice is not anything to be acquired, possessed, and used, but persons to be trusted and served; God as supreme and our neighbor as ourselves as objects of trust and service.

III. THEORIES OF THE FIRST CLASS. The three theories of the first class give erroneous definitions of the real principle of the law. To avoid repetition, the errors common to these three theories will be considered first; afterwards the errors peculiar to and distinctive of each.

1. The fundamental and essential principle of all of them is false. They all assume, as their fundamental and essential principle, that the supreme object of all right action and character is something to be acquired and possessed, not a person to be trusted and served. Or, stated with psychological exactness, that this is the object of the right supreme choice. This involves two fundamental errors: the first is a false conception of the right supreme and ultimate object of human action; the second is a false conception of the action itself. The first error is that the ultimate and supreme object of human action is not a person or persons, but an object to be got and possessed. The second error is that the human action itself consists only in getting, possessing, and using; whereas the fact is that human action is both receptive and productive, both getting and imparting, both taking in and putting forth; and that in these two forms as directed to persons, it consists in acts of trust and service. On account of these errors, fundamental and essential in all these theories, they are all open to the following criticisms.

They all contradict the real principle of the law as declared by Christ. It is not a command to love health, or wealth, or knowledge, or truth, or beauty, or holiness, or happiness; but to love God as supreme with all the heart and our neighbor as ourselves. Words could not declare more explicitly that the object of love or choice, which is required in the law as the primary essence of all virtue, is persons to be trusted and served, not anything to be acquired, possessed, and used.

These theories are also in contradiction to a fundamental principle of true ethics. Kant has shown that the "realm of ends"

is the realm of personality. All true ethics concur in teaching that a person and only a person is an end in himself to be trusted and served ; never an object to be acquired, possessed, and used. That which is impersonal can never be an end in itself. It is always subordinate to the ends of personality. The object of the supreme choice must, therefore, be a person or persons. But these theories present as the supreme object of love and of all action that which is, and in the nature of things must be, subordinate. Whatever is to be acquired, possessed, and used, must be subordinate to an ulterior end. The question remains to be answered, For whom is this object to be acquired and by whom is it to be possessed and enjoyed? It must be subordinate also because, according to true ethics, all which may rightfully be acquired and possessed must be something impersonal ; all the impersonal exists for the higher ends of the personal and spiritual system. Personal beings alone exist as ends in themselves. They are to trust and serve God and one another.

It must be added that these theories present, as the supreme object of action, an object which is impossible and unthinkable. Whether it be happiness or holiness, it is an abstraction which cannot exist nor be thought as existing except as the quality or condition of a being. Language cannot be framed to declare that happiness or holiness is the supreme end of action without conveying the idea that it is the happiness or holiness of some person. One cannot seek happiness or holiness for nobody. Accordingly, the ethical theory founded on hedonism has been divided into two ; and this division rests on the answer to the question, for whom the happiness is sought. This is historical confirmation by hedonists themselves of the truth that the choice of happiness must be subordinate, that the quality or condition of happiness cannot be separated from the person for whom it is sought ; and that the supreme and ultimate object of the action can be found only in the person for whom the happiness is sought. This division has not appeared in the history of the theory of rectitude. But it must appear whenever that theory is thought through. In fact, when, in speaking of a person's seeking anything without specifying for whom, it is always understood that he is seeking it for himself. This was the original assumption of the Epicurean theory. And the theory of rectitude, not specifying for whom the holiness chosen for its own sake is sought, is always

understood to mean that the person is required to seek his own holiness as his chief end.

This is a universe of concrete reality. Knowledge is ontological, the knowledge of beings in their varied powers, receptivities, conditions, and relations. So in ethics we are dealing with the concrete reality of persons and their reciprocal relations, — with men in their real relations to God and to one another. We do not love abstractions. I wish to make my neighbor happy; but I do not love my neighbor's happiness, I love him. I wish to bring him to repentance; but I do not love his repentance, I love him. Therefore, these theories, in requiring the pursuit of happiness or of holiness for its own sake as the chief end of action, require the pursuit of abstractions without concrete reality. And so far as they do this, they are without real meaning. They exemplify and perpetuate that dealing with empty abstractions with which theology has so commonly, and not always unjustly, been reproached. But true ethics and theology deal with the most real and fundamental of all concrete realities.

2. In addition to the errors already mentioned, and common to all three of the theories of the first class, the following are inherent in each of the two hedonistic theories.

They are founded on hedonism, — the doctrine that the good consists of pleasure, enjoyment, or happiness, and that the highest good, the *summum bonum*, is determined only empirically by the quantity of enjoyment as to duration and intensity, — all pleasure or enjoyment being considered the same in kind and of equal worth, and so capable of being added in one sum. The ethical theories founded on hedonism carry in them all the errors involved in that theory of the good.¹

It has already been shown that these two theories as now held, have transcended the original hedonism by recognizing and answering the question, For whom is the happiness sought? for the first asserts that happiness is sought for self; and the second asserts that it is sought for all. But they both still retain, as actually held, many of the errors of the original system.

They both fail to give any independent basis for law and right. They derive the idea of law and the right from the idea of the good as defined above; whereas the good must be defined from the true and the right. By this error law is divested of all author-

¹ See "Philosophical Basis of Theism," pp. 258-266.

ity, of all which constitutes it law and makes its commands imperative and obligatory. It can no longer say, "Thou shalt," and "Thou oughtest," but only, "It is for your interest to do it," "You will find more pleasure in doing it than in not doing it." This involves the denial of the absolute Reason in which all truth and law are eternal, and in accordance with which the universe is constituted; and the denial that man is so constituted in the likeness of God that he knows himself to be under law, under obligation to do duty. Thus it involves the subversion of the whole moral system.

It follows that these theories leave man without any available standard by which to determine what is the highest good. In a universe constituted according to truth and law eternal in the absolute Reason, and realizing and expressing the archetype of God's wisdom and love, it is the truth and law of reason which must determine what good is possible and in what it consists. But these theories teach that the law is derived from the good. Mr. Bentham said, "There ought to be no such word as Ought."¹ Then what the good is can be determined only empirically; all happiness is the same in kind; and the superior good is not superior in kind but only in quantity; and what it is can be known only by ascertaining through some empirical process what quantity of pleasure in the whole of the person's existence would be insured as the result of different actions or lines of action open to him at any time. But it is evident that no finite mind by any empirical process can solve this problem; one cannot thus know in advance all the results of an action for his whole existence, or even for a few months or weeks or days. And besides this, happiness has no fixed objective reality, but is wholly relative to the desires, tastes, and character of the person. The proverb "What is one man's meat is another man's poison" is true of man in all his many-sided being, in the possibilities of diversified and reciprocally exclusive enjoyments, and throughout his endless existence and activity. What a person enjoys, what he seeks as his good, depends on his character and his natural disposition and capacities. A person of one character shrinks with aversion and horror from what another of an opposite character seeks as the source of his highest enjoyment. These theories also assume that pleasures

¹ He cannot avoid using the very word which he would exclude from use.

and enjoyments are all of the same kind, all on the same plane, and of the same intrinsic worth, and that so it is possible to add them up into a total quantity, measuring each, not by its sources, quality, and worth, but only by quantity as to intensity and duration. This is entirely contrary to the facts and to the common consciousness of man. There are many enjoyments which a right-minded man would be ashamed of as unworthy of a rational and virtuous man. Therefore, without a standard of truth and law eternal in the absolute and immutable Reason, and without reason and conscience in man responsive to that eternal law, by which to judge of the worth of objects of pursuit and sources of enjoyment, it is impossible for a person to determine what will give the highest happiness. Suppose an Ahriman, almighty to do evil, should offer to a sinner an eternal sensuous paradise in reward for a selfish and sensual life, and the sinner is to choose between it and the eternal spiritual and holy heaven offered by God in reward for a life of self-sacrificing love. Hedonism gives no principle or law by which he can determine which it is expedient for him to choose. He can decide only in an empirical way. He must decide from his own subjective point of view. And he has always found his enjoyment only in a sensual and selfish life. The spiritual life of self-renouncing love has always been repulsive to him, and he feels himself incapable of enjoyment in it. Thus the distinction between right and wrong has no immovable foundation. The distinction floats on the waves of subjective feeling and character, and on calculations of expediency made under the domination of that subjective feeling and character.

It is also to be considered that non-theistic theories of the universe, when they do not deny moral distinctions altogether, have shown a marked affinity for one or the other of the hedonistic theories of ethics. Intellectual speculation, in whatever denials it may issue, does not annihilate the person's moral constitution, nor extinguish at once all moral ideas and sentiments. Hence, though he denies God and all that can give a reasonable ground for moral distinctions and law, he still feels the necessity of constructing some theory of morals. Then, since he has speculatively rejected all basis for authoritative law, he has no resource but hedonism. Though he has speculatively rejected the authority of law, yet in his moral constitution he has some sense of the real principle of the law. Knowing himself in a moral system he

feels that he ought not to live for himself alone. Then he may rise above the egoistic hedonism and adopt utilitarianism as his theory of ethics. More commonly, however, overlooking both the real and the formal principles of the law, he abides in the theory that every one should make his own enjoyment his supreme and ultimate end. The theory that man has knowledge only of the impressions of sense has been called subjective materialism. It implies that whatever seems true to a person is true to him. It gives no principle which can be a basis for ethics. If applied to ethics it could give only the maxim, Whatever seems right to a person is right to him. But the right could be only the pleasant or agreeable; and the maxim becomes, Whatever is pleasant or agreeable to a person is right to him. And because knowledge is assumed to be only of impressions of sense, the idea of the good or well-being as anything different from these would be excluded. Accordingly Aristippus "taught expressly that the true aim is not happiness, which is the permanent result of many single sensations of pleasure, but the individual concrete sensations of pleasure themselves."¹ Thus non-theistic theories of the universe, if they recognize the fact of man's consciousness of duty and of right and wrong, must accept some form of hedonistic ethics. But both the hedonistic theories are logically incompatible with the true theistic conception of the universe, because they deny that truth and law are eternal in the absolute Reason, and thus antecedent to the universe, determinative of its constitution, and so determinative of what the good is which is possible in the universe, and of the ways in which it should be sought and obtained.

3. The foregoing objections are all valid against both of the hedonistic theories. I proceed to consider objections peculiar to the self-love theory, or Egoistic Hedonism.

It declares self-love, or the desire of one's own happiness, to be the ultimate motive of all rational action. This motive is inherent in the constitution of a rational being; no person can prefer misery to enjoyment when these two are the only objects compared. Therefore, this theory identifies moral character with a constitutional motive or impulse. Therefore, if consistent with itself, it must regard moral character as a natural affection or disposition; as in the nature, not in a choice of the will; as a disposition

¹ Lange, "Geschichte des Materialismus," Bk. I. sect. i. chap. ii.

born in us, not determined by us in the free action of the will. If the theorist denies this and claims that he considers character a free choice of the highest happiness, the answer is that the fundamental postulate of his theory makes moral freedom impossible, because he resolves all motives into the desire of happiness and thus makes this the one only motive of all action. But if man is constituted susceptible to only one motive, then he lacks the constitutional powers and susceptibilities essential to a free moral agent, and free choice is impossible. His character is determined for him in his nature, not by him in his free will. If it is replied that the choice is between happiness and unhappiness, or, what implies the same, between a greater and a less degree of happiness, the answer is that, since man's only motive to act is the desire of happiness, there can be no motive to choose unhappiness in preference to happiness, or a less degree of happiness to a greater. It follows that man, driven by one only motive, is not a free agent.

This theory gives no basis for a theodicy. To the question, What is God's chief end in creating and governing the universe? the answer is, To make himself happy. Why does God punish the wicked? Because he enjoys it. Why does he not do more, or otherwise than he does, to prevent sin? Because it would make him unhappy. There is no law eternal in the divine reason regulating the action of the divine will, determining the constitution of the universe and the good possible in it. On the contrary, God is conceived as a Great Nature having wants and acting only for their satisfaction and the happiness attained in it.

Another objection to this theory is that the character which it requires as virtuous is not essentially distinguishable from selfishness. The definitions of virtue and of vice are in the same words. Using the phraseology of the proper psychological definition of character, this theory would define both virtue and vice to be alike the choice of one's own happiness as the supreme and ultimate object of all action. Whatever terminology is used, in both virtuous action and in vicious the supreme and ultimate object of pursuit is one and the same, the person's own happiness. Here, the objection may be urged that there is a difference, because virtue is the choice of the superior and vice of the inferior good. The answer is that the theory admits no independent law of right, establishing a criterion by which to dis-

tinguish the superior good from the inferior. They can be distinguished only by some attempt to estimate empirically the quantity of enjoyment. There is no place in the theory for righteousness and justice, but only for expediency. Therefore there is no distinction of moral character between virtue and vice. The distinction is only in the greater or less shrewdness of the person in selecting the objects and pursuits which will impart the most happiness. The character required is in its essence selfishness. It is a matter of common observation that when one begins to calculate the personal advantages and disadvantages of a wrong action, his virtue is already faltering and he is likely to do the wrong act. But the theory under consideration excludes all immediate appeal to law and to an intuitive sense of obligation and right, and requires in every instance a calculation of the person's own gain or loss to accrue from the action and a determination in favor of the action which will insure to him the greater gain. By no keenness of discrimination can this be distinguished from selfish action.

Therefore, this theory gives no place for the profound sense of sinfulness, guilt, and ill-desert, for shame and self-reproach in the consciousness of deeds and character unworthy and base, nor for aspiration for a higher and nobler life; and no explanations of facts that such feelings are common in the consciousness of men, especially under the influence of Christianity. It can recognize in the sinner only the consciousness of mistake or folly, and in the virtuous, the consciousness of superior discernment.

The theory excludes all motives to noble deeds and to the heroism of self-sacrificing love. Leonidas, Regulus, and the thousands who have sacrificed life for their country, or for any great and noble end, can hardly be supposed to have done it for their own enjoyment. It requires no little ingenuity to explain such deeds on the basis of Epicureanism. But the advocates of that theory have not shrunk from attempting it. Cicero argues that, when Torquatus, a consul, put his own son to death for a breach of discipline in the army, he could not have done so painful an act for his own pleasure. Torquatus, a descendant of the consul, whom Cicero introduces as the advocate of Epicureanism, replies that it was necessary to preserve the discipline of the army and thus "to preserve the safety of the state in which the consul knew that his own safety was in-

volved.”¹ To show that deeds of heroic self-sacrifice might be done from a regard to one’s own happiness, it was further argued that one might prefer the intense, though brief, joy of a great and heroic deed costing his life, to the tame pleasures of an ordinary lifetime.

But if such ingenious arguments prove the possibility of doing great and noble deeds of self-sacrifice for one’s own happiness, they prove it only by stripping from the deeds all which makes them great and noble. Here we see again the exclusion from ethics of reason and conscience as presenting any fixed law or standard of right; reason not less than will is subjected to the one all-dominating impulse, the desire of personal enjoyment. No one has stated this more explicitly than Hume: “Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them It is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. It is not contrary to reason for me to choose my total ruin to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me.”² He means that man must follow his passions and desires and that the only office of reason is to ascertain whether the objects of these passions and desires really exist and what is the surest way to gratify them. In accordance with this type of ethics Volney sums up the whole duty of man: “All wisdom, all perfection, all law, all virtue, all philosophy consist in the practice of the following axioms, founded on our organization: Take care of thyself; educate thyself; restrain thyself; live for thy friends (*tes semblables*, those of thy own set) in order that they may live for thee.”³

Nor is there, according to this hedonistic theory, any motive to nobler deeds and self-sacrificing heroism in the assurance that in the far distant future all men will be actuated by unselfish love. Mr. Spencer predicts, as the result of evolution, a race of men who will find as much pleasure in serving others as in serving

¹ De Finibus, lib. i. 7. Opera, Boston, 1816, vol. xiv. p. 145.

² Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. ii. part iii. sect. 3. Philosophical Works, Little, Brown, & Co., 1854, vol. ii. pp. 166, 167, 168.

³ “La Loi Naturelle, ou Catéchisme du Citoyen Français,” 12mo. Paris, l’an deuxième de la République. His conception of friendship is the same with that ridiculed in the familiar rhyme:

“Tickle me, Charley, tickle me, do;
You tickle me and I’ll tickle you.”

themselves. But to the people of this generation this promise can be no motive to an unselfish life. They still remain in a far lower stage of the evolution. To them the law of the survival of the fittest has as yet no meaning in ethics except that might makes right. To such unevolved men the only and ruling motive is the desire of their own personal enjoyment. The fact that in the immensely distant future men will be happy in unselfish living and loving, can add nothing to the enjoyment of the men of to-day and therefore, according to this theory, cannot be a motive to any self-sacrificing service of men.

Because this theory practically tends to suppress the motives to noble and heroic action, its tendency is to prevent activity and energy, to restrain men from forming far-reaching plans and undertaking great and difficult enterprises for great and noble ends. One whose supreme aim is to live in ease and self-indulgence and to enjoy life, will be deterred from plans and enterprises which require continual earnestness of action and concentration of energy, ceaseless watchfulness, forecast, and hard work, and expose to risks and dangers. He shrinks from the activity essential to his own development and his highest achievements. Thus the practical tendency of this theory is to prevent the development of man's highest powers and richest susceptibilities, to debilitate and contract him, to induce in him softness, feebleness, and inefficiency, and to cause in him degeneracy instead of growth and progress.

The assertion that the desire of happiness is the ultimate motive of all action is contradicted by the common consciousness of mankind. The consciousness of acting from the desire of happiness is comparatively rare. One can have no enjoyment of any object unless he first has some desire or affection for the object itself. Taking food gives no pleasure but only disgust to one who has no appetite for it; and the appetite must be for the food itself as prerequisite to any enjoyment in eating it. Men are moved to action by desires or affections for specific objects. Hence the many-sidedness of man and the many lines of action in which he can be intensely interested. But one cannot long live a life of gratification of desires and selfish indulgence, before he finds that his desires grow faster than he can satisfy them; and thus he falls into chronic discontent.

Accordingly Epicurus himself aimed at a life of simple pleas-

ures, at tranquillity, freedom from unrest and pain, rather than at high positive enjoyment. His highest type of life was his conception of the gods, blessed in inaction and perfect and tranquil rest. Hence he refused to enter into political contests, and declined all public office and honors from the city. He would not disturb his tranquillity to show any hatred towards his enemies or to try to reform the wicked. Though he esteemed intellectual enjoyment, he thought geometry demanded too much effort, and would not strain his faculties in any intellectual contests. In his own life his ethics stood opposed to all earnestness, excitement, and energy in achievement. Thus this life, devoted to seeking enjoyment, resolves itself into a life of continual self-suppression and self-denial. It was at the best a perpetual shrinking and hiding from pain and discomfort. It is a demonstration, or better perhaps an object-lesson, teaching that even if one devotes his life supremely and solely to enjoying himself, the enjoyment is possible only by continual self-restraint and self-denial.

But the majority will not be content with such simple pleasures, amounting to little more than absence of pain. The common Epicurean is more likely to be an epicure, which Epicurus never was. Thus, if he has the means of self-gratification, he falls into selfishness of the most contemptible sort, in comparison with which the most diligent industry and the hardest work in getting a living, even though not actuated by Christian love, is comparatively respectable. His daily study is to find ways of amusing and enjoying himself. He becomes a dilettante in every pursuit. He falls into a dainty, namby-pamby life. The pleasures pall on his soul and his life becomes faded, spiritless, and vapid; it is *blasé*, burned over by blazing desires, which have left only ashes. He "liveth in pleasure," and "is dead while he liveth." In like manner, in whatever line the activity may be directed, a life actuated by the supreme desire of enjoyment must burn itself out to ashes.

Such a life also induces a morbid subjectivity, self-consciousness, and introspection; a fastidiousness which criticises everything instead of enjoying it. Unconsciousness is a mark of health; a healthy person seldom feels his pulse or asks, Am I well? One who is always seeking enjoyment is likely to be often thinking whether he is happy; he is likely to be a spiritual dyspeptic, always feeling his own pulse. When a person is really happy he

is not thinking of it. His interest in the work he is doing and the results he is achieving is so fresh and absorbing that he does not think whether he is happy or not. When he begins consciously to seek enjoyment, it escapes his grasp ; his pleasures lose their freshness, he falls into discontent, he begins to ask, Is life worth living?

And thus this ethical theory legitimately issues in pessimism. Epicurus taught explicitly a fundamental principle of pessimism, that pleasure is only negative, the absence of pain. And the theory rests also on another fundamental principle of pessimism, that happiness consists only in the gratification of desires ; but these, because they grow by what they feed on, can never be satisfied.

Such is this theory in its original and real form as Epicureanism. In reference to it Carlyle exclaimed : "If what thou namest happiness be our true aim, then we are all astray. Behold, thou art faithless, outcast, and the universe is — the Devil's." Bunsen says : "All the nobler natures that have adopted the theory of the Useful and Agreeable, become unfaithful to it in actual life. They find in themselves something which in critical moments impels them to sacrifice even life itself, — which is to them, as the necessary condition of all besides, the highest good, — to something higher, whether it be called country, or freedom, or honor. Selfishness, sitting on the throne of reason, even if she adorn herself with the sentiment of honor as a substitute for virtue, works nothing but ruin, even for the individual."¹

Writers, who have held this hedonistic theory, in view of its legitimate applications have found difficulty in maintaining it consistently with the fundamental principles of reason and observed facts in human history.

According to Helvetius, the good of man is physical pleasure ; remorse is only "the criminal's foresight of the physical evil to which he would be exposed if the crime should be discovered." In reference to this even Diderot asks : "What does he propose who sacrifices his life? Were Codrus and Decius going to seek for some physical enjoyment in a sepulchre at the bottom of an abyss?" Rousseau says : "Every one, they say, seeks the public good for his own interest. But how comes it about

¹ God in History, Bk. i. sect. v. ; Winkworth's Trans. vol. i. p. 22.

that an upright man seeks it to his own injury? Who goes to meet death for his own interest? Without doubt no one acts except for his own good. But if it is not moral good of which one takes account, he will never explain by self-interest any actions except those of the wicked. It is to be believed one would never attempt to carry it further. It would be too abominable a philosophy in which the only difficulty would be in accounting for the self-sacrificing acts of the virtuous; in which we should be forced to disparage Socrates and to calumniate Regulus." Hence he sees the necessity of recognizing moral law attested by reason and conscience, even though every one does seek his own good. He exclaims: "Conscience! conscience! divine instinct, immortal and heavenly voice; assured guide of a being ignorant and limited, but intelligent and free; infallible judge of good and evil, that makest the man like God! it is thou that causest the superiority of his nature and the morality of his actions; without thee I know nothing in me which elevates me above the brutes, except the sad privilege of leading myself astray from error to error, by the aid of an understanding without law and a reasoning power without principle." ¹

Strange as it may seem, not a few Christian theologians have accepted this Self-Love theory as the basis of Christian ethics. But in their statement of it they recognize, explicitly or implicitly, an eternal divine law incompatible with their ethical theory. They define right character as primarily an elective preference of the superior good to an inferior; and a wrong character as the elective preference of an inferior good to a superior. This definition denotes a good, not merely greater or less in quantity, but superior or inferior in kind. The definition, therefore, presupposes a standard or law by which we decide which of attainable goods is worthiest in kind. This law is eternal in God and antecedent to the universe. In accordance with it God determines his action in creating and governing the universe, determines what the constitution of the universe as created by God is, and what good is possible and of true worth in it. This is an element of Christian thought entirely foreign to the hedonistic theory and incompatible with it. It assumes

¹ *Émile, ou De l'Éducation*, livre iv. pp. 343, 345; éd. Firmin Didot frères, Paris, 1862.

that what the good is and the right methods of seeking it are determined by antecedent law. Thus it wholly sets aside the theory that the idea of right or law is derived from the idea of the good considered as happiness; and that action is right because it insures the greatest quantity of happiness.

But while theoretically the egoistic hedonism is modified by the recognition of God's law and of other Christian elements of thought, in its practical influence it is rather the Christian thought which is modified by the theory.

This practical influence is inseparable from their own statement of their doctrine. The superior good may be chosen for all as well as for self; but even if the good of all is chosen, the ultimate motive of the choice is the person's own desire of happiness. Here they fall back into the original form of the theory, that the person's own happiness is the ultimate object of every right choice. "This self-love or desire of happiness is the primary cause or reason of all acts of preference or choice which fix supremely on any object The being constituted with a capacity for happiness desires to be happy; and knowing that he is capable of deriving happiness from different objects, considers from which the greatest happiness may be derived; and *as in this respect he judges or estimates their relative value*, so he chooses or prefers the one or the other as his chief good."¹ This doctrine has been illustrated by supposing a person to be thirsty. Then among all drinks, water, milk, tea, coffee, beer, and other liquids he can choose that which will best slake his thirst. He chooses water.

Here the essential characteristics of the old theory reappear. The one motive to all action is the desire of happiness; and the one standard of determining the good is the quantity of enjoyment. Therefore the fundamental errors of the theory reappear and retain their practical influence. Here is the psychological error that the one ultimate motive of all action is the desire of happiness, — whereas men do not commonly act consciously from the desire of happiness. They are subjects of many motives. They desire specific objects; they cannot have any enjoyment in the pursuit or possession of an object unless they have some previous desire for it. Here is the error that all action consists in getting, possessing, and using, to the

¹ The Christian Spectator, March 1829, p. 21.

exclusion of trusting and serving. Here is the restriction of free will. For as thirst is not a matter of choice but of constitutional necessity, so also is the desire of happiness. One cannot desire misery in preference to happiness, nor a less degree of happiness in preference to a greater — these alone being the objects compared — any more than he can create or quench thirst by an act of will. Hence liberty is restricted to choosing, among objects which promote happiness, that which will impart the greatest quantity of enjoyment or will most effectually satisfy the desire for that greater enjoyment. But this is not, like thirst, a desire which comes and goes and can be quenched by being satisfied; it is always urgent and dominant. If now the theory takes the form of declaring that the object of the supreme choice is the greatest happiness, it identifies moral character with a constitutional impulse and thus identifies itself with the doctrine that moral character is primarily a constitutional affection or disposition. And, inasmuch as man cannot choose unhappiness in preference to happiness, when they two alone are compared, in choosing happiness he is not susceptible of any motive to the contrary. He is absolutely dominated by his constitutional desire for the greatest happiness. Then, since sin consists in choosing a less good in preference to the greater, sin loses its moral character and guilt and becomes mere ignorance or mistake; and man's moral freedom disappears. Here also is the explicit avowal that the right choice is determined solely by the quantity of happiness: "he considers from which the greatest happiness may be derived." And though these theologians recognize the law of God, yet the inevitable practical drift of their teaching is that the idea of right is derived from the idea of the greatest happiness, and therefore there is no independent law of right which determines what the true good is and regulates the methods of seeking it.

The habit of thinking of getting, possessing, and using, as the only action of man, has led theologians to speak of God himself as the supreme good. In the paragraph, from which I have quoted, from the "Christian Spectator," the writer also says: "In every moral being who forms a moral character, there must be a first moral act of preference or choice. This must respect some one object, God or Mammon, as the chief good, or as an object of supreme affection." Here God is declared to be the supreme good, and

to be the object of supreme affection in the same sense in which Mammon is the chosen good and the object of supreme affection to the sinner; an object to be acquired, possessed and used for his own enjoyment. This form of expression is not confined to advocates of the self-love theory of virtue. It is used by Dr. Dorner, and is not uncommon in theological writings. It carries in it the idea that a person chooses God in order to command and use him for his own advantage and enjoyment, as Aladdin commanded and used the Genius of the Lamp. It presents a religion essentially like that of the idolater who whips his idol when it does not do for him what he has asked. This form of expression may be explained sometimes as an ambiguous and inexact use of the word good. But it could not have gained currency if the error had not been common that the whole action of man is getting and using, overlooking the fundamental facts that the realm of ends is the sphere of persons, and the action to be directed and determined by the supreme choice is the action of trust and service to persons.

Theologians holding the self-love theory also avail themselves of the fact of immortality. But the practical tendency of their ethical theory is to fix the thought mainly, as decisive of the choice, on the quantity of enjoyment proved greatest by its endless perpetuity, with no other criterion by which to distinguish the character of the person and the sources of his enjoyment as worthy or unworthy. And this tendency has been manifested in the history of the doctrine. Its influence is shown, far beyond those who have formally avowed the doctrine, in the prevalence of a type of religion whose ruling motive is the desire to escape hell and to get safe to heaven. Paley says: "Virtue is the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness." "In this inquiry I will omit much usual declamation on the dignity and capacity of our nature; the superiority of the soul to the body, of the rational to the animal part of our constitution; upon the worthiness, refinement, and delicacy of some satisfactions, or the meanness, grossness, and sensuality of others; because I hold that pleasures differ in nothing but in continuance and intensity, from a just computation of which . . . every question concerning human happiness must receive its decision." Paley alludes to the common distinction between prudence and duty, and illustrates it by

the fact that when one returns to its owner a box of jewels intrusted to him, he does not speak of it as an act of prudence but of duty. He then says: "Now in what does the difference consist? inasmuch as, according to our account of the matter, both in the one case and the other, in acts of duty as well as acts of prudence, we consider solely what we ourselves shall gain or lose by the act. The difference and the only difference is this; that in the one case we consider what we shall gain or lose in the present world, in the other we consider also what we shall gain or lose in the world to come."¹ Young, another English clergyman, in the Seventh Night of his "Night Thoughts," says: —

"Has virtue charms? I grant her heavenly fair;
 But if unportioned, all will interest wed;
 Though that our admiration, this our choice.
 The virtues grow on immortality;
 That root destroyed, they wither and expire.
 A deity believed will nought avail;
 Rewards and punishments make God adored;
 And hopes and fears give conscience all her power.
 As in the dying parent dies the child,
 Virtue with immortality expires.
 Who tells me he denies his soul immortal,
 Whate'er his boast, has told me he's a knave.
 His duty 't is to love himself alone;
 Nor care though mankind perish, if he smiles. . . .
 If this is all, if earth a final scene,
 Take heed; stand fast; be sure to be a knave,
 A knave ingrain; ne'er deviate to the right.
 Shouldst thou be good, how infinite thy loss!"

It is represented in the book of Job that when Satan appeared among the sons of God, his attention was called to Job as a pattern of uprightness, fearing God and shunning sin. And Satan answered with a sneer, "Doth Job fear God for nought?" This is the moral philosophy of Satan; and it has a marvellous resemblance to egoistic hedonism. It implies that there is no real goodness among men; all which passes for goodness is only selfishness at heart disguised in the forms of goodness; every man has his price; he appears to be upright and serving God, but it is only for some selfish end; and therefore God's law itself is a failure and his so-called kingdom of righteousness a deception and a sham. The whole book is the disproof of this sneering falsehood, and the setting forth of the reality of disinterested,

¹ Moral and Political Philosophy, Bk. i. chap. 7 and 6; Bk. ii. chap. 3.

incorruptible integrity, righteousness, and fidelity to God ; and it shows that the evils men suffer are not any impeachment of the righteousness of God and the perfection of his law, but are for their improvement, correction, and instruction in righteousness. In those ancient times the hedonistic conception was thought to present a type of ethics fit only for the mouth of Satan. It is to be lamented that a theory so easily identified with this has been held in modern times by ministers of the church of Christ.

4. The next theory to be considered is Utilitarianism ; the theory that the right supreme choice is universal happiness, or the greatest good of the greatest number. As Bentham represents it, the practice of virtue is the art of maximizing happiness. John Stuart Mill claims to be the first who brought this name into use.¹ But the name is in conflict with his theory ; for what is for use is always subordinate to that for which and for whom it is used, and cannot be the ultimate and supreme end. This is another example of the difficulty, not to say the impossibility, of using language to express a hedonistic theory without transcending and contradicting the theory.

All the objections presented under numbers one and two of this section are valid against this theory. In addition, the following errors are peculiar to and distinctive of it.

Utilitarianism cannot, like egoistic hedonism, be identified with selfishness. It may be held, and sometimes has been held, in connection with a doctrine of disinterested benevolence. But it cannot be divested of the errors and consequent evil practical tendencies already indicated as common to it with egoistic hedonism nor of those common to it with the theory of rectitude. It is sufficient to recall a single point. It recognizes no truth and law eternal in the absolute Reason determining the archetype of the universe before the universe existed and regulating God's action in constituting it. What is good can be ascertained, therefore, only by trying to estimate in an empirical way the quantity of enjoyment obtainable from different proposed acts or lines of action. The ideas of law and right, therefore, are not primitive and fundamental, but derived, and that not from a principle of reason but from an empirical idea of the quantity of enjoyment. They thus lose their essential significance as obligatory and authoritative. Being lugged in by a roundabout and surreptitious way

¹ Utilitarianism, p. 9, note.

and, as it were, by the back door, they can never rise to supreme authority in the house. There remains, therefore, no fixed standard of principle for distinguishing a superior good from an inferior, the noble from the base, the worthy from the worthless; and no law determining the methods in which the good may be rightly sought. Hence the appeal must always be to the expedient, not to the right, — to interest, not to law and duty.

The practical issue necessarily is a type of low, calculating, and prudential morality, even in seeking the public good. Thus Sophocles represents Ulysses pleading with Neoptolemus :

“ I know thy noble nature
Abhors the thought of treachery or fraud ;
But what a glorious prize is victory !
Therefore be bold ; we will be just hereafter.
Give to deceit and me a little portion
Of one short day, and for thy future life
Be called the holiest, worthiest, best of men.”

Neoptolemus replies :

“ What open arms can do,
Behold me prompt to act, but ne'er to fraud
Will I descend
I came to be a helpmate to thee, not
A base betrayer ; and, O king, believe me,
Rather, much rather, would I fall by virtue,
Than rise by guilt to certain victory.”¹

Having thus lost the essential significance of right and law, of obligation and duty, utilitarianism naturally resolves all virtue into benevolence or good-will. Righteousness and justice are excluded from love; they are even put into antagonism to it and identified with vengeance. For the same reason the benevolence degenerates into mere amiableness or a desire to please, a desire to make people happy in whatever objects or pursuits they seek enjoyment. Hence the practical tendency is to make men incapable of taking a firm stand against wrong-doing and wrong-doers. They would rather fawn on the Nimrods, the hunters of men, and try to please them, than to confront and oppose their wickedness, fraud, and oppression. In like manner God would be bereft of righteousness and justice, and his character would become a mere amiableness, desiring to make every one happy without regard to any eternal principle of right and law.

¹ Philoctetes, Act i. lines 79-85, 90-95.

It follows that man's love to God would be limited to benevolence, a disposition to make God happy. This type of religion was unconsciously exemplified in a man who, being offended with a brother in the church, exclaimed: "I have done all that I shall ever do for Jesus." When the Maid of Orleans came to the army, the story is that La Hire, the general, did not relish the praying and purifying which she required in the army. But she persisted; and insisted also that he should pray himself. Whereupon he offered this prayer: "O Jehovah, thou hast all power. I pray thee do as much for La Hire in this time of his distress, as he would do for thee, if he were Jehovah and thou wert La Hire." In the chronicles of the crusaders a similar story is told of Richard Cœur de Lion. In his great adversity his prayer changed into reproach: "O fie! how unwilling should I be to forsake thee in so forlorn and dreadful a condition, were I thy Lord and Advocate, as thou art mine. In sooth, my standards will in future be despised, not through my fault but through thine. In sooth, not through any cowardice of my warfare, art thou thyself, my king and my God, conquered this day, and not Richard, thy vassal." And in "Medieval and Modern Saints and Miracles" we read: "Louis XIV., whose reign has lately been extolled by M. Nardi as a model of truly Christian, prosperous, and beneficent government, was a most devout and constant worshiper according to the discipline of the church of Rome. His numerous works of supererogation, including the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the dragonnades against the Protestants of his kingdom, the judicial murders of persons professing the reformed religion, and other pious acts, . . . had inspired him with a conscious feeling of a right to the divine favor in all his enterprises. Hence it was not strange that in the reverses of his old age he should, referring to those meritorious acts, pathetically exclaim: 'How can God treat me thus after all I have done for him?'" These prayers might be a contribution to a liturgy for the Benthamites.

The theory requires a peculiar modification of the conception of God's government of the universe. It teaches that both God's love to man and man's love to God are alike a mere disposition to impart happiness to the persons loved; and that from this is excluded all reference to eternal truth and law antecedent to the universe and ordaining its constitution, the true good possible in it, and the right methods of seeking that good. This leaves no

basis for a government by independent and eternal authority and law; and the only remaining standard of discrimination is the quantity of enjoyment empirically ascertained. Therefore God, being infinite, is susceptible of infinitely more happiness than all finite beings together. His happiness, therefore, ought to be in the same proportion, the greater object of all action both of God and man. Then the only government possible must be something similar to that of an incorporated company in which every share has one vote, and in which one owns fifty thousand shares, and a thousand others own one or two shares apiece.

The theory also fails to give any real basis for civil government founded in justice, administered under just law and asserting and maintaining the rights of man. Mr. Bentham says: "Every species of satisfaction" (for a wrong or injury) "naturally brings in its train a punishment to the defendant, a pleasure of vengeance for the party injured. This pleasure is a gain: it recalls the riddle of Samson; it is the sweet which comes out of the strong; it is the honey gathered from the carcass of the lion. Produced without expense, net result of an operation necessary on other accounts, it is an enjoyment to be cultivated as well as any other; for the pleasure of vengeance, considered abstractly, is like every other pleasure, only good in itself. It is innocent so long as it is confined within the limits of the laws; it becomes criminal at the moment it breaks them Useful to the individual, this motive is also useful to the public, or, to speak more correctly, necessary."¹ But according to Mr. Bentham's own theory, if the action of the government is determined by the majority, the only regulative principle is that the government must seek the greatest happiness of the greatest number. And in every case the majority is the greatest number. The theory justifies the majority in requiring by law whatever they think is for their own greatest happiness: that is, whatever they desire, unregulated by any superior law. Thus the statute laws which, Mr. Bentham says, must not be violated for the pleasure of vengeance to an individual, are themselves only the declaration of the unregulated desires of the majority, in which their desire for vengeance on the minority for any disregard of their wishes counts as one factor. This, certainly, is a precarious and dangerous basis for the administration of justice and the protection and main-

¹ Bentham, "Principles of Penal Law," Part I. chap. xvi.

tenance of human rights. Thus on this theory the will of the majority becomes a despotism. It rolls over the minority like a great garden-roller, pressing everything beneath it to a dead level, and crushing out the life of every plant or animal that is in its path. Professor Tyndall represents himself as saying to the robber: "We entertain no malice or hatred against you, but simply with a view to our safety and purification, we are determined that you and such as you shall not enjoy liberty of evil action in our midst." But who are "we," who are addressing this robber? Who but the majority? And if the "such as you," who are addressed, should happen to be in the majority, is there anything in the utilitarian ethics making it wrong for them to address the minority, consisting of Professor Tyndall and other cultivated and honorable men, in the same terms and imprisoning them, in order that they (the majority) may not be hindered in seeking what they regard as the greatest good of the greatest number? For on this theory there are no more crimes, but only nuisances. And the majority must determine, from their own point of view, what is a nuisance, and see that it is put away. Suppose the majority think it for the greatest good of the greatest number, that is of themselves, that all physically inferior infants, and that all the shiftless, the diseased, the maimed, the aged, the helpless, who can produce nothing and are a burden on society for support, should be put to death, and should enact laws to that effect, — is there anything in the utilitarian ethics making it wrong for them to do so? Or suppose the anarchists and communists become a majority, and confiscate the property of the minority in order to promote the greatest good of the greatest number, that is, of themselves, is there any principle of utilitarianism that is violated? Thus this theory, as applied to popular government, seems to rest at last only on the maxim that might makes right.

Some of the advocates of utilitarianism have seen its deficiencies and falsities and have modified it in various ways. John Stuart Mill recognizes conscience: "The ultimate sanction, therefore, of all morality (external motives apart) being a subjective feeling in our own minds, I see nothing embarrassing to those whose standard is utility, in the question, What is the sanction of that particular standard? We may answer, The same as of all other moral standards, the conscientious feeling

of mankind.”¹ If the common conscience of mankind is recognized as a standard or criterion for determining what is right or wrong, it is an important advance toward a higher type of ethics than mere utilitarianism.

The utilitarian type of ethics has been held in various forms by Christian theologians ; but always with essential modifications. It has been modified by the recognition of the law of God as revealed by Christ as the eternal and immutable standard of right and wrong ; by substituting the good defined as well-being determined by the truths, laws, and ideals of reason, for happiness or enjoyment measured only by quantity of duration and intensity ; and by dissociating this theory from the self-love theory. But the Christian utilitarianism, though lifted above the original theory by Christian elements of thought transcending it, still carries in it serious errors and evil practical influences. True Christian ethics teaches that, in the sphere of getting and possessing, the highest object of pursuit is universal well-being. Christian utilitarianism presents this as the object of the right supreme choice. Thus it mistakes a subordinate choice for the supreme. For the object of the right supreme choice is not at all in the sphere of what is to be got and possessed, but is God and our neighbor as ourselves, chosen as objects of trust and service. The pursuit of the good is always a service to a person and thus subordinate to the supreme choice of a person or persons as the object of trust and service.

And besides this substituting of a subordinate for the supreme end there remain in the Christian utilitarianism other errors. It identifies love with benevolence. It is difficult for it to find a place for righteousness and justice ; its tendency is either to regard justice as something outside of love and even antagonistic to it ; or else to resolve it into general justice, essentially the same with general benevolence, which seeks the general well-being. It seems to resolve all virtue into universal good-will. But because it limits love to benevolence, there is hidden in it a subtle tendency to exclude all love to evil-doers, who are detracting from the general sum of happiness ; and to resolve justice, excluded from love, into vengeance, the pleasure of which, Bentham says, is a good in itself and is included in estimating the sum total of enjoyment. And God’s just punishment of

¹ Utilitarianism, p. 42.

the wicked, excluded from his love, is brought under suspicion and objection as taking on an aspect of malignity. The younger Edwards says: "If love and attachment to any individual, as to a murderer, whose life and prosperity are inconsistent with general happiness, tend to impair the general happiness, I am not obligated in that case to love him." And, finally, there is in it no clear recognition of the fundamental facts that the realm of ends is the sphere of personality, and that the whole action of man, receptive and productive, is in the trust and service of a person or persons.

5. We are to consider next some of the errors and evil practical tendencies peculiar to the theory of rectitude, additional to those mentioned under number one of this section. This is the theory that rectitude itself, right character or holiness, is the supreme object of the love required by the law. Its principle is that holiness must be loved for its own sake, not for the sake of happiness and without regard to reward or punishment. For an act to be done virtuously it must be done because it is virtuous; its virtuousness must be the ruling consideration which leads to the doing of it. Bishop Butler says: "Human nature is so constituted that every good affection implies the love of itself; that is, becomes the object of a new affection in the same person. Thus, to be righteous implies in it the love of righteousness; to be benevolent, the love of benevolence; to be good, the love of goodness; whether this righteousness, benevolence, or goodness be viewed as in our own mind or in another's. . . . Absolute rectitude, the perfection of being, must be in all senses and in every respect, the highest object to the mind." He adduces at the close of the sermon a series of texts from the Bible in confirmation of his doctrine. But it is remarkable that in every one of them it is God who is presented as the object of love and delight, not rectitude or righteousness or benevolence. The character required by the theory of rectitude and here described by Bishop Butler has been called in theology *amor amoris*, the love of love.

This theory was represented in the Greek philosophy by Stoicism. It is the noblest of the erroneous ethical theories now under consideration and has been associated with some of the greatest Christian characters and some of the greatest Christian

¹ The Foundation of Moral Obligation; Works, vol. ii. p. 541.

² Sermons on Human Nature, xii., xiv. pp. 153, 170, 173.

achievements. But besides the errors already mentioned as common to it with the hedonistic theories, it is open distinctively to the following objections.

First, it is an attempt to construct an ethical theory from the formal principle of the law alone. It tells us the supreme object of choice must be conformity with the law, but does not tell us what the law requires, nor in what action and character conformity with the law consists. It does not declare the real principle of the law. It says: Choose holiness for its own sake; choose that which is right for its own sake; choose that which reason judges worthy for its own sake; choose ideal perfection for its own sake. But it does not tell us in what the holy, the right, the worthy, the perfect, consist.

But the will can consent to the formal principle of the law only in actually exercising the love to God and man which the real principle of the law requires. We cannot give the consent of the will to the law in itself abstractly as law, nor to its real principle abstractly as a principle, so long as we disobey its command of universal love. The sense of duty and obligation, the rational approval of the law, the sentiment of respect and reverence for it are inherent in the moral constitution of man. But the consent of the will to the law is much more than these. It can be nothing less than our free and abiding choice of God as supreme and of our neighbor as ourselves as objects of trust and service; nothing less than the actual exercise of the love to God and man which the law in its real principle requires.

The abstractness and emptiness of this theory, as constructing a definition of virtue from the formal principle of the law alone, is evident as soon as we try to grasp the meaning of the definition. Holiness is defined as the love of holiness for its own sake. Then holiness is something different from itself. Substitute for holiness its definition, and we have Holiness is the love of the love of holiness. Make the substitution again, and we have Holiness is the love of the love of the love of holiness, and so on without end. The definition contains the word to be defined and so vanishes in an endless series signifying nothing. The same is true of the *amor amoris*, or love of love; and of every definition of right character which this theory of rectitude permits without transcending itself.

Secondly, its practical tendency is to a narrow and one-sided

type of character. This tendency has shown itself in two directions.

In one direction it issues in a type of character in which the idea of law and obligation predominates; then a stern sense of duty displaces, or at least overlays, the concrete, spontaneous, energizing love to God and man. It is a common defect of systems of ethics that they define virtue as merely the doing of duty; as Reid defines it: virtue consists "in a fixed purpose or resolution to act according to our sense of duty." Thus love, which is the essence of right character and gives it unity, continuity, and spontaneity, is overlooked; virtue is brought up to the surface of the being as outward action; it is broken up into isolated actions; and character is, as with Aristotle, resolved into mere habits formed by successive actions. So Dugald Stewart says: "It is the fixed purpose to do what is right which evidently constitutes what we call a virtuous disposition. But it appears to me that virtue, considered as an attribute of character, is more properly defined by the habit which the fixed purpose gradually forms, than by the fixed purpose itself."¹ This stern regard to duty was the characteristic of the Stoics; and it is the only motive which Kant recognizes as distinctively moral. The same was the characteristic of the Puritans. In this type of character duty resounds through the life and fills the whole firmament of the being, as thunder fills the sky. The fear of God drives out every other fear and makes men strong and bold against wrongdoing by powers however great. But because love is not made prominent, the character becomes marked by a lack of spontaneity and enthusiasm, of the tenderness of Christian compassion, of the sweetness of Christian charity, the earnestness of Christian beneficence in relieving human misery, and of Christian geniality in diffusing happiness everywhere.

In another direction this theory of rectitude practically tends to develop a one-sided piety of another type. It is when the love of holiness for its own sake fixes chiefly on the ideal of personal perfection, and this displaces or overlays active love to God and man. Then we have a religion of emotion, aspiration, meditation, worship; of retirement from the world instead of working in it to save the world; of longing to commune with God and to be like him; a religion which expends itself in subjective spiritual

¹ Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers, Bk. iv. chap. v. sect. 2.

exercises, seeking rapturous experiences. It issues in quietism or some form of mysticism. But love to man and self-sacrificing and painstaking service to men to make them wiser, better, and happier, is not made prominent. And because this does not call attention prominently to God's law, it does not develop a vigorous and ruling sense of duty, nor a nice discrimination between right and wrong. Hence such a person, notwithstanding the emotional fervor, may not be scrupulously honest in business, or kind as a neighbor, or pleasant in the family. This type of piety does not readily accord with our Saviour's teaching that the requirement of love to our neighbor is the second great commandment, like unto the first; and his explanation of it by the parable of the good Samaritan; nor with the teaching of James, "Pure religion and undefiled before our God and Father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction" (Luke x. 25-37; James i. 26, 27).

Thirdly, this theory logically leaves no place for love to the wicked. If holiness is the love of holiness for its own sake, there is nothing in the wicked person, destitute of holiness, which can be the object of Christian love. The wicked then can be the object only of condemnation, abhorrence, and antagonism. Justice to the wicked is no longer done in an atmosphere of goodwill; and an element of malignity and hate naturally creeps in. And there is logically no place for God's love to sinners; and he has been represented in sermons as having no compassion or goodwill to sinners, but only hatred and contempt.

Fourthly, this type of ethics does not preclude unconscious selfishness. When right character is regarded mainly as a doing of duties and obeying the law, it easily admits pride, self-sufficiency, self-righteousness, bigotry, and intolerance. The earlier Stoics reckoned self-sufficiency in the formation of right character as essential to virtue. So Horace says: "It is enough to pray to Jupiter, who gives and takes away, for life and wealth; but a just and equal mind I myself prepare for myself." The Pharisees did the duties of religion, as they understood them, with a punctiliousness and earnestness never surpassed. Yet thereby Pharisaism has become to all ages the name for religious self-sufficiency, self-righteousness, and intolerance.

In that type of character in which the person concentrates his thought and energy on attaining his own personal holiness, there

is easy entrance for selfishness in the fact that his attention is concentrated on himself. He is seeking his own perfection and peace with God. Hence comes a piety which is subjective, concerned with the person's own spiritual state and growth; introspective, watching his own feelings, congratulating himself when he has conscious peace with God and joy in him, and mourning when he has not; concentrated on himself and on nourishing his own spiritual growth, rather than on plans and labor in self-sacrificing love to help and save others. It is a piety of self-development rather than of self-devotement. It is the nourishing of self on the bread and the water of life; a spiritual living in order to eat instead of eating in order to live and do the work of life.

IV. THE REAL PRINCIPLE OF THE LAW IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS. — In distinction from the foregoing three false theories, we are now to consider what the real principle of the law and the moral character which it requires are as presented in the life and teachings of Christ and defined in Christian ethics.

1. A Pharisee, who was a student and teacher of the law, asked Jesus, "Which is the great commandment of the law?" Jesus replied, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength. This is the first and great commandment. And a second like unto it is this, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. On these two commandments hangeth the whole law, and the prophets."¹ This conception of the unity of the law as comprehended in these two commandments is set forth and developed by Christ and his apostles. In fact it is the ethical doctrine taught in the law and the prophets in the Old Testament, though less clearly and fully than in the New. It is the real and essential principle of the law in Christian ethics.

As such it is the comprehensive principle in which all particular precepts are implied and from which they are to be deduced. This is the explicit teaching of Christ: "on these two commandments hangeth the whole law, and the prophets." Equally decisive is the teaching of the apostles: "The end of the commandment is love out of a pure heart and a good conscience

¹ Matth. xxii. 34-40; Mark xii. 29-31.

and faith unfeigned." "Love is of God; and every one that loveth is begotten of God and knoweth God. He that loveth not knoweth not God; for God is love. . . Beloved, if God so loved us, we ought also to love one another. . . If we love one another, God abideth in us and his love is perfected in us."

This universal love is, therefore, the vitalizing essence of all right character. We have seen that the love required in the law, psychologically defined, is not a natural instinct or affection, nor any merely constitutional feeling or motive. It is the person's free and abiding choice of a person or persons as the object of his trust and service. This definition being accepted, then in Christian ethics all right character consists vitally and essentially in the choice of God with all the heart as the supreme object of trust and service, and of our neighbor as, equally with ourselves in the unity of the moral system and under our common relations to God, the object of trust and service. This choice is the essence of right character in its continuity, unity, and spontaneity. It is the love of God with all the heart and of our neighbor as ourselves, involving that which is the essence of all love, the self-renouncing devotement of ourselves to the person loved in trust and service.

When true love to God and man exists, it will be manifested, expressed, exercised, as opportunity offers, in acts of trust and service to the person loved. "If ye love me, ye will keep my commandments." "This is the love of God, that we keep his commandments." Conversely, every act that is right is the expression or exercise of love; and it is because it is so that it is a right or virtuous act. It is the common characteristic of all right acts that they are the exercise and expression of love. It is the love exercised in them which constitutes them right or virtuous. "He that hath my commandments and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me."³ And, negatively, no act can be right which is not the expression and exercise of Christian love. "Though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor and though I give my body to be burned, but have not love, it profiteth me nothing."⁴

The scriptures further teach that love to God is implied in all true love to man, and that love to man is implied in

¹ 1 Tim. i. 5; 1 John iv. 7-21.

² John xiv. 15; 1 John v. 3.

³ John xiv. 21.

⁴ 1 Cor. xiii. 1-3.

all true love to God. Jesus says this second great commandment is like unto the first. Christ in the judgment says; "Inasmuch as ye did it unto one of these my brethren, even these least, ye did it unto me." And he said to his disciples: "He that receiveth you, receiveth me, and he that receiveth me, receiveth him that sent me." In the Old Testament also this fact is recognized, that all true love to man implies love to God; as for example: "He who hath pity on the poor lendeth unto the Lord, and his good deed will he pay him again." And John says: "If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar; for he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, cannot love God whom he hath not seen;" and Paul says: "Owe no man anything, save to love one another; for he that loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the law." "The whole law is fulfilled in one word, even in this: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." ¹

This love is also declared to be the essential principle of the Christian life. "Every one who loveth is born of God and knoweth God. He who loveth not knoweth not God." It is declared to be the essence of God's character: "God is love." Christ reveals that love is the essential principle of his own obedience: "that the world may know that I love the Father, and as the Father hath given me commandment even so I do." ² And the humiliation of the Son of God, and the whole earthly life, work, and death of Christ in their atoning significance, assert and maintain the supremacy, the universality, the unchangeable authority and inviolability of the law of love; a proclamation of law more grand and awful than that on Sinai. In the very redemptive action by which God seeks man to reconcile him to God, he reveals the inviolability of the law of love, as the law in accordance with which the universe has been constituted, so that it is impossible for any person to attain any true good in the universe except by being brought into complete harmony with the law of God and with his righteousness in maintaining and enforcing it. The righteousness and law of God cannot be changed in order to be brought down to the sinner, but the sinner must be brought up into harmony with the law and

¹ Matth. xxv. 40, & x. 40; Prov. xix. 17; 1 John iv. 20, 21; Rom. xiii. 8-10; Gal. v. 14.

² 1 John iv. 7, 8, 16; John xiv. 31, & xv. 10, & iii. 16, 17; Rom. v. 6-11.

righteousness of God. Man is not redeemed from the law but to it; not from God but to God.

The teachings of Christ and the apostles imply also that love in man, as required by the law, is the same in kind with God's love; and that by continued action in love to God and man, the Christian is realizing in himself the moral likeness of God, who is love. "Ye therefore shall be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect." "As he who called you is holy, be ye yourselves also holy in all manner of living; because it is written, Ye shall be holy; for I am holy." God is love. By his own free choice his will is eternally in harmony with the law of love eternal in himself. All his action in constituting and governing the universe is the expression of that love and the progressive realization of its wise and beneficent ends. His love, like that required of man, is benevolence or good-will exercised in righteousness; that is, in willing conformity with the archetypal and eternal truth, law, and ideal of God, the absolute and perfect Reason energizing in perfect wisdom and love.

This must manifest itself, in all finite persons, both in receptive action and in productive; it must be love that trusts and love that serves. This is the common scriptural doctrine, that all right character of men must begin in faith in God. Faith, so far as it is a moral act, is trust in a person. Alike because man is a creature and dependent, and a sinner needing redemption, renovation, and forgiveness, his right character must begin as trust in God; and trust in God is possible only in the sense of need and as self-renouncing, loving trust. Thus the real principle of the law requires love manifesting itself in the receptive action of faith or self-renouncing trust in God, as well as in the productive action of service in obedience to the law.

Such is the real and all-comprehending principle of the law and the vital essence of the character which it requires.

2. Christian ethics teaches that the object of the love required by the law is a person or persons chosen as objects of trust and service, not any objects to be acquired, possessed, and used.

This, as already shown, is the obvious meaning of the teaching of Christ and his apostles. The object of love is not wealth, or fame, or knowledge, — not happiness, truth, duty, virtue, perfection; it is God, and our neighbor as ourselves.

This is demanded also by philosophical thought. The physical

universe is subordinate to the rational and spiritual. All things in it are for use. Minerals and plants, the beasts and birds, the powers and resources of nature, things of every kind, knowledge and character, all qualities, powers, and conditions are for the service and use of man ; and he may seek to gain, possess, and use them for himself or his fellow-men. Man in the beginning was appointed lord of nature, to take possession of its resources and powers and use them in the service of God and man.

But a person, by virtue of his rational free personality, whereby he is in the likeness of God and a participant in the rational and moral system under the moral government of God, is an end in himself. He may never be acquired, owned, and used ; he may never be made a slave, a tool, a stepping-stone, a toy, a victim by and for another. This principle is at the foundation of the modern doctrine of the worth of man and of his inalienable right inherent in his personality, on which all political freedom and social progress are founded. It is this by which men in modern times have established constitutional government and political freedom, have wrought the emancipation of slaves and serfs, and are seeking in every direction the personal, political, and social progress of mankind.

“ Our life is turned
 Out of its course, wherever man is made
 An offering or a sacrifice, a tool
 Or implement, a passive thing employed
 As a brute mean, without acknowledgment
 Of common right or interest in the end ;
 Used or abused as selfishness may prompt.”

In contrast with Christian ethics the philosophy of Greece and Rome proceeded on the supposition that the key to the construction of an ethical system is found only in the answer to the question, What is the highest good? that to find the answer to this question is the one problem which ethics has to solve. The Epicureans taught that the supreme good is happiness ; the Stoics that it is virtue chosen for its own sake without reference to happiness ; and the Peripatetics that it is the practice of virtue in prosperity.¹ But in Christian ethics we break away entirely from this round of theories, in which thought has circled so long in vain. We are now in the sphere of personality, the realm of ends ; the

¹ *Χρησις ἀρετῆς ἐν εὐτυχία.*

question which is the key to true ethics is no longer, What shall I choose to get, possess, and use as the greatest good? but, Whom shall I choose as the object of trust and service? We are therefore in a wholly different sphere of thought. The object chosen is no longer something to be got, possessed, and used, but a person to be trusted and served. And the action is no longer getting, possessing, and using, but it is trusting and serving.

When we consider how plainly Christ and his apostles declare that the essence of right character is love,—that the object of the love is not happiness nor holiness, but God and our neighbor as ourselves,—and that the action in which the love manifests itself is not getting and possessing a thing, but trusting and serving a person, it is surprising that Christian moralists and theologians to-day have been teaching theories closely analogous to the ancient ethics of heathen writers, going through the old controversies on essentially the same questions, and equally without agreement; still bewildered in the labyrinth in which ethical thought has been winding its dubious way for ages through intricate passages from which it has never been able to find its way out into the open sunlight. Thus in Christian teachings on ethics, “Plato, Tully, Epictetus, preach,” instead of Christ.

This has been to a great extent the fact from early Christian times. “The first Christian Ethics is the work of Ambrose on ‘Duties.’ It borrows its title and something more from Cicero’s famous work, ‘De Officiis.’ It might be called a translation from the Ciceronian into the Christian. It is in the sphere of morals that the influence of the ancient views would make itself more strongly felt than in dogmatics. . . . The teachers of the church found a complete and well worked out philosophical system of ethics. They had learned this in the schools. The great Cappadocians, Basil and Gregory, had been brought up and taught like any other aristocratic Roman of that day. Hence they accepted the entire framework of ancient ethics, its categories and definitions, and used it for the insertion of new Christian matter. . . . The form influenced the matter; and the result was not a Christian ethics, but a mixture. . . . Ancient ethics is thoroughly eudæmonistic; the aim of the philosopher even in his moral conduct is his own well-being. Ambrose of course had to renounce this principle, but he lays down a more refined eudæmonism in its place. Philosophers, he argues, ask what is ‘profitable and honorable,’

but have in this inquiry only this life in view. 'We, however,' says Ambrose, 'estimate what is profitable and honorable rather by the standard of things to come than of the present, and define as profitable not what contributes to the enjoyment of this life, but what helps to attain the grace of eternal life.' . . . The ancient framework. . . . the four cardinal virtues, prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance, . . . Ambrose introduced into Christian ethics, and it continued in force to the time of the Reformation."¹ The Christian ethics of the middle ages, as developed by Peter Lombard, in his "Sentences" long used as the text-book in theological instruction, and further by Thomas Aquinas, recognized three theological virtues, faith, hope, charity or love, taken from the scriptures; four cardinal moral virtues, justice, fortitude, prudence, temperance, taken from the Greek philosophy; seven gifts of the Spirit, wisdom, understanding, counsel, strength, knowledge, piety or godliness, and fear or reverence (Isaiah xi. 2, 3); twelve fruits of the Spirit, love, joy, peace, patience, long-suffering, goodness or good-will, benignity, mildness or equanimity, faith (meaning unsuspectingness and fidelity), modesty, chastity, continence; seven corporal and seven spiritual works of mercy, all leading up to the eight beatitudes.

This is largely drawn from the scriptures. But obviously it is not a systematic development of practical ethics from the requirement of love to God as supreme and to our neighbor as ourselves, which is the real principle of the law and of all true practical ethics. Protestant moralists and theologians in recent times have more commonly taken one of the three theories which I have included in the first class as the framework on which to construct Christian ethics. Their systems, therefore, are not copies, but homologues of these theories taught in Greece and Rome. Certainly it is not too much to ask that Christian teachers should construct their systems of Christian ethics, not on the framework of heathen philosophy, but on the law of love as the real principle of the law; that they should recognize the fact that the object of the love required is not a thing, quality, or condition, but persons, God, our neighbor and ourselves; and that the activity devoted to the person loved is not a getting, possessing, and using, but is both the receptive and productive action devoted

¹ Uhlhorn, "Christian Charity in the Ancient Church," Trans., pp. 303-305

to God as supreme and to our neighbor as ourselves in trust and service.

When one, accustomed to think in the forms of one of the three theories of the first class already criticised, begins to think in the lines of Christian ethics, he is surprised at new and unfamiliar moral conceptions, and finds a new significance, reality, and power in the law of God and in the Christian life. He is no longer dealing with abstractions as the objects of love, but with the living God "with whom he has to do," the present God who "besets him behind and before and lays his hand upon him"; and with living men, women, and children, of whatever character, attainments and condition, who come within the range of his action and influence. He is to love all these; and his love is to be of that kind which our Saviour illustrated in the story of the good Samaritan. One may easily delude himself with thinking that he chooses the superior good in preference to the inferior, that he chooses the highest good of the universe, or that he chooses holiness for its own sake, while he has no love to his neighbor as himself. Christ does not say that at the judgment he accepts men because they have chosen the superior good in preference to the inferior, or have chosen the greatest good of the greatest number, or have chosen holiness for its own sake; but because they have rendered service to him by serving their fellow-men when in need.

3. Christian ethics takes up into itself all that is true in the three theories of the first class. Each of these theories is a partial truth rather than an unmixed error. Each presents a single aspect of truth as the whole. Christian ethics presents the real and all-comprehending principle of the law, which takes up all these partial aspects of the truth.

Christian ethics takes up the truth in egoistic hedonism. It teaches that a person is under obligation to seek his own true good, his real well-being; that he has no right to sacrifice the real to any apparent good, the superior to any inferior good, whatever amount of enjoyment the apparent or inferior good may give. Thus Moses is commended for estimating spiritual good in the service of God as superior to all the pleasures of sin; as greater riches than the treasures of Egypt. It is said that Jesus, "for the joy which was set before him, endured the cross, despising the shame." And Christ appeals to sinners to have regard to

their true good: "What doth it profit a man to gain the whole world and forfeit his life?"¹ It is a motive to a higher life which a person sunk in selfishness is still capable of appreciating. It is an appeal to common prudence, enlightening it with the knowledge of man's relation and duty to God, of his immortality and his capacity for the imperishable riches of righteousness. The true development of man forbids him to be indifferent to his own true well-being. Christianity does not aim to unmake a man nor to stunt his growth, but to develop him to the highest perfection of humanity. It demands no self-denial as good in itself apart from the rational ends for which it is necessary, and no self-renunciation which is not essential to his highest perfection. The error of egoistic hedonism is that it presents this single aspect of right character as the whole, this subordinate choice as the choice of the supreme end of all right action. Thus it substitutes the part for the whole, and identifies the character which it requires with selfishness.

Christian ethics takes up into itself also all that is true in utilitarianism. The law requires us to choose our neighbor as, equally with ourselves in our common relations to God, the object of trust and service. Pertinent to the point now under consideration is the question, What service are we to render to him? Christian ethics answers, We are to seek to secure to him, equally as to ourselves, true well-being, determined to be such by the eternal truth and law of God. Here we find the real place in ethics for the true or highest good. It is not to be chosen as the supreme object of action; for that must be a person or persons. But within the sphere of getting and possessing, well-being or the true good is the supreme object to be sought for the person served. Christian ethics, therefore, agrees with utilitarianism in teaching that the law of love requires us to seek for ourselves and for all men well-being or the true good; and this must always be also the greatest good. It does not sever the general well-being and the rational end for which the universe exists from the well-being and rational end for which every personal being should live. Thus utilitarianism is in error because it presents a partial truth as the real and all-comprehending principle of ethics.

In taking up the truths in these two theories Christianity rejects the error common to them both, that the good consists in the

¹ Heb. xi. 24-27; xii. 2; Mark viii. 36.

greatest happiness empirically ascertained. It assumes that the good is to be determined by rational standards of worth and by the law of God. What truth and law are is not to be inferred from the good, but what the good is must be ascertained and determined from the law. In the Book of Proverbs, Wisdom personified declares: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way, before his works of old. I was set up from everlasting from the beginning, or ever the earth was. . . . When he marked out the foundations of the earth, then I was by him as a master-workman." This is a poetical representation of the fundamental reality that before the universe was, all principles and laws of reason, all ideals of perfection and good are eternal in the mind of God, the absolute Reason, and are the principles and laws, the archetypal pattern, which determine the constitution of the universe. Therefore it is truth and law which determine what the good is, not the good which determines what truth and law are. Christianity recognizes truth and law as having a basis independent of all that is finite, in the divine Reason which is unconditioned and eternal.

Christian ethics takes up also all that is true in the theory of rectitude. We are to love holiness for its own sake; not indeed as an abstraction, but as seen in God or in Christ or in holy men and women, or conceived of and aspired to as to be realized in ourselves or others. The theory of rectitude declares a great and essential truth. Its error is that it presents this single aspect of a right character as if it were the whole. It limits the love required in the law, to the love of complacency, the attraction and affinity which a good man feels for like character with his own or of superior excellence. Thus it practically excludes benevolence, the other aspect of love, and leaves no place for love of the wicked.

Thus Christian ethics takes up into itself the truth in each of these three theories. It answers both of the questions, What is the object of the right supreme choice or love? and, What must the Christian seek to obtain for the person or persons loved? The object of the Christian's love is himself and all men in subordination to love to God as supreme. The object to be attained is true perfection and well-being as determined by the truth and law and ideals eternal in God the absolute Spirit. This good or well-being consists in the perfection of the man;

his consequent harmony with himself, with the constitution and development of the universe, and with God ; and the happiness inseparable therefrom. The Christian, in his love to his neighbor as himself, seeks to realize ideal perfection and well-being for every person individually as well as for himself. In love to man as subordinate to love to God the Christian is also to seek to realize the ideal of perfection and well-being for society. Thus the whole realm of personality is the object of his loving service seeking to realize the perfection and well-being of the individual and of society in accordance with the eternal principles, laws, and ideals of reason. The realization of this good among men is found in the establishment and progressive development of the kingdom of God on earth. This accords with the teaching of Christ, who bids us to pray, "Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done, on earth, as it is in heaven." And his command and promise are, "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you." We are not to seek first for what we can get, possess, and use, and so attain the kingdom of God. We are to seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and thus attain all the other things for the possession and use of ourselves and of all men.

Christian ethics presents the love required in the law in both its aspects, as righteousness and benevolence. The love is benevolence regulated by law ; that is, by righteousness. Righteousness and benevolence are the two inseparable aspects of love, and are both included in it. If the righteousness is absent the benevolence defeats itself and effects evil instead of good. If the benevolence is absent the righteousness is no longer an obeying of the law and ceases to be righteousness. Righteousness, therefore, can no longer be misrepresented as in antagonism to love nor even be put into antithesis to it.

We have now left behind all ethical theories which rest on the assumption that the answer to the question, What is the *summum bonum* or highest good? is in itself the answer to the question, What does the law, in its real principle, require? and have extricated ourselves from the never-ending circuits in which thought has so long been involved in its attempts to construct ethics on that presupposition. While not regarding happiness as the object of the supreme choice, Christian ethics does not exclude it from the good which love seeks for all men. Even the later

Stoics recognized prudence as essential in a right character. Epictetus says : " If I am going to sail I choose the best ship and the best pilot, and I wait for the fairest weather that my circumstances and duty will allow. Prudence and propriety, the principles which the gods have given me for the direction of my conduct, require this of me ; but they require no more. And if, notwithstanding, a storm arises, which neither the strength of the vessel nor the skill of the pilot are likely to withstand, I give myself no trouble about the consequences. All that I had to do has been done already. The director of my conduct never commands me to be miserable, anxious, despairing, or afraid. Whether we be drowned or come to a harbor is the business of Jupiter, not mine. I leave it entirely to his determination, nor ever break my rest with considering which way he is likely to decide it, but receive whatever comes with equal indifference and security." And those who have held the theory of rectitude have not been able practically to exclude a regard for happiness. On the other hand Christian ethics cannot reckon happiness or enjoyment as the supreme end of action even in the sphere of getting and possessing ; but only as an incidental and natural result inseparable from right action and the attainment of its legitimate objects. Happiness or enjoyment is spontaneous and independent of the will as an incidental result both of action and achievement, and of the acquisition, possession, and use of the object sought. Happiness, as thus resulting spontaneously from action, achievement, and acquisition, and from the objects acquired, possessed, and used, is ultimate. But just for the reason that it is a spontaneous and natural result, independent of the will, it cannot itself be the supreme object of the choice. This choice must be of the action and achievement, and of the objects acquired and possessed, which are the sources of the enjoyment. And there must be some antecedent desire for these, some interest in them other than the desire of the ultimate enjoyment ; otherwise no spontaneous enjoyment in them would be possible. Here we have an old distinction in theology between the *bonum summum* and the *bonum ultimum*. Happiness is the ultimate ; but it cannot be the object of choice as the supreme good. It is through overlooking this distinction that moralists fall into these ethical errors. The hedonist substitutes the ultimate spontaneous enjoyment, over which the will has no direct control, for the sources of the enjoyment ; and the

theory of rectitude makes virtue itself the supreme object entirely abstracted from the enjoyment which is inseparable from it.

In conclusion, the following are found to be the points which distinguish Christian ethics from the theories of the first class. It does not begin with happiness and determine empirically what the good is, but determines by the standards of reason and divine revelation what the true good is.

It makes the object of right action to be persons, God, and our neighbor as ourselves, not things, qualities, or powers.

It recognizes trust and service to persons as the sphere of moral action ; not merely the action of getting, possessing, and using. The latter it regards as subordinate to the former and as deriving its moral character as right or wrong from the former.

It makes the good to consist, not in happiness only nor in character only, but in the perfection of the man, his consequent harmony with himself, with the constitution and course of the universe, and with God, and the happiness spontaneously resulting therefrom.

It recognizes righteousness and benevolence as two elements included in the love required by the law and both indispensable and essential to it as love.

It makes the love universal, not severing the well-being of the individual from the well-being of the whole, nor the supreme aim of the individual life from the supreme aim of the whole moral system, nor righteousness from benevolence, nor love to God from love to man, nor admitting any antagonism between these ; and recognizing God's love to his creatures as the eternal consent of his will to the same law of love which he requires man to obey ; and in the establishment and advancement of the kingdom of God giving scope for the full exercise of love in all its aspects by both God and man.

It has been objected that the doctrine that love to God and to our neighbor as ourselves is the essence of right character is a form without positive contents. This objection, it is now evident, is founded on an entire misapprehension of the doctrine. The love required by the law carries in it the devotion of all our energies to God and our neighbor as to ourselves in both the possible lines of human action, reception and production, trust and service ; and the service to man consists in seeking the uni-

versal well-being in the advancement of God's kingdom of righteousness and peace on earth and in heaven.

John Stuart Mill objects against Christian ethics: "Its ideal is negative rather than positive; passive rather than active; innocence rather than nobleness; abstinence from evil rather than energetic pursuit of good; in its precepts 'Thou shalt not' predominates unduly over 'Thou shalt.' In its horror of sensuality it made an idol of asceticism, which has been gradually compromised away into one of legality. What little recognition the idea of obligation to the public obtains in modern morality, is derived from Greek and Roman sources, not from Christian."¹ The slightest acquaintance with Christianity exposes the erroneousness of all this. Christianity, above every other conception ever formed of man, reveals the greatness, the dignity, the worth of every individual man. It reveals him as created in God's likeness, the object of God's government and care, bearing in him the immortal and the divine; a being of so great worth that God is in Christ reconciling him to God; that the Christ tasted death for every man; that every one, even though a sinner, may return in penitential trust to God and be accepted by him; that every one may enter into his closet and commune with God, as it were, face to face; and that in view of these relations to God the divine command to all Christians is, See that ye walk worthy of God. As to the charge that Christian morality is negative, passive, and ascetic, rather than positive and energizing, the fact that the command to love God with all our hearts and our neighbor as ourselves is the real principle of the law, is the overwhelming refutation of it. If Paul or John or Peter or the other great heroes of the Christian faith are examples of the influence of Christian ethics, what is there in any of them suggesting the merely passive or negative, or the withdrawing from energetic action for truth and righteousness and the kingdom of God, and in opposition to the powers of sin and evil? In fact, it is Christ and Christianity that have made the ideas of the worth of man, the sacredness of his rights, the obligation to serve him in love and the expectation of progress, powers in the history of civilization. What is most striking in Mr. Mill's criticism is its exhibition of his astonishing ignorance of the real significance of the teaching of Christ and his apostles.

¹ Essay on Liberty, pp. 95-97.

4. The real principle of the law has been stated in different ways without surrendering the distinctive characteristic of Christian ethics. The difference is in the way of stating the object of the love which is the essence of all right character.

Julius Müller teaches that the great and first commandment, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, lays claim to the entire inward life ; and that love to man and all the duties included in it are included or implied in love to God.¹ This has been the more common conception. It is true that, without love to God as supreme, love to man in its full significance is impossible. But there are some objections to this way of putting it.

If the real principle of the law is thus defined it does not include the requirement of love to man. If love to God is the essence of right character then love to man is not of the essence of right character. Then the inference would be that we are not to render service to man because we love him, that the service is not the spontaneous expression of love ; but we render him service solely because God has commanded it and it is our duty to obey God. Thus it tends to throw love to man into the background, to develop a religion of piety toward God manifesting itself in worship and spiritual communion with him to the neglect of practical work in doing good to men in the spontaneity of love for them. And this way of defining the real principle of the law and the essence of right character does not harmonize with the teachings of Christ and his apostles. When Christ said, This is the great and first commandment, he said also, The second is like unto it ; that is, essentially the same in kind. And he did not say that the whole law and the prophets hang on the first of these ; but on these two. Then it is not the first alone from which all the specific requirements of the law are developed, but it is "these two." Thus Christ teaches that these two together constitute the original and real principle of the law from which all duties to God and man are developed ; and that love to God and to man together constitute the essence of all right character. And in many passages in the New Testament we find a similar recognition of love to man as with love to God included in the real principle of the law and in the essence of right character : "He who loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the law." "Love worketh no ill to his neighbor ; therefore love is the fulfilment

¹ Christian Doctrine of Sin, Bk. i. subdivision i. chap. iii. section i.

of the law." "For the whole law is fulfilled in one word, even in this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." "He who loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?" "Pure religion and undefiled before our God and Father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction." And the love which Paul describes so beautifully in the First Epistle to the Corinthians and which he declares to be indispensable to give virtue to the most splendid outward acts, is, as is evident from the detailed description, love to man.¹

According to President Edwards, the object of the love required in the law is being in general, or universal being. This also is a true statement. But it is open to the criticism that it is abstract and cold; that one cannot love being in general, but only particular beings. It may be replied that it was intended as a logical formula to include under one general phrase all beings; that it does not deny that love in actual exercise must be love to a particular being, but affirms that it must be love to all beings. A more important criticism is that it does not distinguish God from man as the supreme object of love; and, therefore, can distinguish him as entitled to more love and service than man only by his greater quantity of being. And because Edwards identifies love with benevolence, his definition allows no recognition of righteousness in the real principle of the law and no place for it in the essence of right character.

A third statement may be this: The object of love is all rational and personal beings in their respective relations to each other in the unity of the moral system. This is an exact and true statement. It has the advantage that it brings to the front the unity of God and all rational creatures in the moral system under the same eternal law. It thus sets forth the basis of the unity and likeness of the two great commandments. At the same time it presents the true basis for the distribution of duties to God and his rational creatures according to their relations in the system. God must be the supreme object of love and of the trust and service in which it is expressed, because he is the source of all law and the originator and Lord of the moral system. And all his rational creatures stand on an equality before him as alike subjects of his law and objects of his righteous good-will, which is love.

¹ Rom. xiii. 8, 10; Gal. v. 14; 1 John iv. 20; James i. 27; 1 Cor. xiii.

But I think that Christ's statement of the two great commandments, of their likeness, and as together constituting the real principle on which hang the whole law and the prophets, is the best, whether for popular use or for philosophical exactness and completeness. When the whole sphere of personality is presented as "the realm of ends," to which all our energies are to be directed in the service of love, we are in danger of losing ourselves in its vastness. In the solitude of his own thoughts and emotions one may think he loves all mankind and is interested in the progress of man; and yet he may not exercise Christian love and render Christian trust and service to those with whom he associates in the intercourse of daily life. The Christian law of love, as proclaimed by Christ, presents the whole sphere of personality as the object of interest and love, but it individualizes the persons. He does not say, Thou shalt love mankind, but Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. The Christian is to love himself; to see to it that he lives and acts so as to insure his own normal development to his highest power, perfection, and well-being. He is to love his neighbor, that is, mankind individualized, every one who is near him, who is within the sphere of his personal influence. And the love both of self and the neighbor must be subordinate to love to God as supreme. The true progress of society is possible only as individuals are renovated in character and induced to come into harmony with God, and our service to men must be rendered trusting in God and working together with him. The particular acts of trust or service in which under given circumstances Christian love will best express itself must be determined by each person for himself in the light of his best attainable knowledge of what under the circumstances is wise and right. Christian love is good-will regulated in its exercise by wisdom and righteousness. Christ presents this comprehensive sphere of personality as the object of service when he says, "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness" (Matth. vi. 33). Christian love prompts every Christian to do his utmost to bring all persons within the sphere of his influence to know, trust, and serve God as revealed in Christ and ever present in the Holy Spirit reconciling the world unto himself, and so, as much as in him is, to aid in transforming human society into the kingdom of God. This grand aim does not exclude geniality of spirit, the

courtesies of life, sympathy and compassion, readiness to lend a hand to help in all the daily intercourse of life. On the contrary, Christian love spontaneously expresses itself in these, and as thus spontaneously expressed they enhance the Christian's influence and promote the progress of the kingdom of Christ.

CHAPTER XXI

THE ESSENTIAL AND DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERISTIC OF SIN

FROM the point of view now attained it is possible to give a clear and exact definition of sinful character in its true significance, and under it to comprehend what is true in various definitions of sin which have been subjects of controversy.

I. SIN THE SUPREME CHOICE OF SELF. — Sin is the choice of self as the supreme object of trust and service.

1. This is sinful character in its primary and essential significance. It is this which distinctively characterizes an act or character as sinful. It is the sinful character which manifests itself or finds expression in every sinful act.

Because it is the choice of self as the supreme object of trust and service, it must present itself in two forms: self-trusting and self-serving.

Each of these, again, will present itself in two forms: the former as self-sufficiency and self-glorifying, the latter as self-will and self-seeking.

The supreme choice of self acts in these four forms in every sinful character. But in different persons they appear in different degrees and proportions.

The sinful character as thus defined may be called selfishness. But selfishness as often understood is restricted to self-seeking, that is, getting, possessing, and using for one's self. When used to denote the sinful character in its primary and essential meaning, it must be understood as comprehending all the four forms in which the supreme choice acts. To avoid this misapprehension it is often called egoism. I shall use both names in the more comprehensive meaning as synonymous.

The seminal principle or root of all sin is the choice of self as the supreme object of trust and service. Out of this all sinful character and action grow and by it they are pervaded, vitalized, and characterized. So the seminal principle or root of all holiness, is the choice of God as supreme and of our neighbor as ourselves as the object of trust and service. Out of this all holy character and action grow, and by it they are pervaded, vitalized, and characterized.

In the actual development of the sinful character, self-trusting is deeper and more radical than self-serving. Out of the self-trusting the self-serving seems to grow. And in self-trusting, the self-sufficiency, the spirit of proud, arrogant, and defiant self-assertion and independence, precedes the self-righteousness or self-glorifying, which presupposes it and issues from it. Therefore selfishness in the form of self-sufficiency is the primitive seed or root of all sin. From it all sinful character and action grow, and by it they are vitalized and characterized as sin. Here again the origin and growth of sin correspond as its contrary with the origin and growth of holiness. Both because man is a creature and because he is a sinner and so dependent on God, his right character can begin only in trust in God. God is his spiritual environment. "In him we live and move and have our being." Man in his normal state is in harmony and union with God, receiving continuously from him the spiritual influences by which he lives and grows and works in the spiritual life, as a plant depends on its environment and continuously receives from it the quickening and nourishment by which it lives and grows. The new life of a sinner in his conversion must begin in his putting his trust in God in the recognition of his dependence, sinfulness, and need. In this act of trust he chooses God as the supreme object of trust; and in the same act he renounces himself as the supreme object of trust. This trust or faith in God is the beginning of his right character, and from it all his acts of obedience and service flow. This is evident both from scripture and from philosophy. So in sin man chooses himself as the supreme object of trust, and therein repudiates God and refuses to trust him. In so doing he repudiates his dependence on God both as a creature and as a sinner, and all the weakness and wants incident thereto, and sets himself up in self-sufficiency as independent of God. Thus as trust in God is the only beginning of a right character in

a finite person, so choosing one's self as the supreme object of trust, setting up for one's self in self-sufficiency and therein renouncing God as the object of trust is the beginning of all sin.

“For then we fell when we 'gan first t' essay
By stealth of our own selves something to been
Uncentring ourselves from our great stay,
Which rapture we new liberty did ween,
And from that prank right jolly wits ourselves did deem.”¹

This self-sufficiency issues in self-righteousness and self-glorification. When the self-sufficient man reflects on himself he ascribes to himself the credit of all his doings. He is like Nebuchadnezzar when he said: “Is not this great Babylon which I have built for the royal dwelling-place by the might of my power and for the glory of my majesty?”² He is like the Pharisee in self-righteousness, enumerating his punctilious observances, thanking God that he is not as other men are, and thinking that of himself without trusting in God he has kept the law and won heaven by his own merit.

As in trusting God the faith works in loving service to God and man, so in trusting self the self-sufficiency and self-righteousness work in the service of self. This self-serving manifests itself first as self-will. The sinner sets up his own will as law and refuses obedience to God. Arrogantly and defiantly he asks with Pharaoh: “Who is Jehovah, that I should hearken to his voice?” and with the wicked mighty ones in Job: “What is the Almighty that we should serve him? And what profit should we have if we pray unto him?” The self-serving manifests itself also as self-seeking. In the sphere of getting, possessing, and using the sinner gets, possesses, and uses merely for himself. Here are all sins of the type of covetousness; the selfish desire always for more; the desire to get, possess, and use, which is always insatiable because the acquisitions are but fuel to the desire, only making it burn more fiercely.

2. The evidence that this is the true conception of sin is next to be considered.

First, it is necessarily implied in the truth already ascertained, that the object of the right supreme choice is God as supreme and our neighbor as ourselves in their reciprocal relations in the unity

¹ Sir Henry More, “Psychozoia.”

² Dan. iv. 30.

of the moral system. If indeed the object of the right supreme choice were something to be acquired and possessed, then the object of the sinful choice would be some inferior or unworthy object in the same sphere. But this it cannot be, because the object of the choice must be a person or persons to be trusted and served. In the sphere of personality, the object of the supreme choice, which is the seminal principle, the seed and root of all sin, can be only the self, chosen as the supreme object of trust and service to the exclusion of God and our neighbor. For, as we have seen, love to God and love to our neighbor as ourselves are of the same kind and one cannot exist without the other. Therefore, the wrong supreme choice cannot be love to God alone, for that necessarily implies love to our neighbor as ourselves; and it cannot be love to man alone, for that would imply love to God. It can be only the choice of self as the supreme object of trust and service to the exclusion of God and our neighbor. Therefore sin in its essence is supreme love to self, isolating self as the object of trust and service from all other men and from God.

The law of universal love is fundamental in the constitution of a moral system. There is no other law, under which it is conceivable that a moral system could exist. That the law of love is the supreme and universal law is a first principle of reason, self-evident in rational intuition to every person who knows himself in his actual relations to the moral system. Such a person knows that he does not live for himself alone, but that his action affects for good or evil those who are about him. And he must know that he ought not to aim or intend to live for himself alone with no regard to the interests and rights of others. The clearness and fulness with which he sees this will correspond with the clearness and fulness of his knowledge of himself and the moral system. The choice of self as the supreme object of trust and service is in its essence the repudiation of the law of love and rebellion against its authority; it is in direct antagonism and contradiction to the constitution of the moral system, and in all its tendencies subversive of it; thus it is the seminal principle of all sin and the essential character of a sinner in all forms of sin. And I cannot think of any definition of sin which sets forth its essential character, unless it recognizes it, either explicitly or implicitly, as supreme selfishness or egoism. It is often supposed that the direct con-

trary of love is hatred. But this is comparatively a rare exercise of the human soul and is exercised against comparatively few persons. The real contrary of love is not hate, but selfishness.

Secondly, this definition of sin in its essential character accords with the biblical representations.

Sin in its origin is represented in the Bible as selfishness or egoism. This is true of its account of the beginning of sin in man. In the twelfth chapter of this treatise, containing an examination of the account of the creation and the beginning of human history in the opening chapters of Genesis, it was shown that, under the influence of the serpent, the common Semitic representation of the power of darkness and evil, the woman was tempted to sin. "Ye shall be as God," — here the temptation was to self-sufficiency and self-glorifying in the renunciation of dependence on God and trust in him; "Knowing good and evil," — you will no longer be in subjection to God to order what you may eat and what you may not, but will be sufficient of yourselves to order your action and to do as you please; "Ye shall not surely die," — here the temptation is to self-will, in disobeying God's command as not a real law of rightful authority and binding obligation, obedience to which was necessary to well-being; the suggestion is, on the contrary, that by disobeying and defying him in self-will you will become wise and great, and may expect to become the equals of God; hidden in this suggestion is the intimation that God imposed the restriction through jealousy of man lest he should become his equal and a dangerous rival; thus the tempter belittles God and tries to insinuate into the minds of the first man and woman a heathenish conception of him. The temptation continues, "good for food, a delight to the eye, and to be desired," — here the temptation is to self-seeking and self-indulgence, to seeking the chief good in getting, possessing, and using whatever satisfies appetite, delights the senses, or gratifies desires. Thus, according to this ancient narrative, the temptation to the first sin was addressed to selfishness or egoism in each of its essential forms: to self-trusting in self-sufficiency and self-glorifying, to self-serving in self-will and self-seeking.

The sin was not that they aspired to be like God. The representation in Genesis is that they had been created in his likeness and admitted to close intimacy with him. Man is constituted

in the likeness of God and his true and highest destiny is to be in union with God and to be like him in universal love. But this destiny can be realized only by trusting in him, receiving his heavenly influences and obeying his law of love. This is what God in Christ reconciling the world to himself is effecting in redemption. And ages afterwards, when Christ has come, the glad tidings is proclaimed that men "may become partakers of the divine nature, having escaped from the corruption which is in the world through lust." But it is only through trusting in God and receiving his grace; "seeing that his divine power hath granted unto us all things that pertain to life and godliness, through the knowledge of him who hath called us by his own glory and virtue; whereby he hath given unto us his precious and exceeding great promises; that through these we may become partakers of the divine nature."¹ The sin of man, as presented in the opening of Genesis, consists not in his aspiring to be like God and to increase in knowledge and power and to satisfy his wants, but in his attempting to realize this high destiny by renouncing God and disobeying his law; choosing himself as the supreme object of trust in self-sufficiency and self-glorifying, and as the supreme object of service in self-will and self-seeking.

From hints in the New Testament, theologians have inferred that the sin of the fallen angels began in self-sufficiency and pride. This has been inferred, for example, from the words of Paul: "Not a novice, lest being lifted up with pride he fall into the condemnation of the devil."²

The Bible also represents sin in its historical development as culminating in self-exaltation in the spirit of self-sufficiency, self-will, and self-seeking. This Paul pictures in the coming "man of sin, the son of perdition," after the type of the Roman emperor demanding worship of himself as a God and putting to death Christians who refused to offer incense to him: "He that opposeth and exalteth himself against all that is called God or that is worshiped; so that he sitteth in the temple of God setting himself forth as God."³

That selfishness is the seminal principle of all sinful character and action in the individual is implied in the life and teaching of Christ. Christ, in his humiliation, obedience, suffering, and

¹ 2 Peter i. 3, 4.

² 1 Tim. iii. 6.

³ 2 Thess. ii. 3, 4.

death, reveals the spirit of self-sacrifice for others as essential in love, both in God and man. Therein he asserts and maintains the inviolable authority and universal obligation of the law of self-sacrificing love and the impossibility of attaining any real good in disobedience to it; and the certainty of perfect development, of the greatest efficiency and the highest blessedness and well-being to all who live the life of self-sacrificing love. His oral teaching is of the same purport. "He who loseth his life for my sake shall find it"; "Whosoever will be great among you, let him be your minister; and whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant;" greatness for service and greatness by service; "even as the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister and to give his life a ransom for many"; "I seek not mine own will, but the will of the Father that sent me"; "I seek not my own glory." And in these and similar utterances and the whole tenor of his teaching he makes it known that the same spirit of self-renouncing love is indispensable in every one who would be his disciple.¹ The same is the teaching of the writers of the New Testament. Paul describes the self-renouncing love of Christ in his humiliation, "taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of man," and then, "being found in fashion as a man," his humbling himself still further in obedience and suffering unto death, even the death of the cross, and says, "let this mind be in you which was also in Christ"; and in contrast with this he declares of sinners, "all seek their own, not the things of Jesus Christ." He presents the self-sacrificing love of Christ as the great motive to Christ-like, self-renouncing love: "though he was rich, yet for your sakes he became poor, that you through his poverty might become rich." And he declares that the change in sinners in turning to Christ is that they no longer live for themselves: "He died for all that they who live should no longer live unto themselves, but unto him who for their sakes died and rose again." He represents the change even as a dying, a crucifixion: "I have been crucified with Christ; yet I live; and yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me." And he commands: "Let no man seek his own, but each his neighbor's good."² The

¹ Matth. x. 37-39, xx. 20-28; John v. 30, viii. 50, vii. 18; Matth. xxvi. 39.

² Phil. ii. 5-8, 21; 2 Cor. viii. 9; v. 15; Gal. ii. 20; 1 Cor. x. 24; Rom. xiv. 7, 8; xv. 2, 3.

same conception of Christian character in contrast with the sinful pervades the Gospel and the Epistles of John. Through the first of his epistles runs the one thought, that in Christ the divine light and life and love have come into the world and that every disciple of Christ is a participator therein. The same self-renouncing love is recognized as the essence of right character and of obedience to the law by the other writers of the New Testament, and also in the Old Testament. This biblical representation of the Christian life in contrast with the life of sin shows that the Bible recognizes, as the essence of sinful character, selfishness or egoism, the love of self as the supreme object of trust and service.¹

Augustine says: "If we ask the cause of the misery of the bad, it occurs to us, and not unreasonably, that they are miserable because they have forsaken God who supremely is, and have turned to themselves who have no such essence. And this vice, what else is it called but pride? . . . And what is the origin of our evil will but pride? For pride is the beginning of sin. And what is pride but the craving for undue exaltation? And this is undue exaltation, when the soul abandons Him to whom it ought to cleave as its end, and becomes an end to itself. . . . Therefore the Holy Scriptures designate the proud as self-pleasers. For it is good to have the heart lifted up, yet not to one's self, for this is pride, but to the Lord, for this is obedience, and can be the act only of the humble. There is, therefore, something in humility which, strangely enough, exalts the heart, and something in pride which debases it. . . . By craving to be more man becomes less, and by aspiring to be self-sufficing he fell away from Him who truly suffices him. . . . For that is true which is written, before destruction the heart of man is haughty, and before honor is humility. . . . And this is averred by the sacred Psalmist: 'Fill their faces with shame, that they may seek thy name, O Lord.' " ² The same conception of sin is presented by Thomas Aquinas, and very commonly by the fathers and the medieval schoolmen. Their expositions of the doctrine show that they use pride as denoting selfishness in its essential and seminal principle.

¹ "It cannot be but that a creature love himself supremely, whom the love of God does not absorb." (Melancthon, "Loci," 1521.)

² *Civitas Dei*, Bk. xii. chap. 6; Bk. xiv. chap. 13.

Pride and all sins of that type are included in self-sufficiency, and imply self-will and self-seeking.¹

II. SIN IN DIFFERENT ASPECTS. — While egoism or selfishness is the seminal principle of all sin, it reveals itself in various aspects. Some of these aspects have been mistaken by theologians for the essential and seminal principle itself. Hence have arisen controversies as to what sin is in its deepest essence. It is therefore necessary to examine the characters thus severally presented as the seminal essence of sin, and to show that they are themselves different aspects or manifestations of the choice of self as the supreme object of trust and service ; that is, of supreme selfishness or egoism.

1. Sin is disobedience to God or transgression of his law.

The defect of this is that it defines sin only by the formal principle of the law. Sin is transgression of God's law. This does not declare what is the real principle of the requirement of the law which is transgressed, nor the essential character of the person who transgresses it. The doctrine that sin is supreme selfishness recognizes the fact that sin is disobedience to God and transgression of his law. It also declares that sin is the supreme selfishness which the law by its requirement of love forbids, and which is the essential character of the transgressor and the seminal and productive principle of all his sinful character and acts.

Thus the important truth is emphasized that sin is not negative, a mere absence of virtue or a nonconformity with law. It is a positive choice of self as the object of trust and service, a positive selfishness energizing in the entire character and giving its sinful character to all actions. Carlyle gives us this maxim : " Bad is

¹ Lord Bacon says : " Man, when he was tempted before he fell, had offered to him this suggestion, that he should be like God. But how? Not simply, but in this, knowing good and evil. . . . It was an aspiring desire to attain that part of moral knowledge which defineth of good and evil, whereby to dispute God's commandments and not to depend upon the revelation of his will, with an intent to give law unto himself, which was the original temptation." (Valerius Terminus "Of the Interpretation of Nature," chap. i. ; "Advancement of Learning," Bk. i. ; Works, Philadelphia, 1850, vol. i. pp. 81, 82, 162).

A prominent preacher says : " The selfish Christian is far superior to the benevolent infidel, because the Spirit of God is in the Christian." This exemplifies a confusion of thought existing at this day. A selfish Christian is as unreal and impossible as a three-cornered circle.

by its nature negative, and can do nothing; whatsoever enables us to do anything is by its very nature good.”¹ This cannot be accepted. A sinful will is a positive energy, productive of evil and destructive of good. The Westminster Catechism says: “Sin is any want of conformity unto, or transgression of, the law of God.” This can be true only when interpreted as meaning that any sinful want of conformity to the law is itself voluntary, positive transgression.

2. Sin is alienation from God. This also is a characteristic of all sin. But it is itself involved in selfishness or egoism. In the order of thought, selfishness is primary and positive, the alienation from God implied in it is secondary and negative. Man must have some positive object of choice. He does not renounce an object for a vacuity or nonentity. He cannot live in a vacuum, either in his physical or his spiritual and moral life. We have seen that a man’s will cannot consent to the real principle of the law except in actually choosing God as supreme and his neighbor as himself, as objects of trust and service. So his will cannot refuse consent to the real principle of the law, except in actually choosing some other supreme object of trust and service. This other object, as we have seen, is self. Therefore one cannot renounce God by a mere act of negation, but only in the positive choice of self as the supreme object of trust and service.

Hence sin is properly represented as enmity against God, as resisting God’s Spirit, as fighting against God.² Hence the great message of the gospel to men: “Be ye reconciled to God.” The choice of self as the supreme object of trust and service is in itself disobedience to God’s law, renunciation of his authority, setting one’s self up in self-sufficiency as independent of God, and in antagonism to him. All sin is thus in its essence rebellion against God and treason against his government. Had it might corresponding to its disposition, it would dethrone God and reign in his stead. And this is the representation of Paul in describing the culmination of wickedness in the man of sin, the son of perdition, already cited.

The theory is sometimes advanced that if God were known as he truly is, every rational being would love, trust, and serve him. This implies that no man is at heart sinful, he is only ignorant.

¹ Review of Boswell’s Life of Johnson, “Miscellanies,” vol. iii. p. 130.

² Rom. viii. 7; Acts vii. 51.

What he needs on his own part is not repentance or a change of heart, but only education and instruction ; and what he needs on God's part is not redemption and forgiveness, but further revelation of God. But if sin is essentially the choice of self as the supreme object of trust and service, then the more clearly and fully God is known in his inexorable requirement of universal self-renouncing love and his inflexible condemnation of all selfishness, the more will the selfish person become aware of his enmity against God. This revelation of antagonism and enmity against God is exemplified in the rejection of Christ. God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself. Therein he was making the clearest and fullest revelation of himself as the God of self-impacting and self-renouncing love, and of the universality, the supreme authority, and the unchangeableness and inviolability of the law of self-renouncing love. And therein was revealed also the sin of the world, as represented both by Jew and Gentile conspiring to consign him to the most ignominious death of a criminal. Thus, on occasion of God's making the fullest revelation of himself coming into the world to save it from sin, the sin of the world revealed itself in its real and essential character as enmity and murderous hate against the Holy One. He on the contrary met this hate with the compassion and gracious power of atoning and redeeming love.

We see why a sinner is so commonly unconscious of his own enmity against God. He says, I never had a feeling of enmity against God in all my life. It is because his positive act in renouncing God is his supreme choice of himself ; to this his attention is directed ; his renunciation of God and antagonism to him is hidden in some form of self-sufficiency, self-glorifying, self-will, or self-seeking. He is thinking only of gratifying his own desires and carrying out his own plans, with no thought of God. Such before his conversion was Paul's unconsciousness of the real significance of his own sinfulness : "I was alive without the law once ; but when the commandment came, sin revived and I died." ¹

Luther and Calvin and after them the older Protestant theologians teach that unbelief or the lack of Christian faith is the root of all sin. This is truly characteristic of sin in its deepest root ; for trust in God is the only beginning of right character in men or

¹ Rom. vii. 9.

angels. But this lack of faith is not a mere negation or withdrawal of trust in God. It is the positive choice of self as the supreme object of trust, with the self-sufficiency and pride, the self-righteousness and self-exaltation, the arrogance, self-will, and self-seeking involved in it or issuing from it. This excludes trust in God. This, though in its most refined form, was exemplified by the Stoics. Seneca says: "Give your whole mind to philosophy, be absorbed in it, cultivate it, and you will far surpass all other men and be little inferior to the gods." He gives us the maxim: "Admire only thyself." He says: "A wise man lives with the gods on an equality as a companion, not as a suppliant."¹

Theology has commonly declared a doctrine of total depravity. We now see in what sense it is total. Sin is essentially a man's choice of self as the supreme object of trust and service. In that choice he totally renounces God as the supreme object of trust and service. One who is in rebellion against the government may be amiable, upright, and trustworthy in the relations of private life. But he has totally alienated himself from the government and put himself into antagonism to it. So the renunciation of God in the supreme choice of self is a complete renunciation and alienation. But it does not destroy the person's reason, conscience, and free will nor extinguish his constitutional susceptibilities, nor his natural affections and instinctive impulses and desires. He may be amiable, honest and honorable in his dealings with his friends. But he has totally alienated himself from God and put himself into antagonism to him. So Christ says: "I know you that ye have not the love of God in yourselves."²

3. Sin has also been represented as being in its essence individuation.

Buddhism, being a form of pantheism, teaches that individuation is the source of all evil. But the individuation denotes the existence of finite beings. Finite existence is evil in itself, and the only redemption possible is the extinction of the individual conscious being and its reabsorption into the absolute.

Christianity recognizes individuation as characteristic of sin in its essence. But it is not individuation in the Buddhist meaning. On the contrary, it recognizes a man in his individual personality as of great dignity and worth, because he is in the likeness of

¹ Ep. 53, 8-11; De Vita Beata, viii. 2; Ep. 52, 31.

² John v. 42.

God, capable of receiving divine influence and of intercourse with God, and so of continued development and the progressive realization of the true good. According to Christianity the personal individuality of a man is not evil but good. The sin is a moral individuation in which the person by his own free choice of self as the supreme object of trust and service, alienates and isolates himself at once from God and from his fellow-men. This selfishness is in its essential nature individuating and isolating, and puts man into antagonism to the moral system of which he is a member. It is alienation from and enmity against God and is the principle of discord and enmity between man and man. So James declares: "Whence come wars and whence come fightings among you? come they not hence, even of your lusts that war in your members? Ye lust and have not; ye kill and covet, and cannot obtain; ye fight and war." Thus selfishness, the essence of sin, involves individuation. It tends to disintegrate society into Ishmaels, each man's hand against every man and every man's hand against him. For the selfish man arrogating everything to himself finds everybody else in his way. He must either control and use them, or oppose and fight them. This is exemplified by Polus in Plato's "Gorgias," who, being asked what is the true good, says that the good is the possession of supreme power in a state, like that of tyrants, who kill, despoil, or exile whom they will, and do in all things just as they like. And Meno, in the dialogue bearing his name, says that "virtue in a man is to know how to administer the state, in the administration of which he will benefit his friends and damage his enemies, and will take care not to suffer damage himself."¹ Professor Royce asked a graduate, who had been out of college a few years and very successful in his business, what was his view of a good and successful life. He replied: "My notion of a good life is that you ought to help your friends and whack your enemies."² Thus through all the ages from Plato's day till now selfishness has revealed itself as always the same, the spirit of tyranny and oppression, the principle of alienation, discord, and enmity. It is, in its essential nature, a cannibal giant that will devour your flesh, crunch your bones and suck their marrow, if so he can promote his own enjoyment

¹ Steph. 466, 469, 71; Jowett's Translation, vol. iii. pp. 51, 55; vol. i. p. 244.

² Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 202.

or the attainment of his own selfish ends. Sophocles says that arrogance, lawless and reckless (*ὑβρις*), is the parent of tyranny.¹ This Greek word, of which no English word is the exact equivalent, well expresses the character of the supremely selfish person, in the self-sufficiency and pride of lawless and resistless power, subjecting men to the insolence and arrogance of his own capricious will.

On the other hand, the individuation inherent in selfishness tends to insubordination, lawlessness, and finally to anarchy among the people. Aristophanes in "The Clouds" introduces a young fellow arguing himself free from all restraints of filial duty. And similar is the selfishness in every sphere of life. Self-will is essential in it. Its maxim is, Every man for himself. In the state it is the repellent force tending to overpower the attractive and to disintegrate society. It generates impatience under the restraint of law, antagonism against all government, brawling day and night against all the established institutions, order, and peace of society, and ultimately revolutionary violence and anarchy.

In the Epistle of James, sin is characterized as "earthly, sensual, devilish." Selfishness in the form of individuation is not merely sin of the earthly and sensuous type. It is devilish. It penetrates into the inmost personal powers and affections of man's spirit and perverts them to evil. In self-sufficiency and pride, in insolent and arrogant self-will and self-seeking, in oppression and tyranny when it has the power, in lawlessness, in reckless and destructive violence, it is satanic.²

A covert approval of egoism or selfishness with its individuating and divisive tendencies lurks, sometimes without the writer's consciousness of it, in some of the current teachings as to the conduct of life. It may be found, for example, in Carlyle's exaltation of mere personal force, in the current Hellenism, the gospel of progress by intellectual and æsthetic culture, in some poetry and fiction, and in all teaching, popular, scientific, philosophical or theological, which implies man's power to realize the highest possibilities of his being by the mere force of his own intellect and will without faith in God. "The tameless liberty, the divine dignity of the individual spirit, expanding till it admits

¹ *Œdipus Tyrannus*, 873.

² Plato in "The Republic" says that even the dogs of Athens have a look of impertinence not seen in the dogs of Sparta.

neither any limit nor anything foreign to itself, and conscious of a strength instinct with creative force,—such is the point of view. This ideal of a liberty absolute, indefeasible, respecting itself above all, disdaining the visible and the universe, and developing itself after its own laws alone, is also the ideal of Emerson, the Stoic of young America. According to it man finds his joy in himself and, safe in the inaccessible sanctuary of his personal consciousness, becomes almost a god.”¹ The same exaltation of self, in its most refined form in poetry, is exemplified in these lines of Clough :

“Where are the great whom thou wouldst wish to praise thee?
Where are the pure whom thou wouldst choose to love thee?
Where are the brave to stand supreme above thee,
Whose high commands would cheer, whose chidings raise thee?
Seek, seeker, in thyself ; submit to find
In the stones, bread, and life in the blank mind.”

4. Paul often calls the sinner the carnal or fleshly man, and the natural man. The two designations have essentially the same meaning, denoting a person acting under the predominant impulses of his bodily appetites and feelings and his animal desires and affections. Accordingly Rothe, Zwingli, and others have held that sensuality or animality is the root from which all forms of sin have originated. Rothe attempts to show that selfishness or egoism is originated from sensuality. But this is impossible ; and in attempting to establish it Rothe has scarcely escaped the Gnostic doctrine that matter is in itself evil and the root of all sin.

Sin, in the aspect in which it is presented in the carnal or fleshly and the natural man, obviously presupposes the renunciation of God and his law in selfishness and is derived from it. Man has many natural appetites, desires, and affections common to him with brutes. When in supreme selfishness he has cast off the restraint of God’s law and no longer rules over his lower propensities in accordance with it, he easily gives himself up to these natural impulses and seeks his enjoyment in gratifying them. And, further, in his selfishness he has alienated himself from God and shut out from his soul the gracious influences of the divine Spirit. Thus separated from its legitimate environment, the higher spiritual powers and susceptibilities in him are weak-

¹ Amiel’s Journal, Feb. 1, 1852.

ened by lack of exercise and nourishment, and the lower appetites, desires, and passions of his nature prevail. So long as a plant or animal lives, the chemical forces are held in abeyance, but as soon as life is extinct they begin to decompose and corrupt the body; so while the spiritual life of love continues, the lower impulses are held in abeyance, but when it ceases and God is shut out in the supreme choice of self, the lower propensities and passions, no longer under restraint, assert their power and the person is corrupted into the carnal or fleshly man; into the natural man in whom the life of nature prevails over the life of the Spirit. He does not cease to be a rational free agent, responsible for his actions. But he is a sinful free agent, who is giving himself up to his appetites and passions to be ruled by them. Reason and conscience are unheeded. The lower impulses of his nature dominate over the higher and spiritual, and these are buried and smothered under them. By his own free action he has submerged himself in sense and nature. Therefore, he is properly characterized as the carnal or fleshly man living for the gratification of appetite, or as the natural man subjecting himself to the lower impulses of his nature which ally him with brutes, and disregarding the higher powers and susceptibilities which ally him with God. And plainly it is his selfishness which is manifested in his thus giving himself up to a life of self-gratification and self-indulgence in repudiation of God's law of universal love.

Here we see the significance of the scriptural representation of sin as a bondage or slavery. A miser is enslaved by the love of money, which by his desire of hoarding has lost to him all its real value; the covetous man is enslaved by his covetousness, driving him to a life of self-denying toil which yet can never satiate it; a drunkard is enslaved by his appetite, which only debases and ruins him. Because reason, conscience, free will, all the higher powers and susceptibilities essential to moral responsibility survive in the sinner, he is conscious of higher and nobler possibilities and obligations. But in every aspiration and endeavor to realize and fulfil them he finds the lower propensities dominant, the law in his members warring against the law of his mind; he becomes conscious of impotence for good, of bondage and servitude to the power of evil; he feels himself to be sold as a slave under sin.

Here it is seen that the divisive influence of selfishness penetrates within the personality of the sinner and brings him into conflict with himself. His reason and conscience are always in conflict with his appetites, desires, and affections; his will is always in antagonism to his reason and conscience. And the lower appetites, desires, and affections are not only in conflict with the higher, but also with one another. Because the man no longer commands and regulates them in accordance with the principles and laws of his reason and conscience, they are like a mob fighting among themselves, with no strong hand of authority to control them. And because they have not had the disciplining and educating influence of a life ordered by reason and conscience, some of these natural propensities are overgrown, distorted or morbid while others are stupefied. Thus the inward personality of the sinner is in disorder, conflict, and confusion.

It may be objected that unity is given to the selfish character by the fact that some one appetite, desire, or affection becomes the ruling passion and brings all other propensities into subjection to itself. It is true that any natural propensity may be exalted by the sinner into a ruling passion. But the rule of passion, supplanting reason and conscience, is itself a morbid condition of the soul in which peace and harmony within it are impossible. The ruling passion is like a cancer which appropriates the nourishment of the body, transforms it into poison and infuses it into the whole system, disordering every organ and function.

5. Sin has also been resolved into worldliness, the love of this present world.

Here it must be remembered that *world* (*kosmos*) is used in the New Testament, especially by John, to denote the kingdom of evil, the dominion of Satan, opposed to the kingdom of God. "The whole world lieth in wickedness." Out of this kingdom and dominion of evil, men are redeemed by God in Christ and by his Spirit, and are translated into the kingdom of Christ. The love of this present world, the spirit of the world which worketh in the children of disobedience, is not merely nor primarily conformity with the fashions and seeking the amusements and pleasures of the world. It is the spirit of egoism in its self-sufficiency and self-glorifying, its self-will and self-seeking, as distinguished from the spirit of self-sacrificing love which trusts God in Christ

and serves him in doing good to men, and as antagonistic to the Spirit and kingdom of God on earth. So Augustine represents it: "Two commonwealths have been formed by two loves: the earthly by the love of self even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God even to the contempt of self. The former glories in itself, the latter in the Lord. The one lifts up its head in its own glory; the other says to its God, Thou art my glory. In the one the princes and nations it subdues are ruled by the love of ruling; in the other the princes and the subjects serve one another in love, the latter obeying, while the former take thought for all."¹

Worldliness, however, includes the inordinate, that is, the selfish love of money or of any earthly good. Our Lord says: "Take heed and beware of covetousness." Paul says that covetousness is idolatry. It is a selfish desire to get, possess, and use; it is a desire not for much, but for more. It, therefore, may exist in its full strength, whether a person possesses little or much; and it is in its essential nature insatiable. Thus all such desires for earthly good are in their essential nature manifestations of selfishness. And covetousness is figuratively called idolatry, because it concentrates the energies on something to be got, possessed, and used, and through the vehemence of desire gives to worldly things the lordship of the soul which belongs to God alone.

Here it must be remembered that the natural and instinctive appetites, desires, and affections, being constitutional and involuntary, are not in themselves moral character. They acquire moral character only as modified by the free action of the will. Hence, it is not evidence of selfishness, that one loves his own family, friends, and country more than those of others; nor that he is interested in acquiring knowledge, or in business, or in the acquisition of property. These become sinful only when the person is actuated by the supreme choice of self and fails to regard his obligations to God and other persons in the moral system under the government of God. Then the desire of property or of any earthly object may be inflamed into the covetousness which is idolatry. The person may be said to idolize his child, his friend, his estate, his learning; that is, he gives to one of these the place in his heart and action which belongs to God as supreme and to his neighbor as himself.

¹ *Civitas Dei*, lib. xiv. cap. 28.

Here the question may arise, whether idolatry in its proper meaning as the worship of false gods, can be classed under selfishness. The answer is, that we are not to say with Melancthon that all the virtues of the heathen are splendid vices.¹ There is nothing sinful in the constitutional religiousness of man. On the contrary, it belongs to his highest capacities and powers as a rational and free personal being. If the worshiper, according to the best light attainable by him, reveres, trusts, and serves the divinity, it is possible that his service may be acceptable to God. The all-seeing eye may see in him a character such that if he knew the God in Christ reconciling the world to himself, he would gladly accept, trust, and serve him. His worship becomes sin only when in selfishness he neglects to attain the light accessible to him and to use it aright, — when thus in self-sufficiency, self-glorifying, self-will, and self-seeking he alienates himself from the divinity as he might know him. This is the doctrine of Paul in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans.

6. Sin appears in another aspect, as the denial of the truth and wilful antagonism to it. In its essence it involves falsehood and lies. The Stoics held that all sins are equal. This cannot be true if it means that a person is equally blameworthy in every wrong act and in every form of sinful character. But it is true in the sense that all sinful character and action are the manifestation of selfishness in some form. And because this is true, all sin is the denial of the truth and wilful antagonism to it.

For, in the first place, supreme selfishness, when judged by reason, must be seen to be an absurdity. Its vindication to the reason must assume, as fundamental truth, that the selfish person is himself the centre of the universe; that from him all beings proceed and for him they all exist; that all things are by him and for him; in one word, that he himself is God. From this point of view the New Testament reveals sin, when its essential character is fully developed, as culminating in “the lawless one, the man of sin, the son of perdition,” “whose coming is with lying wonders and with all deceit of unrighteousness,” “setting himself forth as God.” Our Lord says of sinners: “Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your father it is your will to do . . . When he speaketh a lie he speaketh of his own; for he is a liar and the father of it.” And Paul says of sinners that

¹ Loci, 1521; Corpus Reformatorum, vol. xxi. p. 100.

“they exchanged the truth of God for a lie, and worshiped and served the creature more than the Creator;” and that they are given up at last to the “working of error, that they should believe a lie.” And he declares that the issue must be “that they all might be judged who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness.”¹ And reason shows that this must be the issue to all who persist in sin. For supreme selfishness is in direct contradiction to reason and conscience and to all that is highest in the selfish person himself and in all men, to the constitution of the universe, and to all principles and laws eternal in God the absolute Reason. The sinner’s plan to realize his happiness and well-being in self-trust and self-service can be successful only by subverting the moral system, the constitution of the universe and the righteous law and government of God, and frustrating all the designs of his perfect love. It is inevitable, therefore, that whoever persists in the life of selfishness must miss all real good and be forever frustrated and defeated in his ruling purpose and plan of life.

As thus deluding man into the attempt to realize an absurdity and to exalt himself to be as God, sin presents itself as worthy of ridicule and contempt. It is an ancient story that Salmoneus, king of Elis, required his subjects to worship him as a god. Driving his four-horse chariot with thundering noise over a bridge and darting flaming torches on every side, he claimed that he thundered and lightened like Jupiter. For his presumption Jupiter struck him with a thunderbolt and cast him down to punishment in Hades. There Æneas saw him. Such arrogant self-sufficiency and self-glorifying, thus avowed and acted out, is seen to be worthy of ridicule and contempt; unless, as an alternative, the person is seen to be a madman.² And this is a sort of object-lesson setting forth this peculiar aspect of sin as selfishness. It is, in its real significance, though the sinner is not always distinctly aware of it, an attempt on his part to give reality to an absurdity and exalt himself to be as God. From this point of view the sinner is seen either to be a madman, or to be worthy of ridicule and contempt. Both of these aspects of sin are recognized in the

¹ 2 Thess. ii. 3-12; John viii. 44; Rom. i. 25.

² Demens! qui nimbos et non imitabile fulmen
Aere et cornipedum cursu simularet equorum.

Æneid, lib. 6, 590.

Hebrew scriptures: "Madness is in their heart"; "He who sitteth in the heavens shall laugh; the Lord shall have them in derision" (Eccl. ix. 3; Psalm ii. 4).

There is another way in which sin as selfishness in its essence involves falsehood and lies. It entices men with hopes which are never realized, and with promises which are never fulfilled. When in self-sufficiency and self-will the sinner renounces God and his law, he thinks he is asserting and insuring his own freedom and independence. But he finds himself in bondage to his own lusts and enslaved in the world that lieth in wickedness. In his self-seeking he expects to attain his highest happiness and good; he finds that he has insured to himself the loss of all true good. The tempter promises him all the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them. He wins but an infinitesimal fraction of what is thus promised. And should he win all, he would find in them only such poor and unworthy pleasure as his own sensual appetites and perverted desires and affections are capable of receiving.

7. Sin is represented in the Bible as spiritual death. Sinners are said to be dead through their trespasses and sins. This denotes the sinner's deathlike insensibility to God and all the realities of his spiritual environment, to all his spiritual interests, relations, and obligations. It is like the insensibility of the dead to all the interests of the living. It means that the sinner's living interest is only in selfish action and ends. That it has this figurative meaning is evident from the fact that death is predicated in a similar way of those who trust and serve God. As the sinner is said to be dead to holiness, to God, and to all the interests of his kingdom, and alive to sin, so, conversely, the Christian is said to be dead to sin but alive to God. This aspect of sin as spiritual death is involved in the conception of sin as supreme selfishness and the consequent total renunciation of God, and his law, and total alienation from him and his kingdom.

The necessary conclusion is that supreme selfishness is the seminal principle of sin in all its aspects and the fundamental and distinctive character of the sinner in all his acts.

CHAPTER XXII

LOVE AS SELF-RENOUNCING, SELF-DENYING, AND SELF-DEVELOPING

THE general subject under examination in this and the three preceding chapters is, The Requirement of God's Law. In the first of these chapters moral character was defined psychologically. In the second the essence of the moral character required in the real principle of the law was ascertained, and thus right character was defined ethically and distinguished from erroneous ethical definitions of it. In the third we ascertained what is the essence of sin, the transgression of the law. In further answer to the question, What is the real principle of the requirement of the law? we are to consider, in this chapter, the self-renunciation or self-sacrifice essential in the love required in the real principle of the law, the self-denial incident to it, and the development and well-being of the person insured therein.

Jesus says : " He that findeth his life shall lose it ; and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it " (Matth. x. 39). This is a paradox, that is a proposition which at first sight seems absurd, but when further considered is found to declare a truth ; and which thus brings to light a truth which had been hidden or overlooked. In this saying Jesus simply declares the actual paradox of human life ; he reveals the secret of its true significance and success. Paul had learned this secret and verified its truth in his own experience : " What things were gain to me, these have I counted loss for Christ. Yea, verily, and I count all things to be loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my Lord " (Phil. iii. 7, 8). This is the secret of Jesus, the paradox of human life revealed by him : Man must find by losing, must get by giving, acquire by renunciation, realize his highest development by sacrifice, die to be renewed to a higher life.

Faust, in his embittered contempt of life, as always unsatisfying, exclaims: "What good can the world give me? Renounce! renounce! This is the eternal song which rings in every one's ears, which all our life long every hour is hoarsely singing to us." And many persons, counting the little, great, and greater troubles of human life, have sunk into a similar pessimism, and ask despairingly, Is life worth living? Yet they persist in pursuing pleasures which are always illusive, and so, like Faust, wager their own souls to Satan if he will ever give them satisfaction so complete that they shall say to the passing moment, Stay, thou art so fair. Such pleasure Satan has not to give; it is given by Christ alone. This baleful view of life arises from regarding only the first aspect of the paradox without penetrating to its real meaning; by looking only at the loss, not seeing the gain, — at the renunciation, not seeing the development, — at the sacrifice, not seeing the new and quickened life.

It has been often supposed that Christianity presents only this doleful view of life and emphasizes and demands it. So Feuerbach asserts that religion always implies the sacrifice of man to God. And Hegel, in his younger days, referring to the Eleusinian mysteries, declared in a poem that the desecrated altars of Eleusis are being erected again in their hearts by the initiated; and he described this revolt against Christianity as a reclaiming for man of the treasures he had lavished on God. On the other hand, the deniers of immortality reproach Christianity that its virtue is only a selfish seeking of the rewards and blessedness of heaven, and is therefore of a lower order than that of the materialist who obeys his conscience with no hope beyond the grave. It is necessary, therefore, to ascertain what the secret of Jesus is, — what is the real significance of the paradox of human life as he presents it.

I. THE SELF-RENUNCIATION OF LOVE. — To this end it is necessary first to define what is the real significance of the renunciation or sacrifice required by Christ.

1. It is the renunciation of self as the supreme object of trust and service.

It is not primarily the renunciation of the world, nor of wealth, nor of the pleasures of sense, nor of the gratification of natural desires, nor of anything the world can give. One may renounce

all these in false asceticism, retiring to the desert, and not only renouncing worldly pleasures and treasures, but daily subjecting himself to self-inflicted torments; or he may deny himself all reasonable comforts in niggardly miserliness; and in the former case, as really as in the latter, he may be living a life of supreme selfishness. That which is the object of Christian self-renunciation is not primarily the world and its treasures and pleasures; it is self.

It is not the renunciation of self in the sense of a total sacrifice, of the extinction of all the constitutional susceptibilities and powers, nor of the cessation of all love for self and all care of one's own interests. It is simply the renunciation of self as the supreme object of trust and service. This supreme choice of self is selfishness as distinguished from the constitutional love of self, the instincts of self-preservation and self-exertion, the constitutional and indestructible desire of well-being. Selfishness in its essence is divisive. The selfish person isolates himself from God and man, from the whole moral system. He puts himself in a corner and reaches out to grasp and gather all for himself. But his little corner will not hold all the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them. His selfish accumulations only imprison him in the isolation of his selfishness, and overwhelm and crush him. Man seeking good selfishly will always be disappointed either of what he seeks or in what he acquires. The self-renunciation required by Christ is the renunciation of self as the supreme object of trust and service. It is the renunciation of selfishness.

2. This renunciation of self is made by a person in the act of choosing God as supreme and his neighbor as himself, as the objects of trust and service. An existing desire, affection, or choice cannot be extirpated by merely denying or prohibiting it, but only by the presentation of some other object awakening a new desire, affection, or choice. Love of the world cannot be extirpated by showing merely the vanity of the world, nor the love of self by showing merely the littleness and unworthiness of self, but only by awakening love for some other object. Nature abhors a vacuum, and so does the human heart. It cannot renounce an object to sink into vacuity of desire, affection, and choice; the renunciation is possible only by awakening a new desire or affection, or presenting a new object of choice. We have seen that a person renounces God only in choosing himself as the supreme

object of trust and service. So he can renounce self only in choosing, as the objects of trust and service, God as supreme and his neighbor as himself. The supreme love of self can be extirpated only by loving God and our neighbor.

“Love took up the harp of life and smote on all its chords with might,
Smote the chord of self, which, trembling, passed in music out of sight.”

In this self-renunciation made in the choice of God as the supreme object of trust and service the person comes out from his isolation, recognizes himself in his relations and obligations to God, and to all persons under the government of God in the moral system so far as they are within the reach of his influence. His isolation ceases and he is brought into union and fellowship with God and men. In this self-renunciation in the act of loving God and men, the love of self does not cease to act either as the instinct of self-preservation and self-love, or as the voluntary determination of the person to develop himself to his highest perfection and well-being. It only ceases to be dominant and supreme. When love takes up the harp of life, it smites all the chords. The chord of self continues to vibrate, but its sound, blended with that of all the chords, is lost in the harmony and music of love. In the night each star shines in its own individuality. When the sun rises, the stars in their individuality disappear. But they have not ceased to exist as separate stars, nor ceased to shine. But their light is merged in the one all-pervading light of day. So when love to God and man begins, love to self does not cease; but it ceases to be isolated, and shines on merged and lost to sight in the universal love, the love to God with all the heart and to our neighbor as ourselves.

It follows that love to God is the renunciation of self. These are two aspects of one and the same act. The choice of God is the love in its positive character and action; the renunciation of self is the same love considered negatively as rejecting and renouncing the former supreme object. In the order of thought the positive act of choosing God is first and the negative act of renouncing self is second; but in the order of time they are simultaneous.

3. The love required in the law is in its essence a self-renouncing or self-sacrificing love. This is only the converse of the preceding proposition. Since self is renounced in the act of

choosing or loving God and our neighbor as the supreme object of trust and service, the converse must be true that the choice or love of God and our neighbor is in its essence self-renouncing or self-sacrificing. All love is a self-renouncing and self-sacrificing love. Without the self-renunciation the love would be impossible.

And this is an essential characteristic of God's love. It cannot, indeed, involve self-renunciation or self-sacrifice in the sense of relinquishing any of his perfections or blessedness. Neither is man's love self-renouncing in this sense. But this essential quality of love appears in God in the fact that his action is never a getting and possessing for the satisfaction of any wants of his own. It is always a forthputting, imparting, giving. He opens his hand and his creatures are filled with good. All his action, therefore, is the outpouring and expression of pure, disinterested love. While blessed eternally in his own fulness, his disinterested love moves him to create the universe that there may be beings to be the recipients of his love and participators of his fulness. Accordingly, God's love, when revealed to us in Christ as exercised under human limitations and conditions, is a self-sacrificing love, even unto death, for sinners. And the essential likeness of God's love to the love which he requires in men is recognized in the command, "Let this mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus."¹ Thus Christ brings God's love to men to save them from their sins; in so doing he reveals what God's love is, and sets forth, as no other revelation has done, the universality, the supreme authority, the unchangeableness and inviolability of the law of self-renouncing and self-sacrificing love. Christianity as history, as doctrine, and as life is a sacrificial religion, centring on redemption through Christ's obedience to the law of self-sacrificing love, to man's obedience to the same.

All love, because it is self-renouncing and self-sacrificing, is substitutional or vicarious. It is the expending of one's own in the service of another. Whoever serves another in self-renouncing love takes the place of the person served and does for him and in his stead what he cannot or will not do for himself. By sympathy and helpfulness he identifies himself with the other, bears his burdens and sorrows and makes his needs his own; he may even risk or sacrifice his life to save another. One who tries to

¹ Phil. ii. 5-8.

reclaim another from vice or ungodliness bears his sins in a true sense ; they are a burden on his heart. A mother is in anguish for the sin of a wayward son, and by the love in which she thus bears his sins she at length saves him. The stronger the love the more it bears as a burden the sorrows and sins of the person loved and makes his case its own. So Sophocles says, it may be without having fathomed the deep significance of his words : " One soul present to help in sincere good-will," or, as we might say, in the strength of love, " suffices instead of tens of thousands to atone." ¹ And when God in Christ comes into humanity to save men from sin, and reveals his love to them under human conditions and limitations, it is plainly a substitutional or vicarious and a sacrificial love. " Christ hath once suffered for sins, the righteous for the unrighteous, that he might bring us to God." ²

We see, then, that the love required in God's law, in its very essence as love, is self-sacrificing and substitutional. And every one makes the sacrifice in accepting Christ as he is offered in the gospel, and therein giving one's self to God in loving trust and service. It is the offering of one's self to God. So Paul exhorts : " Present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable to God, which is your reasonable service." And the offering of the living sacrifice is not of the body only, but of the spirit also with all its susceptibilities, powers, and resources. A person, in virtue of his being a rational, self-determining spirit in the likeness of God and receptive of the influence of the Spirit of God, can, as it were, lay hold of, can take up in his hands and lift on high before God, and offer and present to him, himself, his affections, desires, and passions, his intellect, his energy, his will, his whole soul. He is himself the offering ; he is, by the divine spirit in him, himself the priest.

4. Love as essentially self-renouncing is distinguished from desire. Natural appetites and desires are egoistic and are thus distinguished from natural affections, which are altruistic. Natural desires are for objects to be got, possessed, and used ; desire " is an emotion of the soul which has for its avowed or secret end, possession." ⁴ Natural affections are for persons, instinctively

¹ Sophocles, " *Cedipus Koloneus*," 498, 499.

² 1 Pet. iii. 18.

³ Rom. xii. 1.

⁴ Cousin, " *The True, the Beautiful and the Good*," Wight's transl. p. 131.

impelling to self-denial in serving them and imparting joy in the service. These instinctive affections, such as parental, filial, conjugal love, compassion, and many others, are not in themselves moral character. But they are in the nature of man, foreshadowings and intimations of the self-renouncing love required in the law, showing that man was made for conformity with its requirement. The love required in the law is a free choice of the will and is thus distinguished from the natural desires and affections and from all instinctive propensities. It is further distinguished from the egoistic impulses of appetite and desire by the fact that in its essential character it involves self-renunciation or self-sacrifice. "Desire lays hold of its object for the use and enjoyment of self; love takes of the resources of self and imparts them to the person loved. Desire devotes its object to self; love devotes self to the person loved. The movement of desire is like that of a whirlpool, circling abroad only to return on itself and suck everything into its own vortex; and because this is its movement it is always empty, always resistless, and always dangerous to whatever comes within its whirl. The movement of love is like that of a fountain pouring out of its own fulness to bless all around it; and because this is its movement it is always full, always peaceful, and always beneficent. Love enthrones its object and makes self serve it; desire seizes its object and makes it serve self. Love admires, reveres, trusts, and in its highest form adores the person loved; desire uses the thing desired. We love persons who may be honored, trusted, and served, but cannot be owned and used; we desire things which may be owned and used, but cannot be honored, trusted and served. If desire, uncontrolled by love, fixes on a person, it makes the person a toy, a tool, a slave, or a victim."¹ Accordingly Christ teaches, not that the water of life which he gives is poured into a person like water into a cistern, but that it shall be a fountain of living water springing up within him and flowing forth unto everlasting life (John iv. 14, vii. 38).

It is important to mark this distinction, because love is very commonly identified with desire. In popular language, men speak of loving money, or power, or strong drink, or revenge, meaning simply the desire of these things. But in defining the love required in God's law, which is moral character in its pri-

¹ "The Kingdom of Christ on Earth," by Prof. Samuel Harris, pp. 133, 134.

mary sense, it should be carefully distinguished from desires. Yet very often this distinction is not recognized. John Boyle O'Reilly says, "My experience makes me sure of one truth, which I do not try to explain, — that the sweetest happiness we ever know comes, not from love, but from sacrifice, from the effort to make others happy." Here the good-will or benevolence, which manifests itself in unselfish service to others, is explicitly contrasted with love and excluded from it. And even Christian preachers and theologians and writers on ethics often define the love required in the law as being essentially desire. Professor Henry P. Tappan defines it: "That which we love we desire to have present, to possess and enjoy it. . . . The loving an object and the desiring the enjoyment of it are identical." Prebendary Wordsworth says: "True love is not benevolence; it is a burning fire, a passionate eagerness to possess the souls of those whom it loves, a grasping after love in return." Dr. Chalmers says: "Love may be regarded in two different conditions. The first is when its object is at a distance, and then it becomes love in a state of desire. The second is when its object is in possession, and then it becomes love in a state of indulgence." President Bascom says: "We use the term love as the last stepping-stone of ascent by which to express our feelings toward the things that confer enjoyment upon us, from lower objects to the highest persons who minister to our well-being." Our Lord taught that greatness is for service, not for being served; and that in his love to men he came, not to be ministered unto, but to minister and to give his life a ransom for many. In direct contradiction to this, the writer last quoted teaches that Christian love is our feeling toward those who minister to us; and that, in this, love to God and man does not differ from our love to the lowest thing which confers enjoyment on us; therefore not from our appetite for food or drink. Thus he agrees with John Locke, who declares that all love is the same in kind with the love of grapes; "it is no more but that the taste of grapes delights him."¹ These definitions all agree in identifying love with desire; it is the desire to have the object of love present to possess and enjoy it. It

¹ Prof. Tappan, "Review of 'Edwards on the Will,'" p. 18; Wordsworth, "The One Religion," p. 192; Chalmers, "The Expulsive Power of a New Affection," Sermons, vol. ii. p. 271; Bascom, "The Words of Christ," p. 73; Locke, "Human Understanding," Bk. II. chap. xx. sect. 4.

is a definition which, without the change of a syllable, is equally the definition of a wolf's love of a lamb, of an epicure's appetite, a drunkard's thirst, a covetous man's greed, a miser's stinginess, a swindler's rapacity, a seducer's lust. Socrates, in Plato's "Phaedrus," says of such a lover: "There is no real kindness in his friendship; he has an appetite and wants to feed on you, as wolves love lambs." So Mrs. Browning represents a crafty and ambitious woman's love:

"Her love's a readjustment of self-love,
No more; a need felt of another's use
To her advantage — as the mill wants grain,
The fire wants fuel, the wolf wants prey.
And none of these is more unscrupulous
Than such a charming woman when she loves.
She loves you, sir, with passion, to lunacy;
She loves you like her diamonds — almost."

Even Madame Dudevant, known in her writings as George Sand, says: "There is but one sole virtue in the world — the eternal sacrifice of self."

What an unworthy standard of Christian character, what an influence for moral corruption in the church of Christ, when the teachers of Christianity degrade that which is the noblest possibility of humanity, the love which is the essence of God's moral perfection, and which is the godlike in human character, into a mere desire to get, possess, and use.

With such teaching, it is not surprising that some men who think themselves good Christians are in their business unscrupulous in their dealings, rapacious in their getting, indifferent to the rights of their employees or of their employers, unfaithful to trusts, dishonest, untruthful and corrupt in party politics, — that the church has not yet entirely cleared itself from those who "devour widows' houses and for a pretence make long prayers."

5. John says: "Love is of God; and every one who loveth is begotten of God and knoweth God. He who loveth not knoweth not God; for God is love." In a preceding chapter it was shown that John in this epistle represents Christ as bringing into humanity the divine light, love, and life for the renovation of men. Here he sets forth a special significance of that truth, that man's love to God and man is in the likeness of God's love, and that in the exercise of love man attains his fullest knowledge of God.

Man in his scientific knowledge of the universe finds it at every point constituted in accordance with the ultimate and regulative principles of his own reason.¹ Science is nothing but the apprehension and systemization of the realities of the universe in the forms of human reason. Scientific discovery is essentially the progressive discovery of the realities of the universe existing and acting in accordance with the ultimate principles and laws of human reason. For example, the mathematics which men spin out of their own minds are found to be the mathematics in accordance with which the universe is constituted. Science is possible only as it postulates behind all phenomena and all force a mind with rationality like our own, revealing itself and expressing its thought in the universe in the forms of space and time. The science which the human mind is progressively reading in the universe is science eternal in the mind of God which he is progressively revealing in the universe. Therefore there is no warrant for the common concession of theologians that the belief in God rests on no scientific foundation. It rests on a scientific foundation in the same sense in which the law of gravitation rests on a scientific foundation. This law rests on ultimate, self-evident, universal principles of reason which cannot be proved because they are self-evident; and it is held to be true because it alone accounts for the observed facts and makes it possible to comprehend them in the unity of a scientific system. The belief in God rests on a similar basis in ultimate, self-evident principles, and is held to be true for precisely the same reason. Science rests as really as theism on self-evident ultimate principles which can never be proved; and theism, as really as scientific law, is held to be true because it alone accounts for the observed facts and makes it possible to comprehend them in the unity of a consistent scientific system. Science, in order to complete itself as science, must say, from its own point of view, what the Psalmist says in the worship of God: "In thy light we shall see light."

Christ reveals the same likeness of the human and the divine in moral and spiritual truth. In him "was the true light, even the light which lighteth every man, coming into the world." The

¹ "Self-Revelation of God," by Prof. Samuel Harris, pp. 256-272, 365-375, 237-241; "Philosophical Basis of Theism," pp. 82, 143-148, 182-184, 312-314, 560-564.

eternal Reason, revealing itself in him under human forms and conditions, is seen to be the same in the fundamental principles of the moral and spiritual life as the human reason. Man participates in the light of the divine Reason. The God in Christ makes the fullest and most impressive revelation of the law of love in both its aspects as righteousness and benevolence, and of its universal and supreme authority and its unchangeableness and inviolability. Christ reveals to man that his reason and conscience attest the law eternal in God; that his sense of sin is his consciousness of obligation and of disobedience to the eternal law of God.

Christ also brings into humanity the love of God. He reveals it under human forms and conditions to be essentially the same with the self-renouncing and self-sacrificing love which the law requires of men, and which Christ exemplified even unto death. In Christ man receives God's love to himself and experiences its gracious influences on his heart. He responds to it with love like God's love to man. He may participate in love the same in kind with God's love. In both ways he knows in his own experience what God's love is. He who loveth knoweth God. In receiving God's love and responding to it with kindred love he knows in his own experience the love which is the essence of God's character, the highest moral perfection and glory of God. In sympathy with God he becomes a worker with him in progressively accomplishing the great designs of his wisdom and love. He who loveth not knoweth not God. He lives in selfishness. He has no knowledge in experience of that love which is the essence of God's character, no appreciation of its glory, no sympathetic participation in his great work of love redeeming man from sin. By his intellect he may know God. In the deepest experience of heart and life he knows him not. When he accepts Christ as he is offered in the Gospel, then he opens his heart in loving trust and the light of God's love shines within him. Then "God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in his heart, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ" (2 Cor. iv. 6).

In this divine light and love Christ quickens in men the new spiritual life. The spiritual powers and susceptibilities, before perverted or torpid, are now awaked to right action. The

Spirit of God, who, excluded by sin, had stood at the door and knocked, now enters within the soul and dwells in it with quickening, illuminating, and renovating power. Thus the normal spiritual life of man in union with God begins. In accepting Christ, the sinner "lays hold on the life eternal," the spiritual life of love and of energetic action inspired and directed by it, which is eternal in God, and which begins in man when he begins to love, and therein renounces self. Thus he begins to know something of the blessedness of the heavenly glory; for "all that life is love." As a child who has spoken one word has revealed the power to speak all words, as the child who has read one sentence has revealed power to master all literature, — so he who has accepted Christ in loving trust has revealed love like that of Christ, and therein has revealed capacity for all the self-sacrificing heroism of missionaries, reformers, confessors and martyrs, and for the heavenly glory, when we shall see Christ as he is and shall be like him.

II. SELF-DENIAL. — Specific acts of self-denial incident to Christian service are to be distinguished from the self-renunciation essential in Christian love. This is the distinction made by Paul: "If I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and if I give my body to be burned, and have not love, it profiteth me nothing."¹

I. A specific act of self-denial is the foregoing of a present gratification for an ulterior end, irrespective of the worthiness or unworthiness of the end and of the right or wrong character of the person seeking it. Such acts are not peculiar to the Christian life. They are incidental to the concentration of the energies necessary to achievement in any line of action. This necessity arises from the limitations of man. He cannot do all things. If he is to accomplish anything he must concentrate his thought and energy on it and persist in this concentration. This necessarily implies the withdrawing of thought and energy from other lines of action and the foregoing of other pleasures in order to achieve success in his chosen pursuit; he must hold in and hold on. This self-denying concentration is essential for success to the mechanic, the merchant, the scholar, the teacher, the statesman, the day-laborer, as really as to the Chris-

¹ 1 Cor. chap. xiii. 3.

tian. It is essential in politeness ; as when, at a dinner-party, a waiter spilt a bowl of gravy on the new and costly dress of the hostess, and she, with a placid smile, expressed the hope that the company would excuse her for being helped first. It is essential in the enterprises of selfishness and of crime. A burglar, a counterfeiter, anarchists, and nihilists in prosecuting their bloody plots, deny themselves more than an upright man in honest industry. There is as much self-denial in a life of supreme selfishness as in a life of universal love. "Deny thyself," is written over the gate to success in every enterprise whether of virtue or vice, of selfishness or love.

2. While self-denial is not a peculiarity distinctive of the Christian life of love, it is essential both to the development of Christian character and to the efficiency of Christian service.

It develops the power of self-concentration and self-mastery, which are essential to strength of character, boldness of enterprise, and achievement in work. This is the Roman *virtus*, — the robust manhood which the Romans admired as the essence of virtue. The person who has it is no longer living a life of impulse, following every appetite and desire and catching the passing pleasures of the day. On the contrary, he is thoroughly in earnest : he has a plan to be realized, an end to be accomplished, a work to be done, on which he concentrates all his thought and energy, and to which he makes all things bend. He has disciplined his powers to efficiency and trained them to act at his command. He has possession and mastery of himself, as an engineer of his engine, and all his powers work with precision and energy as he will. He has thus learned contempt for self-indulgence, luxury, and ease, readiness for toil, fearlessness of danger. He does not shirk work, but welcomes it as opportunity for achievement.

While this is not a distinctive peculiarity of the Christian life of love, it is indispensable in it for the development of Christian character and spiritual power and for efficiency and success in Christian enterprise and work.

Here two opposite tendencies appear. One is to accept the Roman *virtus* as the whole of virtue ; to worship this self-mastery in itself ; it is the worship of mere manly strength ; its god is Thor with his hammer. Browning is a representative of this tendency. "Weakness, irresolution, even in committing a crime,

is to him the one unpardonable sin, 'hateful to God and to his enemies.' . . . Only when the end, though attainable, is not attained, only when the failure is owing to nothing but the agent's timidity and vacillation, does Mr. Browning's mercy give place to indignation." But mere strength of will crushing out all conflicting desires does not show the moral character of the person. One may be strong and self-mastering in accomplishing selfish ends as really as in the work of Christian love.

On the other hand, the criticism is sometimes made of the current evangelical as well as of ritualistic piety, that it fails to develop the Roman *virtus*, the true and strong manliness and womanliness; that it is disproportionately occupied with saving the soul from hell and rejoicing in the hope of rest and blessedness in heaven; that it manifests itself too exclusively as feeling, too little as intelligent, strong will; that it is too largely occupied with worship, too little with work, removing ignorance and misery, resisting falsehood and wickedness, reforming abuses, and advancing the kingdom of God; that in it is too little of the love that serves as distinguished from the love that trusts; and that thus it fails to develop an earnest, strong, complete, and harmonious Christian character. Whether there is much or little truth in this criticism, Christianity demands men and women of earnestness and strength, of self-concentration and self-mastery. It demands the old Roman *virtus* vitalized and directed by Christian faith and love. Such a man was Paul. "What things were gain to me, these have I counted loss for Christ." "This one thing I do, forgetting those things which are behind and stretching forward to the things which are before, I press toward the goal." Obstacles and opposition only stimulated him to greater zeal: "I will tarry at Ephesus; for a great door and effectual is opened to me and there are many adversaries."¹

It follows that a Christian man or woman, strong in the power of foregoing present gratifications for noble ulterior ends, will not whine and whimper over discomforts and self-denials, making all around uncomfortable with the drizzle of his discontent. Such a complainer may do well to remember the fine saying of Madame Clotilde de Vaux, "It is unworthy of a noble nature to diffuse its own pain"; and the stern words of Carlyle, "Do your work and swallow its annoyances in silence. Contrive to burn your

¹ Phil. iii. 7, 13; 1 Cor. xvi. 8.

own smoke"; and the words of Paul to Timothy, "Endure hardness, as a good soldier of Jesus Christ"; and the words of the dying David to Solomon, "Be thou strong, and show thyself a man." For every work in every line of action involves self-denial as really as the work of a Christian or a Christian minister. The self-denial is a mere incident of the self-concentration necessary to achievement. So Sir Walter Scott says, "There never did and never will exist anything permanently noble and excellent in a character which is a stranger to the exercise of resolute self-denial."

3. The discipline and training of a Christian to this self-mastery is in the actual doing of Christian work in the service of God and man. This life is the school in which God is educating and training us to the full development of our powers, the achievement of our best work, and the realization of the highest possibilities of our being. If we are faithful in every duty to God and man, if we do, "as much as in us is," our Christian work in saving men from sin and transforming human society into the kingdom of God, we shall have all the self-denial necessary to discipline and train us to self-mastery and spiritual power. Asceticism is a word derived from a Greek word meaning exercise and training and referring to athletic exercise. But in our spiritual development there is no need of a spiritual gymnasium into which we are to go just for the sake of exercise. We need not go to the monastery or the desert. We find our exercise and training in the actual work of life. Christians, in this respect, are like day-laborers and mechanics who, working every day, need no gymnastic practice for exercise and the development of muscle. Kant says: "All ethical gymnastic (*ἀσκησις*) consists solely in subjugating our instincts and appetites, in order that we may remain their master in any and all circumstances of moral peril; an exercise and training which renders the will hardy and robust, and, by the consciousness of regained freedom, makes the heart glad."¹

We need not bid, for cloistered cell,
Our neighbor and our work farewell.
If, on our daily course, our mind
Be set to hallow all we find,
New treasures still of countless price
God will provide for sacrifice.

¹ *Metaphysik der Sitten*, Trans. p. 297.

The trivial round, the common task,
Will furnish all we ought to ask ;
Room to deny ourselves ; a road
To bring us daily near to God.— KEBLE.

“ Much must be done and much must be learned by children for which rigid discipline and known liability to punishment are indispensable as means. It is . . . a very laudable effort in modern teaching to render as much as possible of what the young are required to learn, easy and interesting to them. But when this principle is pushed to the length of not requiring of them anything but what has been made easy and interesting, one of the chief objects of education has been sacrificed. I rejoice in the decline of the old brutal system of teaching, . . . but the new is training up a race of men who will be incapable of doing anything disagreeable to them.”¹ Better the severest discipline of the Jesuit training, than that the young be educated without acquiring the power of self-denial in concentration on work and the love of it. And in our Christian life, better the self-flagellator’s scourge than effeminate and luxurious weakness and self-indulgence, refusing toil, hardship, and self-denial. We do much toward bringing under our bodies and keeping them in subjection by keeping them in perfect health ; so that we can do our work and almost forget that we have any bodies. We may do something in the same direction by keeping our bodies so comfortable with all the modern conveniences, that we can do our work without thinking of them. But in this case the danger is that the conveniences may get the mastery. It is better to put our haircloth on our easy-chairs rather than on our backs. But if the easy-chair becomes indispensable and stands in the way of duty, then it is mightier than we and has become our master. Then it were better the haircloth be again on our backs. One must respect the severest ascetic more than the self-indulgent weakling.

Here also is disclosed an evil tendency in those forms of communism and socialism which aim to develop a constitution of society in which every person is to be fed, clothed, housed, and provided for in every way by the community. It necessarily involves a supervision and direction of the individual as to his line of business and work, his hours of work, his marriage, the training

¹ J. S. Mill, “Autobiography,” p. 53.

of his children, and all his action and interest to an extreme of minuteness unknown hitherto in any despotism. Persons thus tended and directed through their whole lives would fail to attain their normal development. They would be overgrown babies, and mankind would degenerate. The intellectual action, the knowledge acquired, the forethought, prudence, and carefulness, the putting forth of the energies in work, involved in self-support, are important factors in the development of the man and of the woman. The evil moral influence lies not in the necessary struggle for existence, but in the selfishness which controls it. Love, regulated in its exercise by wisdom, in accordance with the principles, laws, and ideals of reason eternal in God and determining the constitution of the universe, cannot secure the true progress of man without bringing on every individual the stress of obligation to use, and the necessity of using to the utmost, his own forethought, skill, and energy, in providing for himself as really as for his neighbor, and so in developing himself to his highest attainable perfection and well-being. And his service of love to his neighbor will be directed to quickening, guiding, and helping him to do the same. Society will then be developed on the basis of reciprocal service and helpfulness, respecting the rights and developing the personality of every individual, instead of losing the individual in the gelatinous mass of society. The latter would be analogous to a process the reverse of evolution, and carrying the universe back from its glorious diversity and harmoniously interacting energies, to the peaceful but motionless quiet of the original homogeneous nebulosity. This principle controls God's entire action in the redemption and renovation of individuals and the advancement of his kingdom.

“Shall I be carried to the skies
On flowery beds of ease,
While others fought to win the prize
And sailed o'er bloody seas?”

The grand promise, while recognizing fully the conflicts, difficulties, trials and work of human life, is: “Even the youths shall faint and be weary, and the young men shall utterly fall; but they who wait upon Jehovah shall renew their strength; they shall mount up with wings as eagles; they shall run and not be weary; they shall walk and not faint” (Isa. xl. 29-31). But they who

avail themselves of the gracious divine aid find that it comes in the renewal of their own strength to grander exertion. If they fly, they must use their own wings; if they walk or run they must do their own walking and their own running; however great and rapid their progress, it must always be by the exertion of their own powers. In renovating and developing us, God does everything for us; nothing instead of us and without our co-operation.

4. The false asceticism which prescribes self-inflicted privation and suffering not incidental to Christian duty and work, is founded in error, and is pernicious in its practical influence.

It is founded on a failure to appreciate the full significance of justification by faith. The heathen fitly made religion to consist in sacrifice and penance to appease an offended god, for they had no knowledge of atonement through the God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself.

The Christian, on the contrary, knowing that God is already gracious in Christ who has offered the one sacrifice for sin forever, and that he freely justifies all who accept his grace, knows also that he himself is no longer under condemnation, and has nothing to do in the way of penance and sacrifice to appease an offended God, or to make expiation for sin. Therefore, in the spontaneity, enthusiasm, and joy of loving trust and service, he gives all his time and strength to the duties and work of Christian love in advancing God's kingdom on earth; and he endures every self-denial with thankfulness and gladness of heart that he has opportunity to labor, and even to suffer for Christ, and in saving men from sin.

False asceticism, missing this conscious freedom, makes the person concerned about saving his own soul in the life hereafter, rather than about doing good to men in the advancement of Christ's kingdom on earth. It aims to crush out all natural desires and affections, rather than to regulate them and bring them into harmony under the reign of love to God and man. It cultivates the spirit of Plotinus, who "was ashamed that he had a body, and would never tell from what ancestors he sprung"; or of the father of J. S. Mill, "who professed the greatest contempt for passionate emotion of all kinds, and for everything which has been said or written in exaltation of them. 'The intense' was with him a byword of scornful disapprobation."¹

¹ Lange, "Geschichte des Materialismus," vol. i. p. 146; Mill's "Autobiography," p. 49.

Hence this asceticism drives men to separate from the world, instead of living and working in it for its renovation ; to fear and trembling on account of sin, instead of rejoicing in conscious freedom from condemnation and in the blessedness of loving trust and service ; to look on Christ as a judge rather than as a redeemer ; and to regard suffering as in itself well pleasing to God. Thus it is in accordance with the gloom and terror which overspread the church in the Middle Ages, and which still looks down from frescoes in Florence and Rome.

Hence arose such misrepresentations of the God in Christ and of the Christian life as these : — “ Our Saviour sentenced joy ” ; “ Man approacheth so much nearer to God, the farther he departeth from all earthly comfort ” ; “ If thou couldst perfectly annihilate thyself and empty thyself of all created love, then should I be constrained to flow into thee with greater abundance of grace ” ; “ When thou lookest unto the creature, the sight of thy creator is withdrawn from thee.” Hence, also, the misapprehensions of Christians so noble in character as Blaise Pascal and his sister Jacqueline. “ Whatever complacency the author (Pascal) may have felt in his work, he was careful to check it at once, as he did every feeling of pleasure. . . . He wore an iron girdle lined with iron points next his naked flesh, and whenever there came to him any feeling of gratification in having assisted or advised another, or when he felt pleasure in any place where he was, or in any circumstance whatever, he gave himself a blow with his elbow to redouble the violence of the constant pain and make him remember his duty. This practice appeared to him so useful that he continued it through his increasing feebleness, till the close of his life. . . . His great maxim was to renounce all pleasure and superfluity, and he labored without ceasing for mortification.” He had previously felt obliged to give up his brilliant scientific investigations as inconsistent with the religious life. His sister Jacqueline had poetical gifts, and had been requested by a clergyman to translate some Latin hymns. She wrote for advice to the convent which she had proposed to enter. The reply was : “ It is better for you to hide your talents of that nature instead of making them known. God will not require an account of them, and they must be buried. . . . You ought to hate your genius and all other traits in your character which perhaps cause the world to retain you, for where it has sown it would

fain gather the harvest." But she at least acquired self-mastery, courage, and strength. For when it was proposed to suppress the Port Royal institutions, and the inmates were required to sign a condemnation of the doctrine of Jansenius, an indefinite paper was drawn up as a compromise. This the men were generally willing to sign, thus showing that their ascetic severity had not trained them to manhood, but Jacqueline refused. At that time she wrote to a friend: "I know very well that the defence of the truth is not women's business. But perhaps when bishops have the cowardice of women, women ought to have the boldness of bishops. And if it is not for us to defend the truth, we can at least suffer for it." ¹

III. SELF-DEVELOPMENT BY SELF-RENUNCIATION. — Jesus says: "He that findeth his life shall lose it; and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it." ² This paradox signifies that self-renunciation or self-sacrifice is essential to man's true development and well-being. Every finite person is an individual in the moral system under the moral government of God. He does not exist either for or by himself. Therefore love to God with all the heart and to his neighbor as himself is the normal motor and directing force of the man. When he exerts all his energies in this universal love, he is in harmony with his own constitution, with the universe and with God, and thus he must attain his highest perfection, power, and well-being. If he centres all his energies on himself in self-trusting and self-serving, this is the essence of all sin. In so doing he acts in antagonism to the constitution and law of his own being and to his whole environment. Therefore he cannot realize his own normal development and well-being, but only perversion, corruption, and ruin. And this is the legitimate and necessary consequence of sin. This is the significance of our Saviour's paradox, — "the secret of Jesus," as Matthew Arnold calls it.

1. Love to God begins in the act of trusting him. In that act

¹ Mrs. Weitzel, "Sister and Saint, Life of Jacqueline Pascal," pp. 278, 280, 289, 323. Heinrich Jung Stilling, in his Retrospect of his life, relates: "My father . . . merely from the mystic principle of mortifying the flesh, almost daily whipped me with the rod. I know for a certainty that he frequently chastised me merely to crucify and mortify his love for me."

² Matth. x. 39.

the man is restored to his normal condition of union with God. It has been shown that man's spiritual environment is God, in whom we live and move and have our being; that man, both as a creature and as a sinner, is dependent on God and can attain his normal growth and development and put forth his highest energies in fruitful production only as he is united with God by loving trust and receives and appropriates his gracious and heavenly influences. It has also been shown that by sin man tears himself away from God, wilfully closes his soul against the divine influence, and thus alienated from God, his spiritual environment, is like a branch torn from the vine and withering till it is fit only to be burned. In returning to God in faith or loving trust, the sinner renounces self. He comes out from his self-sufficiency and self-glorifying, his self-will and self-seeking; he opens his soul to receive the gracious and heavenly influences environing him; he is accepted by God and thus reunited to him, like a scion cut off and grafted in again, living anew in the life and bearing the fruit of the vine. Then God works in and with him, developing him to the perfection of his being. Then in all which he does for the advancement of Christ's kingdom he is working together with God, who inspires him with divine wisdom, illuminates him with divine light, inspires him with divine love, and quickens him with divine life. Then he has also come into harmony with the constitution and order of the universe, and, in accordance with God's special providence, all things work together for his good because he loves God.

2. Self-sacrificing love insures the person's complete development, because it stimulates all his own powers to their normal activity and directs them to their normal ends.

It calls into action the person's own spiritual energies and susceptibilities, those which are highest and noblest, and directs them to their proper ends; and brings all the lower powers and impulses of his nature into their normal and harmonious action under the direction and regulation of universal love. Selfishness, it is true, calls the powers into action and, as mere powers of intellect and will, may strengthen and develop them. But it is after all a development of power for evil ends and for the moral and spiritual perversion and corruption of the person. The action of love, on the contrary, develops the person in accordance with his rational spiritual constitution and to the highest

moral and spiritual perfection and power. Selfishness brings the lower impulses to the front and gives them leadership, and thus deadens and suppresses the nobler spiritual impulses and elements of character. Thus the person comes into bondage under sin, his ruling passion is in conflict with reason and conscience; the appetites and passions, not controlled by their legitimate rulers, are in conflict with one another. Thus he can never realize his true perfection and good, or his highest power. But love calls into action all that is highest and noblest in man, all in him which exalts him above impersonal nature, allies him with God, and forms him into God's likeness.

Love also opens to a man the widest and grandest scope for action. Selfishness contracts the horizon of a person's vision and the sphere of his action to the little circle of his own gains. It belittles the man and it belittles the sphere of his interests, enterprise, and enjoyment. The whole range of his activity and interest is limited to transient gains to satisfy his lower propensities in a lifetime which itself is but a vapor which vanishes and a leaf which fades.

“’Tis a vile life that, like a garden pool,
Lies stagnant in the round of personal loves,
That has no ear save to the tinkling lute
Set to small measures; deaf to all the beats
Of that large music rolling o’er the world;
A miserable, petty, low-roofed life,
That knows the mighty orbit of the skies
Through nought save light and dark in its own cabin.”²

Love also quickens all the powers in their normal exercise to the greatest intensity of action. When one who loves God and man considers the grand realities of existence, the greatness of his own immortal being as a child of God, the vastness of his relations to God and the moral system, the glory of the kingdom of God on earth, the opportunities of doing service in advancing it, the momentous responsibilities under which he lives, the sublime privileges opened to him, it must indeed drive him to God to lay hold of the divine wisdom and grace; but it will also inspire him with courage and hope because he is a worker together with God, and must call forth all his energies to their intensest action and rouse him to the most devoted and enthusiastic earnestness.

² George Eliot, “The Spanish Gypsy.”

Thus self-sacrificing love must insure self-development because it calls into harmonious and rightly directed action man's highest powers, opens the grandest scope for their exercise and arouses them to their intensest activity.

3. Self-sacrificing love insures the true self-mastery and the real freedom, the joyous and enthusiastic self-devotion to a great work, which are essential to the fullest development and the greatest achievements.

It is a common impression that the Christian life is gloomy, a painful doing of duty for an ulterior end ; that all its joys are stored away in heaven. This impression arises from looking at the Christian life from the point of view of selfishness. A selfish man cannot see any enjoyment in the life of self-sacrificing love ; he cannot understand the experience of Paul, who, having lost all for Christ, had found that the loss was gain. One cannot have any enjoyment in an object or pursuit unless he has first some desire, affection, or voluntary preference for it. To a person supremely selfish the life of love must appear as essentially and only self-sacrifice and self-denial. It must appear as contrary to all his aims and desires, bristling all over with prohibitions, and every touch drawing blood. It restrains him from what he would do, and constrains him to what he would not do. He can regard it only as gloomy, painful, and repellent. But religion is not a perfunctory and reluctant obedience to rules for the sake of escaping hell. Its sacrifice of self is not a constrained and reluctant sacrifice, as sailors throw overboard a precious cargo to save their lives. It is no mere prudence ; going through the gymnastics of so much prayer and bible-reading every day and so many meetings every week ; getting down nauseous doses of religious service, carefully counting the drops in order not to take more than is necessary to avert threatened death. The same misapprehension appears in a common type of remark, that we must not make religion gloomy by forbidding amusements. It implies that religion in itself is gloomy and hard ; but there is a silver lining to the cloud, — one may occasionally dance, or play a game of cards, or even go to a theatre. All such conceptions arise from looking at religion from the point of view of selfishness ; from which one cannot, as our Lord says, even see the kingdom of God in its real character. The contrary of this conception is true. The self-renunciation is but the reverse

or negative side of love and all its acts of trust and service are spontaneous acts of love. The new love concentrates the person's interest and energies on new objects, opens to him a new world in which to expatiate, is a spiritual birth to a new and higher life, and thus expels the old and selfish love.

“ As by the light of opening day
The stars are all concealed,
So earthly pleasures fade away
When Jesus is revealed.

“ These pleasures now no longer please,
No more delight afford ;
Far from my heart be joys like these,
For I have found my Lord.”

And Christian love, as it continues to rule the action, gradually brings all the motive and emotional feelings to their normal development and harmony. At first there will be conflict with the evil dispositions and habits remaining over from the sinful life. But under the vitalizing power of the new love the natural propensities are not extirpated, but restored to their normal strength and harmony under the regulation of the higher powers and susceptibilities. The very lowest become penetrated and uplifted with the quickening and purifying spiritual energy, and brought into accord with the command, “ Whether ye eat or drink, or whatever ye do, do all for the glory of God.” In addition to this, the spiritual motives and emotions, which had slumbered in torpidity in the life of sin, are called into activity. With the returning sun in the spring, the snow-birds are gone, but the birds of summer return and sing in all the branches ; so when the Sun of Righteousness rises on the soul, new and heavenly aspirations, hopes and joys, sing within it on every spray.

Thus the self-sacrifice of love is not a toilsome and weary doing of painful duty. It is a life of earnestness and enthusiasm, calling forth all the energies in joyous and intense action in reference to the new realities and new interests opened to the view, now that the soul sees the invisible and looks on the things which are not seen.

And it is only in self-sacrificing love that the highest self-mastery and power are attained. The Roman *virtus* is only a preparatory stage in acquiring self-mastery. It can hold a person to his work in spite of its repulsiveness and his strongest desires

to the contrary. But more than this is necessary. Complete self-mastery and the greatest power of achievement are attained only when in the right supreme choice love has vitalized and inspired all the energies and concentrated them on its object, has opened all the spiritual susceptibilities to receive the divine influences, has aroused all the spiritual motives and emotions, brought all natural desires into harmony with itself, and thus has attained spontaneity, earnestness, enthusiasm, and real freedom in Christian trust and service. Christ has brought into the world a new motive, the mightiest of all: "for my sake." In view of Christ's sacrifice of himself for us and the love of God's own heart to men revealed in it, his name inspires to heroism of self-sacrificing service. And "in his name" the self-sacrificing service becomes, not merely an occasional heroism, but the habitual spirit and action of a Christian.

In common language, labor and toil, as implying struggle, fatigue, weariness, are distinguished from work, which is unobstructed and achieving. A ship labors in the sea; the machinery works smoothly. Work, as exertion for an ulterior end, is distinguished from play, which is the exertion of our faculties, physical or mental, for the mere pleasure of the exercise. Christian love does not suppress the play-impulse, any more than other useful natural propensities; it only regulates it. It generates a life of earnestness instead of a life of impulse and frivolity. Play, as recreating, is necessary through life in every line of action and for persons of whatever character. Where there are the earnestness and self-devotion of the life of love, there will be no danger of spending too much time in play. But self-sacrificing love in its spontaneity, enthusiasm, and freedom takes from Christian work the sense of laboriousness, toilsomeness and weariness, and gives instead the springiness and joyousness of a child at play. *Labor ipse voluptas.*

In this way even acts of self-denial become easy to a Christian. The more complete his self-renunciation, the less is he aware of self-denial. The foregoing of a present gratification for an ulterior end is not pleasant in itself. But one can rejoice in the self-denial as expressing love and as necessary to the ends of an earnest life. Love to a person or enthusiasm for a cause makes it easy to endure self-denial for the welfare of the person or for the success of the cause. In fact one ceases to be aware that it is

a self-denial. A man intent on his business denies himself every day ; yet he is conscious of doing only what he is intensely interested in and wishes above all things else to do. Tell him he is working too hard, that he is injuring his health, that he must go away for recreation ; he cannot bring himself to consent to it. In any line of action in which a person becomes intensely interested, he may risk and even sacrifice health or life, and yet not be aware of any self-denial. It is the same in the work of a Christian. Enthusiasm for Christ and his kingdom makes sacrifices easy. He is not conscious of the sacrifice, but only of doing what his whole heart is set on doing. The more complete his self-renunciation, the less is he aware of self-denial. Thus his left hand does not know what his right hand doeth. Not merely does he not do his good deeds to be seen of men, but he keeps them secret from himself. He is so earnest in Christian love, so enthusiastic in Christian enterprise, that he does great deeds of self-denial without thinking of the self-denial and without looking back afterwards to praise himself for it. So Paul says : "I hold not my life of any account, as dear unto myself, so that I may accomplish my course and the ministry which I received from the Lord Jesus, to testify the gospel of the grace of God." It is an ordinary occurrence in the many persecutions of Christians that martyrs, old and young, men and women, have rejoiced at the stake in the consciousness of victory rather than of defeat. The Epistles of the New Testament, sometimes written from prison or in the face of impending bloody death, and always amid hardship and persecution, are the most joyous writings in all literature. In reading Paul's words of triumph, "I am now ready to be offered,"¹ one would never imagine that the chain clanked while the pen wrote. The tranquil and lofty peace of the early Christians in the times of persecution is a deeper and nobler joy than the gaiety of the Greeks and the voluptuousness and luxury of the Romans at the same time. We sing :

"Great God, how infinite art thou ;
What worthless worms are we."

The Psalmist exclaims, "I am a worm, and no man" (xxii. 6). These may express the feeling of a person when in the vivid conception of God's infinite greatness and love he sees his own sin

¹ 2 Tim. iv. 6-8.

and unworthiness. But it is the negative aspect of self-renunciation. In the thought of the greatness and love of God, the Christian's positive experience is the consciousness of greatness rather than of littleness, of nobility rather than of contemptibleness. It is the consciousness that he, as spirit, is in the likeness of God; that he is in communion and union with God; that he is a worker with God in love to secure all that is noblest, purest, and best for individuals and for mankind in advancing the kingdom of God. It is the inspiration of love, the same in kind with God's love revealed in Christ, quickening the Christian to attempt great things and to expect great things in the service of God and man. It is the Christian's consciousness that he is a child of God, therefore an heir of God, a joint heir with Christ to an inheritance incorruptible and undefiled, and that fadeth not away (Rom. viii. 16, 17; 1 Pet. i. 4). Thus through the revelations of God in Christ, the Christian transcends and leaves behind the "worm of the dust" conception, which has often darkened, enfeebled and misrepresented the Christian life.

4. Self-development by self-sacrifice accords with the Christian law of service as declared by Christ.

Salome, the wife of Zebedee, came to Jesus with her two sons, James and John, and asked for them the highest place in his kingdom. Jesus in reply announced as a law of his kingdom, the Christian law of service: "Whosoever will be great among you, let him be your minister; and whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant." And he enforced it by his own example: "The Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister and to give his life a ransom for many."¹ This he contrasts with the usage of heathendom, that the great use their superior power to compel service to themselves. Thus he distinctly presents this Christian law of service as the principle of a new civilization. This ambitious desire for precedence in his kingdom appeared repeatedly among the disciples and was as often rebuked. Once he gave them an object lesson by setting a little child in the midst of them, and said: "Whosoever shall humble himself as this little child, the same is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven."² Luke relates that this contention arose again at the table when Jesus instituted the Lord's Supper. This was doubtless the occasion on which, as we learn from John,

¹ Matth. xx. 20-28.

² Matth. xviii. 1-5.

Jesus at this supper washed his disciples' feet. It was another object-lesson given under these most impressive circumstances to teach them the Christian law of service. He impressed it on them by saying, as Luke relates, "Whether is greater, he that sitteth at meat or he that serveth? but I am among you as one that serveth." And he added, as John relates, "Ye call me Master, and Lord; and ye say well, for so I am. If I then, the Lord and the Master, have washed your feet, ye also ought to wash one another's feet." Even after Christ's resurrection, and just before his ascension the disciples asked him, "Dost thou at this time restore the kingdom to Israel?" Thus they showed that even then they had not wholly rid themselves of the rabbinical error that the Messiah would establish a political kingdom in which the Jewish nation should rule the world. Jesus in reply commanded them to wait at Jerusalem for the descent of the Holy Spirit, whom he had promised, to lead them into all the truth respecting himself. Thus he renewed to them his often repeated instruction that his kingdom was not to be of this world, but to be a reign of love under the illumination and quickening of the Spirit of God.

This law of service has two aspects: Greatness for service; greatness by service.

Greatness for service: — Whatever superiority a Christian has over others in wealth, knowledge, intellectual power, or means of influence of any kind, he is under obligation to use it in the service of God and man. The greater a man's power, the greater the service he is bound to render.

Greatness by service: — Service to others, deemed a mark of inferiority in heathen civilization, is to constitute real greatness in the kingdom of Christ; greatness by serving, not by being served. This is the legitimate unfolding and practical application of the paradox of Jesus: "He who loseth his life for my sake shall find it." Self-development is by self-sacrifice.

Greatness is by service in the sense that by it the person serving develops himself to his highest perfection and his true manhood. The character expressed and developed in loving service is the highest and noblest type of character. Jesus reveals the divine in the human, and the human in its ideal perfection. That ideal is found in his life of service; he came not to be

¹ Luke xxii. 24-27; John xiii. 1-15; Acts i. 1-8.

ministered unto, but to minister. This Man of Sorrows, in the form of a servant, is the perfect man, in whom humanity, long smitten with spiritual death and producing only degenerate beings, at last, touched by the divine, comes forth in full perfection. The first tempter promised: "Ye shall be as gods;" and the promise was to be realized through self-will and self-indulgence: "She took and did eat." It has been the mistake of the world from that day until now to expect to become as gods by getting and being ministered unto. The gospel also gives the promise: "Ye shall be partakers of the divine nature;" but it is by being, like Christ, a servant. The conception of the highest blessedness by being ministered unto is the conception of an everlasting babyhood, an everlasting need and enjoyment of the pap-spoon. The conception of greatness by ministering is the conception of manly strength and power to serve, of resources to give without impoverishment. So we accept the words of Jesus, seeing therein our highest greatness, power, and dignity: "It is enough for the disciple that he be as his Lord." Contrast Paul and Napoleon — both conquerors; the one by force, the other by truth and love; the one for self-aggrandizement, the other for the welfare of man. Contrast them in the imprisonment in which their lives were ended, when, isolated from all factitious support and splendor, you see the men themselves; Napoleon, though surrounded with the comforts and even the luxuries of life, querulous, morose, not self-poised and self-sustained; weak, like a rank vine grovelling on the ground when its prop is gone; Paul, imprisoned and chained in a dungeon, yet how grand his bearing, how self-poised and self-sustained, how peaceful and triumphant.

Greatness is by service also in the sense that by it a person achieves the greatest results, develops his highest power and exerts the greatest and most enduring influence among men. He who by great service makes himself indispensable in a community acquires weight and influence in the community. In the line of that service he becomes a director and commander, a king of men by divine right. He who on a larger scale renders a great service to a nation or to mankind, perpetuates his influence, and is remembered with gratitude and honor by succeeding generations. "If Paul had remained a Pharisee, he would have been a prominent man of his city, and at his death would have been forgotten. But Paul the Christian becomes a man of power

throughout the Roman empire and perpetuates his influence through all ages. If Luther had remained a monk, he would have been a student inclined to despondency and having no higher aim than to keep his own conscience at peace. But Luther in active self-renouncing service, is a man of burning enthusiasm, dauntless courage, heroic enterprise, and broad, hearty humor, the Reformer of the church. . . . It is a condition of abiding influence that the life be identified with truth, which lives forever. The life expended on selfish ends is transient as the objects it seeks and narrow in its scope as the interests of self.”¹ As God loses nothing of his perfection, blessedness, and glory in the exercise of love, always going out and going down to bless those infinitely beneath, so the Christian loses nothing of perfection, power, or glory by renouncing and sacrificing self in the service of love.

It is true, a person in advance of his age may try to effect a reform of belief and practice, of laws and institutions, for which his generation is not prepared. He may be persecuted and killed. The prophets to the people of any generation are commonly stoned by them. But their martyr-death is the seal of their unshaken fidelity, the insurance of their glorious transformation into the likeness of the glorified Christ and of their eternal blessedness with him. And their martyr-testimony is heard through all generations and is a mighty ministration of the word of life from age to age. Even children who have suffered martyrdom have been powerful preachers of the gospel to all ages and all peoples.²

There is even in the physical system a certain analogy to this law of service. Every force expended is at the same time conserved in new relations and doing new work. The sunshine which expended itself ages ago reappears to-day in the burning coal, warming our dwellings and driving our machinery. The grain of wheat which dies in the ground reappears, first the

¹ “The Kingdom of Christ on Earth,” by Samuel Harris (Andover, W. F. Draper), pp. 159, 160, 161. See Lecture viii. in that volume for a more full exposition of the Christian Law of Service.

² “Salvete, flores martyrum,
Quos lucis ipso in limine
Christi insecutor sustulit,
Ceum turbo nascentes rosas.”

PRUDENTIUS, *De Sanctis Innocentibus*. —

blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear. The little acorn which buries itself and dies, reappears in the majestic oak of after years. So in domestic life, a mother expends her life-force on her children; it reappears multiplied in the well-being, character, and influence of trained and educated men and women. And in the spiritual life a person dies to self, like the dying seed, and rises in a new life beautiful and fruit-bearing, "like a tree planted by the streams of water." Every expenditure of physical, intellectual, and moral force in spiritual love reappears in the person's own spiritual growth and productiveness, and is perpetuated and multiplied in its influence on others.

Till this truth thou knowest,
 "Die to live again,"
 Stranger-like thou goest
 In a world of pain. — GOETHE.¹

5. From every act of loving service good accrues to the doer immediately in this present life, and evil from every act of selfishness. Every expenditure of money, energy, or comfort in any act of loving service is followed by a further development of right character, spiritual power, and true well-being. And this gain is immediate because it is wrought within the soul by the very act of service. And vitiation of character, enfeeblement of the power for good, disorder, and corruption follow immediately every act of sinful service of self. Moreover, love in its very exercise is pleasant and satisfying; while sinful desire, prompting to get, possess, and use only for self, is, both in its exercise and in its attainment of its object, restless and unsatisfying. In its essence it is an uneasiness in the sense of want; and as a stimulus to action it grows stronger by its own activity and is thus insatiable. It is the vulture in the myth of Prometheus, daily gnawing the ever-growing heart.

This answers the common objection against the belief that God is love, that the goods of life are so unequally distributed; that the wicked are prospered and the righteous are in adversity. In this complaint the goods referred to are wealth, health, popularity, and other worldly advantages belonging to the natural, not

¹ Und so lang du das nicht hast,
 Dieses: "Stirb und werde,"
 Bist du nur ein trüber Gast
 An der dunkeln Erde.

the spiritual, man, — to this transient life, not to the life eternal. But God is not so impoverished that he has nothing better than these things with which to bless the life of love.

“Wealth on the vilest often is bestowed
To show its vileness in the sight of God.”

The highest good possible in this universe, constituted as it is in accordance with the truth and law of eternal wisdom, and governed in perfect wisdom and love, is the development and perfection of the man in spiritual life and power, and the well-being and blessedness involved therein. These highest and abiding blessings are bestowed with unerring discrimination on those who are serving God and man in self-sacrificing love, and bestowed in immediate consequence of every act of loving trust and service. The contrary spiritual evil comes with equal immediacy and certainty on the doer of any act of sinful trust and service of self. Our Saviour promises for every act of loving self-sacrifice a hundredfold more in this present life. Certainly the spiritual well-being and power which it insures is worth a hundredfold more than the money, energy, or comfort expended in the sacrifice.¹

In the beginning of the Christian life there will be conflict and struggle in doing duty. The service to be rendered may be painful and the sacrifice severe. George Eliot says in “Romola”: “We can have the highest happiness — such as goes along with being

¹ THE COMPLAINT.

“How seldom, friend, a good great man inherits
Honors or wealth with all his toil and pains!
It sounds like stories from the land of spirits,
If any man obtains that which he merits,
Or any merits that which he obtains.”

THE REPLY.

“For shame, dear friend, forego this canting strain.
What wouldst thou have the good great man obtain?
Wealth, titles, salary, a gilded chain?
Or throne of corses which his sword had slain?
Goodness and greatness are not means but ends.
Hath he not always treasures, always friends,
The good great man? Three treasures, — life, and light,
And calm thoughts regular as an infant’s breath;
And three firm friends, more sure than day and night, —
Himself, his Maker, and the angel Death.”

S. T. COLERIDGE.

a great man — only by having wide thoughts and much feeling for the rest of the world as well as for ourselves ; and this sort of happiness often brings so much pain with it that we can only tell it from pain by its being what we choose before everything else, because our souls see it is good.” And the point which I have now been making is that every act of service in self-sacrificing love immediately contributes something to strengthen the love and to bring its healing and life-giving touch upon every power and susceptibility of the soul ; something to develop the spontaneity, enthusiasm, and real freedom of love, which make self-denial easy and transfigure every cross into a joy and crown ; something to complete to fulness all spiritual perfection, power, and blessedness. And thus will the promise be fulfilled : “They who wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength ; they shall mount up with wings as eagles ; they shall run and not be weary ; they shall walk and not faint.”

6. The good attained by self-renouncing and self-sacrificing love is imperishable and everlasting. This is the “riches and honor, the durable riches and righteousness,” which wisdom declares are hers. It is the “treasures in heaven where neither moth nor rust doth consume and where thieves do not break through nor steal.” It is riches and honor which can never be lost, because organized into the spiritual and immortal man himself. Wherever his lot may be cast he carries with him and inseparable from him these imperishable treasures, this never-fading honor. The Christian assurance of this is quaintly expressed in an epitaph on an old tombstone in Tiverton, England :

“Hoe ! hoe ! who lyes here ?
 ’T is I, thee goode Erle of Devonshire,
 With Kate, my wife, to mee full dere.
 We lyved togeather fifty fyve yere.
 That wee spent, wee had ;
 That wee lefte, wee loste ;
 That wee gave, wee have.”¹

¹ “The world teaches me that it is madness to leave what I may carry with me ; Christianity teaches me that what I charitably give while alive I may carry with me after death ; experience teaches me that what I leave behind, I lose. I will carry with me by giving away that treasure which the worldling loses by keeping ; and thus, while his corpse shall carry nothing but a winding sheet to his grave, I shall be richer under ground than I was above it.” (Bishop Hall, “Devotional Works,” pp. 496, 497.)

“Such as have been plundered of their estates in the wars may be content

Its Christian significance is the more striking when contrasted with an epitaph found on an ancient Roman tombstone, expressing the darkness and hopelessness of the heathen mind. "What I have eaten and drunk I have taken with me ; all else I have left behind."

The paradox that self-development is by self-renunciation and self-sacrifice, that we must die in order to live, has been called the Secret of Jesus. Yet it is essential in the idea of the love required in the moral law and disclosed in the normal development of the rational and moral constitution of man. Hence even heathen writers have come to the knowledge of it. It is declared, for example, in an epigram of Martial, which has been translated by Bryant :

"Thieves may break in and bear away your gold,
The cruel flames may lay your mansion low,
Your dues the faithless debtor may withhold,
Your fields may not return the grain you sow,
A spendthrift steward at your cost may live,
Your ships may founder with their precious store ;
But wealth bestowed is safe ; — for what you give,
And that alone, is yours forevermore."

Fichte says : "There is nothing real, lasting, imperishable in me but these two elements : the voice of conscience and my free obedience. By the first, the spiritual world bows to me and embraces me as one of its own members ; by the second, I raise myself into this world and can comprehend it and act in and upon it." But the obedience is possible only in the actual exercise of self-renouncing love to God and man. Only in this does man claim his birthright in the moral system, assert his dignity as a child of God, and live worthy of his high calling as having a personal interest in all the grandeurs of the moral system under the government of God and as a worker together with God in the advancement of his kingdom.

and comfort themselves with this consideration, that so long as they enjoyed plenty they freely parted with a proportion thereof to the relief of the poor : what they gave, that they have ; it still remaineth theirs. Although Job lost his seven thousand sheep, being consumed by fire, yet he still kept the wool of many of them ; for the patriarch affirms that the poor were warmed with the fleece of his sheep. So much of his wool (in the cloth made thereof) he secured in a safe hand, lending it to God (in poor people) as the best of debtors, being most able and willing to repay it." (Thomas Fuller, "Good Thoughts in Bad Times," pp. 241, 242.)

7. The full perfection, power, and blessedness developed by self-sacrificing love is completed only in the life eternal in heaven. We have seen that God's love in its essential quality is the same in kind with the self-sacrificing love required of man; and that it is so revealed under human limitations and conditions in Christ. We have seen also that Christ in his self-sacrificing love reveals the ideal man in his earthly condition; and in his exaltation the ideal of man as consummated in the heavenly glory. The command is, Let this mind be in you which was also in Christ. And the apostle immediately presents the revelation of God's love in Christ as a double humiliation; first, being in the form of God, he emptied himself, taking the form of a servant and being made in the likeness of men; and secondly, being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself still further to death, even the death of the cross. And in correspondence with this we see in man a double exaltation. First, in self-sacrificing love, he is to realize the ideal of man in his earthly life; and, then, glorified with Christ, in love triumphant in heaven, he realizes the likeness of God. While, then, the command, at first sight, seems to demand depths of humiliation and sacrifice too great for man to endure, in its deeper significance it opens to man the highest privilege, the grandest opportunity, the most glorious hope. It invites him by self-sacrifice to realize in himself all that is great and powerful and good in the perfect man, and thereby to become like God who is love. And this divine likeness begins to form itself in the man as soon as he renounces self in loving trust in God. It is further developed in every act of loving service. It is consummated in the heavenly glory. "Beloved, now are we children of God, and it is not yet made manifest what we shall be. We know that when he shall be manifested, we shall be like him; for we shall see him even as he is."

IV. LOVE IS DISINTERESTED. — The objection is urged that, if right action insures the person's highest blessedness, it will be vitiated by selfishness and cannot be an act of disinterested love. It has even been denied that any person ever acts from disinterested love.

The answer is that love is in its essence the renunciation of self, and that the action in which it is manifested is not getting, possessing, and using, but trusting and serving. The act of trusting

in God is itself an act of self-renunciation ; because in it the person renounces his self-sufficiency and self-glorifying ; and the action of serving God and our neighbor is an act of self-renunciation, because in it the person renounces his self-will and self-seeking. Such love is in its essence and all its action disinterested. As this answer is further unfolded it will be seen that the objection rests on a misconception of the meaning of self-renunciation, disinterestedness and love. If by "disinterested" the objector means love to another in which the person loving is devoid of all regard to his own well-being, it is true that there is no love which in that sense is disinterested. It properly means love to another in which love to self or regard to one's own interest is not the dominant and ultimate motive. In this sense all Christian love is disinterested. It is love to self or seeking one's own well-being co-ordinated with equal love to one's neighbor, respecting his rights and seeking his well-being, and both subordinated under love to God as supreme.

1. The objection rests on Hedonism. It assumes that, if a person's highest happiness is the result of right action, every one will seek it as his supreme end. Ritschl, for example, holds that of retributive, especially of punitive, justice there ought to be no mention in the moral and religious sphere. If we may speak of punishment, reward for right action may be spoken of with no less right. But the consequence of admitting the notion of reward into the kingdom of God or the moral sphere would be, that the law of love would be fulfilled for the sake of reward, instead of from love which asks no reward.¹ But this is true only on the Hedonistic principle that the one and only ultimate aim of all human action is the person's own happiness. In contradiction to this, true philosophy gives a basis for recognizing other ends. In the life of nature a person must have some desire, affection or preference for an object before he can find happiness in it. And in the moral and spiritual life a person must love God and his neighbor before he can find happiness in serving them. The happiness presupposes the love to God and man, and thus proves that the love is not a selfish desire of the person's own happiness. On the contrary if a person serves another for the supreme end of promoting his own interests, he is serving himself and using

¹ Ritschl, "Die Christl. Lehre der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung," iii. 211-219.

his neighbor; the service is a manifestation of selfishness, not of love; and the common sentiment of mankind condemns it as such. Self-renouncing love insures to the person his own highest happiness. But if his own happiness is his supreme end, he does not love God and his neighbor. And Paul makes this discrimination between love and a seeming service of love, though carried to the greatest extreme of self-denial: "If I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and if I give my body to be burned, but have not love, it profiteth me nothing."

2. The objection makes no distinction between supreme love to self and love to self in full recognition of the equal rights of others and of obligation to God. The self-renunciation required in the law is the renunciation of self as the supreme object of trust and service. It is not the giving up of all desire of happiness and of all interest in one's own well-being. The attempt to attain one's own well-being, as against the common well-being of the community and irrespective of the rights of others in it, is selfishness. The endeavor to promote one's own well-being with recognition of the equal rights of others in the moral system and in promotion of their well-being is not selfishness. The second great commandment does not say, Love thy neighbor and not thyself, but as thyself.

The objection assumes that love is complete altruism and requires the extinction of all personal desires and of all interest in one's own welfare. The supreme choice of self isolates the person's own welfare from the welfare of others, and brings him into antagonism to them; it may excite him, if unrestrained by stronger force or contrary selfish impulses, to raven among them like a wolf among lambs. And this is suggested in the technical use of the word "lambs" on Wall street. In the renunciation of self as the supreme object of trust and service, this isolation and antagonism cease. The well-being of self is no longer incompatible with that of the neighbor. The well-being of the one is no longer necessarily impaired by the well-being of the other. But each finds his own well-being in promoting the interest of the other; they co-operate in the reciprocal service of love. This does not extinguish all love of self, but each loves himself as he loves the other; each promotes his own welfare in promoting that of the other.

This false conception of love as complete altruism is exempli-

fied by Spinoza : "He who loves God must not endeavor to have God love him in return."¹ But in fact, instead of extinguishing selfishness, this enjoins the extreme of self-sufficiency. It requires a man to set up as sufficient for himself, not asking or seeking the gracious influence of God's love, apart from which no finite person can attain his normal perfection, power, and blessedness. And the demand of the objector for complete and exclusive altruism as essential to disinterested love must issue in the extreme of false asceticism aiming to crush out every desire and joy and making a merit of self-inflicted privation and suffering. This involves self-righteousness; and thus again the attempt to extinguish all love of self issues in developing selfishness.

Those who deny that disinterested love exists, probably suppose it to be complete and exclusive altruism.

3. The objection rests on the assumption that law is an arbitrary enactment; that, therefore, punishment is penalty prescribed and inflicted from without; and that the good which results from self-renouncing love is only wages or reward given by another for service rendered. On the contrary, the law is eternal in the absolute reason, is attested in the constitution of man, and determines the constitution of the universe; and good accruing from obedience is primarily the person's own perfection, power, and blessedness and his harmony with his environment, developed by his life of self-renouncing love, trusting and serving God, and doing all his duty to man. It is not, therefore, payment or reward for doing duty in obedience to an arbitrary enactment. And the penalty for wrong-doing is primarily the corruption and perversion of the man in the life of trusting and serving self supremely, and his consequent disharmony with his environment. Therefore, for the sinner persisting in sin, blessedness is impossible; the prolonging of his life must be only the prolonging of his corruption, debasement, and wretchedness. Certainly it is no proof of selfishness that a person realizes the perfection and well-being which his whole course of right living, according to the constitution of himself and of the universe, must surely develop.

4. A necessary inference is that the objection, if valid, implies

¹ "Qui Deum amat, conari non potest ut Deus ipsum contra amet."
(Ethics, Bk. V. xix.)

the subversion of the moral system. It assumes that, if the universe is so constituted, expressing the archetypal thought of God's eternal wisdom and love, that a life of self-renouncing love to God and man issues in the person's true well-being, then for any one knowing this fact love would be impossible; for its very exercise would transform it into supreme selfishness. But if it were so constituted that a life of love would not insure well-being, then the constitution of the universe would itself be immoral, contradicting the moral law of love. This absurdity is escaped only by acknowledging that self-renouncing love is the renunciation of self as the supreme object of trust and service in the supreme choice of God and our neighbor; not the renunciation of self as a rational, free person, in the likeness of God and legitimately entitled to trust and service according to his true character and his actual place and relations in the moral system and under the government of God.

5. The hope of immortality is a motive stimulating not to selfishness but to self-renouncing love. The objection of the materialist, that virtue not looking beyond this life is purer than that which is animated by the Christian hope is already refuted. It rests, as we have seen, on false assumptions and inaccurate definitions. If one denies his immortality, his own constitution as a rational and immortal being remains unchanged, and his reason and conscience will still assert the distinction of right and wrong and the obligation to duty. Therefore morality may remain. But he can feel no longer the great motives to self-renouncing love which spring from man's conscious relations to God and his participation in the great work of advancing God's kingdom. Morality may remain. But it is a morality for seventy years, shut up to the transitory interests of this life, shut out from the grand scope of the divine likeness and relations and the immortal interests of man. The life of love would be unable to develop itself in its loftiest aspirations, its widest scope, its most far-reaching aims and its greatest spiritual power. Matthew Arnold defines religion as morality lit up with emotion. Rather religion is the consciousness of God and of ourselves in our relations to God, which gives the truth which illuminates, the glowing emotions which accompany, and the spiritual motives which vitalize, inspire, and ennoble morality. Religion and morality in the spiritual life are analogous to genius and talent

in the intellectual life. As genius flashes light into the heart of things which talent with all its laborious investigations misses, so religion illuminates the whole sphere of man's relations to God and his kingdom, and of his immortal existence, which morality without religion never finds.

And here is the Christian optimism. With these large views of God and of his own union with him and of his participation in God's great plans and working with him, the Christian is courageous, hopeful, and joyous in the presence of evil. Knowing himself as a child of God, a spiritual being in a spiritual system, he knows no bounding wall of necessity and evil on which his life must be wrecked. All evils befalling him, death itself, all limits of the finite, are only doors opening as he approaches them, through which he is to pass to a larger freedom, a greater spontaneity and enthusiasm, a fuller realization of himself, a mightier spiritual power, wider and more interesting fields of enterprise, a closer union with God, a more full participation in the divine life, and a more abundant entrance into the divine work. Thus in the vision of God and immortality the pains of life are sifted out and its blessedness remains and grows.

If thou do ill, the joy fades, not the pains ;
If well, the pain doth fade, the joy remains.

GEORGE HERBERT.

Therefore the Christian is always justified in saying : " Be it ours to doubt the glooms but not the glories of our souls ; to distrust the suggestions of lower and more earthly hours, and scatter the fears of the slothful and unawakened heart."

V. INDIVIDUATION AND CO-OPERATION. — The individual must exist before he can serve others or co-operate with them. He must be developed toward realizing the perfection of his being and the fulness of his power in order to render the most effective service and most wisely and effectively to co-operate with others like-minded in promoting the well-being of mankind. This principle is recognized as fundamental in the development of the kingdom of God. This kingdom is developed first by the new birth of individuals under the influence of the Spirit of God to the spiritual life of love ; then by the union and co-operation of these individuals in brotherly love, all working together to influence other individuals to return to God and begin the life of

love, to train all children in the life of love, to bring all human institutions, laws, and usages into conformity with the law of love, and with the aim ultimately to transform human society into the kingdom of God. Therefore every person is under obligation to seek the normal and full development of himself in moral character and in all his susceptibilities and powers in unison with God in the life and work of love in order that he may do the most effective work in the service of God in doing good to men and advancing the kingdom of God on earth. This seeking his own complete development is not selfishness; because the person's good-will to himself must be exercised in righteousness, therefore in loving and scrupulous regard to the rights of others; because the well-being which he seeks is itself the perfection of his being, in universal love in exact accordance with the principles and laws of universal reason; because his good-will to himself is subordinate to his supreme love to God and co-ordinate with his equal love to his neighbor. Accordingly, in enunciating the two great commandments, Christ requires every one to love his neighbor as himself; and this equally requires that every one love himself as his neighbor; because it makes love to self the measure of love to the neighbor. Therefore, if the law does not require love to self, it equally fails to require love to the neighbor. Christian love, therefore, is not egoism alone, which is selfishness, nor altruism alone, which is sinful self-neglect and tends to weakness. It is both, in the co-operation of individuals under love to God as supreme, seeking first the kingdom of God and his righteousness.

We find an analogy to this process from individuation to co-operation in the development of organic life. If you examine a hen's egg at successive periods in the process of incubation, you find first the homogeneous yolk; then diversification, red streaks shooting out in different directions; then partial unification with diversification in the development of different parts and organs; then complete unification in the living chicken, in which all the individual organs cooperate in sustaining its life and nourishing its growth. We find also an analogy in the evolution of the solar system; first the homogeneous; then, in the beginning of motion, diversification, the atoms interacting mechanically, the ultimate simple elements uniformly diffused, as Spencer teaches, throughout the mass, separating as simple substances and uniting in distinct chemical combinations, — the mass breaking into rings around the

central sun, the rings condensing into planets, and the co-operation of sun and planets in the unity of the solar system. The solar system itself is probably a unit among many similar systems of worlds beyond our knowledge in the unity of the physical universe. These are two examples, among many which might be mentioned, of the individuation and the co-operation essential in the development of the physical universe.¹

This is analogous to the development of the moral system, so far as we observe it in the history of man. This necessarily begins with the coming into being of rational, self-determining individuals. As the physical system presupposes individual atoms as the primary units even in the original homogeneous nebulous matter, so individuals, that, is indivisible persons, are the primary units in the moral system. When man appears, the evolution is already far advanced beyond the homogeneous. But, perhaps, in the homogeneous nebulous matter of the physical system we may imagine an analogy with the barbarism of primitive men, as yet undeveloped and without organizations and institutions. But it can be only a remote analogy. The homogeneous matter must have been motionless. Men in their lowest condition, however undeveloped, were rational free agents putting forth their energies in action. Man's action from the beginning must have been both individuating and co-operating. He must seek food and whatever he consciously needs for himself. He is also by his very constitution an organizer. He cannot develop himself as an individual without the co-operation of other men. If any child exposed by its parents ever grew up apart from men and associating only with beasts, it would never have been developed even to the power of using language. Primitive men must have co-operated, or they would have perished. Anthropologists probably have not suffi-

¹ Love, in the sense in which Christ uses the word, can exist only in persons endowed with reason and free will and so in the likeness of God. Therefore, in the lower sphere we can only trace analogies, a likeness between objects essentially different. On account of the essential difference between the physical and the spiritual, the impersonal and the personal, it is unreasonable to demand more than analogies and to urge the fact that there is no identity or complete resemblance as an objection to the reality of God's revelation in each. But we find even identity in this, that, in all that pertains distinctively to the sphere of the physical or impersonal, it is constituted and evolved in exact accordance with the principles and laws of human reason and for the progressive realization of an ideal, so far as these principles and laws are applicable within that sphere.

cient knowledge of facts to decide with certainty the process through which the family originated. It must have been in some form one of the earlier organizations. Then, if the patriarchal theory of the development of government is true, the family developed into the clan, the tribe, and, ultimately, the nation. As the father was supposed to have the power of life and death over his children, the patriarch is a despot. Thus originated the doctrine of the divine right of kings. The authority of the patriarch is transmitted to his heir. Thus eventually the representative of a particular family is supposed to have a divine right to reign. Hence resulted the crushing of personal rights. The doctrine became current that the subjects have no rights as related to the government, but only owe duties; and the government owes no duties to the subjects, but only asserts its own rights. The progress of society, therefore, was in the direction of asserting the rights of individuals. Now in Christian countries the right of the people to participate in the government is recognized. In asserting the principle of development in the line of individuation some go to the extreme of rejecting co-operation. The result is the demand for the extinction of all government whether divine or human. Such are the Nihilists and the Anarchists. On the other hand, in asserting the principle of co-operation, the principle of individuation is overlooked. Then communists and socialists go to the extreme of crushing out the individual as effectively as the worst despotism does. They take away the motive to self-assertion, self-support, and self-development, so that, should their theories be carried out, man would degenerate towards barbarism. Closely allied with this is the teaching that we must first better the physical and social condition of men so that, in respect to these, all shall be on a level, and then their moral reformation will follow. This reverses Christ's maxim, "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you," and says, Seek ye first all these things, and the kingdom of God and the righteousness which he requires will be added. Whatever aid to efforts for moral and spiritual reformation and development may come from improving the outward condition, it must always remain true that the character of society can be improved only as the individuals composing it become better and wiser and make progress in their moral development. Make the tree good,

and the fruit will be good. And the development of right character is the most important factor in improving the outward condition of the individual. Man can be normally developed only as he puts forth his energies both in individuating himself and also in co-operation with his fellow-men, in subordination to love to God as supreme and in willing obedience to his eternal law. This is the explicit teaching of Christ in the two great commandments. The progress of man, therefore, begins in individuation and diversification and goes on in co-operation, thereby not suppressing but effecting the true development of the individual.

We now see political organizations in the Christian nations with government recognizing at once individuation and co-operation. We see also churches organized for religious worship and service, working in co-operation for the development of the individual Christian and the progressive christianizing of society. We see also innumerable voluntary associations for co-operation, as well as for self-improvement and well-being, in work, business, and all industrial pursuits, in politics, in education, and for the promotion of good government and of morality and religion. The principle is, that, as individuals must unite in organizations, so these organizations must co-operate with one another in a more comprehensive union. In the progress of man an urgent problem now before the philanthropist is to bring the organizations themselves to work together in harmony under the Christian law of good-will regulated in all its exercise in righteousness and respecting the rights of all.

The necessity of the co-ordination of individuation and co-operation becomes more evident and urgent with the progress of man in science and in invention, in which he progressively increases his knowledge of nature and his control of its forces for his own use. Formerly spinning and weaving, shoemaking, and much other work were done by individuals, each in his own private house or shop; travelling on land was on foot or with horses. In those days a much larger proportion of business could be done by isolated individuals than can be done now. An isolated individual cannot build and run a great factory, or a railroad across the continent. Corporations have become a necessity. The common declamation against them is misdirected. Corporations are indispensable to the doing of the business of the world. The remedy for any

evils connected with them is not that the corporations be dissolved and the business distributed to isolated individuals, nor that the state assume the business, nor that it so restrict their management by legislation that the business cannot yield a reasonable profit. The only effectual and safe remedy is so to christianize society that the managers of great corporations shall conduct their business under the law of good-will regulated in its exercise by righteousness and in friendly co-operation with all others. The same principles apply to organizations of laborers and wage-earners. It is right for them to associate in societies for mutual help and improvement, and for co-operation in securing their just rights. The error and wrong are in acting through their association in the spirit of selfishness and domination without regard to the just rights of others, and in subjecting themselves to despotic dictation without opportunity to investigate and determine for themselves. The remedy is that the association conduct their business in Christian good-will regulated in its exercise by righteousness, respecting the rights and welfare of others as really as their own.

The same principle applies to nations. The people are organized in nations. The Christian nations in their constitutions recognize, to a greater or less extent, the rights of the people. But they are still far from friendly co-operation with one another, except so far as two or more of them form alliances in antagonism to others. As related to other nations they stand in isolation and jealousy. By prohibitory duties they would close their markets to foreign merchandise. They are always armed against each other at enormous expense to themselves. The duelist's law of honor, which is passing away in its application to individuals, is still the law of action between nations.

Christians are also distributed into different organizations, not only on account of different locations which render them necessary, but also in the same locality on account of minor differences of belief or practice. Thus to a great extent they fail to co-operate, if they do not to some extent oppose each other. In explaining the law of individuation and co-operation I have presented the analogy of the development of a living organism. Paul uses the same analogy. He presents the unity of Christ's disciples as analogous to that of the different organs and limbs united in the human body. No organ or member of the body gives up its indi-

vidual function to the whole body, or attempts the function of any other organ or member, or puts itself into antagonism to them. Each exercises its individual function in co-operation with all the others ; and the failure or disease of one debilitates or cripples the whole body. If one member suffer, all the members suffer with it. "Ye are the body of Christ, and severally members thereof" (1 Cor. xii. 12-31 ; Rom. xii. 4, 5 ; Eph. ii. 16 ; v. 25-32 ; Col. iii. 15). Thus we see the far-reaching significance of the designation of Christians as the body of Christ. There must be distinct organizations of Christians in different towns and countries and in the same city when the number is so large that they cannot meet in one house for worship and the work to be done in different localities requires several churches. But they should remember that they are one in Christ, one in Christian character, life, and work, members or organs of one living body, the body of Christ,— not in oneness of flesh and blood, but in the spirit of Christian faith and love, in union with Christ through the indwelling Spirit, and working together with God and with one another to bring all men into unity in love to God and man through God's grace in Christ, and thus progressively realizing the ideal of his kingdom. God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, seeks every individual to draw him to himself in the life of love. All who yield to his drawing co-operate with him and with one another in drawing men to God in faith and love, and transforming human society into the kingdom of God. In it "there is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, barbarian, Scythian, bondman, freeman ; but Christ is all and in all" (Col. iii. 11). Thus all persons of all races and conditions, all institutions and organizations, all laws and usages of society, and the whole life of man are to be brought into harmony with the universal law of love.

We joyfully trace through the Christian centuries the progress of men toward the realization of this ideal. Already war, when it occurs between civilized nations, is conducted under rules abating its ancient ferocity. Questions between nations are settled peaceably which in former times would have been the occasion of war. The settlement of difficulties by arbitration has already been attained in important cases ; and more and more the people of the different nations are demanding it. Already looms up before us the idea of The Confederacy of Mankind, uniting all nations in

co-operation for the noblest ends.¹ And never has there been so wide-spread and earnest an expression by Christians of the desire and hope for the unity of all Christian churches. It is all included in the ideal set forth by Christ as the kingdom of God. Now more than in any preceding age the people are yearning for this unity in the political, the industrial and commercial, in the educational, and in the religious life of mankind, and are seeing and feeling the real significance of their daily prayer, "Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." Its realization is no longer to be regarded as a visionary phantom, but as the realization of the rational and divine ideal toward which mankind under divine and Christian influences has been tending through the centuries and has already made great progress. The United States of America present a grander example than any ever witnessed before of many states united under one government guarding the rights and promoting the normal development of its citizens. This nation, having the advantage of separation by the ocean's breadth from the nations of the eastern continent, has always been comparatively a peaceful nation having but a small army and navy. Thus it has the opportunity, which, if our people and our chosen rulers are wise, it will improve, to act a great and noble part in bringing about the reign of universal peace, "when they shall beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning-hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more" (Isa. ii. 4). We wait and work and pray for this great consummation of the extension of Christ's kingdom over all the earth,—for the realization of the glorious ideal of all nations and races of men united in the life of love and in willing and righteous conformity with the eternal principles and laws of Reason, which are the law of God, seeking to realize the highest possible ideal of perfection and well-being of every individual, of every nation, of all human society, all co-operating in the universal kingdom of God.

¹ When the war-drum throbs no longer and the battle-flags are furled,
In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world.

TENNYSON.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE LAW OF LOVE AND RULES OF DUTY

I. LOVE REQUIRED BY LAW. — In the preceding chapters of Part IV. I have defined what the love required by the law essentially is. It is necessary now to attend to the complementary proposition that this love is required by law. The law does not present it as merely beautiful and beneficent, but also as obligatory. It does not merely advise or suggest it as expedient, it commands: "Thou shalt love." It is law enforced by penalty for disobedience. It is law in the fundamental principles of human reason; it is law eternal in the absolute Reason, and enforced by the absolute power of God; it is law incorporated into the constitution of the universe. No good is possible to persons who in transgression of the law are not living lives of love. All the agencies of the universe work together for good to persons who love God with all the heart and their neighbor as themselves, and for evil to those who are not living lives of love.

It is the law which determines what the true good is. The first four fundamental ideas of reason are the True, the Right, the Perfect, and the Good. The Good can be only that which is attained in accordance with the truths and laws of reason, and in the realization of its ideals of perfection. No real good is possible in the universe under the government of God except in conformity with his eternal law. And so Christ sets forth the two commandments on which hang all the law and the prophets.

And it is the law which determines the methods by which the good may be sought and can be attained. For it is only by action accordant with the truth and laws of reason, and realizing its ideals of perfection, that any true well-being can be attained. Thus, at every step in seeking the true Good, the action which is the true expression of love is determined by law.

Therefore, in determining practical duty, we are confronted with the question, What action in a given case will be the true expression of love to God and man? And evidently if we have nothing but the real principle of the law, the requirement of universal love, we shall often be at loss in the determination of what action in that particular case is duty. We need, therefore, to look for principles or rules to guide us in determining what in any specific case is the action which the law requires, and which would be the true expression of love.

In a treatise on practical ethics, it would be necessary here to proceed to define and classify the various virtues involved in love to God and man, and to determine the proper distribution of duties to different persons and classes of persons which the law of love would require. To do this is not compatible with the design of this book. I shall confine myself to indicating principles determining the definition and classification of duties or virtues according to the two aspects of love as righteousness and benevolence, and according to the two lines of trust and service which comprehend all human actions directed to persons as their object; and determining the distribution of duties to different persons, to God, to man in his relations to God, and to individuals and classes of men. These principles will be considered in succeeding chapters. In the remainder of this chapter I propose to consider how we are to determine what action in any specific case is required by the law of love. This will make it necessary to examine the rules of duty, the principles and tests by which we are to decide questions of duty not determined by specific rules, and the necessity and possibility of education to moral and spiritual discernment.

II. RULES OF DUTY. — All rules of duty are involved in the law of love, and are applications of that law regulating action in specific cases. A rule simply answers the question: What action in a specific class of cases will be the true expression of the love to God and man which the law requires? There are many such rules which we may accept as fully established.

1. A remarkable tabulation of such rules is found in the Ten Commandments.

It is the basis of God's covenant with Israel when at Sinai he formally instituted the political and ecclesiastical economy of Israel under the rule of God as their theocratic king.

In the first table of the commandments, Jehovah proclaims himself as the God of Israel who brought them out of bondage in Egypt; as the one only God, who alone is to be worshiped, and therefore a jealous God, forbidding the worship of any other; an invisible, spiritual God, not to be represented by any image perceptible by sense, or by any likeness of any form that is in heaven above, or in the earth, or in the waters; a righteous God, punishing all iniquity; a merciful God to all who love him and keep his commandments. The oath taken in his name is to be sacred, and all should have such reverence for him that they will not take his name in vain. The people must remember to observe the Sabbath and keep it holy, an observance, as appears from inscriptions which have been deciphered, previously familiar to the Semitic peoples. And in connection with the fourth commandment, Jehovah distinguishes himself from all nature-gods, and sets aside all pantheistic confounding of God with the universe by declaring himself the creator of heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is.

The second table prescribes duties to man. It recognizes a rightly-ordered family as of fundamental importance to the perpetuity of the state, and, in recognizing the mother as entitled to honor equally with the father, it declares the true basis of a rightly-ordered family. It forbids crime against life, against the proper relations of the sexes, and against property. It guards the administration of justice by forbidding false witness. In the tenth commandment, it passes behind overt acts to the inward spirit, and forbids covetousness. This, fairly interpreted, forbids a life of getting, possessing, and using for self as the supreme end, a life of self-will and self-seeking and self-indulgence in the gratification of selfish desires.

These two tables of the law were given by Jehovah as the basis of his covenant with Israel as an organized theocratic state. If they continue faithful in trusting and serving God according to these commandments, Jehovah covenants to be their God, to bless and prosper them as a people, and through them as a people — in accordance with his covenant with Abraham, renewed with Isaac and Jacob — to bring blessings upon all mankind. If they forsake him and refuse obedience to his commandments he will reject them.

That this is the significance of the transaction at Sinai is

evident. At the Burning Bush, God had renewed with Moses his covenant with his people previously made with Abraham, and had appropriated the name Jehovah as his Memorial Name in his covenant relations with Israel. In the beginning of the Decalogue he announces himself by this memorial name, Jehovah, and gives its covenant significance, "thy God"; he also refers to the deliverance from the bondage in Egypt which he had already effected in accordance with his promise. It was a rabbinical question on the preface to the Decalogue, why God proclaimed himself as Jehovah, and not rather as Elohim, the God of heaven and earth. The answer is obvious, that he proclaims himself by his memorial name as the covenant God of Israel, because in this transaction he is formally renewing his covenant with Israel at its organization into a nation.¹ A further evidence is that the pre-exilian writers testify that the Ten Commandments were the basis of God's covenant with Israel. The same is the explicit testimony of Deuteronomy.² And from the beginning onward the ark, in which the two stone tables of the commandments were deposited, was called the ark of the covenant, and was cherished as the symbol and seat of God's protection and mercy, on which the welfare of the nation depended.³ Through the entire Old Testament the prophets and other writers speak of Jehovah, thy God, who brought thee out of

¹ Professor W. H. Green, of Princeton Theological Seminary, says of the use of "Elohim" and "Jehovah" in Genesis, chapters i. and ii.: "The creative act may be ascribed to Jehovah, Ex. xx. 11, when the thought to be conveyed is that Israel's God, who brought him out of the land of Egypt, was the creator of the world; but when the announcement to be made simply is that the world had a divine creator, Elohim is the proper term and is hence used in Genesis, chapter i. and ii. 1-3, to the end of this first section. Jehovah is distinctively the God of revelation and redemption; hence in the succeeding section, Genesis ii. 4, and onward, where God's grace to man is the prominent thought, his care and favor bestowed on him in his original state, the primal promise of mercy after the fall, and the goodness mingled with severity which marked the whole ordering of his condition subsequently, Jehovah is the only proper term. While to make it plain that Jehovah is not a different or inferior deity, but that the God of Grace is one with God the Creator, both names are combined, Jehovah Elohim, throughout chapters ii. and iii." ("The Pentateuchal Question," *Hebraica*, Jan. and April, 1889, pp. 179, 180.)

² Ex. xxiv. 4-8; xxxiv. 27, 28; 1 Kings viii. 9, 21; Deut. v. 2, 22.

³ Numb. x. 33; Deut. xxxi. 25, 26; Josh. iv. 7; Judg. xx. 27; 1 Sam. iv. 3; 2 Sam. xv. 24; 1 Chron. xvii. 1; Jer. iii. 16; Heb. ix. 4.

the land of Egypt, and in various ways recognize the covenant of God with Israel as the basis of their national life and of their religious faith. After Israel had entered the promised land under Joshua, the mountains Gerizim and Ebal were appointed as witnesses to this covenant, to the promise of blessing for its faithful observance, and to the curse pronounced on unfaithfulness to it; and great stones were to be set up on Ebal and plastered, and all the words of this law were to be written upon them "very plainly" (Deut. xxvii. 4-8). And through the whole history of Israel the prophets present the blessing and the curse together. In every new emergency they insist that if Israel remains faithful to Jehovah he will bless them; if they forsake him the curse will come upon them. As the Messianic prophecy broadens and brightens, the same alternative is presented; and in view of the responsibility of Israel as to receiving the promised Messiah and the terrific consequences of rejecting him, the time of his coming came to be designated as the great and dreadful day of Jehovah. At last, when the Messiah has come, and the Jews reject him, weeping and yearning over them with pity, he pronounces their irrevocable doom.

The Decalogue is not to be regarded as a complete code of Christian morality. This may be inferred from the fact that conformity with it is required as the condition of God's continued favor to Israel as a people according to his covenant with them of which it is the basis, not as the condition of justification to the individual. It must be inferred also from the fact that it was given at this primitive period, preceding the centuries of progressive revelation in which Jehovah was training and educating the people in preparation for the coming of the Messiah, which was to be "when the fulness of the time came" (Gal. iv. 4). There is therefore no reason to suppose that, when originally given, it was intended to be a complete code of Christian ethics.

That it is not such a code is further evident from an examination of the Decalogue itself. It does not declare the law of love. It does not emphasize the inward life of faith in God and love to God and man as the essence and life of right character. In the second table four of the six commandments forbid only overt acts. All of the commandments except the fourth and fifth are negative in form; they are prohibitions, "thou shalt not." But

all virtue is primarily positive, a choosing and doing right, and consequently an abstaining from choosing and doing wrong. It is a poor virtue which expends its energy in holding itself back from sin. It is a poor boast, I never did anybody any harm. The real question is, What good have you done ; and is your heart full of love to God and man so that doing good is your spontaneous action? And as a tabulation of outward duties the Decalogue is not complete. There is, for example, no prohibition of drunkenness ; no requirement of the prudential virtues, industry, frugality, and the like ; nor of the virtues of self-respect, the sense of honor, of the noble and the mean ; nor of patriotism and duties to the state.

Accordingly we find that the Ten Commandments admit and require additional precepts and a further exposition of the law of love. They admit and require further directions respecting religious worship and instruction. This was afterwards provided, not as incompatible with the Ten Commandments or excluded by them, but as a necessary carrying out of the principles laid down in the first table. Because the Decalogue recognizes Jehovah as the covenant God and king of his people, it requires continuous obedience to his will as from age to age it should be known to them. Because the spiritual kingdom of God was inclosed in the theocracy as a chestnut in its bur, to protect it in its immaturity and growth till the Messiah should come, the very conception of the kingdom carried in it the promise and prophecy of greater revelations of God and richer results of his grace in all the future. From the first promise, in the opening of Genesis, of deliverance for man after he had sinned to come through the seed of the woman, from the promise to Abraham, "In thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed," the kingdom was ever looking forward to surpass itself and to insure a future better than the past. Hence the Decalogue does not stand as a finality, a dead wall barring all progress in the knowledge of God and in the intelligent appreciation of the moral and spiritual life. It is rather the basis of that political and ecclesiastical organization in which, according to God's covenant, his kingdom at that time and for centuries after was to exist and grow. It is itself the vital germ of the moral and spiritual growth of man and of the revelation of God redeeming man from sin, which was to blossom out in Christ the Saviour

of the world and to fructify in the new covenant of God's redeeming love.

The Ten Commandments, therefore, ought not to be presented as the full exposition of Christian ethics. When a lawyer asked Jesus, Which is the great commandment of the law? Jesus in reply did not specify any commandment of the Decalogue nor make any reference to it. The first and great commandment which he cited is in Deuteronomy, vi. 5; and the second, like unto it, is in Leviticus, xix. 18. The attempt to present the Decalogue as comprehending all Christian virtues has led to strained interpretations in themselves of unhealthy moral influence, and has laid Christian ethics open to the objections of skeptics.

But the recognition of the fact that the Decalogue is not a complete code of Christian ethics detracts nothing from our admiration of the wonderful character of the code considered in its true significance, in the historical conditions under which it was given, and the influence which from that day to this it has exerted on the ethical ideas and the spiritual and moral progress of mankind. Thus considered, it can hardly be accounted for except as an actual revelation of God. It is remarkable for its comprehensive classification of duties to God and to men. It is a unique and wonderful transaction, especially in view of its early date, as the organization of a nation on the basis of faith in the one only spiritual and personal God and of a covenant of righteousness with him. It is an epoch in the progress of civilization as the first formal recognition of the principle, true for all time, that rectitude of character and the practice of virtue in faith in, and allegiance to, the one living and true God are the only basis of prosperity and perpetuity for a nation as well as for the right life and true well-being of the individual. It is especially remarkable for its representation of God, who in it reveals himself to his people as an invisible, personal Spirit, in distinction from a nature-God; as a righteous God, in distinction from a God of mere superior power; as a God of love and mercy, in distinction from God only terrible; as God dwelling among men, entering into covenant with them, seeking to deliver them from sin and to bring them into harmony and trustful and loving union with himself; as God demanding of his people conformity with his spiritual character as a righteous, benevolent, and forgiving God. The giving of the Command-

ments at Sinai was an epoch in God's historical action among men redeeming them from sin and establishing on earth his kingdom of righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost ; an epoch in God's redemptive action in human history progressively revealing himself as their God, seeking them before they seek him to draw them from sin into alliance and affinity with himself ; fulfilling his covenant with Abraham and its great promise, which Paul declares to be for all generations of men, " We, brethren, as Isaac was, are children of promise " (Gal. iv. 28) ; preparing for the coming of Christ, " bringing in everlasting righteousness " (Dan. ix. 24), and advancing through its preparatory stages the kingdom of God destined to become spiritual, universal, and everlasting.¹

¹ Ewald says : " The ancient people of Israel had times in which it appeared disposed to prosecute similar aims to those pursued by other nations. Under David and Solomon it laid a firm basis for external dominion, out of which an Assyrian or a Roman empire might perhaps have grown ; in the vigor of its temporal power it attempted to rival the Phœnicians in commerce and navigation ; and by its own energies it advanced quite as far as the Greeks before Socrates toward producing an independent science and philosophy. But all such aims, by which other nations of antiquity became great, in this people only started up to yield at once to the pursuit of another aim, which it had beheld so distinctly from the commencement of its historical consciousness, that permanently to abandon it was impossible ; which, therefore, after every momentary cessation, it always resumed with fresh pertinacity. This aim was Perfect Religion, a good which all aspiring nations of antiquity made a commencement and attempt to attain ; which some, the Indians and Persians for example, really labored to achieve with admirable devotion of noble energies ; but which this people alone clearly discerned from the beginning, and then pursued for many centuries through all difficulties, and with the utmost firmness and consistency, until they attained it, so far as among men and in ancient times attainment was possible. The beginning and end of the history of this people turn on this one high aim ; and the manifold changes and even confusions and perversities which manifest themselves in the long course of the threads of this history, always ultimately tend to the solution of this great problem, which the human mind was to work out here. The aim was lofty enough to concentrate the highest efforts of a whole people for more than a thousand years, and to be reached at length as the prize of the noblest struggles. And as, however the mode of pursuit might vary, it was this single object which was always pursued, till finally attained only with the political death of the nation, there is hardly any history of equal compass which possesses in all its phases and variations so much intrinsic unity, and is so closely bound to a single thought pertinaciously held, but always developing itself to higher purity. The history of this ancient people is in reality the history of the growth of true religion, rising through all stages to perfection ; pressing on

An answer can now be intelligently given to the question whether the Ten Commandments are binding on all men in all ages. So far as they were the basis of the political and ecclesiastical organization, they pass away at the dissolution of the organization. But God here instituted a state on the eternal principles of righteousness; a state involving for the time being the spiritual kingdom of God. So far as the Decalogue declares these eternal principles, it is for all time and binding on all men. It is binding, not because God made it the basis of the national life of Israel, but because it expresses eternal principles of righteousness. The principle even of the fourth commandment continues, as consecrating one day of the week as a day of rest and worship. And fitly that day of rest should be the Lord's day, after Jehovah, the covenant God of Israel, has come in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, after the Saviour has risen from the dead on the first day of the week, and his name as redeemer has become the name above every name, the true memorial name commemorating the new covenant in his blood which is shed for many for the remission of sins.

2. Besides the Ten Commandments we find in the Bible other teachings defining principles and rules of duty in application of the law of love.

We have seen that the law of love requires further exposition as to its applications than is found in the Decalogue. Accordingly, in the Pentateuch itself, in the writings of the prophets and

through all conflicts to the highest victory, and finally revealing itself in full glory and power, in order to spread irresistibly from this centre, never again to be lost, but to become the eternal possession and blessing of all nations. . . . Thus the history of this people stretches from the very commencement of the scarcely discernible dawn of antiquity, shares the full noonday beam which lights up the history of a few of the most prominent ancient nations, and ceases only with the termination of the long day of ancient history, to give place to the coming of a new day of the world's history. The history of no other ancient people is, therefore, with all its internal movements, so closely interwoven with the loftiest spiritual endeavors of other highly civilized nations or so necessarily passes into universal history; or, while preserving its internal unity and consistency, undergoes such variety and such complete alteration of external form. No nation has so significantly kept on its course through the three vast epochs of the past, radiating out ever, in the course of two thousand years, from the smallest and most insignificant into ever widening circles, and closing the day of antiquity with a sunset which is itself the earnest of the upspringing of a new and still loftier life." (History of Israel, Introd., sect. i.; Trans., vol. i. pp. 4-7.)

other teachers of Israel, we find many principles and precepts which stand for all time as rules of duty. And the characters, good or bad, delineated in the Old Testament, and the historical actions and their issues narrated, reveal what characters and actions God approves and what he disapproves, and so help us in determining what is duty.

Further instruction is given as to the applications of the law in the Sermon on the Mount and the other teachings of Christ, as well as by his example.

A further exposition of the law of love in its specific applications is found in the teachings of Christ's apostles in the New Testament. Before his death Jesus promised his disciples that the Holy Spirit should come after his departure and "teach you all things, and bring to your remembrance all that I have said unto you." He told them, "I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now. Howbeit, when he, the Spirit of truth is come, he shall guide you into all the truth." Thus he promised that after his departure the Spirit should unfold to them the significance of his life and death, so far as they were not prepared to understand while he was living with them. Hence, in the writings of the New Testament we find other principles and rules still further unfolding the applications of the law of love, and defining the specific duties of a Christian.

3. Principles and rules as to duty in specific classes of cases have been established in the course of history by human experience and observation of the good or evil issue of particular lines of conduct, and by the common consent of the conscience of man. In a similar manner, principles and rules of conduct become established in a particular nation, or in a group of nations, as among the western as distinguished from the oriental nations, the Christian nations as distinguished from the non-Christian, the modern as distinguished from the ancient, the more advanced as distinguished from those less advanced. Here belong the statutes enacted by the state, the established principles of jurisprudence, and the principles of common law acknowledged in the courts of any nation. These principles and rules are not always a finality; they may be changed with changing conditions, corrected and improved with advancing knowledge and moral discernment. But they are necessary in the ordinary affairs of life, to enable one to determine in any particular case what he ought to do.

All effective action would be stopped, and the whole significance of life would be expressed in an interrogation point, if in every transaction one must go behind all rules and usages to determine the reasons on which they rest, and how they can be improved and made perfect. The same is true of the conventional arrangements of business and of politeness. They may become burdensome through minute and excessive ramification, but they are of practical importance; the former, though ridiculed as red tape, are important to insure carefulness and correctness, the latter to protect society from offensive rudeness and the individual from embarrassment in determining what action will be agreeable to the company in which he is.

III. PRIVATE JUDGMENT. — It is impossible to determine right action in every case by rules of duty. There will be many questions as to what ought to be done in specific cases to which no established rule is applicable. And even in cases to which rules are applicable, there will often be peculiarities, making it difficult to determine the precise course of action which the rule would require. If all established rules of duty were collected, formulated, and classified, and action in conformity with each designated by name as a particular virtue, as in a system of practical ethics, still in many specific cases the precise action required by the law of love would be undetermined. It is here that "cases of conscience," questions of casuistry, arise, the precise determination of which largely occupied the attention of moralists in former times; of this Jeremy Taylor's "Ductor Dubitantium" is a favorable example. Of these one valuable result has been the demonstration that it is impossible to determine by rules in every case of conscience what is the action which the law of love requires. There is always a wide range for the conscience of a person to determine according to his best judgment what in particular cases his duty is.

1. In these cases an important principle in determining the distribution of one's duty to particular persons or classes of persons is, that the duty owed is determined by his peculiar relations to the person or persons in the moral system. True ethics rests on the realities of the universe, and all particular duties involved in it are accordant with those realities. If we would decide what particular service the law of love requires us to render to particular persons, we must ascertain what are our actual relations to

those persons in the moral system. I say in the moral system, for our relations are not solely to one person or group of persons. We are all related to God, and by this common relation of all to him the unity of the moral system is constituted, and our relations ramify in many directions and bind us to our fellowmen in this moral system. In distributing our duties to individuals, all these relations must be taken into account, and our duty to any particular person must be determined in view of our actual relations to him in the moral system. Because God is the absolute Being, perfect in wisdom and love, the creator and sustainer of all things, physical and spiritual, we owe to him duties which we cannot owe to any created and finite being. And the same principle holds good when one is determining the distribution of his duties to particular men or communities. A person's obligation to love his neighbor as himself is grounded on the fact of their common relations to God, and therefore to one another in the moral system. And all these relations must be taken into account in determining one's duty to a particular person or community. For example, the question of duty cannot be determined merely by numbers or the greatness of the sphere of work. Because China has more population than this country, it does not follow that it is my duty to devote my life to Christian work in China. Because my neighbor's family is larger than mine, it does not make it my duty to devote more of my labor to serving his family than my own. And the question of duty cannot be determined by the mere fact of greater need. The old nurse in "Faith Gartney's Girlhood" always ate the drumstick when a turkey was served for dinner. She reasoned that somebody must eat it, and there were always enough to eat the nicer parts, therefore she would eat the drumstick. This may have been a real manifestation of Christian love. It may be good reasoning that work is needed in a particular field; enough are ready to work in the more inviting spheres; I will devote myself to this. So Father Damien and several others have devoted themselves to the care of the lepers in Molokai. So a highly cultivated and accomplished woman was invited to be the principal of a seminary in this country, and at the same time to make the untried experiment of establishing a similar school in South Africa. She accepted the latter, unwisely, as many of her friends thought. But wisdom is justified by her children, and the great work accomplished has

justified her decision. Still the mere facts of a greater sphere and greater need do not of themselves determine what is duty. A person is many-sided, and is in contact with his environment at many points. But he is limited, and can work effectively only as he concentrates his energies in a definite direction and acts on society at definite points. He owes peculiar duties to himself, his own family, his own community and country. In doing his special work he accepts special trusts involving special duties. The captain of a ship may not say in time of danger, Life is as sweet to me as to another, and use his superior skill and opportunity to escape the first of all from the ship. He must be faithful to his trust. A parent may owe duties to an idiot child, or a child to a senile parent, which he may not neglect for the most important field of labor. Persons have also peculiar talents and acquirements which adapt them to peculiar lines of work. There must be division of labor. And by this concentration of each on some particular line of service and on particular persons and interests specially related to him, the well-being of society is best promoted. Hence the time spent in the necessary preparation for a chosen line of work is as really service to man, in accordance with the law of love, as is afterwards the effective doing of the work. Therefore, in deciding what service he owes to persons, or classes of persons, one must consider what are his peculiar relations to those persons and to others in the moral system under the government of God.

2. The Golden Rule presents a test by which to determine whether an action proposed to be done to another will be a real expression of the love required in the law. The measure of love to one's neighbor in the second great commandment is "as thyself." The significance of this measure or standard is unfolded by Jesus in the Golden Rule: "All things, therefore, whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, even so do ye also to them" (Matth. vii. 12). This is not to be understood as declaring that the selfish desire of one person is the law of duty to another. When a millionaire meets a beggar and thinks, If I were that beggar and he were as rich as I, I should wish that he would give me all his riches, — it does not follow that it would be the duty of the millionaire to give all his property to the beggar. By what action he should express his love to the beggar would be determined, as already shown, by the principles, laws, ideals, and ends

of reason, by the established rules of duty, and by the relation of the two persons to each other and to the moral system under the government of God. Jesus, introducing the Golden Rule by the word *therefore*, presents it as an inference from what he had been saying of the graciousness of God and his fatherly readiness to give of his fulness in answer to the prayers of his children; and throughout the discourse he speaks of the significance of the law of his kingdom in its breadth and depth, requiring not only the outward act, but also the inmost spirit and character to be right. He cannot have intended by the Golden Rule to set all this aside and to declare that the selfish desire of any other person is the measure of one's duty in fulfilling the law of love. So far as the Golden Rule is a statement of the law of love to man from a special point of view, it must require love to our neighbor regulated by law. Kant's statement of it is in accordance with this: "So act as if the maxim of thy action were through thy will to become a universal law. . . . So act as to use humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of another, never merely as a means but always as an end."¹ The peculiar form of the statement in the Golden Rule of the law of love to man gives us a test by which we may determine what action toward a person, in any given case, would be the right application of the law of love. It says, Put yourself in his place and imagine what, if you were he, you would think in this case was due to yourself. Thus if one is seeking an unfair advantage of his neighbor he will see the unfairness and selfishness of the proposed action. The Golden Rule is an Ithuriel's spear, whose touch compels selfishness to drop its disguises and reveal itself in its true form.

After declaring the Golden Rule, Jesus immediately added, as reported by Luke, some further explanations which Matthew omits: "And if ye love them that love you, what thank have you? for even sinners love those that love them. And if ye do good to them who do good to you, what thank have ye? for even sinners do the same. . . . But love your enemies and do them good, . . . never despairing; and your reward shall be great and ye shall be sons of the Most High; for he is kind toward the unthankful and evil. Be ye merciful, even as your Father is merciful" (vi. 31-36). Your love is to be disinterested and

¹ "Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten," herausgegeben von Rosenkranz, pp. 47, 57.

self-sacrificing; your service is to be rendered for your neighbor's good, not to gain a return of the favor. Hence you are to render the service of love even to enemies, even to those who use you despitefully and persecute you. You are to be merciful to the sinful, even as God is, who is your Father though you are sinners; and, as the apostles could afterwards add, even as Christ, while you were yet enemies, died for you and reconciled you to God. Hence it is a test of the right application of the law of love when one can interest himself in those who are not attractive to him, to enlighten and save them, as Christ came to seek and save lost sinners. A person of culture seeks the society of cultivated persons, because he finds in it enjoyment and improvement, — not for their good but for his own, seeking for something again. A wicked person seeks the society of the wicked because he finds pleasure in it and help in his wicked designs, being in sympathy with them in their wickedness. But it is a test of Christian love when one is interested in persons with whose character and plans he is not in sympathy, who are uncultivated, vicious, disagreeable, and repulsive, seeking the sinful to save them from their sins, seeking the spiritually impoverished to enrich them with spiritual gifts, to lift them to a higher plane of life, character, and blessedness.

Jesus in dealing with men touched them on that trait of character which was the strongest in binding them in sin and holding them away from him. When he required the young ruler to sell that he had and give to the poor, he did not declare it as a universal rule; he touched his ruling passion, the love of property, and thus revealed to him his actual separation from the Christ and his kingdom, and the selfishness which caused it and debarred him from inheriting eternal life. But when he spoke to Pharisees he was not wont to speak of the love of property; but he laid his finger on their self-righteousness, their legalism, formalism, literalism, and traditionalism, and condemned even their careful paying of tithes as a mere punctiliousness lacking true faith and love; and in these characteristics he revealed, in their legal and religious observances themselves, their self-sufficiency, self-righteousness, self-will, and self-seeking, which separated them from the kingdom of God, in which they supposed themselves above all others to have inherent right. A minister of the gospel at the present day is seldom drawn away from interest in

his appropriate work by the love of money. But interest in literary pursuits and intellectual investigations may draw him away from interest in the practical life of men and from his appropriate work in the care of souls, in bringing sinners to repentance, and elevating the people around him to nobler characters and a higher plane of life.

But if one would test the reality of his love to God and men and the correctness of his application of the law of love in determining the action due in specific cases, it should be by real and not by imaginary tests, — by tests of the kind which we have been considering. One may ask himself whether for Christ's sake he has refrained from deceiving a customer in order to get a larger price on a sale of goods ; or has been faithful to every trust, great or small ; or has done his best in every piece of work which he has engaged to do ; or has not wrongfully provoked his child to wrath ; or has spoken and acted in accordance with truth ; or has willingly lent a hand to help in time of need so far as he has had fit opportunity and could wisely do it. Any one of questions like these is of more practical value to a Christian as a test than any imaginary test, — such as asking himself whether he could die in peace, or could in time of persecution be a martyr for the truth, or would be willing to suffer eternally in hell if it should be for the glory of God.

IV. DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION OF CONSCIENCE. — The possibility and necessity of the development and education of the conscience are known from observed facts in the progress of man from infancy to maturity and from savagery to civilization. Man is educated and developed to increased spontaneity of moral action under the inspiration of love anticipating both the fear of punishment and the sense of duty ; to increased delicacy of moral sensibility ; to increased nicety and clearness of moral and spiritual discernment ; and to increased moral and spiritual strength and efficiency. On the other hand, while advancing from infancy to maturity, from savagery to civilization, man by persistent wickedness may deaden conscience into insensibility, “having his conscience seared as with a hot iron” ; he may lose clearness of moral discernment so that he calls evil good and good evil ; and he may develop his moral strength and efficiency only to persistence and power in doing evil.

For the right education and development of conscience the prime requisite is constant and faithful obedience to its commands. This may be supplemented by direct instruction in the education of children and of the inferior races, by the dissemination of right moral principles from the pulpit, the platform, and the press, and by all agencies by which public opinion may be wisely and rightly formed. This education is promoted also by familiarity with people of high moral excellence and with the lives of men and women distinguished for moral beauty, greatness, and heroism, and by communion with Christ, living by faith in him and breathing his moral atmosphere. And here, as in every sphere of human life and action, man can realize his ideal only by faith in God and in union with him through the indwelling Holy Spirit. When a sinner awakes to the consciousness of God who besets him behind and before and lays his hand upon him, when he thus becomes aware of his own spiritual environment and willingly receives the divine influence which encompasses him, he becomes a new man, he gains a new power of spiritual and moral insight and discernment, so that the spiritual world becomes as real to him as the physical, he sees the things that are not seen, things which the natural man knoweth not but which are spiritually discerned. And without this union with God no man can attain his clearest moral and spiritual discernment and his fullest moral and spiritual knowledge, nor realize his own normal condition and perfection.

The necessity of moral and spiritual education and development is seen also in the fact that there is so large a sphere for private judgment in determining in specific cases what the law requires.

This use of private judgment is itself an important factor in moral and spiritual education and development. Because a person is obliged to proceed cautiously in determining questions of duty, "sounding on his dim and perilous way," he must be constantly recurring to the law of love and the principles implied in it, studying as a chart the established rules of action, and prayerfully communing with God and seeking the light and guidance of his indwelling Spirit, that he may know in cases continually arising, what the true application of the law of love would be. If one were provided with a sort of Gyges' ring, which, instead of making him invisible whenever he would, would pinch his finger

when he began to incline to do wrong and would increase the painful pressure until he abandoned the wrong course of action for the right, all this careful recurrence to principles and rules, all this prayerful looking to God for guidance, would cease. Morality would become a mechanical and piecemeal doing of outward acts and duties, not the spontaneous service of God and man in love. And this would be the result of attempting to regulate all action by rules.

The evil practical tendencies and results of such attempts have been strikingly exemplified in history. On the one hand, the man justifies himself in doing whatever is not expressly forbidden by what he accepts as his code of rules. So a celebrated London clergyman is reported to have justified his habit of smoking cigars by saying that he found only ten commandments to keep, and not one of them forbids smoking cigars; therefore he would continue to smoke. On the other hand, the supposed necessity of having a rule to meet every possible case necessitates an endless multiplication and most minute ramification of rules. This is exemplified in the rabbinical attempts to construct a "hedge about the law"; and the innumerable and ridiculously minute rules became indeed a thorny hedge through which no one could penetrate to a real obedience. Concerning the fourth commandment alone the rabbinical interpreters devised innumerable rules comprised in many chapters, prescribing what may and may not be done on the Sabbath, even what kind of knots may be tied in strings and what are forbidden, and a multitude of other acts equally petty and insignificant. These rules are a curiosity and amusement to the modern reader, but must have been confusing and distracting to all who felt bound in conscience to obey the regulations. Thus they made the law of none effect through their traditions. A multiplication and minute ramification of rules, like the rabbinical traditions, are found in the Buddhistic writings, having the same practical tendencies. The Bishop of Colombo in Ceylon says of the first part of the Buddhist "Vinaya Pitaka," or Books of Discipline: "In the Párajika book is a long passage which I can only describe as the most cold-blooded collection of moral horrors ever put together. The only defence urged of it is that to be sure of preventing sin you must specify every possible form of it, lest any form of it remaining unforbidden should be thought lawful. The explanation is genuine, as

regards the enumeration, in equal details, of sins against the seventh commandment as of those against the eighth ; but what a dreary unreality of moral feeling any such system reveals ; what can be hoped of a moral system which must enumerate all the possible forms and conditions of theft, lest any theft should seem to have been left unforbidden.”¹ In all such teaching, the inevitable tendency is to a mechanical and constrained doing of a multitude of petty outward duties with the entire suppression of the unity, spontaneity, inspiration, aspiration, and freedom of the life of love ; to the destruction of all delicacy of moral feeling, all clear moral and spiritual discernment, and the highest efficiency for good. A mere knowledge of rules can never be the motor force for obeying them ; this is only love, the essence of all right character and the spring and inspiration of all right action.

Christians individually and the Christian church collectively exercise the prophetic function, both in testifying to what they know of God in experience, and warning against immoral tendencies, and also in foreseeing evil impending on account of wrong principles and wrong courses of action, and in calling for the reformation of abuses and the putting away of evil practices ; and especially in testifying to the necessity of faith in God and love to God and man and warning against the dangers consequent on their decay. And the continued exercise of private judgment in determining what action is in given cases the true application of the law of love, educates and develops this prophetic power. It keeps up a continual recurrence to the law of love to ascertain its true significance in concrete application to real cases, and to God for guidance and quickening in applying it ; it sustains and develops the unity and spontaneity of the Christian life of love ; it creates delicacy of moral and spiritual sensibility sensitive to the first changes of moral temperature ; it quickens to keen moral and spiritual discernment and effective power. Thus it has so often come to pass in history that through moral and spiritual

¹ Bishop of Colombo, “Buddhism,” *Nineteenth Century*, July, 1888, pp. 130, 131. The Bishop also expresses his regret that in the volume of the “Sacred Books of the East” translated into English, which professes to contain this First Part of the “Vinaya Pitaka,” this passage is not only omitted (he says no printer would print it), but that its omission is not mentioned nor in any way indicated ; thus concealing a real defect in Buddhistic morality.

foresight it has been the poor wise man who by his wisdom has delivered the city ; and so often and so sadly it has come to pass that, though wisdom is better than strength, nevertheless the poor man's wisdom is despised and his words are not regarded.¹

Therefore the principle sometimes advocated is not true, that Christianity merely renovates individuals to the life of love in Christian trust and service, but does not concern itself with institutions, laws, and customs. Christianity exists only in the lives of Christians and in the love of God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself. In the very essence of Christian character are involved moral and spiritual insight and therefore foresight, which require prophetic utterance in declaring the application of God's law of love to society in its actual condition and needs, and warning of the evils which must follow the toleration of wrong-doing and "the framing of mischief by a law" (Psalm xciv. 20). But the Christian begins by enlightening the people in the knowledge of truth and right in the application of the law of love, and by the persuasive influence of Christian love under the guidance and influence of the ever present Spirit of Holiness, rather than by fomenting an immediate revolution of established institutions and laws.

In all progress there must be the fixed and unchangeable, and transition and change. In a race the goal to be reached and the laws defining the line of advance and the regulations of the race are fixed and unchanged and the purpose of the runner is continuously the same, but the race is continuous transition and change. In the growth of a germ, the ideal of the tree into which it is growing and the laws directing and regulating its growth are unchanging, and the vital force of the organization is continuously directing its growth to the realization of its ideal ; but the growth is a perpetual transition, and marvelous changes appear as the white and slender shoot grows through successive epochs, putting forth stem, leaf, flower, and fruit. In moral and spiritual education and development the law of love is universal, eternal, unchangeable. It declares the love, which is the essential and eternal character of God, to be the norm and standard of all moral perfection, the goal of all moral endeavor. It recognizes as regulative of all action, the principles, laws, and ideals, which are eternal in God, the absolute Reason, which regulate the action

¹ Ecclesiastes ix. 14-16.

of his love and determine the constitution of the universe, and which are known in human reason as regulative of all thought and action, as the fundamental postulates of all intelligence, the laws of all action, and the ideals of all perfection. These are universal, eternal, and unchangeable. And the love is continuously the same, which inspires the Christian endeavor and gives unity to the Christian life: "one thing I do, forgetting the things which are behind and stretching forward to the things which are before, I press on toward the goal." But the action required in applying the law of love to particular cases varies with the conditions of the case.

The only real progress of man is toward this fixed and unchanging goal; toward bringing the entire life and action of the individual, and the institutions, laws, and customs of society into conformity with the law of love and with the principles, laws, and ideals which it involves. It is progress in bringing all men, as to character, into the likeness of God who is love, and transforming human society into the kingdom of God and the reign of love over all the earth.

But the realization of this is possible only by progressive education and culture. The goal of a race can be reached only by running the race. The fruit of a plant can be attained only by the growth of the plant. The necessity of growth by progressive education and development is inseparable from a moral system of rational free agents under the government of God. The action of free will in the light of reason is essential to the existence and development of a moral system. A finite person must form his own character, acquire his knowledge and skill, develop his powers of action and his capacities of receptivity by his own free action. He cannot attain the perfection of his being by a leap. If it is asked why God does not create personal beings with right characters and fully developed in moral and spiritual life, the answer is that this would destroy the moral system. It would substitute the action of God's almighty power in place of the free action of man. The being so created would not be a person, but a mechanical construction, like a wax-flower manufactured to order, without life or growth of its own. If it is asked why God does not accelerate the progress, the answer is the same; it would be substituting God's action for man's, and would be incompatible with a moral system. An additional answer is that such action of God is not only incompatible with a moral system, but also with

the necessary finiteness of all created beings. Here we recur to principles established in a preceding chapter, that what is effected by God's action must be commensurate with the capacities and powers of the finite being on which he acts and of the finite agency through which he acts; that the exercise of God's almightiness is regulated by the principles, laws, ideals, and ends of reason eternal and archetypal in the absolute mind, that is, in God; and that he does for every creature all which perfect wisdom and love permit and require. The objections implied in the two foregoing questions rest on the fundamental error that God is a capricious almightiness, unregulated by reason, not governed by wisdom and love. Therefore a created personal being must attain education and development, if at all, by his own action and therefore progressively. Thus man's moral perceptions are clarified, his consciousness of moral and spiritual realities, as his environment, becomes more constant and influential, he attains a deeper recognition of moral character as the inmost life of love and having unity therein in distinction from a multiplicity of outward duties, and his conception of a right life becomes more elevated, pure, and comprehensive. This progressive moral and spiritual development, varying under different types of religious and moral culture, is observable in all history. And this progressive education and development imply change in the action by which the man expresses his love in conformity with the law. Man enlarges his knowledge of the universe and of God; he takes possession of the powers and resources of nature, he strengthens his intellectual, moral, spiritual, and physical energy; but he uses all his new powers and resources in the service of God and man. The ways in which he acts in rendering the service of love are wondrously changed; but the love which he expresses, and the principles which regulate his action remain unchanged.

Hence the same outward act may be right in some circumstances and wrong in others; and doing the action in the former case and not doing it in the latter may be both equally the expression of the love required by the law. Here we come upon a distinction sometimes denoted as a relative and an absolute rectitude; the former denoting the rectitude of an action as approved by the agent's own conscience; the latter denoting rectitude as God sees what would be obedience to the requirement of the law by one educated and developed to full moral and spiritual perfection.

One may love God and his neighbor, his will may consent to the law of love and he may always obey it, following the dictates of his own conscience according to all the light which he can attain. But in his own personal development and in the progress of civilization he may come to correct his views as to the action by which love to his neighbor may be most wisely and effectively expressed. For example, he may have given freely to all beggars at his door. Afterwards he may have learned more effective methods of helping the poor, which he substitutes for indiscriminate almsgiving. In the former case his action was right relatively to his own conscience. But it was not really and absolutely right, because it was not according to the facts in the case, — it was not such action as God sees to be the most wise and effective in promoting the well-being of the poor. In the former case the love may have been as sincere and pure as in the latter. But in the latter the person has acted more fully in accordance with the reality and the facts, and with principles of reason always regulative of the action of love and determining the effects of different lines of action, designed to be applications of the law of love, of which he was ignorant before. But in the former case the person would not be held guiltless unless from the beginning of his free moral action he had united himself with God by faith, and so had received the indwelling Spirit and availed himself of God's offered wisdom and strength, unless in love to God and man he had always obeyed the dictates of conscience and in all cases had used all means in his power to ascertain what action in each case would be the true expression of Christian love. A sinner's responsibility and guilt are measured by the whole distance from what he might have been, if he had always done his best, down to what he is. One is blameworthy for ignorance when he has neglected any available means and opportunities for gaining knowledge.

Institutions, laws, and usages may be true expressions of the law of love in one age which are not so in another; as the cradle and the rules and usages of the nursery are right for infancy but wrong for the college and the work of mature life. In the infancy and childhood of the race, institutions, laws, and usages may be right and best for that age, which must be superseded by what is better and higher in the advancement of the race to maturity. Accordingly Christ spoke of usages tolerated by Moses on account of the existing state of society; but, he says, from the

beginning it was not so ; they were relatively right, according to the knowledge and development of that age ; but not really and absolutely so. And Christ declared that he himself had many things to reveal to men which he could not, before his death, communicate to his disciples ; for, he says, ye cannot bear them now, but you will understand them in the future and higher stage of the progress of his kingdom when the Spirit of truth and holiness shall have come. Of the same purport are his parables of the new patch on an old garment and of the new wine in old bottles. Hence, in all the progress of God's kingdom, he taketh away the old that he may establish the new.

It follows that there can be no true progress of society except by the progress of the men and women composing society toward a higher type of manhood and womanhood. Society can become wiser and better only as the persons composing it become wiser and better. The progress, therefore, does not begin with the change of institutions and laws, but with the renovation, culture, and development of the persons composing society. It is man who creates his institutions, laws, and usages, not the institutions, laws, and usages which create the man. Christ said : The sabbath was made for man, not man for the sabbath. The same is true of all institutions ; they are for man, not man for his institutions. As men become wiser and better they will change and improve their institutions, laws, and customs. But this change in individuals must be not merely a change from immorality to morality independently of God. It is that reunion of the soul with God in the faith which worketh by love, which our Saviour calls the new birth, and which is the beginning of a new spiritual life, "the life of God in the soul of man," the life of universal love. It is only as this new life of the Spirit, the life of faith working by love, begins with individuals one by one, and so pervades society, that the true progress of man is possible.

Thus the progress will be by modification and improvement corresponding with advancing intelligence and spiritual and moral growth, rather than by revolution ; by cherishing and developing, rather than by destroying. The changes should come as epochs of a living growth ; and so Christ represents the progress of his kingdom, — first the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear. All that is essential in the life as already de-

veloped persists and is unfolded in a new growth. It is only that which is erroneous or pernicious, or that which has done its work and is no longer needed, which is sloughed off like the dead bark from a living tree. When, by the processes of a living growth, an epoch of further development has come, it is a false conservatism to resist it; as if the blade of the wheat should resist the development of the stalk, and the stalk should resist the opening of the blossoms, and the blossoms should resist the setting and ripening of the grain. On the other hand, it is a false progressiveness to demand the ripened grain without the processes of the living growth, or to welcome everything new, even rust and blight, as a new epoch of growth improving the quality of the grain.

CHAPTER XXIV

LOVE IN ITS ASPECTS AS RIGHTEOUSNESS AND BENEVOLENCE

IN the last chapter it was shown that all specific duties are simply specific applications of the law of love ; and the principles and methods of ascertaining the true applications of the law were indicated. In further defining, classifying and distributing duties in application of the law of love, the next step must be to consider the love itself as existing in two aspects, — righteousness and benevolence.

The love required in the law is the subjective character of a person. It is the essence and life of the right character, of which all virtues and duties are specific applications and expressions. This love, psychologically defined, is the choice of God as the supreme object of trust and service and of our neighbor as, in the moral system under the common government of God, equally with ourselves the object of trust and service. Benevolence or good-will to the person loved is of the essence of the love ; because the law requires love to all, the love must involve in its essence benevolence or good-will to all ; it must seek universal well being. Love in this aspect is benevolence or good-will. But this good-will is not to be exercised at random or capriciously ; it may not seek for a person whatever at the time satisfies the person's desires or gives him pleasure. It is both required and regulated by the truths, laws, and ideals in the supreme and universal reason, that is, God. It is these, attested in the reason and conscience of man, which make it obligatory to seek universal good or well-being instead of universal evil. It is these which determine what the good or well-being is. For God has constituted the universe in accordance with these, and the only real good or well-being possible in the universe is that which is the expression of truth, in accordance with law, and the

realization of ideal perfection. And from these principles, laws, and ideals of reason all rules regulating the action of love are derived, and they are the norms or standards by which all private judgments of duty are ultimately determined. Thus love is required and all its action is regulated by truths, laws, and ideals of reason. Love in this aspect, as thus required and regulated by reason, may be called righteousness. Love, therefore, is universal good-will or benevolence regulated in its exercise by righteousness. Love is the choice of God and man as the objects of trust and service. This choice involves the determination of the will to seek universal well-being, and in this aspect it is benevolence. It also involves the consent of the will to the reason and the determination to regulate all action in seeking well-being by its truths, laws, and ideals ; and in this aspect it is righteousness.

These are two aspects of one and the same universal love ; two bearings of one and the same choice. In the very act of choosing God as supreme and our neighbor equally with ourselves as objects of trust and service, the will consents to the eternal law which requires it, and which determines what the true good is and the ways in which it can be attained. So, to compare great things with small, in the very act of determining to go to any place the person consents to regulate his action by the time-table of the railroad on which he must travel. Before this he may have intellectually approved of the time-table. But his will has never determined to act in accordance with it till he determines to travel on the road. Then he consents to it and studies it as the law to his own action. In choosing God as the supreme object of trust and service we do not choose him as an unknown or characterless God ; nor as a God of mere resistless and capricious almightiness. We choose him as the true God, all-wise, all-righteous, all-perfect, in whom the truths, laws, ideals, and ends of reason are eternal, the God who is love and has proclaimed the inexorable law of love. The choice of God as the supreme object of trust and service is in itself the choice of his truth as our light and guide, his law as binding on us, the ideals of perfection eternal in him as the norm and goal of all aspiration and attainment, and good or well-being only as determined and made possible in accordance with these truths, laws, and ideals. And, as it was explained in a former chapter, in the act of

choosing God and man as objects of trust and service, which is the essence of the love required in the law, the will consents to and accepts the law as the rule of life ; and it is only in that act of love that the will can consent to and accept the law and come into harmony with it. No one consents to the law except in actually loving God and man ; and no one actually loves God and man without therein consenting to the law of love and accepting it as the rule of life. Therefore righteousness is not excluded from love nor in antagonism to it, as is often supposed ; it is itself one essential aspect of love. And benevolence is not the whole of love, as many suppose ; it also is one aspect of love. Righteousness and benevolence are the two essential aspects of love to God and man ; if either were wanting, the love would no longer exist ; and neither true righteousness nor true benevolence can exist without the other ; they are possible only in union as the two essential aspects of universal love.

The recognition of righteousness and benevolence as the two aspects of Christian love, and of their inseparable unity in the love, is essential as a basis for any correct classification of duties in Christian ethics. It must precede the common classification by the distribution of duties to different persons and communities ; as duties to the family, to the state, and the like.

I. RIGHTEOUSNESS. — Because the first three fundamental ideas of reason, the True, the Right, and the Perfect, are norms for determining what the Good is, and are regulative of all action in seeking it, we designate by the general name of righteousness the consent of the will to be regulated by these in all action in trusting and serving God and man. Therefore love or right character, in its aspect as righteousness, presents three corresponding subdivisions, Truthfulness or love of truth, Justice, and Complacency.

1. Truthfulness, or the love of truth, is the consent of the will to the truth as distinguished from intellectual assent or belief, and from curiosity and the scientific motives and emotions, which are feelings. It is the consent of the will to the regulation of all action in conformity with the truth ; the harmony of the will by its own free choice with the truth.

The perception of truth, being wholly an act of the intellect and not directly dependent on the will, does not belong pri-

marily to moral character. One believes on evidence and has no choice about it. And curiosity and the scientific motives and emotions which interest us in the investigation of truth, being instinctive or rational feelings, do not belong to moral character in its primary meaning.¹ The love of truth, so far as it belongs to moral character, is the state of the will through its own free choice in reference to the truth. So far, then, as the love of truth belongs to moral character in its primary sense, it is the consent of the will to the truth; the harmony of the will with the reason in its enunciation of truth. There is no choice, preference, or determination of the will opposing the belief and acknowledgment of truth and constituting a bias against it; but the choice, preference, or determination of the will is consenting to and in harmony with truth as known by the reason.

The love of truth must be further defined as it exists under three different conditions.

First, in the process of investigation before the truth is known, it is candor. This is the absence of any hindrance to belief of the truth arising from any choice or determination of the will, from any bias of acquired character or of personal interest, or from any repugnance of natural feeling. It is docility, openness of mind and heart to receive whatever may be found to be true. It is the choice and determination of the will to make a fair and thorough investigation in order to ascertain what is the true reality.

Secondly, after the truth is known, the love of it is trust or confidence in it, the determination to stand by it, to maintain it, and, so far as it has practical bearings, to apply it to the conduct of life.² This is wisdom, which is knowledge of truth applied in the determination of character and the regulation of conduct. The person who loves the truth will say: I have found this to be true. I trust myself to it; I rest my whole weight on it. I am ready to live by it and to die by it; to live for it and to die for it. I will follow whithersoever it may lead. This aspect of love of truth is entirely overlooked in much of the declamation now current respecting love of truth, in which the truth is always assumed to be unknown. Hence love of the truth is strangely identified with entire indifference to it. The doctrine is, that in respect to any

¹ Philosophical Basis of Theism, pp. 345, 347.

² See Chap. xix. III. 2.

proposition whatsoever, one must be equally ready to believe or disbelieve it; the mind must always be at an equipoise in respect to it. It is a professed love of truth in the abstract before it is known, but an entire indifference to every truth so soon as it is believed and enunciated. On this theory it is entirely inconceivable that any one could be justified in becoming a martyr for the truth. On the contrary, by so doing, according to this theory, he would only show himself to be prejudiced, illiberal, and bigoted. But true love of truth implies, after it is known, trust in it, loyalty and allegiance to it. It may become inwrought into the whole inmost moral and spiritual life. For the belief of truth, and the consent of the will to it in its practical applications, are like warp and woof inwoven into all right character. Can it be possible that Paul at the Areopagus in Athens was in an attitude of indifference, as this false conception of the love of truth requires? that he was as ready to believe the speculations of heathen philosophy as the truths of Christianity, as ready to accept and worship the gods of Greece as the God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself? And history shows that the glorious epochs of human progress have been times of strong belief of truth, and of intense earnestness of will in its advocacy, defence, and propagation, daring and doing in its proclamation, suffering and dying in loyalty and allegiance to it. The ages of progress and beneficent achievement have been ages of faith; the ages of criticism, skepticism, and unbelief have been ages of moral and spiritual decay. The current tendency to identify candor and impartiality in the investigation of truth with indifference to it after it is known, must rest on one or the other of these two errors: it must either deny the possibility of man's knowing any truth or reality, or it must deny that truth when known has any bearing on the interest of human life.

The lover of truth, in this confidence in it and loyalty and fidelity to it, will have confidence that truth must prevail. None can utter more heartily and courageously than he the often-quoted and sublime maxims which declare that truth is mighty and will prevail; that truth crushed to earth will rise again. The universe is made up of realities amid which men dwell, and which may be trusted to reveal themselves more and more to men as they come continually in contact with them and are obliged to investigate what they are. But this is not confidence that truth will prevail

of itself and overthrow error without the efforts of men to elucidate, defend, and propagate it. Here we meet another misapprehension of the love of truth, representing that truth is so great it will take care of itself, and so throwing reproach on all earnestness and carefulness in teaching and defending it as needless or as assuming that human care is necessary to preserve the truth. Thus Oliver W. Holmes says: "Some people look on truth as an invalid, who can take the air only in a close carriage, with a gentleman in a black coat on the box. But truth is tough. It will not break like a bubble at a touch; nay, you may kick it about all day like a football, and it will be round and full at evening." This recognizes no distinction between truth and man's knowledge of the truth. The realities of the universe and the eternal truths revealed in them are persistently the same, and independent of man's care and protection. But man's knowledge of these realities and truths is a very different matter and does depend on man's diligence in ascertaining the truth and making it known to others. Thus the sentiment quoted implies that man has nothing to do in refuting error and ascertaining, vindicating, and proclaiming the truth. It entirely ignores the fact that error and falsity have darkened the world through all human history; that truth has made its way slowly, laboriously, and painfully in displacing it; that this advance has been made, not by truth left to itself, but by great scholars who have devoted their lives to its investigation, by great teachers who have vindicated and propagated it, by great heroes who have suffered and died in its defence, by innumerable workers unknown to fame who have taught it and have exemplified it in their lives, and by Christ's church through the ministry of the word in accordance with his command, Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature. Thus, through innumerable and terrible conflicts with error and falsehood, the knowledge of the truth has been carried onward and enlarged in its slow but glorious progress through the centuries. Even scientific discoverers, announcing great and even epochal discoveries in science or inventions in art, have encountered ridicule and opposition from scientists themselves, and have had long controversies against old-established error, before they could attain acceptance of the new truth. History shows that in like manner the knowledge of moral and religious truth has advanced through great conflicts with error and

by persistent and strenuous efforts from age to age in ascertaining, declaring, and defending the truth, witnessing for it often unto death. The ancient prophets, Paul and the apostles, the early Christian churches, the Christian fathers and martyrs, Luther and the reformers, faithful witnesses for Christ in all ages, have not been nursing truth as a pale and feeble invalid, but have been declaring it as truth and contending for its sovereignty as such over the thought and lives of men. In the parable quoted, the kicking of truth as a football must represent the assaults of error and falsehood on it; it is the action of the misleaders, deceivers, and betrayers of men, who kick truth in contempt or trample it under foot in rage. The fact that truth is not changed by these assaults is no argument against the necessity of carefully ascertaining and defining it, and of earnestly declaring and defending it; it is, on the contrary, an encouragement and inspiration of those who ascertain and define the truth, who proclaim and vindicate it as the light of all thinking and the law to all action, and as disclosing the real goal of all right aspiration and endeavor, the light, law, and inspiration of all human progress, whether of the individual or of society.

Truth is the intellectual equivalent of reality. It is reality intellectually apprehended and enunciated. Trust in truth, being an act of will, does not terminate on the truth as the intellectual apprehension of a reality and its enunciation in words. It goes through the words and the intellectual apprehension which they enunciate to the reality itself which the intellect apprehends and the words declare. We can trust only a being exerting power. Truth without power, truth revealing no reality or power, cannot be the object of trust. In fact, it would no longer be truth; for it is of the essence of truth that it is the intellectual equivalent of reality. One does not trust in the law of gravitation as apprehended by the intellect and enunciated in words. To this we give the assent of the intellect; we believe it to be truth. But in the act of the will we trust the mysterious power that throughout the physical universe is always energizing in accordance with this law. The will does not trust the thought or idea that God is love to which the intellect assents as truth, but in the living God eternally acting in love. The will does not trust the mere idea of God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, but the living God revealed in Christ and the Spirit whom he sends from

the Father, the divine energy inspired by love and enlightened and directed by wisdom that is acting through all human history in redeeming man from sin. Looking even at what is sometimes regarded as merely subjective, trust in the intuitions and universal postulates of reason is not trust merely in a thought, idea, or truth, but is trust in reason itself, in reason as supreme and universal, trust in the human reason as in the likeness of the divine and absolute Reason and participating in its light. That which is the basis of all science and makes science possible is the truth that whatever exists is a manifestation of reason and therefore susceptible of rational — that is, scientific — apprehension and explanation. The belief of this truth is explicit or implicit in all scientific investigation and reasoning. This intellectual belief is the warrant for the trust of the will acting on the assumption of the rational order of the universe. And this implies, still further, trust in God, the absolute and universal Reason energizing with almighty power in accordance with reason and realizing the archetypes of perfect wisdom and love. The Scriptures insist that faith is the beginning of all right character and that continuously all right character and action must be by faith. Now we find faith or trust to be essential in love of truth, — that is, in the consent of the will to truth. Because this faith or trust is found in the relation of character to truth, which is the first fundamental idea of reason, ethical philosophy must recognize it first in the analysis and development of the character which is the true expression of the love required in the law. Thus science and philosophy, not less than the scriptures, recognize faith or trust as the first element of right character. In its most abstract form the trust, as thus recognized, is trust in the reality of things as ordered by reason and susceptible of scientific explanation, as expressing rational truth, ordered in accordance with rational law and progressively realizing the rational ends of perfection and well-being. More definitely it is trust in God, the absolute Reason, who thus orders the universe in wisdom and love. And because in Christ, the Light that lighteth every man came into the world and manifested in human forms the absolute Reason as like the human reason, and the perfect wisdom and love of God, and because God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, this faith which is the living germ of all right character, is, when we come to our highest knowledge of the universe and of God revealed in it, trust in the God in Christ redeeming men from sin.

Thirdly, the love of truth as manifested in utterance or expression of it appears in two forms, veracity and sincerity.

Veracity is the disposition or purpose to utter truth in speech with the exclusion of all lying.

Sincerity is the disposition or purpose to express the truth in action. Complete sincerity makes the external in man to be the true expression of his inward thought and character. The sincere man's acts and deportment are the real expression of what he is. He is like the golden gods on the shield of Achilles; the gods and the garments which clothed them were all of one piece and all pure gold. Sincerity of course excludes hypocrisy and deliberate dissimulation. But it is much more than this. It is the complete harmony of spirit and action, so that the person spontaneously and without effort acts out what is in him. It is frankness and ingenuousness as opposed to secretiveness and dissimulation; artlessness and naturalness as opposed to affectation and pretence; simplicity as opposed to duplicity; straightforwardness as opposed to cunning, trickery, and intrigue; heartiness and earnestness as opposed to cant in profession, formalism in observance, and indifference and heartlessness in action; it is the reality of virtuous character and of generous and noble feeling expressed in action, as opposed to mere decencies and conventionalities as exhibited in the woman satirized by Pope:

“ She speaks, believes, and acts just as she ought;
But never, never reached one generous thought;
Virtue she finds too painful an endeavor,
Content to dwell in decencies forever.”¹

Sincerity implies that the inward, living character penetrates and characterizes all the conduct, like a vital force, imparting its own unity to all the diversified action; a unity in diversity analogous to that which the organic life produces in a tree. Every part of an oak is penetrated by the distinctive quality of the tree. You see it in the distance and you know it by its shape to be an oak. You pick up a single leaf and you know that it is an oak leaf. You see and taste a fragment of bark, and you say it is oak bark. You see a piece of dry board and you recognize the distinctive grain of the tree. So in a man of sincerity his whole conduct is the spontaneous outgrowth of his inmost life,

¹ Moral Essays; Epistle ii. “Of the Characters of Women,” lines 161-164.

the natural and honest expression of the man. Thus is insured a vital unity in all the diversity of the person's life. In every aspect in which he presents himself, in every fragmentary thought, sentiment, and act you recognize the distinctive character of the man. The vital force of his character has developed itself without obstruction, creating his outward history and penetrating and characterizing it in every part with its own quality. Sir Thomas Browne says: "The finger of God hath left an inscription on all his works, not graphical or composed of letters, but of their several forms, constitutions, parts and operations, which, aptly joined together, do make the word that doth express their natures." So all the acts and outward manifestations of a sincere person are the letters fitly joined in one word which expresses what he is.

Sincerity as thus defined is indispensable to the exertion of one's greatest power. If one would do good he must be good; if he would do great good he must be great in goodness.

Character is continuous in its influence, while words and actions are put forth and cease. A person's benefactions may be frequent but they cannot be continuous; but one's presence is sunny or drizzly, diffusing cheerfulness or gloom every hour. A good man does good by directly inculcating goodness. He does more by his good life lying always before the people, with all its alternations of action and repose, like a grand landscape, with principles of eternal righteousness towering like immovable mountains, with vales of peace and fields of industry fertilized by gladdening streams which burst from those mountains' sides, rich in the good fruits of truth, justice, and good-will, and all warm in the sunlight of Christian love radiating blessing in acts of Christian faith and service.

God is truthful; he is the God of truth, not only in the sense that all truth is archetypal and eternal in him, but also in the sense that all his action is the spontaneous expression and thus the continuous and ever progressive revelation of what he is, of his power, wisdom, and love, of all that is divine in him.

2. The second aspect or subdivision of righteousness is justice, corresponding to the second fundamental idea of reason, the Right, which denotes conformity of action or character with law recognized as authoritative and imposing obligation. Justice is the consent of the will to the law of God, which is the law of love. It is the harmony of the will with the law through its own

free consent. In choosing God and our neighbor as objects of trust and service the will consents to the law and comes into harmony with it. And it is only in thus choosing that the will can consent to the law and come into harmony with it. The will consents to the law of love only in actually loving God with all the heart and our neighbor as ourselves. Righteousness in this aspect as the consent of the will to the law is called justice.

Justice, as the consent of the will to the law, must be distinguished from assent to the law and approval of it by reason and conscience. This assent and approval are presupposed in the action of the will consenting to the law and obeying it, or refusing consent and disobeying it.

Justice is not co-extensive and synonymous with righteousness. The latter denotes a general class of virtues, under which truthfulness, justice, and complacency are the three species. This distinction is very commonly overlooked, and justice is used as a synonym of righteousness. It would be a gain to theology, in promoting clearness and precision of thought, if this distinction were always regarded.

Justice is subjective character or choice; it is the consent of the will to the law. It is thus distinguished from right, which denotes the conformity of a choice, character, or action with the law. An action in accordance with the law is right; a person whose will consents to the law is just. The word "just," however, is sometimes used as synonymous with "right"; right acts are spoken of as just acts, right laws as just laws. "Right," however, is rarely used instead of "just" to characterize a person. We do not speak of a right person meaning a just person. When we say the man was right, we refer to his action; he uttered a correct opinion, gave a correct decision, did a right action. When we speak of just laws we mean laws enacted in the exercise of justice and requiring justice. It would remove considerable confusion of thought in theology if it were always remembered that justice is a trait of subjective personal character; that it is simply the consent of a person in his free will to the law of love in all its legitimate applications as authoritatively imposing obligation to obey it, and his consequent volitional action in conformity with it.

Justice in its essential idea is of the nature of love. It carries altruism in its essence. It recognizes other persons in relation

to ourselves and within our sphere of action, to whom we owe service. It carries us out of our egoism and isolation and recognizes our membership in the moral system under the law of love. It recognizes others as objects of trust and service equally with ourselves; it recognizes ourselves as objects of trust and service, not supremely and exclusively, but on an equality with others in the moral system and under the law of God. Justice, therefore, cannot be in antagonism to love; it is an essential aspect of love.

Justice, as the consent of the will to the law, necessarily has three aspects or subdivisions.

First, it is the consent of the will to the authority of the law and to the obligation which it imposes; it is the consent of the will to the law of love as supreme and authoritative law. It extinguishes self-will in which a man would set up his own will as his law, saying with Pharaoh: Who is Jehovah, that I should obey his voice? It is submission to rightful authority, loyalty and allegiance to government and law. On the part of the government itself it is consent to the authority of the moral or divine law manifested in declaring and maintaining it.

Justice in its second aspect is the consent of the will to the requirements and prohibitions of the law, the purpose to obey it in all its commandments. It is the willing doing of all one's duties, the rendering to all their dues. It is discharging every obligation to one's self or to others. One may be just to himself as really as to others. Hence the common remark, In justice to myself I must do it or refuse to do it. Justice in this sense is predicable of civil government. Civil government itself is under obligation to enact just laws. It must recognize God's law of universal love in all its principles and their legitimate applications as binding on itself and must make all its enactments in conformity therewith. A government is said to be just when it enacts just laws and adjudicates and executes them justly.

Justice, in its third aspect, is the consent of the will to the sanction of the law; to its maintenance and enforcement by the government in the infliction of penalties on transgressors. This may be called vindicative justice, as maintaining and vindicating the authority of the law; or retributive justice as inflicting just retribution on the transgressor. A just person consents to this maintenance and enforcement of law by penalty and gives his cordial support to the government in detecting and punishing

transgressors. If himself a transgressor and penitent, he will consent to the penalty on himself as deserved by his transgression and a just vindication of law. So Paul said: "If I am a wrongdoer and have committed anything worthy of death, I refuse not to die" (Acts xxv. 11). Justice in this sense is exercised by the government in inflicting on transgressors just punishments required by just laws.

God is just in all three of these meanings of the word. He knows the law of love as eternal and of absolute authority in his own absolute Reason; and his will eternally and freely consents to its authority. He consents also to its universal requirement by obeying it himself. He has constituted the universe in accordance with it and with all the principles of reason implied in it and with all its reasonable applications. All God's action is in conformity with this law and is the continuous revelation of the love which the law requires. He exercises also vindicative or retributive justice in asserting, maintaining and enforcing the law of love by inflicting punishment on transgressors. In fact, because this law is eternal and absolutely supreme in God, and he has constituted and is administering the universe in conformity with it, it follows that by the very constitution and ongoing of the universe the selfish man must miss all true good; it is impossible for any being to be blessed in a life of selfishness in this universe at any time or any place through all eternity and immensity. And the penalty thus coming on the sinner is in the highest sense a punishment inflicted by God as the expression of his just condemnation of sinners and disfavor toward them; for the constitution and ongoing of the universe are themselves the revelation of God's eternal law and the continuous expression of his conformity with it and obedience to it. And if the punishment comes on the sinner through the constitution, laws and ongoing of the universe itself, for that very reason it must be the expression and revelation of what is fundamental and dominant in the mind and will, in the thought, character, and purpose of God; it must be a part of the continuous expression and revelation in God of the love which the law requires and which God reveals alike in conformity with the requirement and in inflicting the penalty which the law demands.

It has been a source of much error in theology that God's justice has been limited to its third and retributive aspect. Be-

cause thus limited, the other aspects of God's justice, recognizing the eternal and absolute authority of the law and conforming all his action to its requirements, have been overlooked. The result has been that God's justice, thus limited to retribution, has been confounded with hate and vengeance, and has been conceived as the arbitrary and wrathful infliction of suffering by God's own hand, entirely aside from the constitution and order of the universe and the continuous conformity of all God's action to the requirement of the law of love. This error has been the basis of misconceptions of the atonement which have prevailed in the church and of most of the arguments against the atonement. The result has been that many, confounding these misconceptions with the true doctrine of the atonement, have denied altogether that the humiliation, obedience, suffering, and death of Christ have any significance as atoning for sin, as asserting and maintaining the authority, universality, and inviolability of God's law of love in his redemption of men and his forgiveness of their sins.

3. The third aspect of righteousness is Complacency. This has often been called the love of complacency in distinction from the love of benevolence. It corresponds with the third of the fundamental ideas or norms of reason, the Perfect. It is the consent of the will to perfection. In choosing God as the supreme object of trust and service the will chooses perfection as the object to be realized in ourselves and others. It is not the intellectual perception of the perfect, nor the emotion of beauty attending it. It is the free choice of perfection by the will as the end to be attained for one's self and for all. It is complacency in all that is beautiful and lovely; but pre-eminently in moral and spiritual perfection, in the character perfected in love. It is a corresponding displacency towards all that is sinful and evil. In the contemplation of God, the all-perfect, it shows itself in adoration and praise, in aspiration and endeavor to be like him, in longing to commune with him. Towards human beings it shows itself in a similar way, in admiration of noble characters, in aspiration and endeavor to be like them, and in desire to associate with them. It quickens also aspiration to realize perfection in ourselves and in all our works. Michael Angelo says: "Nothing makes the soul so pure, so religious, as trying to make something perfect; for God is perfection, and whoever strives for it strives for something godlike. True painting is only an image of God's perfec-

tion — a shadow of the pencil with which he paints, a melody, a striving after harmony.”

George Eliot represents Stradivarius as saying :

“if my hand slacked,
I should rob God, — since he is fullest good —
Leaving a blank instead of violins.
He could not make Antonio Stradivari’s violins
Without Antonio.”

In God complacency cannot appear in aspiration and endeavor to be perfect, for his perfection is eternally complete. But he is blessed in the archetypal ideals of all beauty, loveliness, and perfection eternal in his own mind and progressively realized in the finite by his continuous action in space and time ; he has complacency in all the beauty of the creation, and the moral and spiritual perfection progressively realized by men and angels. This character of God, as opposed to all pessimism, is remarkable in the account of creation in Genesis, where it is repeatedly and emphatically declared at the successive steps in the creative process : “ And God saw that it was good.” And God’s complacency in those who are seeking spiritual and moral perfection is continually expressed in the Old Testament : “ The Lord taketh pleasure in those who fear him, in those who hope in his mercy ” ; “ They who are of a froward heart are abomination to Jehovah ; but such as are upright are his delight.” “ They shall be mine, saith Jehovah of hosts, in that day when I make up my jewels.” And the same is clearly expressed in the New Testament : “ For the Father himself loveth you, because ye have loved me and have believed that I came from God.”¹

II. BENEVOLENCE. — Love in its other aspect is benevolence, or good-will. We have seen that the love required in God’s law is the choice of God as supreme, and of our neighbor equally with ourselves as the object to which all our energies are to be devoted in trust and service. The question arises, What is the service to be rendered? In the sphere of things, qualities, and conditions to be acquired, possessed, and enjoyed, what are those which we are to seek for all persons in our trust and service ; that is, both in our receptive and our productive action? It is impossible to answer in detail. The one object comprehending all that has

¹ Gen. i. ; Psalm cxlvii. 11 ; Prov. xi. 20 ; Malachi iii. 17 ; John xvi. 27.

true worth and is worthy of the pursuit of a rational person, is the Good: it is the highest perfection and well-being possible to be attained in a finite universe. This is the archetypal ideal which God is progressively realizing in the creation and evolution of the universe. All who love God and man devote their energies to the realization of the same ideal, thus working together with God. As Christ puts it, they are to seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all other good will be added. Love, as seeking for all in the whole sphere of personality the highest perfection and well-being possible in a finite universe, is benevolence or good-will. This very definition implies that benevolence is regulated in its exercise by righteousness under immutable law. We can promote the true good only as we act in conformity with the truths and laws of eternal reason, progressively realizing its archetypal ideal of perfection and well-being.

Benevolence corresponds to the fourth fundamental idea of reason, the Good. Righteousness, corresponding to the True, the Right, and the Perfect, has three subdivisions. Benevolence, corresponding to the single idea of the Good, admits no similar subdivision.

Benevolence, in all its exercise, is regulated by righteousness. The law requires benevolence, and determines what the good is, and what are the right methods of seeking it. The good to be sought for one's self or for any person, is not mere enjoyment, the gratification of the person's appetites, desires, and affections, whatever they may be. That alone is good or well-being, which accords with the truths, laws, and ideals of reason.¹ The good is that which, estimated by the standards of reason, has true worth, or is worthy of the pursuit of a rational person in the likeness of God. Any attempted benevolence not regulated by righteousness must defeat itself and cause evil instead of good. The universe being constituted and administered in conformity with the truths, laws, and ideals of absolute Reason, well-being is possible in it only in conformity with these. Any supposed good not in conformity with these would be evil, and any methods of seeking it contravening these must fail of attaining it and be productive of evil. For these reasons benevolence must be regulated by righteousness. Love is benevolence regulated by righteousness.

Here we see the necessity of wisdom in all Christian work.

¹ See "Philosophical Basis of Theism," chap. xi., pp. 256-285.

Wisdom is more than knowledge. One may have knowledge and skill to adapt means to an end; but if the end itself is wrong, the man, however knowing, is not wise. One is wise only when he chooses both a right end and the right means of attaining it. In all personal culture, in the education of the young, in all attempts to reform abuses and promote the progress of society, there is need of wisdom to ascertain what in any particular constitutes true well-being, and by what means it may be most effectively attained. Otherwise the educator or reformer may do more evil than good. And from this point of view we see again the importance of moral and spiritual education and development, and of trust in God for the quickening and guidance of his Spirit.

III. UNITY OF LOVE IN ITS TWO ASPECTS. — Righteousness and benevolence are distinguishable but inseparable. They are in inseparable unity as the two aspects of love. Each is essential to the love, and the love would no longer exist if either was lacking.

Righteousness cannot be the whole of love. The assertion that it is so would shut us up to the theory of rectitude already refuted. It would shut us up to the formal principle of the law without telling us what the law requires; it would make virtue consist in the bare doing of duty defecated from all feeling, under the categoric imperative of law excluding all spontaneity of love.

Benevolence cannot be the whole of love. The assertion that it is so would shut us up to hedonism in the form of utilitarianism. It would exclude truthfulness, justice, and complacency, it would exclude righteousness from the character of God, and from the right character of man. Implying the denial that benevolence is regulated by law, it would practically exclude the law, and make virtue to consist in that which is lawless; or else it must conceive of the law as something other than the law of love, and of love and law as antagonistic and reciprocally exclusive.

It was shown in the beginning of this chapter that this unity of righteousness and benevolence in love is involved in the psychological definition of the love required in the law as the choice of God and man as objects of trust and service. This choice terminates on a person chosen to be trusted and served, not to be

acquired, possessed, and used. Here the question arises, What service is to be rendered to the person loved? The answer is that the service will consist in promoting his good or well-being so far as it is in our power. Good or well-being, with all which as really and rightly promoting it is relative good, comprehends all which may be legitimately sought and acquired for the person loved, and be possessed, used, and enjoyed by him. Here the love manifests itself as benevolence. But the beneficent service is required and regulated by the truths, laws, and ideals of the eternal reason determining what the good is, and what are the right and wise methods and means of attaining it. Here the love manifests itself as righteousness. And both the righteousness and the benevolence are involved in the love as the choice of God and man as objects of service. And in like manner both are manifested in the love that trusts. We choose God as the supreme object of trust. Why do we trust him supremely? Because he is really entitled to it, as the absolute and all-perfect God, in conformity with the truths, requirements, and ideals of reason. Here is the righteousness; in one important sense, the righteousness of faith. And for what do we trust God? For guidance and help in the work of beneficence, seeking the well-being of ourselves and of all persons in the moral system. In like manner we put our trust in a man according as, in the light of reason, we judge him worthy of our confidence, and thus the trust is regulated in righteousness. But the trust is also in the exercise of good-will towards the person trusted as well as for help to ourselves in the work of Christian love; and thus, also, the trust is a manifestation of benevolence. Therefore, Christian love, alike in trust and service, is benevolence or good-will exercised in righteousness and regulated by it. This is set forth by Paul: "This I pray, that your love may abound yet more and more in knowledge, and in all discernment; so that ye may approve (ascertain) the things that are excellent; that ye may be sincere and without offence, being filled with the fruits of righteousness" (Phil. i. 9-11).

Accordingly, we find both righteousness and benevolence in those acts of love in which one alone seems predominant. The payment of a debt or the fulfilment of a contract is commonly regarded as an act of justice only. Yet benevolence is exercised in it; the Christian in good-will to the other party takes pleasure

in rendering a service equivalent to that which he has received. On the other hand, the action of the good Samaritan, helping the man who had fallen among robbers, is commonly regarded as an act of pure benevolence. He may have acted in good-will so spontaneous that he never thought of the act as duty; but the more spontaneous the action was in love, the more completely was it in conformity with the law of love. Thus it was a deed of righteousness in obedience to the law. Paul recognizes both the righteousness and the benevolence in his own heroic acts of self-sacrificing love: "I am debtor both to Greeks and to Barbarians, both to the wise and to the unwise. So, as much as in me is, I am ready to preach the gospel to you who are at Rome also" (Rom. i. 14, 15). He recognized himself as debtor, under obligation of law to all men to render to them the service of self-sacrificing benevolence to the utmost extent of his ability. There can be no act of benevolence so great as to transcend the law of love, or to lift the doer of it above the obligation to obey it.

The inseparableness of righteousness and benevolence in the action of love appears in the fact that true love to God and man is always in antagonism to sin. It is righteous as well as benevolent. As such, love is the great fighting principle in the kingdom of Christ, putting every one who loves God with all his heart and his neighbor as himself into perpetual and irreconcilable antagonism to all sin and to all sinners persisting in sin. "God loved the world, and in redemption his love goes out to save the lost. Sin cannot stop its efflux nor change its nature, though it may exclude its life-giving efficacy from the sinner's heart. But God's love still rolls on, filling every creature according to its capacity and disposition with the fulness of God and flooding with its glory even the heart which shuts itself against it. God's love converging on the sinner, must act like the sunshine on the seed, and, failing to quicken it, hastens its corruption. But the love remains pure love. All the sin in the universe is powerless to check its outflow, to lessen its fulness and extent, to vitiate its divine purity and sweetness, or to infect it with any taint of malignity or ill-will. When the Bible speaks of God's hatred of sinners, it only declares in popular language the righteousness which is essential in love and which is in unchangeable antagonism to selfishness and sin. Christ weeping over Jerusalem

expresses, under human limitations, the heart of God in condemning the wicked ; the tears reveal his inextinguishable good-will, while the declaration of the inevitable doom reveals his righteousness. His whole action in redemption is in antagonism to sin ; this redemption itself implies. But his whole action is the expression of love.”

“ The same must be true of all human antagonism to sin. It is necessary to the possibility of antagonism that there be some similarity of nature in the antagonists. A cannon-ball cannot be turned aside by argument or an appeal to compassion ; an argument cannot be shattered by a bomb-shell, nor a conclusion overturned by a lever. The only possible antagonist of error is truth, and the only possible antagonist of selfishness is love. Love, then, is the only effective opponent of sin. The law of the kingdom is: ‘ Overcome evil with good.’ ”

“ In the Christian character, opposition to sin is not primary but secondary. It is not the action but the reaction of love. Religion does not consist primarily in hating the devil, but in loving God and man. The opposition to sin, being a reaction of love, must be in its essence love. And love in every manifestation of it, whether by God or man, must exclude selfishness, ill-will, hate, as light excludes darkness. While in approaching sinners it can never divest itself of righteousness as itself required in the real principle of the law, it is still benevolence.”

“ And love in its conflict with sin, and seeking to save sinners from it, is the highest and most truly divine love in both its aspects as righteousness and benevolence. Love to sinners in its righteous conflict with sin is love in its farthest reach and greatest power ; love which even vileness and defiant iniquity cannot repel ; love embracing sinners as the sunshine cherishes the reeking mould, in its own absolute purity incapable of defilement by the contact, and quickening the seeds of life hidden in the corruption. Love to sinners is the highest type of love ; it is the love of Christ submerging himself in humanity and bearing the sin of men to save them from it, yet revealing the indefectible purity and inviolable righteousness of love ; declaring the authority and majesty of the law, yet dying to redeem sinners from its curse. Love to sinners is love most distinctively imperishable and unconquerable ; the vilest unable by his greatest

sins to restrain the forthcoming of that love, or to check it as it goes on its divine course of suffering and sorrow, or to prevent its opening wide to the sinner the golden gates of mercy and proclaiming with infinite tenderness, Whosoever will, let him come. Like Christ's is every Christian's love. It is love to sinners, opposing the sin in righteousness, seeking to draw the sinner from his sins in good-will. However wicked a sinner may become, he has no power to quench Christian love to him, or to suppress it, as, imperishable like the love of Christ, it breathes in prayer, it prompts to efforts, to suffering, to sacrifice in opposition to sin and to save the sinner from it."

"Love is spiritual life. Its processes in its antagonism to sin are analogous to those of life. Life subdues foreign matter by transforming it into its own organization. When an acorn falls into the ground it may be said to enter into conflict with all around it. Yet the conflict is not the primary idea, but secondary and incident to life. And the living seed is continually conquering in the conflict, not by destroying its opponents, but by transforming them into its own organization. Thus the slender germ shoots into the upper air, and lifts itself in victory over gravitation, and builds its great trunk and boughs and crowns itself with leaves, transforming the soil, the air, the rain, into its own organic strength and beauty. Such is the kingdom of God; a mustard seed growing into a tree, a vital power of God transforming the world into a kingdom of righteousness and good-will."

"And in this its strength lies. The earth which lies heavy on a seed cannot repress its pale and tender shoot rising with the force of life into the air. So it is with the growth of the kingdom of God. However ancient and solid any institution of evil, it cannot repress the vital force of love quickening any seed of truth. Any reformation which is the bursting into growth of this vital force will prove itself irresistible."

"When a vital organ is invaded by a foreign substance which it cannot transform, it will expel it; and if it cannot expel it, its resistance will be uncompromising and persistent until death. When a speck of dust enters the eye, the eye resists with weeping and expels it; and will itself perish, resisting and weeping, if it cannot expel the intruder. So prompt, uncompromising, and persistent is the resistance of love in righteousness to sin,

resistance with weeping and suffering benevolence, and, if it does not prevail, persistent unto death.”¹

I have already alluded to the current error of excluding justice from love and putting it into antithesis and even into antagonism to love. And commonly those who advocate this error make no distinction between justice and righteousness and often limit justice to the infliction of penalty. Some of them carry the error very far. They set forth misconceptions, which at different times in the course of the Christian ages have grown as excrescences on the ideas of God's moral government, law, and justice, as the essential significance of these realities. They represent these as anthropomorphic conceptions derived from human government and law, which ought not to be ascribed to God in his dealings with men. They thus imply that the very ideas of moral government, law, and justice are to be banished from theology. H. W. Beecher, in a published letter to Rev. J. Spencer Kenard, goes so far as to say that, according to the common representation of God's justice, hatred is the central element in the idea of God's moral government. “The root of the whole matter with me is, in a word, this: Which is the central element of moral government—love or hatred? I say hatred, for in human hands that is what justice has largely amounted to.” Instead of the love which acts in righteousness and benevolence, writers of this type would substitute mere benevolence not regulated by righteousness, a boneless jelly of good nature yielding to every pressure. Mr. Beecher says, “True justice's primitive form is simply pain, and this suffering is simply auxiliary, pedagogic, the schoolmaster until men are enough developed to work by love.” Justice is thus regarded as a benevolent infliction of pain for disciplinary and educational ends. Instead of recognizing law as at the basis of the constitution of the universe and regulative of all its on-going and all God's action as in exact conformity with it, writers of this type regard law and justice as belonging to a condition of immaturity which is temporary and transient, destined to pass away and give place to the life and work of love. Love they regard as antagonistic to law and justice, which must necessarily supersede and set them aside when it acquires control of the life. But love does not supersede law, it is the

¹ “The Kingdom of Christ on Earth,” by Samuel Harris, pp. 39-42. Andover, W. F. Draper.

essence of all obedience to it. It is remarkable that these writers seem always to forget that the law itself is the law of love, and that conformity with God's law is possible only in the life and work of love.

This erroneous type of thought appears as early as the time of Marcion in the second century. Marcion held that God's love lacks righteousness; that it is in antithesis to righteousness and exclusive of it; that, from his unwillingness to punish, God wills neither law nor justice. But if God is not the giver of the law by which the universe is constituted and ordered, he cannot be the creator in the full meaning of the word; he cannot be the eternal source of all truth, law, and perfection; nor can the existence of suffering be accounted for as in any sense the result of God's action or included in his plan; if indeed a lawless being could have any plan. Marcion, therefore, found himself obliged to carry the separation of love and justice so far as to put justice, the requirement of conformity with law as essential to well-being, entirely outside the good God and to hypostasize it in a Demiurge, as *Deus saevus*, the God of justice, in antagonism to the god of love. This would seem to be a necessary inference, and, therefore, a reduction of this theory to absurdity. Theodore Beza undertook to correct this error by carrying the still unresolved antithesis of grace and justice into the Godhead, and so establishing an eternal duality and antinomy in God's own moral perfection. This again is a sort of *reductio ad absurdum*. As Hartmann says: "For a unitary apprehension, which accepts justice and grace only as different but consonant sides of the theological world-order, such a conflict between justice and grace, in which justice is worsted, is quite unthinkable."¹

The only solution of the problem is the recognition of righteousness and benevolence in unity and harmony as the two essential aspects of the love which is the fulfilling of the law. This gives the true significance of God's moral government and law, of his righteousness and benevolence, and of his love, excinds all the excrescences of error which have grown on it like fungi, presents righteousness and benevolence, without abrading anything from the essence of either in order to reconcile them, each in its highest significance and, therefore, in complete unity and harmony in the vital essence of universal love. As Nitzsch says:

¹ "Die Religion des Geistes," B., p. 173.

“Love is a holy and righteous love ; for righteousness, by which the bad is ever separated from the good, by which justice is revealed in the highest development as the giving of law and sin is judged, is not excluded from love, but is in it and from it.”¹ This union of good-will and righteousness in the love required by the law is beautifully and poetically expressed by the Psalmist : “Mercy and truth are met together ; Righteousness and peace have kissed each other” (lxxxv. 10).

¹ “Christliche Lehre,” § 136, p. 272. See also § 80, note 2 ; and Dorner, “Christliche Glaubenslehre,” vol. i. § 29, 2, p. 351 ; Transl. vol. i. p. 365.

CHAPTER XXV

LOVE MANIFESTED IN TRUST AND SERVICE

THE next step in the analysis of the love required in the law is to consider the two lines of action in which it must be exercised. All human action is in the two lines of reception and production. In finite beings the reception must always precede the production. God alone can produce without having previously received; he alone can act without dependence on another.

The object of the love required in God's law is always a person or persons. The love is the choice of a person or persons as the object of the whole activity; to whom the whole activity is to be directed. Because all activity is in the two lines of reception and production, taking in and putting forth, love is the choice of a person as the object both of the receptive and the productive action. From the person loved we receive or take in; for him we produce or give forth.

The receptive action in which love manifests itself is trust. It is the act of looking to a person for help, to receive from him that which supplies our need. Acts of trust imply man's consciousness of limitation, need, dependence.

The productive action in which love to any person manifests itself is service rendered to the person; it is putting forth energy, imparting, achieving for the person loved. Acts of service imply man's consciousness of power, will, freedom.

The love to God with all the heart, required by the law, is the free choice of him as the supreme object of both trust and service. Love to the neighbor, required in the law, is the free choice of him as, equally with ourselves in the moral system and under the government of God, the object of trust and service. The love of self required in the law is the free choice of self as, equally with

our neighbor in the moral system and under the government of God, the object of both trust and service.

The love required in the law must manifest itself in these two lines of action, trust and service. There is no other line of voluntary human action in which this love can find expression.

I. LOVE MANIFESTED IN ACTS OF TRUST.— It is a common error to regard the whole of moral action and character as belonging to productivity, the putting forth of one's own energies in work and achievement. This issues in one-sidedness and superficiality in ethics. It overlooks the whole receptive side of human character and action ; forgets that this is fundamental and that all productiveness is conditioned on it ; excludes faith from love ; and stumbles at the scriptural representations of the essentiality and vital importance of faith in right moral and religious character.

1. So far as faith is moral character or action it is a choice or determination of the will, and in its essence as such it is trust. Faith is sometimes used in philosophy to denote spontaneous knowledge or belief which does not rest on proof ; as thus used it includes all self-evident universal truths and rational intuitions. It ought to include also all immediate presentative or perceptive intuitions. Accordingly, as we have seen, all scientific knowledge of the physical universe begins in faith and rests on it as really as the knowledge of moral distinctions and of God. With faith in this sense we are not here concerned, but only with faith as an element of moral character manifested in moral action. In this application of the word, faith is essentially trust.

Trust presupposes knowledge or belief. "He who cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them who diligently seek him." Voluntary trust in any person is inconceivable without some knowledge or belief as to the person who is trusted. But this is merely a necessarily antecedent condition of the act of trust ; it is the light in which the will determines, — not the trust itself. Faith, therefore, as moral character and action, is not an assent of the intellect but the consent of the will. It is a person's free voluntary act trusting himself or some interest of himself to a person for protection and safe-keeping, for guidance, for additional strength, for help of some sort. If the trust is to another, the action of the other in our behalf is necessarily substitutional ; the person trusts another to do for

him and in his stead what he cannot or will not do for himself. The Bible represents faith in God, not only as an element in moral character and action, but as the beginning of all right character and the continuous source of all right conduct. As thus represented, while it presupposes knowledge and motive feeling, it is not in its essence an intellectual belief nor a feeling, but a choice or determination of the will. It is the act of trust. In this discussion I shall use trust as expressing the essential ethical significance of faith.

Faith, therefore, is not passive. It is receptive indeed, but it is an active and willing receiving. It is the act of a person seeking help and willingly laying hold of it and using it. The reception may involve the highest energy ; as when one ready to drown lays hold of the rope thrown to him, or one clings to a tree or climbs a high rock to escape from a flood. The receptive act is not analogous to the passivity of a cistern receiving water poured into it, but to the activity of a plant sucking in nutriment from the air, the soil, and the rain and converting it into its own tissues and so bearing fruit ; or to the activity of a scholar appropriating and assimilating the instruction and discipline of the teacher ; or to the activity of an Alpine climber receiving the direction and assistance of the guide. So faith in Christ is described as "accepting Christ as he is offered in the gospel."

This accords with the representation of faith in the New Testament as the condition of justification and the beginning of a Christian character ; it always carries in it the idea of trust. This is recognized in the definition of *πιστεύω* by Grimm and his translator Thayer, as well as by other lexicographers of the New Testament. In the seventh revised and enlarged edition of Liddell and Scott's lexicon, in Cremer's Biblico-theological lexicon of New Testament Greek, and in Sophocles' lexicon of Byzantine Greek, trust is given as the first and primary meaning. In Greek, as in English, the phrase, to believe in a person, denotes confidence or trust in him ; as when one says he believes in a physician, in a party-leader, or a statesman. In the Old Testament the word "trust" is commonly used and is the proper translation of the Hebrew. Trust in God is the dominant quality in the most remarkable historical representatives of faith, both in the Old Testament and in the New. Abraham and Paul are instances. The same significance is prominent in the figurative representa-

tions of faith in Christ and in God, — as coming to Christ, receiving Christ, committing one's self to him, looking to him, abiding in him, staying one's self on God. Accordingly trust is commonly recognized by theologians as of the essence of justifying faith. They have recognized it as implying *notitia*, *assensus*, *fiducia*; knowledge, intellectual assent or belief, and trust. Knowledge of God, especially as revealed in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, is presupposed in faith. Intellectual assent is presupposed as belief of God's word, especially of his promises as the redeemer of men, in Christ and the Holy Spirit, from sin and condemnation. Trust is the action of the will, in the light of this knowledge and belief, accepting God in Christ as offered in the gospel and committing ourselves and all our interests to him as our redeemer from sin. Accordingly the Westminster Confession defines faith as accepting, receiving, and resting on Christ. The "Heidelberg Catechism" says, "Faith is also a cordial trust." Professor Charles Hodge says: "The primary idea of faith is trust. . . . This view of the nature of faith is all but universally received, not by theologians alone, but by philosophers and the mass of Christian people."¹

2. That the love which is the essence of all right character must begin and go on by faith is in accordance with the universal law of all finite power, that there can be no production without preceding reception.

This is a law of mechanics. Whatever does any work must first receive the force by which it works; it can act only as it is first acted on. The train on a railroad is moved by the traction of the engine; the engine is moved by the force of the piston; this derives its force from the steam; the force of steam comes from the coal, liberated by heat; the force stored in the coal came from the sun. And whatever may be the second causes sustaining the heat of the sun, the energy must always be communicated from a preceding agent, till at last we find its originating source only in the absolute, the unconditioned, the power underived and eternal, that is God.

¹ "There is only one word for faith in all these languages (of the primitive Aryans), and it always stands for trust and respect. Its first meaning, like that of religion, is really that which unites to the divinity. Prayer is described by the same word, whether it is addressed to gods or men." (Pressensé, "The Ancient World and Christianity," p. 119.)

The same is the law of organic life. This is the analogy used by Christ in the parable of the vine and its branch: "As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine, so neither can ye, except ye abide in me." The branch derives its nourishment and its productive power from the vine, the vine from the soil, the atmosphere, the rain, the sunshine. Every plant and every animal is a centre on which all the physical forces of the universe act continuously, sustaining its life and growth. Every living organism has derived its life from a pre-existing life. And if evolution is a fact, the higher species have been evolved from the lower till we go back to the origin of life and find ourselves face to face with God. From every living creature as a centre the thought follows all the lines of energy centring on it and can rest only in God, who alone has life in himself and is the ultimate source of all life.

Thus the doctrine, that in the sphere of moral and religious life, faith or trust is the beginning and the continuous inspiration of all right action and character, is analogous to the scientific doctrine of the relation of reception to production in the mechanism and the organic life of the physical system. It is an analogy often used in various applications by Christ, in explaining the nature of his kingdom. But it is analogy, not identity nor exact likeness. In mere physical mechanism and organism there can be no trust and service manifesting moral and religious character, because there is no intelligent free will. But alike in the physical system and the moral it is a universal law that reception and production are the only lines of action possible to finite beings; and reception must precede production. By production I mean the causing of effects by the exertion of power or energy; what scientists call *work*, and what in moral life the New Testament designates by the same name, *works*, to distinguish it from the receptive action of faith or trust.

In mechanical action and organic life there is a double dependence; physical agents are dependent for their being and their constitutional powers and susceptibilities, and also for the force, impulse, and direction communicated from their environment. This double dependence has its analogy in the sphere of moral and religious life. Neither men nor angels are self-existent. They derive their being and their constitutional powers and susceptibilities from God and are continuously dependent on him

for existence. "In him we live and move and have our being." And in the moral system he is the eternal source of all truth, law, perfection, and good, the supreme object of trust and service; the God with whom we have to do in all moral action; and only in communion and fellowship with him is a right moral and religious character possible. All right character presupposes that he has revealed himself to men, is graciously willing on his part to receive their trust and service, anticipates all their seeking him by his seeking them, imparting the light of his wisdom to guide and the warmth of his love to quicken and inspire them to love God with all their heart and their neighbor as themselves and thereby to attain their true well-being. Thus they are dependent on him for continued communication of divine moral and spiritual influences fitted to induce the free will to trust in God and to serve him, and so to quicken and develop them in the life of love and to form them into the moral likeness of God, who is love.

In the sphere of human free agency the law that reception and production are the only lines of action and that reception must precede production is continually exemplified in the ordinary life of man. A person in solitude cannot realize his normal development. Every one is continually dependent on others to receive from them what he cannot do for himself. In the daily action of life man lives by faith. Faith or trust is the bond of society. Without its continual exercise society would be disintegrated, civilization and even the existence of men in communities of any kind would be impossible. When one orders his dinner and goes home at the dinner hour expecting to find it on the table he acts by faith in many persons. When he travels it is only by trusting his life and property to many others. When he builds, or engages in mercantile business, or works by the day, or goes on a pleasure excursion, every hour and in every transaction, in all business and in all pleasure he acts and lives by faith. The great economical principle of the division of labor rests on the limitations and dependence of man and the consequent necessity of living by faith, by trusting others to do for him what he cannot do for himself.

A further exemplification of this law is found in the natural affections which bind men together in families and in larger associations. Man lives by being loved as really as by loving, —

by receiving as really as by rendering service, — by faith as really as by work. A babe derives its life from its parents. When it comes into a house, by its very helplessness it takes command of the household and receives the loving ministry of all. It is born into an atmosphere of love. It lives by being loved. And after it is sufficiently developed to know those who tend it, its life for a long time is chiefly a life of dependence and trust. There is no more striking illustration of faith than a little child's faith in its father and mother, which our Saviour used. It is taken with them on a journey; it knows not whither it is going nor how long it is to travel; it goes out with them, like Abraham under the call of God, not knowing whither. But amid whatever new and strange scenes, it is peaceful and contented so long as its parents are with it, trusting fearlessly in them. And, as the babe is born into an atmosphere of love, so all our lives long we live by being loved. We strike our roots into the hearts of our fellows and suck up their best affections. Life would be insupportable for a person whom no one loves. Probably no such wretch exists on earth. But when we nourish our souls with love given us by others, the giving does not impoverish. The love that trusts is returned for the love that gives and serves. The parents' love grows by loving and imparting as really as the child's love grows by loving and receiving. Love is like the sunshine, never dimmed by being used, but ever pouring its inexhaustible light and warmth on all who receive it. Love is the marvellous power which is not lessened by giving, nor wasted by exercise, which may spend itself forever on its object and not be spent but only greatened.

The same law of reception and production is true of the spiritual life in the kingdom of God. When the Scriptures teach that all right spiritual life must begin and continuously go on by faith in God, it only declares of man in his relation to God a law of all finite beings from the lowest to the highest and in every sphere of action. Much more must it be true of man in his immediate relations to God in the religious life. God is the spiritual environment of the finite spirit. Man is "*capax divini*," capable of participating in the divine (2 Pet. i. 4). He must draw his spiritual life and growth, his spiritual productiveness, from God as really as a plant must draw its nourishment from its physical environment. He can no more grow to

the perfection of his being and attain his highest power of achievement and production without faith in God than a plant can grow when pulled up by the roots and removed from its proper environment which sustains its life. We commonly think of Paul as expending all his energies in serving others. But those mighty energies of service were fed by faith in God. He says: "Who loved me and gave himself for me." In this and similar sayings we find this hero of Christian service feeding his own soul and nourishing its spiritual force by receiving God's love to him. Thus he lived by being loved; he lived by faith, receiving God's grace. We are all born into the household of God and the atmosphere of God's love. But it depends on our own free will whether we accept his love. If we trust him we therein strike our roots into the very heart of God and receive for our own spiritual life and growth his eternal love, the love set forth in Christ, dying to save sinners from their sin.

Though every one is born into the atmosphere of God's love, in the exercise of his own free will he may close his heart against it in self-sufficiency and self-glorifying, in self-will and self-seeking. He may refuse to live by being loved and set himself up as sufficient for himself. From this point of view we see again the essential nature of sin as the soul's wilful separation of itself from God and isolation of itself in itself, and its necessarily consequent shrivelling in spiritual dryness and death. As such, sin itself is "the great gulf fixed" which separates the sinner from God. It is only by turning away from sin that the sinner can return to God and come again into union with him. And because sin is fundamentally self-sufficiency, the only way of returning to God, which in the nature of things is possible, is by faith. This also our Saviour illustrates by the parable of the branch and the vine. If we conceive of the branch as intelligent and having free will, it might become impatient of its dependence on the vine; it might, therefore, close the pores through which it receives sap from the vine and set up for itself as competent to produce grapes without dependence on the vine. The result must be that it will wither and dry up, and eventually will fall from the vine and be fit only to be burned. So by isolating himself from God in self-sufficiency the sinner closes all the avenues of communication from God, the source of all right

spiritual life. Therefore he must fail to realize the true ends of his being and must wither in spiritual dryness and deadness, and so, according to the nature of things, he becomes no longer susceptible of good, but only of evil.

Here the question arises, Can the sinner be restored to union with God and to the true and fruitful life in him? This is possible only on two conditions. One is that God be willing to receive the returning sinner and seek him in his alienation with gracious influences to induce him to return to himself and to trust him. Without this gracious disposition and action of God the sinner could not rectify himself; for the beginning of all right character must be the sinner's trusting in God and accepting his grace. But he cannot receive God's favor and his gracious and quickening influence unless God is already graciously disposed. And this prevenient graciousness of God is revealed in Christ; and in the Holy Spirit it is in the world as a power of redeeming grace to draw men away from sin to God. The other condition is that the sinner willingly trust in God, opening his heart to receive the divine grace which brings the agencies and influences of redemption. God being graciously disposed toward the sinner, nothing prevents his return to God except his own choice of self as the supreme object of trust and service, and the character developed from it.

What danger is there, then, that any sinner will fail to be restored to the life of love? The danger is in the fact that character is formed and confirmed by action. The sinner may persist in the life of selfishness till his character becomes fixed, so that no moral influence will ever induce him to change. And, according to the nature of things, no physical force, only the person himself under moral influence and in the exercise of his own free will can change his own free supreme choice, which is moral character in its primary meaning. God's love is, like the sunshine, all-encompassing and free to all. Each may use it in all its fulness without withdrawing any of it from another. But the sinner in his self-sufficiency may persist in refusing to accept and trust it till his character becomes fixed, and all the influences of God's love forever beating on him are as ineffective to induce him to change as the ever-encompassing sunshine to melt a rock. The determining preventive of salvation is never in God, but always in the sinner. Here we may return to the parable of the

branch. After a scion has been cut off it may, under proper conditions be kept a long time without losing its capacity to live if grafted in again. Within that period, should it return to the tree, it might find the place of its excision cicatrized and incapable of receiving it back. But, behold, the tree gives up under the grafter's knife one of its own living branches, that in the bleeding wound the returning scion may be grafted in and live. Then gladly will it renounce the straw wrappings on which it had depended for a precarious life, and trust its whole being to the living tree which pours freely its own life into it. But if its reinsertion is delayed too long, there comes a time when its vitality is gone and no skill of the gardener can make it live again. So a sinner may go far in sin and yet be restored to union with God, and live and be productive in him. God in Christ opens his own wounded and bleeding side to give life to the vilest sinner who returns from his isolation and trusts himself to God's redeeming and life-giving love. But if the sinner persists in refusing God's grace and resisting his Spirit, there comes a time when God sees that he is hopelessly hardened in sin, and that all moral influence for good, even all influence of God's love, would be expended on him in vain. This is the sin against the Holy Spirit, of which Christ says that it has never forgiveness, neither in this world nor in the world to come. If one asks, May I not be already one of these hopelessly hardened sinners? the answer is, Whosoever will, let him take the water of life freely. God never refuses any sinner who is willing to trust him; no one who is willing to trust him can have become a hopelessly hardened sinner; and God never casts off or abandons any sinner in the sense that he ceases to be graciously disposed toward him, and would implacably reject him even if he should repent and put his trust in God.

Here we see the true meaning of Christ's words: "No man can come to me, except the Father who hath sent me draw him." He recognizes the fact that man is dependent on God, and in his normal condition is in union with him by faith receiving his divine and quickening influences, and declares that therefore it is impossible for man to be thus in union with God and receptive of his quickening influence unless God is beforehand graciously disposed and seeking him with gracious influences to draw him to himself. And this sets aside two opposite errors. It is an error to say that a sinner, by the mere force of his own will, can regenerate himself

and restore himself to his normal condition. This assumes that God has no agency in the transaction ; it overlooks the facts that sin is wilful alienation from God, and that if the sinner is to be reconciled to God, God must first be graciously disposed toward him, and ready to receive him on his turning from sin and trusting him ; if the condition of acceptance is that the sinner trust God and accept his gracious influences, God must first be seeking him with gracious influences and offers, which the sinner is invited to accept, and when the sinner seeks forgiveness it is God alone who can forgive. In this transaction between a man and God, it is plain that the man cannot, by the mere force of his own will, bring himself into harmony with God without any prevenient gracious action of God on the man. The opposite error is to say that man has not power of any kind to turn to God and trust him, accepting his proffered grace ; to say that the regeneration of a sinner is by an irresistible act of God's almightiness ; or to imply in any form of statement that the determining preventive of a sinner's turning to God is in the action or non-action of God, and not in the action or non-action of the sinner. Accordingly, Christ himself intimates plainly that the drawing of the Father is not by almighty power, but by moral influence adapted to free-will. In his next sentence, after saying, No man comes without the Father's drawing, he says : " It is written in the prophets, And they shall all be *taught* of God. Every one, therefore, who hath *heard* from the Father, and hath *learned*, cometh unto me." God's love to man always precedes man's love to God. It rests on all men as light, motive, and attraction. Every person is free to yield to this gracious influence, to trust God in his gracious approach to man, and to be accepted by God and restored to his normal union with him. Regeneration is the change in a man when he puts his trust supremely in God, and therein, yielding to the drawing of God's love under the influence of the Holy Spirit, begins the life of love and of self-renunciation.

3. All right character and action must begin in trust in God.

We have already ascertained that the renunciation of self is effected in the choice of God as the supreme object of trust and service. This choice is the primary essence of love to God with all the heart. Now we see that in this choice God is chosen primarily as the supreme object of trust. Love to God, therefore, begins in trust or faith in him. This must be so because all

finite persons are dependent on God for their rational and personal being, for the truth which enlightens and the law which regulates their lives, for the ideals of perfection and good in which well-being consists, and for divine moral and spiritual influence, inspiration, and quickening in right character and action. Therefore, a finite person can never be right in character and action until he consents to this fundamental fact of dependence on God. And the will can consent to this only by actually choosing God as the supreme object of trust. Whatever the person may do, whatever diligence he may use to conform his action to ritual or moral law without hearty trust in God, he persists in his wilful alienation from God, repudiates his own condition as a creature, sets up for himself as independent and sufficient for himself even in realizing the highest possibilities of his being, and thus aims to isolate himself from God and from the moral and spiritual universe under God's government. This is the essence of the Pharisaism which Jesus so continually and sternly condemned. Evidently, therefore, love to God is primarily manifested in trusting him; it is primarily the choice of God as the supreme object of trust. And this is the scriptural doctrine that right character and action must begin and go on by faith.

This is true of all finite persons, from the highest angel to the weakest child. It is not, as is often supposed, a condition of their acceptance by God peculiar to sinners. All finite moral beings must be educated and developed. The highest angel must have formed his character by his own action from a characterless beginning. If a rational being, born or created into God's household and its atmosphere of divine love, and met at the outset by the heavenly influences of God's Spirit, has yielded in his first moral act to the divine drawing and trusted God, and ever since has been a loving follower of God, his whole development from the beginning has been by faith in God uninterrupted by sin.

If in his first moral act or at any subsequent time this person has sinned and thus alienated himself from God, the fact is an additional reason why his renewal to right character and action must begin in faith in God. Because now he is not only dependent as a finite creature on God, but also as a sinner needing to be forgiven and accepted by him. And God alone can forgive sin; God alone can show mercy to the sinner and accept him. Nothing which a sinner can do can kindle compassion and grace

in the heart of God, if it is not there already, any more than we can kindle sunbeams in the sun. And so God said to Moses, asserting that it is his prerogative to pardon: "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion." And from this Paul infers the doctrine which I have stated: "So, then, it is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God who hath mercy" (Rom. ix. 15, 16). And because the sinner has already transgressed God's law of love and put himself in antagonism to it, resisting all the motives and influences which it brings on the heart, there must be agencies and influences from God to redeem him from his sin. These are brought on men in redemption by Christ and the Spirit whom he sends from the Father. Hence the right character of the sinful man must begin in faith in God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, in God the redeemer of men from sin. This is the name that is above every name, not only in this world, but in that which is to come; there is no other name under heaven given among men, whereby we must be saved; this is the name in which every knee should bow (Eph. i. 21; Phil. ii. 9, 10):

Here we see the true relation of faith and repentance. We have seen that self-renunciation is the negative aspect of the positive act of love to God, and that love to God must manifest itself first as faith. Faith, then, is the positive action of love in trusting God, the redeemer of men from sin. Repentance is the negative act of renouncing self and sin involved in the choice of God as the supreme object of trust. Faith and repentance, therefore, are simply two aspects of one and the same fundamental choice of God as the supreme object of trust. Faith, as trust in God, is in the order of thought antecedent to repentance. In the order of time they are simultaneous as two aspects of one and the same act. If, when speaking to a person, I hear the voice of a friend calling me from behind and turn to him, my turning to him and turning my back on the other person are simply two aspects of one and the same act. But my turning to my friend is primary and positive, because it was his call which moved me to turn; and my turning my back on the other is involved in my turning to see my friend. So when a sinner hears Christ's call, "Come unto me, all ye who labor and are heavy laden," and turns to him and trusts him, this is the primary and

positive act. The turning from self and sin is involved in it. Faith, therefore, in the order of thought, precedes repentance. Hence the direction is given to the sinner: Come to Christ just as you are; do not try first to make yourself better and worthy to be received. So long as this is your thought, you are still acting in self-sufficiency. Come as you are and trust God to receive you, and by his heavenly influences to quicken and purify you in the life of love. Come to Christ as you are; but you do not remain as you were; in the very act of trusting him the change is made. Trusting in him and willingly receiving his gracious influences, you become a new creature in Christ, living henceforth not in self-sufficiency, self-glorifying, self-will, and self-seeking, but in trustful union with God in Christ. And for such Christ ever intercedes: "As thou, Father, art in me and I in thee, that they also may be one in us" (John xvii. 21).

II. LOVE MANIFESTED IN ACTS OF SERVICE. — The word *service* is used to denote both acts of obedience to one who commands, and acts helping a person in his undertakings and designed to promote his interests. Because God has no needs, service to him must be principally obedience to his commands. Service to a man, on the contrary, consists principally in doing something for him to supply his needs and promote his welfare. In the Christian life these two types of service, obedience and doing good, are brought into unity. The truths, laws, and ideals, archetypal and eternal in God the absolute Reason, determine what the well-being possible in this universe is, and what are the only effectual methods of seeking it. Therefore, service to man is doing him good or seeking his well-being in obedience to the law of God. On the other hand, service to God is obeying his law by doing good to men. God's law requires of men universal love like the love which is eternal in God and constitutes his moral character and perfection. The only way in which we can obey God is by the exercise of universal love, working with God in promoting the well-being of men in conformity with God's law of love. God's entire action among men in his providential and moral government and in redemption is the expression of love, establishing and extending Christ's kingdom. So far, therefore, as we work to promote the true well-being of men we are working with God to bring them back to conformity with his law of

love. Thus we serve God both by obeying his law and by entering into his archetypal plan and working with him in the advancement of his kingdom. The service of God by obedience is in its essence the service of men by doing them good, and seeking their well-being in the kingdom of God. The service of men by seeking their true well-being is in its essence the service of God in obedience.

The words *service* and *servant* have acquired an opprobrious meaning, implying degradation, because service has so commonly been compulsory, enforced by arbitrary and overmastering power. A compulsory obedience is degrading. But obedience to rightful authority declaring just laws is elevating and ennobling. The transition from a cringing subjection under force to a reverential obedience to just laws is an epoch of progress of an individual and of society. Pre-eminently the service rendered in obeying God's law is ennobling, not only because it is obedience to law as distinguished from subjection to force, but also because the law obeyed is the law of God the absolute Reason, in conformity with which he has constituted the universe and administers its government; because man in obeying it discovers his own greatness as capable of knowing God and working with him in the progressive realization of his archetypal ideals; and because the law requires universal love manifested in the service of doing good to man and promoting universal well-being, in which the man participates in the love which is the moral perfection of God, and so in his own character partakes of the divine.

From this point of view it appears that he who serves another is, as to that particular service, the superior of him who receives it. He has what the other wants. He renders a service which the recipient cannot so well render to himself. Here we find again, imbedded in the very constitution of the universe, the law of greatness for service and greatness by service. And because God has no wants and all his action is in love seeking the well-being of the universe in conformity with the truths, laws and ideals of perfect reason, we may truly say that God's love manifests itself in service. Accordingly, when God makes the fullest revelation of himself, the God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, he took "the form of a servant"; and so our Lord said at the last supper, after washing his disciples' feet, "I am in the midst of you as he that serveth."

In a preceding chapter it was shown that the action of God in the creation and evolution of the universe, is the action of the Highest coming down to the lowest to elevate and develop it, to realize progressively the highest perfection and well-being possible in a finite universe, for countless millions of finite beings constituted in his own likeness as rational self-determining persons. Therefore God's whole action in the universe is rendering service. The necessary inference is that the revelation of God in Christ under the forms and conditions of humanity and therein taking the form of a servant, is not a myth invented by his disciples nor a mere speculation of theologians; but it is the legitimate culmination of the continuous revelation of God in the finite, of the highest coming down to the lowest to lift it up. Once admit that God is revealing himself in the progressive evolution of the finite universe, and the revelation of God in Christ becomes not only conceivable as possible, but antecedently probable, as a legitimate development of God's continuous and progressive revelation of his own essential being and character and of the fundamental law of the moral system eternal in him as the absolute Reason. Therefore the law of service is not an arbitrary requirement of a despotic will, but an eternal principle of reason incorporated into the constitution of the universe. The law of love, which requires service, is fundamental in the constitution of the universe. It is as essential to the existence of a moral system as the law of gravitation is to the existence of a physical system. Accordingly Christ teaches that the service of love exalts the servant to be a personal friend. "Ye are my friends, if ye do the things which I command you. Henceforth I call you not servants; but I have called you friends" (John xv. 14, 15).

III. THE UNITY OF LOVE IN TRUST AND SERVICE. — Trust and service are two manifestations of one and the same love. Love to God, psychologically defined, is the free and abiding choice of him as the supreme object of the entire activity. The entire activity of man is twofold, reception and production, which, directed to persons, are trust and service. Love to God as supreme involves love to our neighbor as ourselves. This also manifests itself in the same two lines of action. Thus we have the unity of moral character as the supreme choice or love manifesting itself in acts of trust and service. George Eliot says: "I

believe that morality began whenever one creature felt its need of another." Julia Wedgewood quotes this and says: "We should rather say that morality cannot begin till some creature feels itself needed by another."¹ We should say that the trust recognized by the former and the service recognized by the latter are the two lines of action in which the love required in God's law manifests itself. But love to God legitimately manifests itself first as trust.

1. Trust or faith is a manifestation of love. It is a common error that faith is entirely distinct from love and that love is manifested only in acts of service. But it is love that trusts as really as it is love that serves. A child's instinctive love to its father and mother in its earlier years is manifested chiefly in acts of reception and trust; while that of the parents to the child is manifested chiefly in acts of service. But the child's instinctive love in receiving and trusting is as real love as the parents' instinctive love in imparting and serving. It is often said that love to a person is strengthened more by giving to him and serving him than it is by receiving from him and trusting him. But this overlooks the distinction between the two manifestations of love. The love of a child is strengthened by receiving and trusting as really as that of the parents is strengthened by giving and serving. And in general the trustful love of the weak is increased by receiving and trusting as really as the serving love of the strong is increased by imparting and serving.

The biblical distinction of faith and love is in harmony with the fact that faith is a manifestation of love. Paul says: "Now abideth faith, hope, love, these three; and the greatest of these is love" (1 Cor. xiii. 13). The verb is singular, suggesting the oneness of the three. Love is the greatest, for it is in itself the fulfilment of the law and comprehends all right character. Faith or trust is the primary manifestation of love to the heavenly Father, as it is of a child's love to its earthly father; and hope is a necessary consequent of loving trust in God, being simply the person's appropriation to himself of the promises of God in conscious trust in him, and therefore in confidence that he is accepted by God and reconciled to him. Paul speaks also of "faith which worketh by love" (Gal. v. 6). The Greek admits the translation, "faith which is wrought by love." This is given in the margin of the Revised Version, and has been accepted as the

¹ Contemporary Review, July 1889, p. 127.

preferable translation by many scholars, especially in the Roman Catholic Church. Thus translated, the passage would declare that faith is action in which love manifests itself. The translation preferred in our English version involves the same meaning; faith works itself out in love; faith is love in its incipient form, and in its action or working reveals itself as love. Here is found a real meaning of the old distinction between *fides informis* and *fides formata*. The former would denote faith as incipient love simply trusting in God; the latter would denote the trusting love working out and developing its essence as love in works of production and service. As Julius Müller expresses it: "Faith is a moment in the idea of love"; that is, it is an essential element, a moving energy, a momentum, in love.

2. Both in trust and in service love is manifested in its two aspects as righteousness and benevolence.

It has been shown in a preceding chapter that the service of God and man is a service of benevolence or good-will regulated by righteousness. It is necessary here only to show, also, that the trust in which love first manifests itself involves benevolence or good-will, and in its exercise should accord with truth and law, and so is regulated by righteousness. Both of these aspects of love are present in trusting as really as in serving.

That trust in God involves benevolence as implicit in it, is evident from the fact that in choosing God the sinner must renounce self as the supreme object of trust. Trusting himself to God, he no longer trusts himself in self-sufficiency. And because self-sufficiency is the primal germ of all sin, the renunciation of it involves the cessation of the self-glorifying, self-will, and self-seeking, which are inseparably connected with it. In the act of trusting God the change of heart is effected, and the love which involves universal good-will begins. From the beginning of this love the good-will or benevolence is implicit in it, and must reveal itself explicitly when the love is developed in service. It is not conceivable that one can intrust himself and all his interests to God without the renunciation of self, and the sentiment of good-will toward God manifesting itself in interest in his kingdom, and the benevolent desire that all men be brought to participate in it as citizens. The very purpose with which one trusts God is to gain deliverance from the alienation and isolation of selfishness and reunion with God in the life of love. The act

of faith presupposes that the person has been awakened to see his sin and misery in the alienation and isolation of selfishness. To be delivered from this is precisely what he seeks in casting himself on God and seeking to receive from him forgiveness and quickening and saving grace. If a sinner should look to God merely with the intent that God should save him from the pains of hell and use the divine almightiness to protect and bless him forever, his intent would be to make God his servant, not to become himself the servant of God. In such an act the sinner would not have exercised the faith which worketh by love; he would not have renounced self nor have trusted in God, but would be still continuing in his self-sufficiency, self-glorifying, self-will, and self-seeking. Thus the act of supreme trust in God has implicit in it the spirit of universal good-will.

The exercise of faith is also regulated by righteousness. It is in accordance with the truth, and required and regulated by the law, and in harmony with the archetypal ideals which are eternal in God the absolute Reason and determine the constitution of the universe. It is in conformity with the fundamental and unchangeable realities of the universe. In choosing God as the supreme object of trust, the person chooses him as he is; chooses him because he is what he is, God, the absolute Reason, the all-wise, the all-perfect, the almighty, the Creator, on whom all things depend. Otherwise, he would not be trusting the true and living God, but a fiction of his own mind, an idol created by his own imagination. In trusting God, he consents with all his heart to the supremacy of God, to the authority and inviolability of his law, to his absolute perfection, and his worthiness to be the supreme object of trust. Thus trust in God is required by law and regulated in righteousness. The reason why God should be the supreme object of trust is found in the eternal truths, laws, and archetypal ideals of absolute Reason, showing God alone to be worthy to be the supreme object of trust for all finite persons.

And in love to man trust is regulated by righteousness. We may trust men no farther than we see them to be trustworthy. We must withhold our trust and confidence so far as we know persons to be false, dishonest, corrupt, and also so far as we know them to be weak and incompetent.

Our trust is regulated by righteousness, also, in reference to our own powers and needs. One is not justified in leaning on

others and making himself a burden to them for what he can do as well for himself. Every one is bound to make the highest and best use of his own powers. A babe, by its helplessness, commands the willing service of all in the household. But if, after he has grown, the boy demands the attention and service which were given him as a babe, he is only laughed at as a great baby. The same principle applies to our trust in God. We are not to trust him to do for us what we can do for ourselves, but only to quicken us with divine influence, so that in our normal union with him we may exert our own energies in their greatest effectiveness and for the noblest ends.

3. Trust or faith in God, leads to the exertion of the energies in obedience and doing good, in works of righteousness and benevolence, in works of Christian service ; and it makes it a trustful, willing, and spontaneous service, a service of love. This is implied in the nature of faith. When one has lost his way in the woods and a man appears and offers to guide him, if the bewildered person trusts him as an honest and competent guide he will follow him, carefully keeping him in sight and obeying his directions. If he distrusts him, thinking him a robber, he will avoid him. If a sick person trusts his physician, he will follow his prescriptions carefully ; if he distrusts him, he will fling his medicine into the fire. If one commits money to another, in whom he has confidence, to invest it for him, he will follow his advice ; so far as he lacks confidence in him he will hesitate to follow it. The same is the essential tendency of faith in God. Whoever trusts himself wholly to God will spontaneously obey his commandments and do his will. Faith, according to its essential nature, works in loving obedience and service. No one may safely trust himself and all his interests to any man, for it would give the man thus trusted the absolute control of him. And no man is sufficiently wise, good, powerful, long-lived to justify such a trust. Hence there is a debasement in such a trust in man ; a just contempt is felt for one who so gives himself up to another as to become his man, to be used for his purposes. There is a natural gravitation of the weak to the strong. By virtue of it the Nimrods, the hunters of men, attract followers and use them as tools or victims for the purposes of their own ambition. But there is no such danger in trusting all to God, and in that confidence becoming God's men, doing all his will and working with

him in fulfilling the great plans of his wisdom and love. Nor is there any debasement in this complete surrender of ourselves to him. On the contrary, it is only in this complete surrender of ourselves to God and union with him by faith that we are able to exert our powers in their highest energy, and to realize the highest possibilities of our being.

4. Trust and service, while manifesting the same love, manifest it in different forms.

Love in the exercise of faith is receptive ; in service it is productive, forthputting, imparting, energizing, achieving. Faith receives. In it the soul, like a flower opening to the sun, opens itself to God in Christ, the Sun of Righteousness rising on it with healing in his wings. It lifts up suppliant hands to receive blessing. Its native speech is prayer, thanksgiving, and praise. But while faith takes in, love in service gives forth ; by what it has received in faith, love grows and in service bears much fruit and gives to those who need.

Love in faith looks up. It is the lower reaching up to the higher, the weak laying hold of the strong ; it ascends to God and receives of his fulness. Love in service goes down to those who are beneath to lift them up ; it goes out to those who are without, bringing to them the spiritual gifts which by faith it has received from God. Faith is the cry of weakness and need ; service is the work of the strong energizing in the strength which the cry of weakness and need has won from God.

And these are manifestations of the same love. In faith we open empty hands in supplication to receive ; in service we open filled hands to give. Like God who opens his hand and all creatures are filled with good, we open our tiny hands and give the blessings with which he has filled them. These two forces of love are in the moral system the centripetal and centrifugal forces by which it, like the solar system, moves forever in order and glory. In faith in Christ, Christians are drawn to God by the attraction of his love ; and quickened by his grace and inspired by his love they are impelled outward to serve him. By these two forces they are held steadily in their orbits ; like planets revolving around the sun, reflecting its light and storing up its heat in support of multitudinous life, they move on their glorious way, ever shining in God's love, reflecting it upon all, and storing it up to nourish spiritual life in those about them ; they are ever

drawn to God and held in union with him by his love, ever impelled outward by participating in that love, even as Christ was, to seek and save the lost.

In faith love is incipient and germinal ; in service it is developed to its full productivity and fruitfulness. It is not merely that the Christian's love had its beginning in an act of faith ; but that the energy of Christian service is daily and hourly fed by reception of divine influence. When Luther was climbing Pilate's staircase it was revealed to him that the just live by faith, not by the observance of ceremonies nor by attempting to obey rules of duty without faith in God. And this faith inspired him continuously in the great work of his life. This continuous faith is known in theology as the *actus adhesionis*, the act of adhesion to Christ. It is expressed familiarly in worship as clinging to Christ: "Simply to thy cross I cling."

In this continuous life of faith the person's capacity to receive divine influence becomes greater and greater. He grows in the grace and knowledge of our Lord and Saviour, Jesus the Christ. When a scion is grafted into a young stock it begins at once to receive life and nourishment from the stock. It must continue so to receive or it cannot live. Thus continuing, its receptivity increases. Its growth will be slow. Part of it, dried in its separation from the tree on which it grew, decays and drops off. By and by a single tiny leaf appears. Continuing to receive more and more, it at last becomes capable of appropriating the whole life and nourishment of the stock and becomes itself a great tree, receptive in every root and twig and leaf from all the cosmic powers and resources of its environment, bearing much fruit. So the Christian "shall be like a tree planted by the streams of water." He grows continually in capacity to receive, appropriate, and assimilate the divine, and more and more becomes strong in the Lord for effective service.

Hence faith is the energizing principle of the Christian life. The sinner, fleeing to God as the refuge from all enemies, is inspired by him with courage to face them all and strengthened with divine strength to overpower them. This energizing power of faith in one wiser and stronger is continually exemplified in history and in every-day life. It is expressed by Horace, "Nil desperandum Teucro duce et auspice Teucro."¹ The military

¹ "Carminum," Lib. I., vii. 27.

success of Napoleon was due largely to his soldiers' faith in him. Much more is faith in God the spring of heroic endeavor and mighty achievement. The Epistle to the Hebrews declares that faith in God was the secret of the mighty deeds done by the heroes of God's kingdom in the Old Testament. The same was the secret of the spiritual power of Paul and the other apostles, of the Christian confessors and martyrs, and of all great workers for Christ and for humanity in the Christian church. They are rightly called heroes of faith.

5. We now see the true significance of the scriptural distinction of faith and works. Trust in God, the willing reception of his grace, is the faith; the service in obedience and in doing good, in which the faith by its essential nature issues, is the works. Together they manifest the love which the law requires, which is the fulfilment of the law, and which a sinner begins to exercise in the act of faith in regeneration or the new birth under the influence of the Holy Spirit of God.

This discloses the true significance of the scriptural doctrine that the whole Christian life is by faith. Hence, on the one hand, any supposed works of service, which are done without faith in God, cannot be manifestations of the love required by the law nor be acceptable to God as real obedience to the law; on the other hand, any supposed faith which does not issue in works of service in obedience to God and doing good to men, cannot be real and saving faith in God.

It follows that the common objection, that the doctrine of justification on condition of faith is of immoral tendency, rests on a total misconception of the doctrine. The objection insists that justification must be conditioned, not on faith, but on right character. But the doctrine of justification conditioned on faith is itself the doctrine of justification conditioned on right character, because faith in God is the only possible beginning of right character either in men or angels, either in sinners or in those who have never sinned. If God should offer forgiveness to a sinner on any condition other than his forsaking sin in the exercise of the love to God and man required in the law, he would thereby set aside and annul the authority of the law and the universal obligation to obey it. There can be no justification and salvation of a sinner except on condition of his forsaking sin. But sin in its essence is alienation from God and isolation from

men in selfishness, involving self-sufficiency, self-glorifying, self-will, and self-seeking. Therefore, the only possible way of forsaking sin is by self-renunciation; and the only possible way of self-renunciation is by the sinner's returning to God and putting his trust in him, to receive from God the divine grace and the spiritual influences without which no rational creature can attain his normal development and realize the highest possibilities of his being. In thus trusting God, the sinner ceases to live in self-sufficiency, self-will, and self-seeking; he recognizes his dependence on God and his unity with all rational beings in the moral system; he comes into harmony with the fundamental realities of the universe and of his own being and begins to live the life of universal love required in God's law. The doctrine of justification by God on condition of faith alone, that is, excluding as a condition of justification all antecedent and faithless acts of falsely supposed obedience to the law, is the only possible doctrine of justification on condition of right character. It is the only doctrine of justification on condition of right character which is possible or conceivable in harmony with the belief in a moral system of rational beings under the moral government of God, who is love, and whose law is the law of universal love. Therefore the denial of the doctrine of justification only on condition of faith logically involves the denial of God and of the moral system under the government of God and his law of universal love.

It follows that the doctrine that the just shall live by faith is the same with the doctrine that the just by faith shall live; for all right spiritual character with its appropriate action and life is by faith in God.

6. It is important to the clear apprehension of the subject to notice another point; though it can be only indicated here and not fully investigated. Acts of trust and service are manifestations of love and derive their moral character from the supreme love which they manifest or reveal. The essence of moral character in its primary sense is the choice of the supreme object of trust and service; and the trust and service derive their moral character from the supreme choice which expresses or manifests itself in them. If a person loves God with all his heart, God will be the supreme object of trust and service and the character expressed in these acts will be right. If he loves him-

self supremely, his supreme trust will be in himself and will appear in self-sufficiency and self-glorifying ; and his service will be of himself and will appear in self-will and self-seeking.

Selfishness in its essence and tendency is isolating. But a person, however selfish, cannot rid himself of his dependence on others. Man must live in society, and society cannot exist without reciprocal trust and service. Hence even robbers banded together trust and serve one another in the prosecution of their criminal designs. And in well-ordered society, in the family, in the markets, in all lines of business or of pleasure, life can go on only by mutual trust and service. Men have good natural affections prompting them to seek the welfare of others ; they have reason and conscience by which they see their duty and feel under obligation to do it ; and Christian influences have refined and elevated civilization. The resulting acts of trust and service are not wrong in themselves. A saint in the closest union with God and actuated by the strongest love to God and man might do the same outward acts. The deeper spiritual character, the supreme love to God and the love of our neighbor as ourselves, or, on the other hand, the self-sufficiency, self-will, and self-seeking manifesting the supreme choice of self, infuses itself into the acts of trust and service and imbues them with its own character. But, of multitudes of those thus living in reciprocal trust and service, that may be true which Christ said of the Pharisees : " I know you that ye have not the love of God in you." They have never chosen God as the supreme object of trust and service ; therefore they have never exercised real self-renunciation nor come into real conformity with the second great commandment of the law, " Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." This state of things accords with the principle that men may live in sin for a long time and yet remain accessible to divine influence and reclaimable by divine grace. If men once reached the condition in which all mutual trust and service had ceased, human society would be nothing better than hell.

CHAPTER XXVI

DUTIES TO GOD, AND TO MAN IN HIS RELATION TO GOD

In the analysis of the significance and applications of the love required in the law we come next to the distribution of duties to different persons and classes of persons.

The two great commandments of the law present God and man as distinct objects of love and of the specific duties implied in love. Therefore in the distribution of duties to different persons the first and great distinction is of duties to God, and duties to man as related to God.

I. DUTY TO GOD. — The peculiarity of duty to God is determined by the fact that he is God, the source of all being, power, and life, and of all truth, law, perfection, and good, the absolute and all-perfect, above all creatures by the whole distance from the conditioned to the absolute, from the finite to the infinite. Hence he is the supreme object of love, and we owe to him duties such as we can never owe to any or all creatures.

1. Love to God is manifested both in trusting and serving him. But because men are dependent on God as his creatures, their love to him, like a child's love to its father and mother, must manifest itself primarily in acts of trust. Trust in God naturally expresses itself in worship. Prayer, confession, thanksgiving, praise, adoration, are the native language of faith. Because God is independent and in want of nothing, the service rendered to him must be primarily obedience to his law and submission to his will, in the renunciation of self-sufficiency and self-will. But we can obey God's law and submit to his will only in the exercise of love to God and man. Therefore, in the very act of obeying God's law, we render to him the further service of entering into his plans, working with him in the

redemption of men from sin and advancing his kingdom, and thus doing the works of righteousness and benevolence towards men. This God accepts as service to himself. "He who hath pity on the poor lendeth to the Lord and his good deed will he pay him again" (Prov. xix. 17). And Jesus says in his judgment of men to their final destiny: "Inasmuch as ye did it unto one of these my brethren, even these least, ye did it unto me" (Matth. xxv. 40).

2. Love to God appears as righteousness, in its three subordinate forms of truthfulness or love of truth, justice, and complacency.

First, Truthfulness towards God is the consent of the will to God as true; it is the consent of the will to truth in all dealings with God.

Before the truth is known, love of the truth pertaining to God or revealed by him is candor or docility, willingness to be taught by God and to receive his teachings as true; it is earnestness of purpose to know God; it is the attitude of readiness to give the assent of the intellect and the consent of the will to the truth respecting God so far as God has revealed himself. It is the attitude of mind and heart required by Peter: "Putting away therefore all wickedness, and all guile, and hypocrisies, and envies, and all evil speakings, as newborn babes, long for the sincere (pure, unadulterated) milk of the word, that ye may grow thereby unto salvation" (1 Peter ii. 1, 2). It is willingness to do God's will when known, as our Lord says: "If any man willeth to do his will, he shall know of the teaching" (John vii. 17). It is the attitude of the willing servant: "Behold, as the eyes of servants look unto the hand of their master, as the eyes of a maiden unto the hand of her mistress, so our eyes look unto Jehovah, our God" (Psalm cxxiii. 2). Crude and rude materialism betrays the absence of candor, of fairness, and of openness of mind to evidence, when it wilfully repudiates the idea of personal spirit as unscientific, and on this pretext refuses even to look at the decisive evidence of the existence of rational free will and personality in man and of the revelation of reason and rational will in both the physical and the moral systems in the universe. This is untruthfulness toward God, the lack of love of truth in dealing with him. By no conceivable revelation of himself could God make him-

self known to a mind so firmly and wilfully shut up in the prejudice that nothing can exist that transcends the perceptions of sense and is not included in matter and its motions.¹ On the other hand, wilfully to support a preconceived opinion respecting God and his revelation of himself by any special pleading or any sophistical argument, by any unfair interpretation, or by denying any established result of criticism or fact of science is untruthfulness toward God and evinces a lack of love of truth in dealing with him. The untruthfulness in each of these cases may be rebuked in Peter's words to Ananias: "Thou hast not lied unto men, but unto God."

After the truth is known, truthfulness toward God is the consent of the will in strong adhesion and allegiance to it; it is trust in it, living in accordance with it, propagating it, if needful dying for it, as the truth and word of God. The trust does not rest finally on the truth, but on God who is revealed in it. We cannot rest our whole weight on an abstraction. The truth is a revelation of God. It is God, revealed in the truth, whom we trust and proclaim. And because the principles, laws, and ideals according to which the universe is constituted and carried on are archetypal and eternal in God, all truth of science and philosophy as well as of morals and religion is the truth of God. The will consents to it as to the truth that reveals God. And when once we know God and trust him, we believe his word and all his revelations of himself, so far as he has communicated them to man. Faith is taking God at his word.

Truthfulness toward God appears also as veracity and sincerity in all our dealings with him. We know that nothing can be concealed from God. Sincerity toward God is the cordial consent of the will to this fact and action accordant with this consent. It takes away all desire to conceal anything from God. It leads to a life of confidential intimacy with him. The disciples, return-

¹ "It is curious to see scientific and realistic teaching used everywhere as a means of stifling all freedom of investigation as to moral questions under a dead weight of facts. Materialism is the auxiliary of every tyranny, whether exercised by one or by the masses. To crush what is spiritual, moral, human, so to speak, in man by specializing him; to form mere wheels of the great social machine instead of perfect individuals; to make society and not conscience the centre of life, to enslave the soul to things, to depersonalize the man, — this is the dominant drift of our epoch" (Amiel's Journal, June 17, 1852. Trans. p. 38).

ing from a missionary circuit, came and told Jesus all things, both what they had done and what they had taught. Like this is the sincere and confidential intimacy with God which is the essence of prayer and of communion with him. In such sincerity the Psalmist prayed: "Search me, O God, and know my heart; try me and know my thoughts; and see if there be any way of wickedness in me; and lead me in the way everlasting" (Ps. cxxxix. 23, 24).

Righteousness toward God appears in its second form as justice. It is the consent of the will to "God's just rights," as Edwards expresses it. It is loyalty or allegiance to God's supreme and rightful authority. It is willing submission to God's sovereignty, — not to his "naked sovereignty," as theologians have sometimes expressed it, but to the sovereignty of God clothed with all the attributes of reason and wielding almighty power under the regulation and direction of perfect wisdom and love. Justice to God is also the consent of the will to all the requirements of his law in willing obedience. It is also the consent of the will to God's vindication of the law and his assertion and maintenance of its authority by the punishment of transgressors. It prompts sinners to acknowledge their ill-desert, to take the blame wholly on themselves, and to acknowledge the justice of God in their condemnation. This is the sentiment of the fifty-first Psalm, which ever since it was written has expressed the true penitence of sinners better than they could express it in their own words, and has been one of the "golden bowls full of incense" in which from age to age "the prayers of the saints" are borne before the throne of God (Rev. v. 8).

Righteousness toward God appears also in its third form as complacency, and expresses itself in adoration and praise, in aspirations to commune with him and to be like him. Its language is "Nearer, my God, to thee"; "O how love I thy law, it is my meditation all the day; more to be desired than gold, sweeter also than honey and the honeycomb" (Ps. cxix. 97; xix. 10).

3. Love to God appears also as benevolence or good-will. This, however, cannot be shown by supplying God's wants, for he has none; nor in conferring favors on him, for he needs none. If this were possible, it would imply that man is, at least in some respects, superior to God, and that God is to the same extent dependent on man. Accordingly Augustine says: "Who is so

foolish as to suppose that the things offered to God are needed by him for any uses of his own? We must believe that God has no need of cattle or any other earthly and material thing, or even of man's righteousness, and that whatever right worship is offered to God, profits not him but man. For no man would say that he conferred a benefit on a fountain by drinking, or on the light by seeing."¹ But benevolence, or good-will to God, manifests itself as a determining choice or preference in every act of trusting or serving him, and in working with him in the advancement of his kingdom.

II. DUTY TO MAN IN HIS RELATION TO GOD. — The subject now to be treated is man's duty to man in his relation to God. It is the relation of the second great commandment, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself, to the first, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart. It is the relation of morality to religion.

1. The true and full significance of man's duty to man is determined by man's relation to God. Love to man in its true and full significance does not exist apart from love to God. True love to man is vitalized by love to God.

First, this is implied in the essential idea of moral law and government. Because man in his constitution is a rational and free moral agent, he will be conscious of moral ideas and obligation, whether he believes in God or not. But without the knowledge of God he cannot comprehend the law of reason and conscience in its full significance and inviolable authority; and his doing of duty to men will lack the vitalizing force of love to God. Morality in its true and full significance is a manifestation of religion and does not exist apart from it. It is the doing of duty, not merely, as Kant says, as obedience to the command of God, but also as the spontaneous expression of love to him, as spontaneous and loving service of God in loving trust in him. Without recognition of man's relation to God the imperative sense of obligation and duty is the dictate of the person's own conscience, resting on no authority above or beyond himself; with this recognition of God, the conscience is itself the light of the eternal Reason shining in the person's own reason and conscience with authority absolute, eternal, inviolable, in God. Without this recognition the moral law is only a subjective metaphysical ab-

¹ *Civitas Dei*, Lib. X. 5.

straction ; with it the moral law is the voice of God, who himself is love, proclaiming the requirement of universal love as the inviolable law of the universe ; inviting and commanding all to trust in him and receive from the fulness of his love, quickening, inspiration, and guidance to participate in love like that of God himself, manifesting itself as God's love does in works of righteousness and good-will to do good to men. Without the recognition of man's relation to God the moral law is a collection of isolated rules ; with it, the moral law is the one all-comprehending law both to God and man, the law requiring universal love, which, as universal good-will regulated by inflexible and perfect righteousness, spontaneously manifests itself in a life of trust and service to God and man. Evidently, then, if God exists, love to man in its true significance cannot exist dissociated from love to God ; morality, in its full significance, cannot exist without religion. The doctrine that man can do all his duty to man without love to God can have no sufficient basis except atheism.

Atheism gives no reasonable basis for the supreme authority of the law of love and the universal obligation to obey it, nor for the existence of any moral system or moral government. The existence of the moral system under one supreme and universal law is dependent on the existence of God. Such a system and law are impossible if God does not exist, as the absolute Reason, the eternal seat and source of that one universal law and authority, — if he has not in the free energizing of his almighty will constituted the universe and does not sustain and direct its ongoing in harmony with that law. And in that system there would be no unity and harmony of character and of co-operation for the common well-being, if God were not the God of love and his universal law the law of universal love. In the sphere of morals, therefore, the imperative of conscience and the ultimate principles and ideas of reason necessarily carry us to God as their original seat and source.

And this is not peculiar to ethics, and, therefore, exceptional. It is equally true of all science. In a preceding chapter it was shown that all science rests on the rational intuition of self-evident universal principles which cannot be proved, such as the law of continuity, the law of uniformity, and the principles of mathematics, which all science assumes to be universally true through all space and time. Thus all science rests on the as-

sumption that the universe is scientifically constituted and evolved in accordance with the universal and eternal principles of absolute Reason. This absolute Reason is God. Therefore, the existence of God is the necessary presupposition of all science. It is equally the necessary presupposition of all ethics. Science also claims to rest on the observation of facts. Here also it rests on presentative intuition in sense-perception and self-consciousness, which also is self-evident, unproved knowledge. Ethics rests equally on the observation of facts in the constitution and history of man. I have as real knowledge that I am a rational and morally responsible person as I have of myself as existing, or of what I see, hear, and feel. And from observation of my fellow-men and acquaintance with the history of mankind I have as real knowledge that men are rational and morally responsible persons, as that they see, hear, and feel. Theism, therefore, does not depend on self-evident postulates any more than all science, physical, ethical, or spiritual, depends on them. Theism is involved in the fact that all science, as well as all morals and religion, necessarily rests on the postulate that the universe is constituted and evolved in accordance with the principles and laws of absolute Reason. Theism simply affirms the existence of that absolute Reason, that is, God; and by observing the facts in all the spheres of reality in the universe, mechanical, chemical, vital, ethical, and spiritual, and in all history, it seeks to ascertain what God has revealed himself to be. It may also be noticed that physical science, as it pushes its inquiries, always comes to questions which it cannot answer, and to difficulties and, sometimes, to seeming contradictions which it cannot solve. The antinomies of physical science are as obtrusive as those charged on philosophy or theology. In such cases the scientist accepts the facts in the confidence that with increasing knowledge they will be found to be scientifically explicable. In philosophy, ethics, and theology we have equal right to take the same position. Therefore, the student of physical science, the philosopher, the moralist, the theologian, and the historian, should alike recognize God and reverently acknowledge, "in thy light we see light" (Ps. xxxvi. 9).

Secondly, the scriptures teach that the reality and significance of man's duty to man is determined by his relation to God. The Decalogue is given by Moses as the law of God. The existence

and oneness of God are proclaimed in the beginning, and man's duties to him are declared first, as the basis of all duties to man. Thus the law of Moses proclaims an absolute morality founded on man's relation to God. It incorporates into the political constitution of the Israelitish theocracy the recognition of God's moral government of mankind. The universality of God's moral government and of blessing from him to all men was announced in the original promise to Abraham: "In thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed." This great promise in its universal outreach was more and more fully unfolded by the prophets, and set forth and realized in its full significance by Christ, the Saviour of all men. Paul brings all morality into the sphere of religion: "Whether ye eat, or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all for the glory of God."

Religion, even in its lowest forms, has usually, and Pressensé says always, been connected with morality and has found some motive to duty in the fear of the god or in obedience to him. Matthew Arnold takes a long step backwards in regarding morality as independent of religion, and religion as merely morality lighted up with emotion. As well might one say that daylight is moonlight lighted up by sunlight. As the moon derives its light from the sun, so man derives his morality from God. As the moonlight is not extinguished by the sunlight but is absorbed in it, so morality is not annulled by religion, but absorbed in it.

Therefore man cannot do his whole duty to man without love to God. By his relation to God all his moral duties are taken up into religion. So the Preacher said of old, "This is the end of the matter; all hath been heard; fear God and keep his commandments; for this is the whole duty of man" (Eccl. xii. 13).

2. On the other hand, there can be no true love to God which does not issue in love to man. Man cannot do his duty to God in its full significance without love to man and doing his duty to man. This is a fundamental principle of religion and morals.

This principle exposes a misrepresentation of religion by disbelievers. Feuerbach, for example, maintains that all religion in its essential significance implies the sacrifice of man to God; to enrich God, man must become poor; that God may be all, man must be nothing; therefore, that the literal sacrificing of men or women to God is the legitimate expression of the inmost signifi-

cance of religion in all its forms.¹ Men in all ages have rightly regarded religion as sacrificial; they have rightly believed that sacrifice on man's part is essential to acceptable obedience to God. And this is implied in the principle now under consideration. All love to others is in its exercise sacrificial, because it is using one's own resources and powers in the service of another; it is also vicarious, because it is the action of one instead of and in behalf of another to do for him what he cannot or will not do for himself. And it is in this sacrificial and vicarious service to man, in benevolence regulated by righteousness, that obedience to God's law consists. Love to God must manifest itself in love to man, which impels the servant of God to render service to men in righteousness, doing all that he can to develop individuals to their highest perfection and well-being, and so to advance the progress of society toward the realization of its highest ideal. In thus expressing his love to God he is not suppressing and sacrificing himself, but developing himself to the realization of the highest possibilities of his being in the likeness of God and communion, union, and working with him.

But the history of religion demonstrates that men have been slow to learn this fundamental principle and to conform their lives to it in its true significance. They have misinterpreted the sacrificial element in religion and have regarded it as requiring the sacrifice of man to God. Even among Christians the false humility of "the worm of the dust" conception of man, and the conception of religion as realizing its highest perfection in the asceticism of the desert or the monastery have been examples of this misconception of sacrifice in the religious life. But love to God manifests itself in loving service to man, trusting that even in the vilest sinner there is somewhere a door of access through which the divine influences and the noblest motives may find entrance, and, if he will consent, develop him to his highest perfection in the divine life of love.

In the lower stages of development men have regarded even human sacrifices as acceptable to the deity. Even at this extreme, the error may have resulted from the misapplication of truth. It is true that we ought to devote our most precious possessions to God; and what is more precious than one's own son? More influential in originating this horrible sacrifice may have

¹ Feuerbach, "Wesen des Christenthums," chap. 27.

been the sense of sin and guilt, which has followed man like his shadow, the consequent fear of the offended deity, and the conscious need of propitiation and expiation. It has been said that the ancient Greeks were an exception to the universality of this sense of sin and guilt and the consequent fear of the god; accordingly, Carlyle remarks that Socrates was "dreadfully at ease in Zion." But the representations in Greek tragedy and mythology of the punishment of wickedness by the gods, and of the anguish of criminals in their consciousness of their crimes and their fear of the wrath of the gods, and of their efforts to find some way of purification from guilt, show that the Greeks, with all their bright enjoyment of life, were still shadowed by the sense of sin and of the need of propitiation. And from the cultured Greeks down to the lowest savages a sense of guilt, a fear of divine wrath, and a conscious need of expiation and propitiation have been common characteristics of man. In this sense of guilt and fear of the avenging deity, men offer sacrifices to appease him; and what victim can be greater for the sacrifice than a man? especially than a man's own son? So the king of Moab, when hard pressed and driven to his last walled city by the enemy, sacrificed his first-born son, the heir of his throne, on the wall of the city and in the presence of the victorious and besieging army, as a burnt-offering to Chemosh, the god of Moab (2 Kings iii. 27). And from a similar perversion and misapplication of true principles, though not pushed to this extreme, may have arisen analogous false ideas of the sacrifice of man to God in penance, asceticism, and the suppression of life and joy, which in the ethnic religions have darkened the minds of the worshipers, and which have not been absent even in the history of the Christian church.

That this is a false conception is recognized in the history of the ethnic religions themselves. In them are found evidences of veneration for the god, recognition of his kindly care, and even the name of God as Father and All-father. And the religions characterized chiefly by terror are usually, if not always, degenerated from a purer religion with a higher conception of God and his service.

It is recorded in Genesis that Abraham was forbidden to offer human sacrifices, and when alluded to in the subsequent history of Israel these sacrifices are condemned with horror. The two

great commandments, quoted by Christ, are found in the Pentateuch. The writers of the Old Testament always treat morality as dependent on religion. They also teach, often with great clearness and force, that all acceptable worship and service of God must issue in benevolence or good-will to all men, regulated in its exercise by righteousness.

But it is Christ who gives us the real and full significance of the sacrificial character of true religion. The sacrifice of self required in the law is not the sacrifice of the person himself and all his interests. It is only the renunciation of self as the supreme object of trust and service; it is effected in the act of loving God with all the heart and our neighbor as ourselves; and it results in developing the person, who renounces self, to his highest perfection and well-being, and in promoting the progress of the kingdom of God and thereby the well-being of society, and in promoting the well-being of the person served if he is willing to avail himself of the service offered. And the sense of sin and guilt and of the need of atonement in the forgiveness of sin is met and satisfied by Christ. He, in his humiliation and in all his earthly life, obeyed the law of love in perfect self-renunciation through sufferings unspeakable and even unto death on the cross in order to bring men back to reconciliation with God. Thus he revealed the law of love more fully than it had ever been revealed before, and fully asserted and maintained the righteousness of God and the universal obligation and inviolable authority of the law of love at every step in the redemption of men and in the forgiveness of sin. And thus he made atonement for sin and guilt. In the ethnic religions, men have expended their energies in sacrifices and penances trying by themselves to make atonement, instead of expending them in the service of righteousness and good-will to men. But God has made atonement for all men in Christ, and therein has revealed his love to the world and his gracious disposition to draw all men to himself and to receive every one whom, by the agencies and influences of redemption, he can induce to return to him. Sinners, therefore, have nothing to do to make expiation for sin or to dispose God to be gracious. God's eternal graciousness is revealed in Christ. Sinners have only to put their trust in God, to show their trust in him by obeying his law of love, and in love to God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself to put forth all their energies, quickened

by divine influences, in doing good to men in the service of righteousness and good-will.

It follows that love to God should find its manifestation in trusting and serving men in benevolence regulated by righteousness in all the work and duties of daily life. Christ requires his disciples thus to manifest their religion in their homes, their business, and the common intercourse of life, to do good as they have opportunity in love to their neighbor as to themselves, and in every transaction with another to be as careful to promote his welfare as their own. Because it is love to God which is manifested in the service of man, life in all its daily action is sanctified as religion and ennobled as service of God. This is the emphatic teaching of the Holy Scriptures. John says: "If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar; for he who loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?" And he declares: "We know that we have passed from death unto life because we love the brethren." God says to Cain: "The voice of thy brother's blood crieth unto me from the ground" (Gen. iv. 10). And James says to the covetous rich man: "The hire of the laborers who mowed your fields, which is of you kept back by fraud, crieth out; and the cries of them that have reaped have entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth" (James v. 4). The cry of the defrauded and oppressed is heard in heaven. And God says by his prophet in the Old Testament: "I will be a swift witness against those who oppress the hireling in his wages" (Mal. iii. 5). Every transaction of daily life, whether right or wrong, is related to God, is lifted to greatness as obedience or disobedience to his law of love.

Religion does not admit any manifestation of itself as a substitute for trust and service to man in righteousness and benevolence. Jesus rebukes the Pharisees for teaching that one may be justified in neglecting an obvious duty of love to man by the plea that he acts from a higher love to God. He referred to their teaching that, if a son gave for religious purposes the portion of his property which he would have expended in supporting his aged parents, he was free from all obligation to support them. And Jesus said to these teachers: "Ye have made the commandment of God of no effect through your traditions." The study of theology renders important service to man in securing a clear and

exact statement of all which may be known of God, and a clear recognition of the line between the knowable and the unknowable. But religion cannot manifest itself in zeal in support of sound doctrine to the exclusion or diminishing of zeal to do good to man. Nor can religion manifest itself in faith in God and in the worship in which this faith finds expression, as a substitute for the service of man in righteousness and good-will. Man's trust in God, with the worship in which it finds expression, is not an end in itself, but is for the very purpose of obtaining from God inspiration, wisdom, spiritual power in the service of God by advancing his kingdom of righteousness and good-will, and so promoting the true well-being of the person rendering the service, of the person directly served, and of human society.

Here, then, we have the great truth that love to God cannot find its true expression without love to man and the duties of righteousness and benevolence which love to man implies. Even among Christian peoples this truth has not been as clearly set forth and as strongly emphasized in religious teaching nor as consistently exemplified in religious practice as it should be. There are, however, many influences at work arousing the attention of the church to this truth, and indications that Christian people will come to a higher appreciation of its significance and importance, and will bring Christian thought and work into conformity with it.

We now see that the two great commandments of the law are complementary; neither can be obeyed in its full significance without obedience to the other. They are two aspects of one and the same law, the law of universal love. In the history of the Christian church we discover tendencies to overlook this unity and to give preponderant attention to one with comparative neglect of the other. The inadequate attention to either is practically dangerous and cripples the individual and the church in their character, work, and influence. If the fact that love to God must manifest itself in loving service to men is overlooked, the tendency is to regard religion as consisting exclusively in the worship of God; then the tendency is to seek highly-wrought feeling, to retirement and meditation in the life of worship, to asceticism, to mysticism and fanaticism, to superstition, to the pharisaic and self-righteous multiplication of rites and rules, and punctiliousness in observances. If, on the other hand, the fact is overlooked

that there can be no true and normally effective love and service to man which is not vitalized, inspired, and guided by love to God, the tendency is to a godless and shallow humanitarianism, which seeks to better man's condition from the outside by changing his circumstances, by enactment and enforcement of civil laws, by caring for his physical wants, without seeking the spiritual renovation of the man himself, and in disregard of the principle of Christian progress, "Make the tree good and the fruit will be good also," and without recognizing man's relations to God and the true significance of right character and the attractive motives to it involved in that relation. Such humanitarianism misses entirely the true conception of what man's true well-being is and of the true methods of realizing it. As Mrs. Browning represents it, its advocates

cry that everywhere
 The government is slipping from God's hand,
 Unless some other Christ (say Romney Leigh)
 Come up and toil and moil and change the world,
 Because the First has proved inadequate . . .
 For Romney has a pattern on his nail
 (Whatever may be lacking on the Mount),
 And, not being over-nice to separate
 What 's element from what 's convention, hastes
 By line on line to draw you out a world ;
 Without your help indeed, unless you take
 His yoke upon you and will learn of him.

Aurora Leigh, Bk. viii.

This one-sidedness in the conception of the two aspects of the law of love and the consequent misapprehensions and misapplications of the law are rebuked by Christ. In his person and life, as well as in his teaching, he reveals the inseparable unity and interdependence of love to God and love to man, as two aspects of obedience to one and the same law. As the God-man, he reveals God himself, in conformity with the law of universal love, taking the form of a servant in seeking the perfection and well-being of man. This he seeks by bringing them into communion and union with himself, and so into conformity with the law to be workers with him in serving men and promoting their perfection and well-being. This revelation of himself he continues through all generations in the Holy Spirit. Thus in redemption through Christ God is perpetually revealing that only in loving communion and union with God are man's true perfection and well-being attain-

able. God in Christ reconciling the world to himself continuously reveals that true love to God must manifest itself in love to man, and that love to man can be real and effective only as it springs from love to God and aims to bring men back to harmony with God in love to him, in which alone their well-being is possible. The same is the doctrine of Christ in his oral teaching. He declares the inseparable unity of the law of love to God and the law of love to man. In the Pentateuch the two laws are recorded apart (Deut. vi. 5 ; Lev. xix. 18). Christ brings them together, and declares that they are the two great commandments of the law and that the second is like unto the first (Matth. xxii. 37-40 ; Mark xii. 30-33 ; Luke x. 27-37). He teaches that all true love to man springs from love to God, and that all true love to God issues in love to man. Thus he declares the inseparable unity of the two great commandments of the law ; obedience to one is never genuine and complete without obedience to the other. He presents them in unity as the principles under which all human duties to God and to man are summarized, and from which all duties in detail are to be unfolded and defined. It will be an epoch in the advancement of the kingdom of God and the renovation and progress of human society when the inseparable unity of religion and morality, of love to God and love to man, is acknowledged in its full significance and importance, and the lives of all Christians are in conformity with the law of love in both its aspects.

3. The normal progress of mankind collectively can be attained only in the exercise of love to God and of love to man in their complementary unity. Man in unity and solidarity as mankind, man as man, man by virtue of his participation in human nature, can be the object of the love required in the law only as his relation to God is recognized, and duties to man are inspired by love to God, and are done by faith in God and as service to him.

Love to man implies love to mankind, manifested in interest in human laws and institutions, in the progress of society in civilization, in all which pertains to the welfare of man, in all that is human. It is the spirit expressed in the familiar maxim of Terence : " I am a man, and nothing which is human can be alien from me." It is enthusiasm for humanity.

Love to mankind contemplates all men in unity or solidarity. Mankind can be thus in solidarity the object of love and duty

only as in unity in the moral system. And they can be in the unity of the moral system only in their common relation to God under his government and his universal law of love. Men have common interests, also, arising from the fact of their common sinfulness. This has its significance in the fact that they are sinners against the same God and the same universal law of love. Hence, also, they have a common interest in redemption. God is in Christ reconciling the world unto himself. Christ tasted death for every man; he is the propitiation for the sins of the whole world; the Holy Spirit is poured out on all flesh. Hence all men have a common interest in God's work of redeeming men from sin and establishing and extending his kingdom. Here all men are in unity and solidarity in common needs and interests arising from their common relations to God, and in this unity mankind becomes to every Christian an object of interest and service.

By virtue of the unity of men in their common relations to God, love and service are rendered to the individual man as man, in view of the fact that he is human, independent of peculiarities of character, attainments, or condition. He is a child of our common Father, though, like the prodigal son, he has forsaken his Father and his Father's house; he is constituted in the likeness of God as personal spirit, though he has abused his powers and lost all likeness to God in moral character, and lives only in selfishness instead of love; he is subject to the same law of love, though he lives in transgression of it; for him as well as for us Christ died, and so has made it possible for him to be renovated to the life of love and fitted for the pursuits and the blessedness of that life. We are not to love him for his rank or condition; nor for his peculiar powers, endowments, or attainments; nor for tastes in affinity with our own or character attractive to us. We are to love him as man; we are to be interested in him in view of the raw material of humanity and its grand possibilities. From this point of view we are to love persons though they are disagreeable to us, though we condemn and abhor their characters, though we can feel no complacency toward them. We are to love them with benevolence and compassion exercised in righteousness like that with which Christ came to seek and save the lost.¹

¹ "He who denies that a slave can do an act of beneficence to his master is ignorant of human virtue; for virtue pertains to the disposition of the person who does the service, not to his condition. Virtue is precluded

And man's relation to God in the unity of the moral system is the only basis for this love to mankind, this enthusiasm for humanity, this love to every human being simply as human. It cannot result from natural affection, personal friendship, or love of family, class, tribe, race, or nation. These are all partial and divisive. History shows that difference of race has in all ages been the source of hostility and strife. The mere physical and organic unity of mankind as a race "of one blood" by descent has always been powerless to prevent the feuds, wars, enslavements, and hatred of the minor races into which mankind have been divided, and has never made mankind, in unity or solidarity, the object of love. This is effected only by the recognition of the common interests and the unity of men in the moral system under the government of God and the law of universal love, and especially as objects of God's redeeming love in Christ.

Love to God excludes love to an individual only so far as the latter love isolates the person loved from his relations to God and to the moral system. This isolation sets up the person loved as a sort of anti-god, or idol. But love to God includes love to an individual, when the latter love renders to the person loved the service of benevolence regulated by righteousness in recognition of his relation to God and to his fellow-men in their common relations to God and to one another in the unity of the moral system. In fact, the service in which love to man finds expression cannot be rendered primarily and directly to man as a whole, but only to the persons and to the classes or groups of persons that constitute mankind. The progress of society is impossible without the progress of the persons composing society. Society can become wiser and better only as the persons composing it become wiser and better. Society can be educated and developed no faster than the persons composing it are educated and developed. Laws, institutions, and social usages can be improved only as the persons composing society become wise enough and good enough to see the need of improvement and to accept the new ideas, to devise and adopt the new laws and institutions, and to practise the new courses of action which the improvement

from no one, it is open to all, admits all, invites all, citizens, freedmen, slaves, kings, exiles. It does not choose the house, nor the rank and estate; it is content with the naked man." (Seneca, "De Beneficio," Lib. iii., cap. 18.)

implies. Speaking and writing, and every agency and influence employed to introduce new ideas, to promote reform, to devise wise methods of promoting human welfare and to secure their adoption, can be effectual to benefit mankind only so far as they enlighten and educate, convince and persuade the persons who constitute mankind. The result aimed at cannot be effected by the mechanical process of enacting and enforcing a new law, or even inserting a new clause in the constitution of the state, but only by the laborious process of educating and developing the people to receive the new truth, to welcome and support the reform, and not only to enact, but cordially to obey and support, whatever new law or institution may be the outgrowth and expression of the higher thought and life of the people. Civil law is not to be looked to as the cause, but as the effect, of a reform. Thus, love to God does not exclude love to the individual, but inspires and ennobles it as the manifestation of love to God, and broadens it as the expression of love to mankind and of interest in all that is human. Special relations involve special obligations and duties. Love to God cherishes, purifies, and elevates all natural affection of family and friends, and all love to individuals and communities, and inspires, vitalizes and intensifies this specialized love by the recognition of the individual in his relation to God, and to all men in the unity of the moral system under the government of God. Thus recognized and developed, the love which renders peculiar service to a particular individual, or to one's own family, neighborhood, or nation, therein renders the most effective service to mankind. Therefore, if a person has any wisdom, or power of beneficent influence, or good of any kind to impart, let him consecrate it with love to God, and for Christ's sake impart it to his own family, to his neighbor, or any one near to his heart or accessible to his influence, and so he will serve mankind and show his love to all men. And as people more and more act in this spirit, the blessing consecrated by love to God will be passed from hand to hand, like the bread and the cup at the Lord's Supper, and all the service of human life will be at once a service to the individual and to mankind, and a sacramental service of God and communion with him.

4. The historical fact is that the idea and expectation of human progress have become a power in civilization through God's revelation of himself, especially through his revelation in

Christ, and man's knowledge of himself in his relation to God as thus revealed.

The Greeks, Hindus, and other Aryan peoples conceived of four ages, — of gold, silver, brass, and iron. They recognized continuous degeneracy. As the ages pass, all things depart farther and farther from the point of their emanation and grow worse and worse. It is the result of an inexorable destiny; the moving force of their development can only effect their deterioration. According to the Hindus, when the cycle of the four ages is once completed, the world begins anew and runs through the same process of deterioration.¹ Plato compares the world in successive series of ages to a spindle, which by its movement fills itself with thread and then by a reversed movement runs the thread off; and during the period of reversed movement the sun will rise in the west and everything in the world will be just the reverse of what it had been before. But Christianity, though recognizing the sinfulness of man in its true significance and its universality more clearly and fully than any other religion, yet through redemption in Christ opens to man the possibility and brings to him the divine promise of progress, of a future always better than the past.

Accordingly it is the Christian nations that have been the progressive nations. The religions of the East, imbued with pantheism, have developed a civilization characterized by despotism, caste, and stagnation. The Confucianism of China, scarcely recognizing a personal God, has been attended with a like stagnation. Whatever progress has recently appeared in the oriental civilization has been introduced from the Christian nations. Mohammedism in Arabia in its early history was attended by scientific activity. But this activity was short-lived; and for many centuries the civilization of all Mohammedan peoples has been unprogressive and stagnant. The wonderful progress during the last five or six centuries, in science and invention, in political organization and social order, in the general diffusion of knowledge and of the comforts of life, has been almost exclusively in the Christian nations.

This difference is due to the fact that the idea and promise of human progress are inherent in the very idea of the action of God in Christ redeeming men from sin and developing the kingdom of God on earth, which is the essence of Christianity. The

¹ See Lenormant, "Beginnings of History," Chap. ii., Trans. pp. 67-74.

genius of Christianity is progress. Accordingly in the beginning of the Bible is the record of the beginning of God's redemptive action and the promise justifying the outlook of hope for the future. So soon as man has sinned God seeks him, calls him to himself, and, while condemning him for his sin, receives him again to favor and accepts his worship; and he gives the promise that in some way through the race that should spring from the woman, the head of the serpent, the Semitic representative of the power of evil, should be bruised. This promise inherent in the idea of redemption, this idea and expectation of progress, penetrating the darkness of the future like an expanding beam of light, accompanies all God's redemptive action recorded in the Old Testament. The promise is renewed to Abraham; and, while the agency through which the blessing is to come is more exactly defined as the seed of Abraham, the blessing promised is more explicitly declared to be for all men. And as God's historical action establishing his kingdom continues, the agency through which the blessing is to come is more precisely defined as the seed of David and then as the personal Messiah, and with increasing clearness the Old Testament declares the universality of the blessing and the richness of its import as the reign of the Prince of Peace in righteousness and good-will, as the unfolding of the kingdom of Jehovah, then germinant in the Israelitish theocracy, into a spiritual and universal kingdom. And when the Messiah so long predicted has come, it is in the fulfilment of the ancient promise, unfolding its significance, extending it to all nations, and perpetuating it through all time. The promise had been a beam of light penetrating the darkness; in Christ, the sun of righteousness arises, revealing the source and fulfilling the prophecy of that gradually brightening dawn, and flooding the world with its light. The idea and expectation of progress, of a future ever brighter than the past, had their origin in the revelation of God and his redeeming grace and have come down to us from the beginning in the line of his redemptive action. In this sense the Christian is "the heir of all the ages;" as Paul says: "We, brethren, as Isaac was, are children of promise."

It follows that pessimistic views of life are excluded only by the knowledge of man in his relation to God. Atheism, in banishing the idea of God, changes the essential idea of man. Pessimism is its logical inference. And it is the highest revelation of God

in his redeeming love in Christ which alone absolutely excludes it. When God created the world "he saw that it was very good." And after man had sinned, God in redemption opens to every one who will the way to progress in all that constitutes the well-being of man, progress not terminated with the earthly life, but endless in immortality. With such a conception of the possibilities of a human life through man's relation to God, who is love, pessimistic views of life are impossible.

5. The principles quickening and regulating the progress of mankind derive their significance and power from man's knowledge of God and of his own relations to him. This is strikingly exemplified in the political and social progress of modern times.

The doctrine of the dignity and worth of man derives its real significance from man's relation to God. The dignity and worth of man lie in his likeness to God as rational and personal spirit, and in his being the subject of God's moral government and law and the object of his loving care ; they are revealed in the fact that God esteems him of so great worth that even after man has sinned God comes in Christ and the influences of the Holy Spirit to redeem him from sin and restore him to reconciliation and union with God. It is revealed not only that Christ is "a propitiation for the sins of the whole world," but also that distributively he "tasted death for every man ;" and this demonstrates God's estimate of the worth of every man in his individual personality.

The doctrine of man's inalienable rights derives its real significance from man's likeness to God and his relations to him as a rational and personal being and his dignity and worth involved therein. God's law commands all men to act always in love to God and man, to exercise benevolence regulated by righteousness in every act to any person. Therein the law equally declares the right of every person to be trusted and served by his fellow-men in acts of good-will regulated by righteousness. The law which imposes on every man a duty and obligation, guarantees to every man the correlative right. And this law is the law of God, absolute, supreme, universal, inviolable ; it is eternal in the absolute Reason and imprinted in the constitution of the universe. No authority or power can either absolve a man from his duty and obligation or annul for any man the correlative right. This is the real significance of the sacred and inalienable rights of man. It is not true, indeed, that every one has an inalienable

right to life, or to liberty, or to the pursuit of happiness in whatever way he will. It is true that every person has the right to be treated by every other in good-will regulated by righteousness; and that every person on his own part has a right to obey God in benevolent and righteous action. A government may by force prevent the exercise of this right; but no authority or power can annul it.

Christianity, therefore, sets aside the theory of government prevalent in the ancient and heathen civilization, — that the individual has no rights in relation to the government but only owes duties, and that government owes no duties to the individual but only exercises rights authoritatively. This is a theory which can be the basis only of despotism. And yet Comte sets it forth explicitly as the true theory of government in the reconstruction of society to which as the goal of all human progress the prevalence of his godless positivism was to bring mankind. Christianity teaches that civil government itself is subject to the law of God, and has no right to disobey its commands or to violate or attempt to annul the correlative rights which the law establishes. Accordingly, the preaching of Christianity had scarcely begun when Peter and John stood under arrest before the Sanhedrin and said: “Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you rather than unto God, judge ye.” And very soon after, being arrested again, Peter said in the same presence: “We must obey God rather than men” (Acts iv. 19 and v. 29). These prisoners, before the chief council of their nation, confronted human government with an assertion of rights of the individual, founded on man’s relation to God, which no human government has the power to annul or the right to disregard; and thus in its beginning Christianity disclosed within itself the fundamental principle of the doctrine of human rights which underlies the modern progress of popular government.

The brotherhood of man has its deepest significance and its practical power for good only in the common fatherhood of God. The mere unity of race is ineffective to bring all men into a common brotherhood or fraternity. On the contrary, race-connection has been the continual source of alienation, division, enmity and oppression.¹

¹ “The Gospel of Christ has this dogma (the Brotherhood of Man); but we proclaimed it 3000 years before the Christian era, and our ancient books contain this article of our faith, ‘All men in the universe are brothers.’”

The equality of men is real only in their relations to God as alike his creatures, subject to his law, objects of his loving care and his redeeming grace, and admitted on equal terms to communion with him and to the privileges of the children of God.¹

6. The Christian revelation of God in Christ as the redeemer of men from sin, and of their duties and privileges in their relation to him as such, is essential to fit men for self-government and to enable them to solve the great problems of political, social, and moral reform and progress. Modern progress is characterized by an increasing trust in man as man. A striking exemplification of it is the tendency to popular government and universal suffrage. This tendency has given us, in justification of itself, the maxim, All men are wiser than any one man.

A dangerous error lurks in this maxim. One man with a telescope sees farther than all men with their unaided eyes. And in science, mechanical invention, statesmanship, in every sphere of thought and action, one great genius will see farther than all other men and will communicate to them what they would never have acquired. All history has shown that society cannot dispense with its great men. Therefore the maxim quoted tends to the reign of mediocrity; it would substitute the average of human wisdom, power, and character for the highest. This tendency is exemplified in politics. It is pre-eminently exemplified in many attempts to elevate labor, which are made on the principle

(“The Chinese Painted by Themselves,” by Col. Tcheng-Ki-Tong, Military Attaché of China at Paris, Trans. from the French by James Millington, p. 105.) All thoughtful peoples have more or less distinctly recognized the law of love through their common rational and moral constitution. The earlier religion of China is supposed to have recognized a personal God more distinctly than Confucianism does, and the saying quoted probably originated in that earlier time. But what I have said is only that the real significance of the brotherhood of man depends on the recognition of the common fatherhood of God. This is verified by the history of the Chinese; losing the conception of the Fatherhood of God, though the maxim of the brotherhood of man may still stand in their ancient classics, they have themselves become the most exclusive and self-isolating of all peoples.

¹ “The Duchess of Buckingham, after attending one of Lady Huntingdon’s meetings (of Whitefield’s followers after his separation from Wesley), wrote to her: ‘It is monstrous to be told you have a heart as sinful as the common wretches that crawl on the earth. This is highly offensive and insulting; and I cannot but wonder that your ladyship should relish any sentiments so much at variance with rank and good breeding.’” (“History of the Christian Church,” by Prof. Geo. P. Fisher, D. D., LL. D. p. 520.)

of the least work for the most money, and aim to prevent skill, diligence, and faithfulness in work from having any advantage over ignorance, laziness, and negligence. Professor Tyndall speaks of the sadness with which among the Alps he saw the mountains disintegrating and sliding down into the valleys. Here is an analogous political and social tendency which elevates the low by pulling down the high. Society while getting rid of barbarisms may take on vulgarity; the gain in the useful may be attended with a loss of the beautiful; the gain in the material, with a decay of the spiritual; the sense of honor may be displaced by the calculations of expediency, the honest by the successful, religion by adoration of wealth.

On the other hand, the history of all ages demonstrates that great men have often used their superior power to mislead and oppress the people, making them tools or victims for their own aggrandizement. They become Nimrods, mighty hunters of men.

The great problem of civil and social polity is so to constitute society that the greatest ability, wisdom, and moral integrity of the people shall lead and command the people. This has been realized in some considerable degree only in exceptional cases and for comparatively brief periods. The problem to devise a constitution of society by which this result may be as a rule secured, and the reverse be an exception speedily corrected, has not yet been solved. Neither under despotism, nor monarchy limited by constitutional law, nor aristocracy, nor any form of popular government has either the leadership in political parties and social organizations or the government of the nation been continuously secured to the highest wisdom, integrity, and ability. And this result can never be secured by any change in the mere form and mechanism of government.

Christianity alone gives the key for solving this problem. It assumes that the people must be educated and developed intellectually, morally, spiritually, and practically in order to be capable of wise and beneficent self-government. It therefore proceeds on the principle: Make the tree good and the fruit will be good also. It presents man's relation to God as the most fundamental, and practically the most important, reality with which his action and well-being are concerned. It therefore assumes that the principles determining the right and wise political and social constitution of society cannot be found without the recog-

inition of man's relations and obligations to God and of the significance and universal authority of his law of love. Christianity does not deny the importance to human progress of scientific discovery, industrial inventions and improvements and the devising of wise and effective political and social machinery and methods, though it was not within the scope of the Christian revelation of God in redemption directly to reveal them. But these are not in themselves adequate to insure the best political and social constitution of society and the true well-being of man; for these make no change of character and aims, but only increase man's efficiency in attaining the ends which he is already seeking and which may be the unworthy ends of a supremely selfish character; hence they may be used to make more effective the aggrandizement of the few and the repression or even the oppression of the many. Christianity recognizes, as underlying these and essential to control and direct their use to worthy ends, the fundamental principles of righteousness and good-will involved in the right understanding of what man is in his likeness and relations to God and in the right interpretation of God's law of universal love. The right development of these principles and of the significance of the law of love is essential to any true and complete sociology. It is the aim of Christianity to elevate and ennoble man by revealing to him what he himself is in his likeness to God in his rational and free personality, in his relations and obligations to him, and in his privileges as a child of God through his redeeming love in Christ; and to bring man into conformity with the law of love in its full significance and in all the ramifications of its practical application. Thus developing the individuals, who constitute the people, in wisdom, in right character, in faith in God, in physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual power, in the full appreciation of the possibilities of humanity, it aims to fit the people for self-government. Then they will be both competent and disposed to organize society under right institutions and laws, and to adopt the wisest and most effective methods to promote the well-being of all. Thus the whole tendency of Christianity has been to deliver men from the reign of arbitrary will and despotic force, and to bring them under the reign of law, and that law the eternal law of love, the law requiring universal good-will regulated by righteousness. The modern tendency to organize society politically and socially on

the basis of trust in man as man, of trust in the people, is unquestionably a Christian tendency and a result of the influence of Christianity. But trust in man must be in accordance with the divine law and regulated by righteousness. We cannot trust the wicked or the incompetent. Hence the aim of Christianity is to make the people trustworthy, and to trust them as soon and as far as they are worthy of trust.

Accordingly Christianity approaches all persons individually and collectively, with all available influence, to induce each one to renounce self as the supreme object of trust and service and to live the life of universal love. And this excludes all tendency to the reign of mediocrity. It recognizes the needed and legitimate influence of men of great genius, of large powers, and special attainments. It recognizes also the necessary division of labor, and every Christian's legitimate business as a calling of God. "Let each man abide in that calling wherein he was called" (1 Cor. vii. 20). Its aim is to induce every man to develop his powers to the utmost for the noblest ends. It invites him to multiply his own power by availing himself of God's gracious illuminating, quickening, and strengthening Spirit, working in and with him in his own development and in all achievement. According to its maxims, Greatness for service and Greatness by service, it demands of every one his greatest powers and resources and insures their fullest development. Christianity teaches that love to God is to be manifested in righteousness and good-will to man, and thus human work in every condition of life and every line of action is consecrated as religious service of God; therefore it gives scope for Christian work to every variety of genius and talent and to every special attainment of knowledge and skill. And it cultivates in the whole community the spirit of reverence for real excellence and the disposition to trust the truly great and good.

As to the question between forms of government, though civilization is far from being thoroughly christianized, the facts of history justify the conclusion that it is already safer in the most advanced nations to trust the general intelligence and good sense, the honesty and right-mindedness of the people, and the broadening, educating and reciprocally corrective influence on one another of many minds discussing a common interest and deciding their action on it, than to trust to personal and kingly govern-

ment in any form with the expectation that only the great and the good will be the kings. And the more completely Christianity vitalizes civilization, the more will government "of the people, by the people, for the people" prove its superior advantages. Its best results will be ultimately realized when all human society shall have been transformed into the kingdom of God on earth.

It is characteristic of Christianity that it requires men to do their duties rather than to assert their rights. It is characteristic of human advocacy of civil liberty apart from Christianity that it calls on men to assert their rights rather than to do their duties. Rights are correlative to duties. A person has no rights except so far as other persons owe him duties. If I owe a man five dollars it is my duty to pay it and he has a right to receive it. It is common for men to insist on their rights rather than their duties. Christ and the prophets and apostles insist on men's duties and have comparatively little to say of their rights. They hold up the law of love and insist on obedience to it in all duties of universal good-will regulated by righteousness. This is the only wise and effective way to secure to all men their rights. So far as all men in love to God and man do all their duties, so far all men will have all their rights. It is common declamation that popular government rests on the love of liberty. But the love of personal liberty is essentially the same with the love of power. It is the desire to do as one will unhindered by any external power. Hence the strongest love of personal liberty is compatible with holding other persons as slaves, or with oppressing them in other ways and using them as tools for personal aggrandizement. The true basis of popular government is not the love of liberty; it is the love to God and man required in God's eternal law and manifested in good-will to all, regulated by righteousness; it is not the assertion of personal rights alone, but the love which renders to all their dues and so cares for and guards the rights of all.

7. The methods and aims of real service to man in promoting true human progress are determined by his likeness, obligations, and relations to God.

The principle determining the distinctive aims and methods of Christian philanthropy is set forth by our Saviour in the Sermon on the Mount. He recognizes the fact that food and

raiment, the physical comforts and conveniences of life, are important: "Your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things." But he bids men not to be anxious about them nor to make them the primary object of interest and pursuit. On the contrary, he says: "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness and all these things shall be added unto you." These directions, applied not merely to regulate the life of the individual but of mankind, present the fundamental principle which determines the aims and methods of all Christian endeavors to promote the progress of man. The primary and dominant aim must be to bring men into conformity with the law of universal love, and so into harmony with God and with one another, and thus gradually to transform society into the kingdom of God. And so far as this is accomplished, men will attain their own most complete development, will advance in the knowledge and command of the resources and powers of nature, will of their own accord establish right institutions, laws, and usages, and so will insure the highest degree and widest diffusion of physical good. For to the command, "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness," our Saviour adds the promise, "And all these things shall be added unto you."

In seeking this end Christianity begins with individuals. It aims primarily to promote the progress of society by the renovation and development of the individuals who compose society. This is necessary because society can make true progress only as the individuals who compose it become wiser, abler, better, and happier, capable of interest in nobler ends and of enjoyment from higher and purer sources. This education and development are necessary in every sphere of action and enjoyment. They are necessary to prepare man to avail himself of the results of discovery and invention, if communicated to him ready-made from without. The gift of a sewing machine would be useless in the wigwam of a savage, because he has no use for it and no capacity to use it. So education and development are necessary to prepare a people for popular government, for new laws, institutions, and customs. Nothing can bless a person till he is educated and developed to the need of it and the capacity to enjoy and use it. Men must be developed to the consciousness of the higher powers and possibilities of their being, and to capacity to appreciate and enjoy the higher intellectual, moral, and spiritual

pursuits and attainments in which man's true good consists. Their slumbering capacities for higher good must be awakened and developed.

The change which Christianity would effect in the individual is not merely intellectual development and increase of knowledge, but also moral culture ; not merely a change from immorality to morality, but a return to God in faith and repentance, and the beginning of a new life in union with God. This is a new life in the spontaneity and enthusiasm of love to God and man as the inmost character and the spring, inspiration, and direction of all action. The aim of Christianity is not primarily to promote man's physical comfort, but to bring him to recognize his relations to God and the spiritual system as his environment, as real as his physical environment which he perceives through the senses. Christianity promotes the advancement of science and industrial inventions, the diffusion of knowledge and culture, and whatever constitutes civilization. It does this, not by making it the primary aim, but, by aiming primarily to renovate the man to right character, to awaken him to nobler ends and to the consciousness of the higher possibilities of his being. Thus it awakens the strongest motives and the most strenuous exertions to improvement in every direction.

Hence, in promoting the progress of society, Christianity does not begin on the outside to change existing circumstances, laws, or institutions, but it begins with renovating and developing the individual man. It does not aim first to supply what man wants in the line of his present action and character, nor to furnish implements and resources for greater efficiency in his self-seeking ; but to make him a new man conscious of higher needs and seeking nobler ends. As the persons composing society become wiser, abler, and better, they will develop for themselves a higher civilization with all the science and arts incident to it ; and will ultimately solve the great problem how to secure the highest degree and widest diffusion of all the advantages, resources and comfort of human life. Laws and institutions fitted to a people, so that under them they may do their best and most effective work, must be the outgrowth of the people's life. It is through the healthy processes of life that a lobster casts its shell and fits itself with a new one. As one sees the image of the sun in a dew-drop, so in this little creature we see a type of the living

organic growth of society, changing thereby its customs, laws, and institutions as the living growth requires. The vital force of this growth is love to God manifesting itself in universal love to man.

It is sometimes asked why Christ did not reveal modern discoveries and inventions. But if he had revealed them, men would not have been prepared to receive and use them. When inventions have been made in modern times it has repeatedly been found that the same had been made generations before and had been neglected and forgotten, because men were not prepared to use them. And if Christ had revealed them, and the knowledge of them had survived, man would have missed the discipline and development obtained in gaining the knowledge and mastery of nature by his own exertions. And Christ would have hindered his own work by turning men's attention away from their spiritual interests to their physical needs; and so leading them to infer that God thought it worth while to send his Son into the world to make the highest revelation of God by revealing to men more effective agencies for accumulating the riches which perish in the using.

In all its means and agencies for the renovation of men and the transformation of society into the kingdom of God, Christianity proceeds on the principle that the primary hindrance to man's true progress is within the man himself, — that it is his dominant selfishness which isolates him from God and from his fellow-men, and tends to make every man an Ishmaelite whose hand is against every man and every man's hand against him, — that it is the dominant idea that a man attains his highest good only by serving himself in getting, not by serving God and serving all men equally with himself in the highest productivity of his powers. Therefore the primary aim of Christianity in promoting the progress and well-being of man is to root out the selfishness in which he chooses himself as the supreme object of trust and service; and this it would displace by the universal love in which the person chooses God as the supreme object of trust and service, and serves him in obedience to his law by love to man manifested by trust and service rendered in universal good-will and directed and regulated by righteousness.

This exposes some common mistakes in philanthropic endeavors. Tolstoi¹ abandoned his work among the poor in Moscow

¹ See his book: "What to do."

because he had discovered that the needs of the poor could not be met by giving food, clothing, or money. After thorough investigation, he found only one, an imbecile old woman, who could be made happy by the gift of money. He found that the poor were human like himself, — that they could be “angry, bored, heroic, sorrowful, happy,” — that their happiness or unhappiness, like his own, came from within rather than from without, from what they were rather than from where or in what circumstances they were. The mistake which he discovered has for ages been widespread and dominant. Tolstoi’s experience confirms the recent conclusions of social science. And reception without production is contrary to a fundamental law alike of physical and spiritual life.

After Tolstoi had discovered this mistake he retired to his estate and began to work with the laborers employed on it in daily manual labor. Here he made another mistake, the same with that of Mr. Ripley and his co-laborers at Brook Farm; and this mistake has also been a favorite idea of many. The mistake is that what laborers need for their help and elevation is to give dignity to labor; and that this will be done if the educated and wealthy employ themselves in manual labor. But by so doing they would injure those who depend on manual labor for their living by doing their work and to that extent depriving them of opportunity to earn wages. This error is also incompatible with the division of labor, the necessity of which is a fundamental principle of political economy. Man is many-sided, and therefore has a great variety of wants. As, in the progress of civilization, man is developed, his wants multiply. This is only another way of saying that his powers and receptive capacities are enlarged and multiplied. And different persons have different and peculiar powers and attainments; they have skill in different and peculiar lines of work for the supply of these varied wants, physical, intellectual, moral and religious, personal, social, and political. Christianity declares the duty of every one to do the best work possible with his own peculiar powers and attainments and in his own peculiar circumstances, to meet one or more of human wants. Such work in any line, done in love to God, Christianity recognizes as a true manifestation of religion and as a service to man done in true love to mankind. “Whosoever shall give to drink unto one of these little ones a cup of cold water only, in the name of a disciple,

verily I say unto you, he shall in no wise lose his reward" (Matth. x. 42). Besides all this, in the error under consideration there lurks the assumption that a person's own independence of labor for support gives dignity to labor when he condescends to engage in it and sheds some of his own lustre on the labor of those who are obliged to work for a living. So it is not the dignity of labor which is seen, but the dignity of independence of labor. The dignity, however, if there is any, is not of the labor in itself, but of the laborer. And the dignity of the laborer is not in the labor but in the spirit in which he labors. The worker in any kind of work has dignity and worth when he does his work as a service to man in love to God, when he aims to accomplish by it some worthy end for the welfare of man. The dignity is not in the work but in the service rendered to man in the work.

"Honor and shame from no condition rise ;
Act well your part ; there all the honor lies."

Christian love enables a person to realize the highest ideal in the humblest circumstances. The influence of Christianity on civilization has elevated industrial pursuits into public functions promoting the well-being of mankind. In these pursuits is now scope for the highest genius and enterprise as well as for the highest Christian character and service. The great men, who once expended their superior energies in war, may now find scope for their highest powers in the great enterprises of industry, drawing the nations together in the bonds of common interests and extending peace and prosperity instead of enmity and desolation throughout the world.

In his intercourse with the poor, Tolstoi found that their idea of happiness was to receive more than they give. This, however, is not a peculiarity of the poor. It is simply an expression of selfishness, which is dominant in the rich quite as much as in the poor. It is what Professor Drummond calls parasitism, sucking one's nourishment out of another without returning an equivalent. In opposition to this false idea Tolstoi infers that all should be taught to receive less than they give. But this cannot be accepted as an adequate enunciation of the Christian law of love, nor of the fundamental principle of all right efforts to remove the evils of society. In the first place, it conceives of Christian love as manifested only in service, overlooking its equally essential manifesta-

tion in acts of trust. A finite being cannot produce without having first received. And it cannot be truly said without qualification that a Christian gives more than he receives, because he receives from God his being and all his powers, and also all the agencies and influences of God's redeeming grace. And for the right constitution of society and its true well-being trust in man is as necessary as service, each being the expression of good-will under the regulation of righteousness. Popular government and all real elevation of the people involves trust in man as well as willing service. Man's confidence in man is a bond essential to hold society together. Society constituted and going on in harmony with God's law of love would show a continual reciprocity both of trust and service between man and man. In the second place, the maxim is an inadequate expression even of the Christian law of service, and a false conception of the self-renunciation implied in the Christian law of love. If one is always to give more than he receives he must soon come to beggary. The principle, accepted without qualification, can only issue in false asceticism. It entirely overlooks "the secret of Jesus," that "he who loseth his life for my sake shall find it." It overlooks the fact that the self-renunciation of Christian love is the true self-development, — that the Christian law of greatness for service is also the law of greatness by service. As the training and discipline of the body by the severest exercise and self-denial issues in the development of all the physical powers, so the self-denying and self-renunciation involved in Christian service to man develops the man who serves to his highest moral and spiritual wisdom, power, and well-being. It is impossible, therefore, for any one to live the life of Christian love in self-renouncing service of man without receiving a hundredfold more even in this present life, in the development of his being to its highest possibilities, in the blessedness inseparable from love to God and man, and in likeness to God and communion with him. In the third place, a person is not required to love his neighbor more than himself, but as himself. Good-will must be regulated in its exercise by righteousness, and the principle is that every transaction in business is an exchange of equivalent services or of equal values.

It follows that the progress of society under Christian influences and in accordance with the principles, aims, and methods of Christianity is not designed to be effected by revolution and con-

vulsion, but by living growth. It is not effected by putting new wine into old wine-skins, or by patching new cloth on an old garment, but by the gradual advancement of the people, through education and development, under the quickening and renovating of God's ever-present Spirit, to capacity to receive and appreciate the higher types of character and life, and to use their higher powers for nobler ends. Thus the kingdom of Christ on earth grows like the growing grain. There are epochs in the growth of the grain marked by the development of the plant into new and higher forms, — "first the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear"; but these epochs are themselves successive stages in the growth of the grain, of which they are the natural results. Analogous to this is the vital growth of the kingdom of Christ through the great epochs of its history. And it is in this sense that the kingdom of God "cometh not with observation." It is true that conflicts and revolutions have attended the progress of Christianity. But this is because men in possession of power forcibly resist the truth and the vital and normal progress of mankind, and thus conflict arises between the powers of light and the powers of darkness; and so through conflicts and fiery martyrdoms arising from supporters of the falsehood, oppression, and evil-doing which it opposes, the kingdom of Christ has advanced in the world. This Christ foretold when he said: "I came not to send peace but a sword." But in these conflicts the blame for the disturbance of peace rests on those who resist the truth and attempt to repress by force the progress of man, — or who take the sword to destroy the preachers of God's law of righteousness and good-will. When Ahab met Elijah he said: "Is it thou, thou troubler of Israel?" Elijah answered: "I have not troubled Israel; but thou and thy father's house, in that ye have forsaken the commandments of Jehovah, and thou hast followed Baalim" (1 Kings xviii. 17, 18). So in Philippi, evil men dragged Paul and Silas before the magistrates and declared, "these men do exceedingly trouble our city" (Acts xvi. 20, 21). And in Thessalonica the outcry was, "these who have turned the world upside down have come hither also" (Acts xvii. 6). The answer of Elijah embodies the truth for all time, — that in the progress of Christ's kingdom they are to blame for the disturbance of society who forsake the commandments of God, and for selfish ends resist the efforts to establish in the world the universal reign of

righteousness and good-will, in order to maintain and perpetuate unjust and oppressive institutions, laws, and usages, or such as were adapted to society in a lower stage of civilization, but are now effete.

The conclusion is that the fundamental principle of true social science must be the Christian law of universal love, and the science must consist of the development of the true and full significance of the love required both to God and man, in its two aspects, as benevolence regulated by righteousness, in its manifestation in the two lines of human action as trust and service, in its application in detail to all the actions, conditions, characters, and relations of men, and the ascertaining and declaring of the wisest and most effective methods of insuring the highest well-being of man in accordance with this law.

8. The measure of service due to mankind is the ability and opportunity to render it. This measure of service is recognized by Paul: "I am debtor both to Greeks and to Barbarians, both to the wise and to the unwise. So, as much as in me is, I am ready to preach the gospel to you also who are in Rome" (Rom. i. 14, 15). And of the same purport is the Christian law of service propounded by Christ: Greatness for service. Love establishes a lien on all a Christian is and has. Whatever his knowledge, skill, tact, natural or acquired power, possessions and resources of any kind, he is to use all in serving mankind. The increase of these powers and resources brings obligation to a proportionally greater service. In whatever peculiarity or degree of power one is superior to others, he is required to render corresponding superiority of service. A person owes different kinds and degrees of service to different persons, and in distributing his service to individuals he must exercise his judgment in determining what kind and degree of service he should render to each. But the measure of his service due to mankind is nothing less than his ability and opportunity to render it. All his powers and resources must be used in all his action in the service of man.

And this is obligatory; it is commanded by God, required by his law. So Paul recognizes himself as *debtor* to this extent to all men; it is a service due under law, like a debt. And this is only saying that all the service of benevolence is regulated by righteousness.

This exposes an error common in theology, that a person is not

required by law to be benevolent; he is required to be just, but not to be generous. This implies that in acts of beneficence and generosity he is above law and independent of it. This mistake arises in part from the error that, when a person acts in love so spontaneous that it outstrips the sense of duty and the person does not think of it as obligatory, he has ceased to be under the law; whereas, in fact, this action in the spontaneity of love is what the law requires, and there can be no perfect obedience to the law without it. It is because his consent to the law is complete, and therein he has come into conformity and harmony with the law so complete that he does not feel any constraint or restraint from it. The divine promise is fulfilled and the law is written on his heart. So honest persons refrain from stealing in the spontaneity of honest character, without ever thinking of the law forbidding theft. Thus they are obeying the law more perfectly than one who is restrained from stealing only by fear of the law forbidding it.

The denial that benevolence is required by law implies the denial that the requirement of love is the real principle of the law. Benevolence or good-will is of the essence of love to a person. If it is not required by the law, then universal love is not required by God's law. Thus the law is divested of its real principle and disintegrated into rules of action; it requires no fundamentally right character, but only piecemeal actions. Those who make this mistake fail to discriminate between the statutes of human government and the law of God. The civil law does not require a person to give his property to another, or to work for another without wages. But the law of God requires the consecration of all our powers and resources to the service of mankind, not for wages or reward, but in the spontaneity of love. One must judge for himself what service he shall render to particular persons; he has the right to bestow his property and service on particular persons as he thinks best. This right Peter recognized in the primitive church, when he said to Ananias, as to the money received for the sale of a piece of property: "While it remained was it not thine own? and after it was sold was it not in thine own power?" (Acts v. 4). But this determination of the particular service due in any case to an individual, must always be subordinate to the controlling consideration, — what service to this individual will be accordant with the law of love, and will contribute most to the

advancement of the kingdom of God, and to the well-being of mankind.

The same error has led to the misconception that God in the exercise of benevolence is subject to no law.¹

The truth is that, while God is subject to no law or authority external to or above himself, he is subject to the law eternal in his own rationality, in accordance with which he has constituted and is evolving the universe. God, in the exercise of his almighty will, eternally and freely consents to the truths, laws, ideals, and ends archetypal and eternal in him as the absolute Reason and conforms his action to them. The eternal and archetypal thought of his Reason and the eternal choice of his will are continuously expressed in time, revealing his wisdom and love. Thus in all the action of his will he obeys the eternal law of love. And this is the same as saying that his action is always in benevolence regulated by righteousness. Love manifests itself in good-will. Because it is required by law and in its exercise is obedience to law and conformity with it, it is righteousness. Also because what the true good is which benevolence seeks to promote and what are the true and right ways of attaining it are determined by the principles, laws, and ideals of reason, love in its exercise must conform to these, and so for this second reason it is righteousness.

This error, that the law does not require benevolence but only justice, has been made the basis of a theory of the atonement. It implies the truth of the doctrine of works of supererogation. A person acting in the spontaneity of love does more than his duty, more than the law requires. By these acts of supererogation he lays up before God a treasure of merit not needed for his own justification, and therefore available for those who have done less than their duty. Hence has arisen the false doctrine of the merits of the saints, available for sinners. For the same reason it is inferred that God was under no obligation to exercise benevolence or graciousness toward sinners; no law required it; it was not his duty. His action in Christ reconciling the world unto himself was done in the spontaneity of love independently

¹ "Justice is necessary in its exercise; but mercy is voluntary." (Rev. Dr. Shedd, "Dogmatic Theology," vol. ii. 402.)

"God is bound to be just; he is not bound to be generous. Men thank him for his goodness, but not for telling the truth." (Rev. Dr. Francis L. Patton, "Retribution," Princeton Review, January, 1878, pp. 10, 11.)

of all the requirements of the law.¹ Christ in his humiliation, and in his earthly life, sufferings, and death for man, was under no obligation of law thus to seek to save the lost. If he had been so, he would have been doing only his own duty and could have made no atonement for others. But because in the spontaneity of love he was doing more than the law required, he laid up a store of merits transcending immeasurably the merits of all the saints and sufficient to satisfy the demands of the law and to be a propitiation for the sins of the world. Then the condition on which the sinner is to be justified would not be the change of his own character in his voluntarily returning to God in loving, penitential, and self-renouncing trust, and so to conformity and harmony with the supreme law of love; it would be God's imputation to him of Christ's supererogatory righteousness.

God in all his action revealing himself in the constitution and evolution of the finite universe obeys the law of love in good-will exercised in righteousness, that is, in strict conformity with the eternal truths and laws of absolute Reason and for the progressive realization of its archetypal ideals of perfection and well-being. The same is his action in the redemption of sinners from sin and condemnation; and it is this which gives to his redemptive action its significance as atonement; his good-will is exercised in righteousness; in redeeming and justifying sinners he obeys the eternal law of love, asserts and maintains its inviolable authority, and so makes the satisfaction to his own eternal law and righteousness which is the atoning significance of his redemptive action. Therefore, as I have shown in a preceding chapter, in all God's action in the finite universe he may truly be said to be serving his creatures; it is always the highest coming down to the lowest to lift it up; and the service is always in good-will or benevolence exercised in righteousness in strict accordance with the eternal truth and law of absolute Reason. He created the universe in love that there might be persons on whom he might bestow blessing and worlds which might be a place for their abode, resources for their use, and a sphere for

¹ "For him (Christ) who came to fulfil the law in his own life, it had actually ceased to be law; his will and the divine will had become one; the latter no longer stood over against a 'Thou shalt,' because Jesus performed it, saying 'I cannot do otherwise.'" (Weiss, "Life of Christ," Book iii. chap. 10; vol. ii. p. 146, Trans.)

their action, development, and well-being. His providential and moral government is in the exercise of good-will in wisdom and righteousness to insure their perfection and well-being so far as possible in a finite universe constituted in accordance with the principles and laws of reason. His action is always forth-putting, imparting, serving.

In Christ, God reveals himself under the conditions and limitations of humanity. Here, also, he reveals himself in "the form of a servant; and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, becoming obedient even unto death, yea, even the death of the cross" (Phil. ii. 7, 8). Because God in his infinite love is always serving in his highest and most complete revelation of himself in the redemption of men from sin he comes in the form of a servant. But this is only carrying out, in its highest form in the moral government of the world and the redemption of men from sin, the continuous revelation of God acting in good-will regulated by righteousness in accordance with eternal law which has been continuous in his whole revelation of himself in the constitution and evolution of the physical universe and in the constitution, development, and history of man.

Thus the revelation of God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself is the most complete and decisive revelation of the supremacy, universality, immutability, and inviolable authority of the law of love, even in the redemption of sinners and the forgiveness of sin. And this is the essential significance of the doctrine of the atonement; it is the essential atoning significance of the humiliation of the Son of God in Christ and of Christ's obedience, sufferings, and death. In it the God in Christ asserts and maintains the supremacy, universality, and inviolable authority of God's law of love in the redemption and forgiveness of sinners, and the unchangeable integrity and purity of his own righteousness regulating every act of his grace toward them in strict conformity with that law. In redeeming the sinner he himself obeys the law of love to the utmost extreme to which, under human conditions and limitations, faithful obedience is possible, even to the sacrifice of life in allegiance to God's truth and law and for the furtherance of his work of love. This is God's highest conceivable assertion of his law and of its inviolable authority made in the very act of redeeming sinners. This is not, however, the introduction of any new principle into the action of God and

his revelation of himself therein. It is simply the revelation, in its highest form in Christ, of the divine love as good-will or benevolence, and also as righteousness in conforming with law and maintaining its authority, which appear in all God's revelation of himself in his moral government of rational persons. If the persons had never sinned and were perfect in holiness he would have revealed his love to them as good-will exercised in righteousness, and in some way would have revealed his likeness to them, his good-will to them, and his affinity for them, to bring them into communion and union with himself, as effectually as he has revealed himself in Christ. But it would not have had atoning significance, because these have always consented to the law in obedience to it in the life of love, and so, to the utmost possible for them, have themselves asserted and maintained its authority. God's righteousness in maintaining and vindicating the authority of his law takes on atoning significance when he exercises his love in the redemption of sinners; and the particular modes of action in which he manifests his love will be such as are best adapted to the redemption of sinners. But the love will be manifested in benevolence exercised in righteousness, asserting and maintaining the authority of law, and so is the same with the love which he has exercised in all his revelation of himself. The revelation in Christ with his atoning significance is not incredible nor antecedently improbable. It is simply God carrying out the action of his love, as always progressively revealing himself, to its legitimate issues in reference to the fact that man has sinned.

Accordingly the only condition on which, in the nature of things, it is possible for a sinner to be accepted by God is his turning away from sin and coming into conformity with God's law. He is redeemed not from the law but to the law; not from the righteousness of God, but to it, through God's grace coming into harmony with the law and righteousness of God. And this, as we have seen, is possible for the sinner only in turning to God in faith; for faith, trusting God, is the only possible beginning of right character and of harmony with the law and righteousness of God.

The erroneous conception of God as in the spontaneity of love exempt from obedience to law excludes all that is essential in the true significance of the atonement and all reasonable grounds of

its necessity. In fact, it logically implies that there is no law of God eternal in his absolute reason; but whatever law there may be is itself only the arbitrary decree of a despotic will enforced by almighty power. It would follow that God, who issued the decree, can change or annul it; and if men disobey he can by the same arbitrary will reinstate them in his favor on any terms as he pleases. Hence there is no eternal basis in reason for universal and immutable law and its supreme and inviolable authority, nor for the necessity of any atonement. The denial that love is required and regulated by eternal law logically issues in the theory of the absolute supremacy of the divine will in naked sovereignty above all law, and of the supralapsarian decree of election.

And if justice alone is required by law and benevolence is not required, then God redeeming the world in Christ would make no revelation whatever of the law, and would not assert, maintain, and vindicate it as law supreme, universal, and inviolable even in the forgiveness of sin. On the contrary, he would reveal himself in the redemption of sinners and the forgiveness of sin as acting in entire independence of the law, and wholly transcending it. Then redemption rests, not on God's eternal law and absolute reason, but on his almighty will, transcending the law and independent of it. Then men would be redeemed, not to the law and righteousness of God but from them. And the necessary inference must be that God's law is in conflict with his love and his righteousness in conflict with his benevolence. For the error assumes that God's law is something less and other than the law of universal love; that righteousness is not included in love but is antagonistic to it; that the spontaneity of love is incompatible with doing duty in obedience to law, while in truth the only possible obedience to God's law is the free spontaneous choice of the will in the act of loving God with all the heart and our neighbor as ourselves. It misses the essential atoning significance of the humiliation of the Son of God and the obedience, suffering, and death of Christ, as the normal consummation of God's revelation of himself in all his action rendering service in conformity with the law of love. In fact, the advocates of this error seem to forget that the law declared and vindicated by Christ's redemptive work in its atoning significance is itself the law of universal love and a declaration of the eternal character of God

as love. They depreciate the law as if its requirements were mere arbitrary rules, — the punishment of transgressors, by which it is sanctioned and enforced, the expression only of implacability and vengeance, — and all insistence on the significance of Christ's work of atonement in asserting and vindicating God's law as mere Pharisaism.

Therefore, if those who hold the error that the law requires only justice, and not benevolence, recognize the reality of law and the necessity of atonement, they can do it consistently only by substituting an unphilosophical, unreasonable, and unscriptural conception of each instead of its true significance. Atonement is then presented as some artificial method of adjusting the supposed conflict of law and love, of righteousness and benevolence, some appeasing of God's wrath and making him willing to show mercy, some satisfaction to an offended and almighty despot, some suffering by Christ of the punishment due to the sinner.

Thus, whether we consider the law of love in itself or in the forgiveness of sinners through the atonement by Christ, we see that it is the supreme, universal, immutable law of inviolable authority inexorably demanding of every person the consecration of all his powers and resources to the service of man, so far as he has ability and opportunity to render it, in entire trust in God and willing obedience to him.

9. A universal religion is necessary in order that all peoples may participate in human progress toward the realization of the common well-being of mankind.

This is a necessary inference from the inseparable connection of love and duty to man with love to God, as it has now been presented. Without a universal religion recognizing one and the same God, mankind would have no common standard of morality and would not know themselves as comprehended with God and all rational beings in one and the same moral system. We have also seen that it is equally true that mankind would have no basis for recognizing common universal principles and law regulating thought, and hence would not know themselves as comprehended with God and all rational beings in one and the same rational system. Nor would they know any ground in absolute Reason for physical science in knowing the physical universe as scientifically constituted and evolved in accordance with these universal principles and laws. Thus all human knowledge, whether of a physical

or moral system, would disappear in mere relativity and individual subjectivity.

A universal religion is necessary as a basis for the unity of mankind and their consequent harmony and co-operation in promoting human well-being. So long as the peoples worship different gods the cleavage which divides them cuts through the very foundations of human thought and life on which humanity rests, and there remains no basis for recognizing a common humanity. All that would be left as a basis of union would be the union of blood-relationship in the family, clan, tribe, and race, which, as we have seen, has been always divisive and aggressive. The gods of one nation would fight against the gods of another; there would be no common standard of appeal to judge between the nations in their strifes. Everything would be left to the sole arbitrament of force. But when men recognize themselves as subjects of one and the same God under his one and universal law of love, as children of their common father in heaven and redeemed from sin by God in Christ their common Redeemer, they have a basis for unity. And it has been shown that it is only in the recognition of man's relation to God that we find the real significance of those essential principles of human progress which declare the dignity and worth of man, the sacredness of his rights, the brotherhood of man. Here, then, we have a basis for the unity of all men in a state of society in which war, oppression, slavery, will cease and all peoples become workers together in the service of mankind by the advancement of Christ's kingdom of righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost. Thus only can the ancient prophecies of the Messianic days be fulfilled: "They shall beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning hooks. Nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more. For the earth shall be full of the knowledge of Jehovah as the waters cover the sea. The wolf shall dwell with the lamb and the leopard shall lie down with the kid; and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together; and a little child shall lead them" (Isaiah ii. 4; xi. 6-9).

This state of society cannot be introduced and developed by a merely theoretical recognition of the one only true and living God, but only when the life of the people is actually in conformity with God's law of love. An individual can be saved and can

realize his true well-being only when he renounces his supreme selfishness and in faith in God begins the life of universal love. Similar must be the new birth of a nation. So long as the institutions and laws of a nation, the administration of its government, and its national life express the spirit and principles of supreme selfishness, so long it will miss its true well-being. There will be injustice, oppression, venality, favoritism, personal ambition and cupidity, partisan fraudulence and corruption in the internal administration, and war with other nations, or peace only in the spirit of war, in mutual hostility, jealousy, and aggressiveness. Nations as really as individuals are subject to the law of love and their well-being is possible only as they are in conformity with this law of universal good-will regulated by righteousness, both in the internal administration of the government and in all dealings with other nations.

I know that to those in the thick of the crowd in selfish competition this declaration is but the far-off voice of one crying in the wilderness. But like the voice of the forerunner of Christ it proclaims a great and enduring reality of human life. In fact, it is the very truth which the forerunner of Christ proclaimed and applied to Israel, and which was terribly realized, before the generation then living had passed away, in the destruction of Jerusalem: "And now also the axe is laid unto the root of the trees; every tree therefore which bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down and cast into the fire." For the axe is a reality at the root of every government that does not honestly seek the well-being of the whole people in good-will regulated by righteousness, — that does not deal with other nations fairly and honestly in good-will regulated by righteousness; and it is only a question of time when such a government shall fall either by violence or by internal corruption and decay. As I have shown in a previous chapter, the coming of the Cæsar and the coming of the Christ were nearly simultaneous. The coming of the Cæsar was the culmination in a great empire of a reign of force, conquest, and subjugation continued through many centuries. It was followed by degeneracy and decay, presenting in some of its emperors monsters of beastliness and brutality, looked on with horror by all succeeding generations. The coming of the Christ was the culmination of God's historical redemptive action among men progressively revealing himself to them as the God of love seeking to draw them away

from sin to himself, issuing in the God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, and in his divine energy in the Holy Spirit poured out on all flesh and abiding among men with divine influences drawing men from selfishness to the life of love. And Christ's kingdom of righteousness and good-will has been the mightiest and most benignant power on earth since his coming. And it is still growing in numbers and broadening its influence throughout the world.¹ The coming of the Cæsar and the coming of the Christ, with all that prepared the way for them and all that issued from them, are two great object-lessons in history revealing the dependence of all human progress and well-being, political, social, and personal, on man's right relation to God in conformity with his eternal law of love.

It is evident, indeed, that even in Christian nations civilization is as yet very imperfectly Christian. Yet we see that great progress has been made in vitalizing civilization with Christian influence and modifying governments and their administration in accordance with it. Evidence of this appears in the abolition of slavery by the Christian nations, in the progressive displacement of despotism by constitutional government, in the wider prevalence and the better understanding of the principles of popular government, in the general condemnation of wars of conquest and in their lessening frequency, in the prominence of moral and humanitarian questions in public discussions, in the multitude of reformatory and benevolent associations and institutions, and in many other manifestations of Christian influence in modern civilization. And here we see further exemplification of the truth that society can advance only as the individuals composing it advance, — that governments will not act on the Christian principles of righteousness and good-will except as the people themselves have formed

¹ The increase in the Christian churches in the United States is given as follows in the "Independent" (August, 1889): "Certainly a net increase of nearly 877,000 Christians for the year is no insignificant return. The deaths among the 19,790,323 Christians of last year must have made a large figure. This loss and all other losses have been made good by conversions and immigration, and nearly 900,000 gained in addition. We now have 142,767 churches and 98,322 ministers, showing a net gain of 3,882 churches and 3,865 ministers. A clear addition of an average of between ten and eleven churches, and as many ministers every day in the year, does not appear to indicate decline of power of growth. A daily harvest of 240 souls is not symptomatic of that decay which certain sceptics profess to discover in Christianity in this country."

characters accordant with these principles, regulate their own conduct by them and demand that the government shall regulate its action by the same.

Here the question arises, What will this universal religion be? Christianity claims to be the one and only universal religion. It says of Christ: "There is no other name under heaven given among men by which we must be saved." And an examination of the spiritual needs of men and of the adaptation of Christianity, contrasted with that of other religions, to meet them, abundantly confirms this claim. There are important truths in the non-Christian religions. "God has not left himself without witness" in any one of these (Acts xiv. 17). Christianity takes up into itself whatever truth is recognized in any one of them. But it presents distinctive peculiarities essential to the universal religion which all other religions lack. It would be out of place here to attempt a full presentation of these peculiarities. I will only refer to a single one.

Because men are conscious of sin and guilt, the universal religion must present a way to deliver them from the fear of God's displeasure, so that their religious service shall no longer consist in efforts of their own to make expiation for sin and so to propitiate the offended deity. In doing this it must satisfy the demands of the sinner's own reason and conscience in his consciousness of deserving God's displeasure by presenting God's revelation of himself as redeeming men from sin in such a way that in the very act of seeking the sinner to save him from his sin he asserts and maintains the law, manifests his compassion and mercy in harmony with righteousness, and makes atonement for the sinner while forgiving him. Thus God releases the sinner who trusts his redeeming grace from the necessity of doing anything to make expiation for sin and to propitiate God, delivers him from the consciousness of condemnation and brings him to the consciousness of forgiveness, and of reconciliation and peace with God. The universal religion must also meet the sinner's consciousness of ignorance, weakness, and bondage under sin by recognizing God revealing himself as active among men in gracious and redemptive action to quicken them to accept his grace, and to guide and sustain them in the new life of loving trust and service. And it must present this grace as accessible to all, so that whosoever will may come boldly unto the throne of grace, that he may obtain

mercy and find grace to help in time of need (Heb. iv. 16). This implies a peculiar line of God's action in human history seeking to save sinners from sin, and in this course of action revealing himself as their redeemer, at once compassionate and righteous, at once forgiving them their transgression of the law and asserting and maintaining the universality and immutability, and the supreme and inviolable authority of the law. The knowledge of God is not to be attained by dint of mere human thinking, by mere philosophical thought in its heights and its depths. If that were all God would be only a subjective idea created by human thought. The real knowledge of God presupposes his revelation of himself by his own action in some way. He has revealed himself in the constitution of man and of the physical universe ; by studying these we read God's thoughts, we find the principles and laws of reason according to which he acts, the rational ideals which he is progressively realizing. All science and philosophy are studies of God's revelation of himself. In addition to this, God is continuously active in the course of nature and the history of man, and thus is continuously revealing himself, — as the human spirit reveals itself through the body by the expression of the face, by attitude and gestures, and by work in accordance with plans and for definite ends. The human soul reveals itself in a momentary smile, frown, or gesture ; God's analogous revelation of himself in the physical universe or in human history may be in the process of ages ; the human soul reveals itself in plans for a day or a year, God in plans for all time. God also is continually revealing himself in the action of his Spirit on the human Spirit, bringing on it heavenly influences, and so making possible man's direct communion with God. God reveals himself in these ways to all men ; and all religions assume the reality of the deity's revealing himself to men. But when we come to the question of the forgiveness of sin, of the reconciliation of sinners to God and their restoration to union with him and to all the privileges of the children of God, additional revelation as to the possibility and conditions of the reconciliation is needed ; and without this a universal religion, meeting all man's spiritual needs, is impossible.

This peculiar revelation God has made in Christ, and in God's distinctive revelation of himself in the history of Israel preparatory to Christ's coming and culminating in it. In this preparatory

stage of his redemptive work God was cherishing his kingdom in its germinal and immature condition, preparatory to its being unfolded into a spiritual and universal kingdom in the coming of Christ and the outpouring of the Holy Spirit on all mankind. And all the truths revealed to other nations, and more or less clearly apprehended in the religions of the world, are taken up into the revelation in Christ and presented in their true significance and relations. All the flashes and beams of light enlightening particular individuals or peoples are gathered in him in whom the light that lighteth every man came into the world. And on account of this peculiar revelation of God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, Christianity claims that it is the one and only religion for all mankind.

The only other religions whose claims to be the universal religion are worthy of consideration are Judaism, Buddhism, and Mohammedism. Judaism is only Christianity in its rudimentary and immature form, a child become old without growing and maturing. The Old Testament looks forward to the Messiah and the development of the theocracy of Israel into a universal and spiritual kingdom. In rejecting the Christ, Judaism destroyed its power to be the light and hope of mankind. Buddhism in its different forms is always pantheistic or atheistic, and pessimistic. It regards individuation in a finite personality as the essential evil; and the only redemption from evil is the extinction of the individual person by his being reabsorbed into the infinite and absolute. Its religion in its highest form is retirement from the active world, living by begging in extreme asceticism. There is no place in it for the idea of progress or for the hope of a future better than the past, and no motive stimulating to seek it. Mohammedism is monotheistic. But its one God is an absolute and arbitrary will predestinating all things and scarcely distinguishable from blind fate; its heaven is sensual pleasure; its appeal has always been to the sword; and to this day in countries under Moslem rule death is the penalty on every Moslem who forsakes the Moslem faith; and its highest product is "the unspeakable Turk." Each of these three religions fails to present the grace of God redeeming men from sin, and no one of them can insure the renovation of man or inspire him with hope for the future or quicken him to work

in the spontaneity of love and in enthusiasm for humanity to promote the progress of mankind.

The necessary inference is that Christians are imperatively required, by the law of love and by Christ himself, whose life was the revelation of God's love and the realized ideal of man's love, to go into all the world and preach the gospel of Christ to every creature; and this is the primary and indispensable requisite for the progress of individuals and nations toward realizing their true well-being and for the bringing of all mankind into the unity of reciprocal trust and service in Christian love, in goodwill regulated by righteousness under the reign of Christ, — "that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father" (Phil. ii. 10, 11).

If Christianity is to be the one universal religion it must be Christianity in its essential and comprehensive characteristics, not restricted and disintegrated by the minor and sometimes petty differences of sects. These differences among believers in God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself dwindle into comparative insignificance when it is proposed to make Christianity the one religion for all mankind; and at the same time their power to hinder and the malign influence always inherent in them are revealed. How to remove this evil and to bring all the Christian forces into united action for the christianizing of the world is a problem which still awaits solution. Doubtless there will always be among Christians difference of opinion as to minor points and forms of statement of doctrines and difference of preference as to forms of worship and methods of Christian work. But it may reasonably be expected that the time is coming when, notwithstanding these differences, Christian churches of different denominations will cease to expend a large part of their energies in jealously guarding against or even opposing one another and concentrate them on the common Christian work, — and so present a united front against the powers of evil at home and abroad and work together in mutual helpfulness in extending the kingdom of Christ throughout the world.

CHAPTER XXVII

DISTRIBUTION OF DUTIES TO MEN

SERVICE to mankind must be distributed. It is primarily service to individuals in specific acts. We are to serve man by serving men. This is implied in Christ's teaching that love to man is love to one's neighbor. He does not say mankind, but neighbor, that the love may not evaporate in sentiment by being diffused among a multitude, but may be concentrated and made real in some specific service to an individual. And in saying neighbor he means one who is nigh to us with whom we come into personal contact. In the story of the good Samaritan he defines our neighbor as any one, even a stranger or an enemy, who is, however casually, within reach of our influence and whom we have ability and opportunity to serve. A person may, indeed, have good-will to all, may render service to persons with whom he never came in contact, service to humanity out-reaching all specific acts to individuals. But no enthusiasm for humanity can be a substitute displacing the obligation to specific acts of service to individuals or to particular communities of individuals so far as we have ability and opportunity to render the service.

The plan of this work does not permit the definition and classification of duties to particular persons and communities, which would be necessary in a treatise on ethics. And, however precise and minute such definition and classification may be, it is impossible to give definitions and rules adequate to determine in every given case what particular service is due to a neighbor. The rabbinical and Buddhistic attempts to do this exemplify its impossibility. Instead of establishing the law in its true spirit and intent, they made it void through the tradition

of their rulings. Therefore in all questions reaching beyond explicit principles and rules of duty¹ each person must determine for himself in each case as it arises what is the specific service due to a particular person or community in accordance with the spirit and specific requirements of the law; and he must determine it by considering what is, under existing circumstances, his own relation to that person or community and to others in the moral system, — that is, by considering what the case really is in all its bearings. I shall confine myself to some general suggestions to aid in determining questions, continually arising in actual life, as to the right distribution of duties.

The right distribution of duties requires a correct conception of the distinction and relation of the religious and the secular life. There must be a right estimate of the claims of daily business and other interests of the secular life and of the service to man rendered therein. This distinction of the religious and the secular is often pushed so far that the two are regarded as separate and reciprocally exclusive spheres of life. Religion is cantoned off as a little Goshen, where the light of Christian love shines, while the rest of life lies in Egyptian darkness.² But if we are to distribute our service to men aright we must understand that religion must renovate, inspire, pervade, and control the entire life of man, — that the so-called secular life is crowded both with opportunities and with imperative duties to render service to man in loving obedience to God, — that itself is to be consecrated to God and elevated into religion. One special need of the present time is to rectify the common error which magnifies the separation between the religious and the secular, and to show their real relation and unity; to carry religion down and out through all the secular life, and to sanctify and ennoble all its pursuits as loving service to man in manifestation and expression of love to God.

¹ See Chap. XXIII., Law of Love and Rules of Duty.

² I heard a man object to taking the usual collection at the close of the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. He said: "I do not like to hear the jingling of money at the Lord's table; I hear enough of that all the week." Another said: "I would never put money into a contribution box on the Sabbath, any more than I would buy a horse." These sayings express the feeling of many that the daily business of life is totally separate from religion, that it is not only secular but profane, that money is religiously unclean, polluting to the touch, that the giving of money even for the advancement of Christ's kingdom is not a religious act.

The commandment of the Christian religion is, "Whether ye eat or drink, or whatever ye do, do all for the glory of God"; its promise is, in the words of Jesus, "Whosoever shall give to drink unto one of these little ones a cup of cold water only, in the name of a disciple, verily I say unto you, he shall in no wise lose his reward"; and its warning is, in the words of Jesus, "For every idle word which a man shall speak, he shall give account thereof in the day of judgment." This religion certainly lays claim to the whole of human life as its own, requires every act of man from the least to the greatest to be a loving service of man, whether of self or of another, in loving obedience to God, and thus lifts the least and lowest of human pursuits and acts into the life eternal. Therefore every sphere of human life and action is a sphere for the Christian service of man in love to God, and the whole action of man, in every legitimate line of action, may itself be such a service.

I. CHRISTIAN SERVICE TO MAN IN SECULAR BUSINESS. — A Christian is to render service to men in his daily business and work; he is to do all his industrial business and work in love to his neighbor as himself and in faith in God and in obedience to him.

1. This is evident, because the greater part of his life must be occupied with his daily business. Therefore, if his daily business gives no scope for Christian service of man, the greater part of his action in life is exempted from the law of love to man. It is often thought that the daily business is merely secular or worldly; that, so far as business is concerned, a person serves men only in that portion of his income which he gives to the needy or to beneficent institutions or associations. But this would imply that he serves men only in giving a small fraction of his income, while the bulk of his earnings and all his work in his daily business are expended in serving himself, and therefore are mere worldliness. It is also a common impression that one is rendering Christian service to man only in distinctively religious acts, as in efforts to promote some distinctively religious enterprise or moral reform, or to persuade persons to become disciples of Christ. But this would imply that man never begins to do good to men till after his day's work is done, and that all he does in the service of man is done occasionally, and in his hours of leisure. But for the immense majority of mankind, it is an absolute necessity

to be occupied much the greater part of the time in daily business or work of some kind, and on it the greater part of every one's thought, interest, and energy must be concentrated. This is necessary for the support of the person himself and of those dependent on him, as well as for preserving civilization and promoting the welfare of society. His daily business is his life-work, and in it, when his life ends, by far the greater part of all which he had achieved in life will have been done. This inevitable necessity must be taken into account in determining in any given case what service is due to an individual. For the claims of business must be continually taking precedence of benevolent service to be rendered outside the business. And if the business itself is not a sphere for Christian service to man, then the greater part of the Christian's thought, time, and energy must be expended and his principal life-work done outside his religion and his service to man; and his religion and his service of man must be outside what most occupies his time, interest, and energy, and is his principal life-work. This is a reduction to absurdity of the proposition that business cannot be in itself a Christian service of man.

2. The daily business, if it is a legitimate business rightly conducted, is itself, in its actual prosecution, a service in supplying the wants of man, which may be rendered in love to man and be as genuine and acceptable an expression of love to God as prayer, or the preaching of the gospel, or gratuitous help to the needy.

This is evident from the nature of business and its actual observed effects. It rests on the basis of supply and demand. There is no demand for things which satisfy no wants; when there are no wants to create a demand, there can be no business. All business is in its essence planning and working to supply human wants; it is doing for others what they cannot as well do for themselves. In this sense all business is a service rendered by man to man.

If we now look at business in all its various lines, we see that all business does supply human wants, and is thus a service to men, whether those who are engaged in it do or do not intend it to be so. All men in all countries are serving one another. They are rendering indispensable service to man, who supply his physical needs; who get the raw material from the field, the forest, the mine, the quarry, and the waters; who manufacture

it into forms fitted for human use ; who transport it by land or water ; who make it accessible in the market to those who buy ; who invent and construct, or run, the machinery by which man is able to employ the mightiest forces of nature to do his work. This division of labor and perpetual interchange of service are indispensable to provide for man what are significantly called the necessities of life ; they sustain the lives of men, and they are also essential to perpetuate and advance civilization.

They also who do not own and sell the products of their labor but sell their labor itself, working for wages or salary, are rendering service to man. Primarily these render service to their employer ; but because their service is indispensable they render also a service to man in the product itself, proportional to what their labor contributed to its production.

The government of a nation gives employment to a great number of persons. The business of government is to enact just laws, to adjudicate all cases under them justly, to execute and enforce them impartially and effectively, to maintain the integrity and authority of the government and the order of society, to protect the rights of the people and thus to promote the public good and the general welfare. Government exists for the good of the governed. Here is a line of business of the nature of administering a trust for the good of the people. "Public office is a public trust." Plainly the business of every government official from the highest to the lowest is to do the duties of his office faithfully in the service of the people. In this sense rulers are properly called servants of the people. They do not cease to rule in fidelity to the constitution and laws ; but they are servants as using their high prerogatives, not for personal emolument or aggrandizement, but to confer benefits on the people, — servants in the exalted significance in which Christ declared himself to be a servant, when he came to bring salvation to men. In the legal profession the business is to interpret the law, and thus to assist clients in the legal management of their property and business, and in their cases in court to give them the protection and help to which the law entitles. In the medical profession the business of the doctor is a direct service of his patients, and teaching people to remove or avoid the causes of disease. In every line of legitimate business the persons engaged in it are servants of the people.

There are also lines of business which some may choose as their life-work in which the work aims directly to develop and improve men themselves physically, intellectually, morally, and spiritually. Such is the business of educators in the school and through the press, of ministers of religion, and of those who devote their lives to the advocacy of some particular reform. Here also we may class the great geniuses who have done great work and sometimes have marked, if they have not created, epochs in human progress. Such are the great discoverers and inventors, the philosophical thinkers, the great statesmen, the great authors and artists, the great Christian theologians and preachers, the leaders of great social, political, and religious reformations.

Thus the survey of business in all lines shows that it consists in supplying human wants; and that every sphere of legitimate business gives scope in its prosecution for the service of man in the exercise of Christian love. There is, however, one necessary qualification of this conclusion. The business of those who devote their lives to direct efforts to promote the intellectual, moral, and spiritual improvement of men is not always the supply of a want which is felt and of a demand which is made by those to whom the service is rendered. It is the supply of a real need, but not always of a consciously felt want. The object of the worker is to awaken the higher powers and susceptibilities of men, to show them the higher possibilities of their being, and thus to make them conscious of their need. It is the beneficent worker himself who by awakening and developing the man, arouses in him the demand for knowledge, or virtue, or union with God.

3. There is a further significance in the service which business may render to man. All business renders a service which reaches beyond the individual directly served, and becomes in a true sense a service to mankind. This is conspicuously exemplified in the service rendered by great and beneficent geniuses. In this the service to particular individuals is scarcely noticed in the wider service of mankind. Great scientific discoveries like those of Copernicus and Newton, great inventions like the mariner's compass, gunpowder, the art of printing, the steam engine, and the electric telegraph, a great reformation like that of Luther and the abolition of slavery by the Christian nations, the discov-

ery of America by Columbus, render service which transcends all influence on individuals, and becomes the possession of mankind. The benefit of such epoch-making achievements is indeed ultimately distributed to individuals; otherwise they could not benefit society and promote its progress. And even great works of genius at the outset require a transaction of business, an interchange of services between individuals as direct as any interchange of products or of labor for wages. Milton sold the copyright of "Paradise Lost" for ten pounds; Homer's poetry was probably recited by minstrels for pay; an inventor takes a patent on his invention; pictures which money cannot buy may have been painted originally for a comparatively small sum; Columbus went from country to country seeking funds for the outfit of his voyage. But these relations of such works to individuals are lost from sight in comparison with the service they have rendered to mankind.

It is not, however, the great geniuses alone who thus render service to mankind transcending that rendered directly to an individual in a transaction of business. All kinds of business in the very prosecution of them as business exert this wider influence. Whatever adds directly or indirectly to the general comfort of mankind, increases the power and resources of man, purifies civilization, sweetens and ennobles life, is a service to humanity. As Swift's king of Brobdingnag says, "Whoever makes two blades of grass grow where only one grew before is a benefactor of mankind."

This broader service to mankind is rendered in the production and exchange of physical products. The persons whose wants are ultimately supplied by the product may be the antipodes of the producer. When we take our meals, or clothe ourselves, or furnish our houses, we are indebted for what we use to the service of many persons in many lands. And thus the whole process of production and exchange is a service to mankind. Every one has at his door the products of all the world. And to this service of mankind every workman has contributed who has assisted at any stage in the production of the raw material, the manufacture, transportation, or exchange. And every one who renders personal service to another contributes to the benefit of mankind so far as the person served, by the service thus rendered to him, is able more continuously and effectively to use his own

peculiar powers in his own line of business. Manual laborers, skilled or unskilled, exceedingly over-estimate their service when they claim to be the only real producers of wealth. The capitalist, who provides the raw material, the place, and machinery for preparing it, the ships and railroads which transport the products, and the ability to plan and manage the complicated business, produces far the larger part of the product, and renders the larger part of the service to man. But the real service to mankind of the workmen in the various stages of the production and exchange must be distinctly and fully appreciated. By a similar line of thought it may be shown that in every line of business the service reaches beyond the individuals immediately concerned and becomes a service to mankind.

4. It must be considered also, that the service rendered in business not only reaches beyond the individual to mankind, but also beyond its immediate products, and contributes to the progress and higher good of man. The products of man's work in various lines may be distinguished as perishable and imperishable. The products which supply physical wants are consumed, some immediately, others in the lapse of months or years. In the language of Scripture, "They perish with the using." But whatever is accomplished in the development and improvement of man, in purifying, renovating, and ennobling human life is imperishable. It is often thought that the development and improvement of men and their progress in the spiritual life are effected solely by the efforts of those who are working immediately for these ends. But in fact all legitimate business contributes directly or indirectly to these higher ends. The various lines of business, the products of which are consumed in supplying physical wants, may seem to contribute nothing to the imperishable results effected in the renovation, development, and culture of man and to be therefore of inferior dignity and worth. Yet from another point of view this creation of products for consumption is a service of fundamental importance without which the higher results of human renovation, culture, and progress would be impossible. Man must have the necessaries of life. Without the service which produces what is to be consumed man would cease to exist; there would be no men to be educated and developed and no human society to make progress. And as the savage advances to civilization, his wants

are multiplied because in his progressive development he becomes aware that he is many-sided, he touches his environment at new points, he becomes susceptible of new and higher enjoyments. The civilized man is as much greater and more complicated than the savage as his house with all its complicated apartments, conveniences and elegancies is greater than the savage's wigwam. Without the business which supplies products to be consumed in supplying these multiplied and higher wants, civilized man would relapse into barbarism. And these lines of business are also seen to be essential to man's higher culture in the fact that these physical wants are the primary motives which excited the primitive man to the exercise of skill and power to supply them, and which through the ages have stimulated the inventive genius which has given man control of the resources and powers of nature. In the prosecution of the necessary work of life man has effected his own education and development and the progress of civilization.

Thus the business whose products are consumed in supplying man's physical wants is lifted into a service to humanity and shown to be essentially connected with all direct efforts to promote the improvement of man and the progress of society, and an indispensable condition of their success. The work of men in all lines of legitimate business is necessary to the progress of man; it is impossible to limit the service which promotes it to any one. Men build better than they know. The service they render outreaches its immediate end. Whether men intend it or not, all work in supplying legitimate human wants will have influence immediate or remote on the progress of civilization and the development of man; it all has relation to the life eternal and the kingdom of God, and gives scope in the prosecution of the business for love and service to man in love to God.

And so far as business in any line thus contributes to the production of the imperishable products of human improvement it reaches onward into the future. The attainments of one generation are the vantage-ground where the next may begin. Whatever develops or improves an individual or a generation is transmitted to others. The lighted torch is passed from hand to hand. The circle rippling in the water widens. No grain of sand is lost. No force once exerted is annihilated.

And thus the progress of man is the result of complicated forces acting from of old. Man is ever the heir of all preceding ages.

The mere fact that any business is a service to man does not prove that the person doing the business is actuated by love to man. He may be actuated solely by a selfish regard to his own interest, or by interest in science or art with no thought of the welfare of man. But it demonstrates that the business gives abundant scope for Christian service to man in love to God and ought to be prosecuted as such.

5. A further evidence that business may be a Christian service of man is the fact that in all its transactions in detail Christian benevolence regulated by righteousness is required, and thus there is scope for the continual exercise of all the Christian virtues.

6. Business, including all work for hire, gives scope for the Christian service of man in the use of the income. I do not refer merely to what one gives away for charitable purposes, which, as already shown, is a comparatively small part of one's life-work. The entire income of any industrial pursuit is to be devoted to the service of man. Thus the use of the whole income may become a real expression of love to God with all the heart and to one's neighbor as himself. Of course the person recognizes the fact that he owes a peculiar service to himself and his own family the rendering of which is an essential part of his service to mankind. The decision of every question as to how much of his income he shall expend on himself and his own family, how much he shall invest, and how much he shall give for charitable purposes, hinges on the question, in what way of expending he will most completely meet all his obligations of duty and so most effectively advance the kingdom of God on earth and thus promote the well-being of man. The expenditure of income is not strictly a transaction of the daily business and industry; but in the often monotonous transactions of daily business and industry one feels himself inspired and his business ennobled as a Christian service, by the fact that its income is to be expended in promoting the kingdom of God and the well-being of man.

Thus Christianity claims all human business as a Christian service of man under the law of love; and all legitimate busi-

ness gives scope to such service in the business itself, in all its transactions in detail and in the use of its income.¹

II. RECIPROCAL AND GRATUITOUS SERVICE. — In determining what service one owes to another in any given case, an important point to be considered is their respective ability to render service. From this point of view the Christian law of greatness for service is found to imply two rules or laws of action. The first is the law of reciprocal service ; when in any particular transaction each party is, as to that transaction, equally able to serve the other, each is required to render to the other a service equivalent to that which he receives. The other is the law of gratuitous service ; when one is in need of service which he cannot requite, the strong must serve the weak so far as he has ability and opportunity to do so in good-will and righteousness to all.

I. The former of these two is the law in all transactions of business. Business consists in the exchange of labor or commodity for labor or commodity, or for money which represents all values ; or, as some writers on political economy properly express it, in the exchange of services. And the law of all legitimate business is that in every transaction the service rendered shall be of equal value with the service received ; the transaction shall be an exchange of equivalent services ; each party shall be equally benefited.

In this way business is to be done in benevolence regulated by righteousness. It is commonly admitted that in transacting business a person should be always truthful, just, honest, and honorable ; that is, that his action should be regulated by righteousness. But it is a common impression that in business there is no place

¹ There is a widely spread impression that a person of great genius is thereby exempted from strict compliance with the Christian law. Thus it was said of Madame Dudevant (George Sand), "Genius in all time has seemed to assume the right to be a law unto itself, and we have in this case another instance of the difficulty of holding exceptionally gifted natures to the conventionalities that are the welcome safeguard to less daring souls." But the Seventh Commandment is not a mere "conventionality;" it is the law of God. This same writer says of this gifted woman, that her "history had passages wicked beyond comment or excuse." And her novels, especially the earlier ones, were corrupting and debasing. But in fact a person, by virtue of superior genius, is the more under obligation to use his or her great powers in the service of man in benevolence regulated in its exercise by righteousness. Superior greatness is under obligation to render superior service.

for benevolence. Business is business, it is said ; what I do in benevolence must be outside my business. This assumes that benevolence is exercised only in what we give away. It is true that the law of gratuitous service is not a law of the transactions of business. These transactions consist in the exchange of equivalent services under the law of reciprocity. Giving property away is not the transaction of business. But it does not follow that benevolence is excluded from business. In giving an equivalent for what I receive I may do it in good-will to the person with whom I am dealing, in the desire that it may be to him a service fully equivalent to that which he has rendered to me. Justice requires that I render to him a full equivalent for what I receive. But justice is not exclusive of benevolence, but is always to be exercised in benevolence. Benevolence is the atmosphere in which true justice must live and breathe. Accordingly, in every transaction in business each party is bound to be as careful to see that he renders an equivalent for what he receives, as he is to see that he receives an equivalent for what he gives. The employer must serve the workman as really as the workman must serve the employer. This excludes from all business the maxim *Caveat emptor*, let the other party look out for himself, — a maxim which implies that in any transaction each party shall look out only for his own interest with no concern for the interest of the other. The maxim is unchristian and immoral. The only legitimate bargain under the Christian law of love is one in which equivalent services are exchanged, in which each party is equally benefited and takes care and pains to have it so. Any transaction, in which one intentionally takes from another property or service for which he does not render an equivalent, is fraudulent. It must be classed with cheating, stealing, swindling, and robbing ; for what are these but taking a person's property without rendering an equivalent ?

2. The law of gratuitous service is, when the parties are not able to render equivalent services, the strong must serve the weak in good-will regulated by righteousness. This is a general principle, not a specific rule. What service is to be rendered in such a case must be determined by each one for himself in view of his own ability and of his relations and obligations to others in the moral system, and of the best and most effective ways of helping the needy.

III. PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE CHRISTIAN CONCEPTION OF BUSINESS. — This Christian conception of business as service to man in loving trust in God and obedience to him is of far-reaching practical importance.

1. The Christian conception of business gives the criteria by which to distinguish legitimate business from illegitimate, and so to guide in choosing a business as the work of life. Paul speaks of the business of a Christian as a calling of God (1 Cor. vii. 20). Hence it is familiarly spoken of in Christian countries as the man's calling. And as the line of a man's life-work in the service of God and man it is properly so designated, and should be chosen as such seeking the guidance of God.

The first criterion of a legitimate business is, that in its prosecution and its products it is a beneficent service to man. Drugg-selling, brothel-keeping, counterfeiting, the adulteration of food, medicine and other products are illegitimate lines of business, because in their prosecution and products they are injurious to individuals and to society.

A second criterion is that in the detailed transactions of the business it shall be possible for each party to receive a full equivalent for what he gives. By this criterion the making and holding of slaves, gambling, betting, lotteries, and all transactions designed to extort something for nothing, are excluded from legitimate business. Speculation which creates a corner in wheat or purposely and artificially raises the price of a commodity is an illegitimate business which the Christian law of love forbids, because it creates no value; it only compels the transfer of value from others to one's self without returning an equivalent. And what does the highwayman more? The difference is only of method. The latter compels the transfer by force on the peril of life; the former equally compels the transfer, though by indirection, and equally it may be on the peril of life; for, at whatever price, a person must have the necessaries of life or die. And so the scriptures pronounce the condemnation: "He who withholdeth corn, the people shall curse him"¹ (Prov. xi. 26).

Here the objection may be made that all business satisfies human wants, and that therefore all business is equally legitimate.

¹ Of course by these two criteria all living by stealing, robbery, and other criminal acts is excluded, and all dishonesty and fraud in any business which is in itself legitimate.

But from ignorance or vice men have perverted desires, the satisfaction of which is a detriment both to the person himself and to society. Therefore the two parties in a transaction may each be satisfied that he has received an equivalent for what he gave ; and yet in reality one has received evil and not good. All business which consists in satisfying such perverted desires is illegitimate ; it is contrary to Christianity and good morals. It is like giving a child a scorpion because he cries for it. The only effective way to suppress business of this kind is so to educate and develop the people that they will not allow themselves to become victims of such evil desires and habits. With the cessation of these wants all demand for the supply of them would cease. Here, as always, the progress of society is possible primarily only by the improvement of the people, to which regulation, restriction, or prohibition by the civil law must always be secondary.

These criteria must be recognized in selecting one's line of business. The distribution of duties to men must be determined in part by the fact that one's service must be rendered in some specific business. This is rendered necessary by the division of labor essential in civilized life. Hence the right choice of a profession or business is of supreme importance. It is to be the person's life-work, in the prosecution of which far the greater part of all which he accomplishes through his whole life in the service of God and man will be done. As such he must choose it conscientiously and consecrate himself to the service of God and man in it. He must choose only among lines of business which have the distinctive criteria of legitimate business. Among these, few may be accessible and the range of choice is commonly very limited. But in selecting among those which are accessible to him he should select the one best suited to his own peculiar powers, and in which therefore he can achieve the greatest and best results in the service of man.

2. The realization of this Christian conception of business would broaden the conception of the Christian life by correcting a common tendency to misapprehend the distinction of the religious and the secular and to set the one apart from the other. It would make religion pervade human life like the atmosphere pressing on every surface and penetrating every opening ; or like electricity acting unseen in every living organism ; or like the

sunshine, with its light and heat. Many Christians become discouraged and think they are leading useless lives, because, pressed with the necessary work of every day, they have time and strength to do but little in the way of direct efforts to lead men to Christ or to work in charitable enterprises. But they may be relieved from discouragement when they consecrate their daily business itself to God and do it as their Christian work in the service of man, continually in contact with human needs and working to supply them. Thus they would become healthier and more whole-hearted Christians, for their religion would be no longer crowded into a corner or a closet, but would spread like sunshine over the whole activity of life, enlightening, warming, and quickening it, making it all aglow with a divine glory.

3. The importance of realizing in actual practical life the Christian conception of business as a loving service to man in obedience to and trust in God is further evident in the type of character and civilization developed by it in contrast with that developed by doing business only for selfish gain.

Let it be said in the outset that the business of the world rests on the trust of man in man, and is a vast exemplification of fidelity, honesty, and honor in response to the trust reposed in men. The fact that this trust or confidence continues from year to year and from generation to generation is proof that fidelity, honesty, and honor in business are the rule, not the exception. If this confidence of man in man should cease, the transaction of business on any large scale would be impossible. If we trace a single product, as a chest of tea, from the hand of the planter to the table of the consumer in the centre of this continent, we see a process of successive trusts to a great number of persons, who, with a few exceptions are unknown to one another, as well as to the person who, at any particular time in this process, is the owner of the tea. In collecting and paying what is due in mercantile transactions, immense sums in drafts, bank cheques, and bills of exchange are continually in transition from one city to another over all the world. Yet they are paid as they become due; the exceptions compared with the amount of the exchanges are few and small. And this fidelity, honesty, and honor in transactions of business ramified over all the world, justify and perpetuate the confidence of man in man which is the basis for the possibility of business, and are worthy of admiration. This does

not mean that the business is done in Christian love to men. The leading motive may be a regard to the person's own interest. For if he fails to honor the drafts on him for payment of what he owes, his business is ruined. But, even if so, the fact that the business of the world cannot be carried on without prevailing fidelity, honesty, and honor, is one of the many evidences that the law of love is inherent in the constitution of the moral system and that a prevailing fidelity, honesty, and honor are essential to civilization and to the well-being and even the existence of society, and that one must conform his action to the law of righteousness and good-will in order to secure his own interest. And as the nations are more and more becoming neighbors and are more and more bound together in common interests, we see in the business of the world both scope for the exercise of universal Christian love and its necessity to the most healthful and successful prosecution of the world's business and to the welfare of mankind.

But the frequency of unfaithfulness to trusts, of swindling, and of concerted arrangements to get possession of the property of others without paying an equivalent prove that much remains to be accomplished in order that all business may be done, not selfishly for personal gain, but as a Christian service to man. And the fact that some who do these dishonest and dishonorable deeds have been members of the Christian church exemplifies the false conception of the separation of religion from the secular life and emphasizes the fact that the daily business, as occupying the most of one's time and energy, is the principal sphere for the exercise of religion, for the manifestation of Christian character, and for rendering Christian service to man.

I proceed to consider in contrast the type of character and of civilization indicated and developed by selecting and prosecuting business selfishly for personal gain and that indicated and developed by selecting and prosecuting it as a Christian service to man.

“If industry in business is regarded selfishly as the means of personal gain it will be prosecuted as a drudgery and shirked when practicable. Success will be the acquisition of property with the privilege of exemption from work. Idleness will be coveted and a life of luxurious indolence will be envied as the highest condition of man. But if work is regarded as useful

service every right-minded person will desire opportunity to work. No one is rightly educated till he learns not to shrink from work as a drudgery but gladly to accept it as an opportunity for rendering service.

“ If business is regarded as useful service, the aim of the workman will be to do all work thoroughly, as for God. The mechanic will congratulate himself, not merely that he has received a sum of money, but that his work is well done and will render good service. The manufacturer will congratulate himself, not merely that he has made money on a contract, but also that he has given employment to many persons and paid them the full worth of their work, and that he has turned out goods well made, all that he contracted they should be, that will do good service wherever used. The merchant will congratulate himself, not merely that he has made large and profitable sales, but that he has given his customers a full equivalent for their money, taking no advantage of any one’s ignorance, carelessness or necessity. Thus work in every department develops a noble and generous character of inflexible integrity and intent on the welfare of men.

“ But if work is done only for gain, it manifests and develops the contrary character. The only joy in work done is for the gain acquired. The day-laborer works unfaithfully and with purposed slowness. The mechanic does his work imperfectly. The manufacturer grinds his workmen to the lowest wages and turns out articles adulterated or otherwise of inferior quality. The man no longer regards his employer, his workman, or his customer as a fellow-man to be served under the law of reciprocity, but as a victim to be plundered, a goose to be plucked; and he plucks him as near as he dares to the very life. Then he boasts how much he has made out of him, and prides himself on the sharpness with which he has taken another’s property without rendering an equivalent. Work thus prosecuted strengthens the greed of gain. The man becomes rapacious. He receives, but makes no return. His life is a Sahara, sucking the blessed sunshine into its burning barrenness and returning no green thing. He becomes unscrupulous, reckless of justice and honor. As Dr. South says, he retails heaven and salvation for pence and half-pence, and seldom sells a commodity but he sells his soul with it, like brown paper, into the bargain. He becomes mean in getting and niggardly in spending. He becomes hard, reckless of

the rights and interests of others, incapable of compassion, diligent and energetic in his business as an iron steam-engine at work, and as hard and heartless as it. He lives not to benefit society, but to prey upon it, — a pirate seizing prizes, a devil seeking whom he may devour.”¹ And the civilization developed will be characterized by rapacity for gain, recklessness of the rights of others, venality, and gilded corruption.

4. Because legitimate business rightly conducted is a service rendered to man in obedience to God’s law of universal love, political economy must have its basis in ethics, and the laws of business in their deepest significance must be moral laws. Every attempt, in accordance with long-established usage, to develop the science of political economy from the principle of self-interest alone must fail to give any true solution of the problems involved. For it practically exempts business, the greater part of every one’s life-work, from the law of love and consigns it to sheer selfishness, restrained only by the civil law. A true science of political economy can no more be developed from this self-centred point of view than a true astronomy from the supposition that the earth is the centre around which the sun and all the stars daily revolve.

A fundamental problem of ethics is to find the harmony of the service one owes to himself with the service he owes to others. Egoism and altruism, if apart from each other, are in irreconcilable antagonism. Egoism would be supreme love of self with no regard for another except to use him in the service of self. Altruism would imply that the whole action of life must be the service of others with no regard to the interest or well-being of one’s self. It would require one to deny the distinctive essence of his own personality, and no longer recognize himself as a person who is by virtue of his personality an end in himself, to be served, never to be used. It would involve the absurdity that every person must recognize every other person as an end in himself to be served not used, but himself as not an end in himself, as not to be served, but only to serve and be used. And it would leave out that powerful and indispensable factor both in personal improvement and the progress of civilization and religion, each person’s regard for his own interest and well-being.

Ethics solves this problem by the Christian law, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and thy neighbor as thy-

¹ “The Kingdom of Christ on Earth,” by Samuel Harris, pp. 162, 163.

self. This law recognizes all human beings in one moral system under the government of one and the same God and in allegiance to one and the same law of universal love ; and so each one having rights as well as owing duties, every duty to another involving his correlative right, and all bound to reciprocal trust and service. Thus each is to love and serve himself equally as his neighbor, and his neighbor equally as himself. Thus egoism and altruism are shown to be in harmony as complementary aspects of the life of universal love.

The same is a fundamental problem of political economy. And this science must accept the solution of it by Christian ethics, for there is no other. On the basis of an exclusive regard to one's own interest, on which that science is commonly rested, no solution is possible.

5. The practical realization of the Christian conception of business as a service to man in loving trust and obedience to God is the only true and effectual solution of the great economical problems now agitating society, such as the relations of capital and labor, the adjustment of combinations and competition, the question of co-operation, and the resulting tendencies to socialism, communism, and anarchy. These can never be harmonized so long as both in the use of capital and in labor, both in competition and in combination, men are acting in exclusive egoism,—are looking out solely for their own gains, not concerned to make their business in its prosecution and products a service to man, nor to render to all with whom they deal service equivalent to that which is received. Thus conditioned, both competition and combination are a warfare of man on man. They imply the use of skill, power, capital, or advantage of any kind to take away from another his work or his trade and to crowd him out of the way. Thus, for example, combinations of labor prevent men, often by violence, from working, or forbid the young to learn a trade ; and trusts and combinations of capital force men out of the business by taking away their trade. Both strive to deprive men of their right to earn a living. The law of the survival of the fittest, that is, that the strong will crowd out the weak, may be a law of the physical system. The law of personal beings in the moral system is the law of love. Both combination and competition in the selfish pursuit of gain are attempts to establish in the moral system the law of force, that the strong crowd out the weak, in place of

the law of love. Thus conditioned they must be in perpetual warfare.

But if work and business are done as a service of man the competition and combination are harmonized under the law of love, and each becomes a factor in doing business and thereby rendering service to man. Competition would then be in doing more and better work, in producing more and better products, and in fidelity, honesty, and honor in all transactions. Incidental to this would be increased gain ; for he who did the most and best work would get the highest wages and the most constant employment ; and he who produced or sold the best articles would get the highest price and the most custom. And the customer, if he were doing business as a service to men, returning an equivalent for what he receives, would willingly pay the higher wages and the higher price. But a difficulty in the present state of society is that buyers demand cheapness rather than excellence in what they buy, and low wages, slighted work and adulterated products are the result.

If business and work were done as service to men, combination also would have its legitimate place and become an important and beneficent factor in business and in promoting civilization. Combination is co-operation, and as such is indispensable at every stage of human progress. Even savages help one another, in doing what one cannot do alone. As civilization advances, co-operation and combination become more necessary, and the combinations become larger, more definite and longer continued. As man gains command of the powers and resources of nature, the forces which he uses through machinery become too great and complicated and the enterprises of industry too vast for an individual to manage. Hence partnerships and corporations are a necessity of civilization and indispensable to the progress of man.

A proposed alternative is to give the management of these larger enterprises of business to the government. The alleged reason for this is that corporations and combinations or trusts open the way to oppression ; and that the business is administered for the emolument of the few and the crushing out of all competitors. But if so, and society remains at the same moral level, the necessary inference is that, when the principle of combination is thus carried out and all the wealth and business of the country is

put into possession of one single corporation called the government, it would insure evils of the same sort in a vastly greater degree, and would issue in the helpless subjection of the many to the few. And certainly men with brains powerful enough to originate and organize such a great enterprise, and who have spent years familiarizing themselves with its management, and who are pecuniarily interested in its success, are more likely to manage it well than politicians elected to office for a short period or appointed as a reward for partisan political service. The ideas of political economy current before the wonderful inventions now giving man control of the mightiest forces of nature, must give way to new ideas and methods adapted to the progress of civilization. Hence the jealousy of corporations and the opposition to them is largely indiscriminating and unreasonable. In the early days of railroads there were many short roads owned and managed by distinct corporations, as, for example, between Buffalo and Albany, between New York and Boston. The consolidation of these shorter roads has in fact usually, if not always, resulted in greater accommodation and better service to the public and lower rates for passengers and freight. And, with an honest purpose to serve the public, such combinations involve less expense and greater facilities for doing the work, and therefore may reasonably be expected to produce these results.

It is evident, therefore, that problems of the relation of labor and capital, of combination and competition, will have their complete solution if the Christian conception of business and work as a service to man is realized; and no other solution is possible. And this is possible only as persons love their neighbors as themselves and practically exercise this love in doing all their work and business. Legislation may attempt to regulate combination and competition so as to restrain them from the evils occasioned by them under the rule of the selfish desire of gain. But nothing can remove the evil short of bringing society into conformity with the Christian law of love.

6. Is it possible that man will ever attain a civilization in which all work and business will be done as a Christian service to man and not in selfishness merely for personal gain? Is it reasonable to propose it as a definite and dominant aim, and to work for it in the expectation of success? Or is it only a Utopian idea and expectation cherished only by doctrinaires and sentimental-

ists? The great majority of those who claim to be practical men seem to regard it as the latter. And yet it is a civilization like that which Herbert Spencer declares must be the inevitable result of the natural evolution of man in society. From a widely different point of view John Stuart Mill reaches the conclusion that such a civilization is attainable, and that men ought to work for its attainment.¹ These two writers start from different points of view, and reach their conclusion by different lines of thought independent of each other, and with no acknowledgment of dependence on the teaching of Christ. But more than eighteen hundred years ago Christ announced the law of service as the law of his kingdom; greatness for service and greatness by service. And he explicitly calls attention to the fact that this law of service was to be the principle of a new civilization in the kingdom of righteousness and good-will which he was about to establish. Christianity gives no encouragement to merely artificial and external changes, in which the tyranny of a single despot over society gives place to the tyranny of society over the individual, as in the democracy of the first French revolution, as in various proposed forms of communism and extreme socialism, — a tyranny extending its regulation and espionage to the affairs of private life to such an extent and minuteness as no individual despot ever attempted; a tyranny becoming practically that of a few leaders seeking their own advantage. Christianity aims to extend Christian civilization no faster or farther than the people become in

¹ "We" (himself and Mrs. Taylor) "looked forward to a time . . . when it will no longer either be or be thought impossible for human beings to exert themselves strenuously in procuring benefits which are not to be exclusively their own, but to be shared with the society they belong to. . . . We saw clearly that, to make any such social transformation either possible or desirable, an equivalent change of character must take place both in the uncultivated herd who compose the laboring classes, and in the immense majority of their employers. Both these classes must learn by practice to labor and combine for generous, or, at all events, for public and social purposes, and not, as hitherto, solely for narrowly interested ones. But the capacity to do this has always existed in mankind, and is not now, nor is ever likely to be, extinct. Education, habit, and the cultivation of the sentiment of patriotism will make a man dig or weave for his country as readily as fight for his country. . . . Interest in the common good is at present so weak a motive in the generality, not because it cannot be otherwise, but because the mind is not accustomed to dwell on it, as it dwells from morning till night on things which tend only to personal advantage." (Autobiography, pp. 231-233.)

heart and life Christian, in actual love to God and man. All thus christianized will spontaneously do all work and business as a service to man in Christian love. All who have faith in Christ and in the triumph of his kingdom, must believe that a civilization will be realized in which business and work will be done as a service to man in love to God and man. And it is a great need, perhaps the great need of the time, that all Christians should propose its realization as a definite and prominent object for which to pray and labor.

IV. CHRISTIAN SERVICE IN DOMESTIC AND SOCIAL RELATIONS. — A Christian has opportunity to serve men outside his daily business, in the family, and in all other relations to individuals and to society. The greater part of this activity is commonly regarded as secular. Yet the Christian love to God and man, which is religion, must pervade and vitalize it all and make it a Christian service to man in obedience to God's law. This does not mean that every act in the intercourse of life is to be done by rule and in explicit consciousness of doing a duty. A mother does not kiss her babe by rule and as an act of duty. But in all the intercourse of life the Christian is to act always in the spirit of Christ, in spontaneous good-will, in readiness to help, in sweetness and patience of love, in delicacy of regard to the rights and interests of others, in the spontaneity of love which "suffereth long and is kind; which envieth not, vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up, doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not its own, is not provoked, taketh not account of evil, rejoiceth not in unrighteousness but rejoiceth with the truth, beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things; love which never faileth" (1 Cor. xiii.). In this daily intercourse of life there is opportunity for great deeds of kindness; one may save another's life at the peril of his own. And in sickness and bereavement, in the greater embarrassments and trials of life and in any great emergency are opportunities for deeds of kindness never to be forgotten by the receiver. But opportunities for great service are comparatively rare. If one waits for them he will neglect a large, probably the larger, part of his opportunities for useful service.

"The primal duties shine aloft like stars;
The humble charities, that soothe and bless,
Lie scattered at the feet of man like flowers."

Life is made up of comparatively little things. There are opportunities for kindly service every hour. If it is only to make a child happy for a while, or to soften for any one the minor asperities of life, or to lend a helping hand in any need, it may be the spontaneous outbreathing of the sweetness and power of Christ-like love in a real service to man ;

“ that best portion of a good man’s life,
His little, nameless, unremembered acts
Of kindness and of love.”

This is exemplified in the life of Jesus. On one occasion, when the disciples had been disputing which of them should be the greatest, Jesus was trying to teach them the Christian law of service in his kingdom, that he who would be first must be a minister or servant to all. Then he took a little child in his arms and said : “ Whosoever shall receive one of such little children in my name receiveth me, and whosoever receiveth me, receiveth not me, but him that sent me.” Thus he stands there as the medium of the union of heaven and earth, embracing the little child and binding it to the loving heart of God. What an object-lesson is this ! Before these disciples, ambitious of personal aggrandizement in what they expected would be a kingdom of this world subduing all nations, stands the Messianic king himself, the Lord of Glory, with a little child in his arms, revealing that ministering to a babe may be done in his name and express love to man like his own ; and whoever thus receives a little child in his name and ministers to it, receives him and ministers to him, and so receives God and renders service to him. At the last supper with his disciples, when the same question arose among them, Jesus washed their feet. It was an object-lesson, teaching not only the Christian law of service, but also that any, even the humblest, personal service, may be and should be a genuine expression of Christian love. And once, when a blind beggar approached him, loathsome to look on, no doubt, as blind beggars of the East are wont to be, Jesus took him by the hand and led him along the street to a retired place and there restored his sight. Great and divine was the service to the blind man in restoring his sight. But scarcely less admirable and divine the manifestation of the Redeemer’s love in the kindly service of tenderly leading him by the hand. A few days before his crucifixion, while he was at supper in the house of Lazarus, Mary

anointed his feet with a costly ointment. When she was censured for not selling it and giving it to the poor, Jesus accepted it as a fitting and pious service. "The house was filled with the odor of the ointment." And the whole world is still fragrant with the sweetness of this tribute of gratitude and love. When in the house of Simon the leper, a woman anointed his head and was in like manner censured, Jesus not only approved of it, but also declared: "Whosoever the gospel shall be preached throughout the whole world, this also which this woman hath done shall be spoken of for a memorial of her" (John xii. 3-8; Matth. xxvi. 6-13). That Christian love must ramify into every act and vitalize it into a Christian service to man is evident also from the teachings of Christ and the apostles. Paul says: "Whether ye eat or drink, or whatever ye do, do all for the glory of God." Jesus says: "Whosoever shall give to drink unto one of these little ones a cup of cold water only, in the name of a disciple, verily I say unto you, he shall in no wise lose his reward" (Matth. x. 42).

V. SERVICE IN ACTS DESIGNED TO EXERT A DIRECTLY RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE.—Man is to be served in acts commonly regarded as distinctively religious.

1. This comprises all worship and personal communion with God, prayer and intercession for all men and for the advancement of the kingdom of Christ. It comprises the ministry of the word which is intrusted to the church. "The Spirit and the Bride say, Come; and let him who heareth say, Come" (Rev. xxii. 17). Here are three distinct agencies in proclaiming the gospel: the Spirit is everywhere with heavenly influences drawing men to Christ; the Bride, that is, the church in its collective capacity, by sustaining the ministry in the hands of pastors and missionaries, and by all legitimate agencies; and the individual, who hears the gospel and accepts Christ as offered in it, is to extend the invitation to others and use all his influence to lead them to Christ. This type of service includes the Christian nurture and training of children in the family and in the church, and all direct personal efforts to awaken men to the consciousness of God and of their spiritual needs and to lead them to begin and to help them to live the Christian life, and all efforts, all gifts of money, and all co-operation with others in benevolent associa-

tions to promote Christian education, moral reforms, and the advancement of the kingdom of Christ. Here is a vast and important sphere of service additional to the daily business ; and every one is a debtor to his fellow-men to do in this sphere "as much as in him is." Nor is this service separated from the secular life, but intertwined with it. The daily business and intercourse of life open incidentally opportunities for every one to be a witness for Christ and for the worth and blessedness of the Christian life and hope.

2. To these direct efforts the unconscious influence of the Christian must be added in order to get a correct estimate of the service which he renders in advancing the kingdom of Christ. In every line of action there is a continuous and silent influence of the individual's character and personality which is of fundamental importance, and must always be taken into account in estimating the service which any one renders to man.

When a lame man asked alms of Peter and John, Peter said to him : "Silver and gold have I none ; but what I have give I thee. In the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, rise up and walk." This is the law of all giving. One cannot give what he has not. He must give of what he has. In giving what he has the influence of what he is must go forth with what he does. This influence cannot be manufactured to order. One does not make it, he lives it. It is a vital growth. And each peculiarity of character has its peculiarity of influence. You take up a handful of dry seeds ; they look much alike and equally dry and dead. But in each is a peculiar and essential character ; and each as it grows reveals itself in these peculiar characteristics. One grows into wheat, and men bless it as food ; another into a balsam-tree, and men bless it as medicine ; another into a nightshade, and men shun it as poison. But whether full of blessing or curse, each seed will certainly put forth in leaf, blossom, and fruit just its own life and character. Even the grafted scion, so persistent is its vital character, puts forth its own peculiar character, not that of the stock into which it is grafted. So a person's influence is the blossom and fruit of his character, the simple and under all circumstances persistent outgrowth of what he is. Men do not gather grapes of thorns nor figs of thistles. Under all conditions this influence from one's character, life, and personality diffuses itself spontaneously, con-

tinuously, and unconsciously, as light radiates from a star, as fragrance exhales from a rose, or infection from a pest-house.

This unconscious influence is probably the most important and effective part of the influence exerted in any human life. Electricity attracts most attention in lightning splitting the oak and the thunder crashing in the sky. Yet it is not in these that its greatest work is done, but as it courses unnoticed through all living organizations, and all-pervasive is ready to flash out wherever art provides an outlet, and to run wherever art provides a conductor. So the greater part of a person's influence may be the silent and unconscious influence of what he is, which is vital in all his action, streams out at every point of contact with man, and flashes along every line of his communication with society. For example, the influence of Christian conversation may not be so much in direct efforts to convince a person of error, to induce him to reform from a bad habit, or to begin a Christian life, important as these are, as in the spontaneous expression of Christian thought or feeling on all occasions, and the consideration of all subjects from a Christian point of view. In the Christian education of a family, direct instruction and admonition are important. Yet more important and influential is the spiritual atmosphere of the home, pure and invigorating, or foul and mephitic, which the children continually breathe. In deliberately planned efforts to influence a person, the influence of character is essential. It is like the heavy head of an axe which gives momentum to the stroke, without which the edge, however sharp, could not fell a tree. We call it weight of character. Here is an influence which comes in from a person's conduct of his business. His character in his business and daily work enforces or nullifies the influence of his Christian counsels and of all his direct efforts to promote religion and the well-being of society.

And a person puts forth his greatest power in any work only when his heart is in it. If an act is not hearty it is not mighty. This is exemplified in eloquence. Cotton Mather says of Rev. Jonathan Mitchell that the truth which he preached had been, as it were, seethed into the very substance of his soul.¹ This is the only way to be eloquent. Words are but wind. But when the heart speaks in them, when its tenderness trembles on the lips and mellows in the tones, when its firm resolve clangs in the

¹ "Magnalia," vol. ii. p. 76.

brazen throat, when its fierce passions flash in the eye and shriek like a hissing tempest in the accents, then words are powers; they become like Luther's words, "half-battles." Eloquence is speech with the heart in it, with the whole man in it. Daniel Webster said that eloquence comes, if it comes at all, like the breaking of a fountain from the earth or the eruption of a volcano. A fit comparison; for eloquence is an eruption of soul, whether genial as a fountain or terrible as a volcano. Here is the difference between eloquence and dramatic acting. Eloquence is the expression of conviction, determination, and feeling bursting all alive from the soul; acting is the imitation of this expression. As Sheridan said, "I go to hear Rowland Hill because his ideas come red-hot from his heart." A man can be eloquent only as he speaks the deep convictions of his own mind, the truths which live in the life of his own soul. Otherwise he sinks into an actor in the lecture room, a demagogue on the rostrum, a charlatan or a dullard in the pulpit. The ancients taught that eloquence is a virtue. Certainly it can reach its highest power only in alliance with truth, virtue, and religion. This exemplifies what is true of all action. The arm is powerless when the heart no longer throbs in it.

This unconscious influence greatens the influence of every one beyond his own conception of it. Life is short. But every person exerts influence for good or evil, which is perpetuated forever and widely diffused from one to another. Even a babe that dies leaves behind precious and imperishable memories; the love it awakened survives, reaching out after it beyond the grave and awakening the hope and expectation of meeting it again in the life immortal. If one influences a sinner to accept God's grace and return to him beginning the life of love, that influence in its result is perpetuated forever in the new life of the converted person and multiplied by his influence in leading others to begin the life of love, and in ever widening circles by their good deeds in advancing the kingdom of God and promoting the well-being of mankind. "He who converteth a sinner from the error of his way, shall save a soul from death and shall cover a multitude of sins" (James v. 20).

If one acts a part in life, trying to appear to be what he is not, much of his thought and energy will be expended in keeping up appearances in the part he is acting. Even then he will not

succeed. No one can avoid giving out influence in accordance with his character. The soul expresses itself, not by purposed acts and words alone, but spontaneously and unconsciously by the tones, the attitude, the eye, the face, natural signs which the will does not control. What a tell-tale is the human face; how feelings, thoughts and purposes flash out through it, which the words would deny and the actions would conceal. One sometimes hears a tone of voice so tender that the history of a heart's discipline of sorrow and struggle is concentrated in it. Sometimes a look betrays the carefully guarded secret of a life. No schooling can train these natural signal-bearers of the soul to lie. After a time the history of the life gets itself written on the face. Says the Son of Sirach, "A man is known by his look, a wise man when thou seest him is known by his countenance. The attire of the body, the laughter of the teeth, and the gait of the man show what he is" (Ecclesiasticus, xix. 29, 30). Sensuality is a Circe,

whose pleasing poison
The visage quite transforms of him who drinks,
And the inglorious likeness of a beast
Fixes instead, unmoulding reason's mintage
Charactered in the face. — MILTON, *Comus*.

General Fremont said that some tribes of Indians among the Rocky Mountains had the faces of beasts of prey; the story of their ravaging lives from generation to generation stamped on their faces. Chrysostom says of Bishop Flavian: "The countenance of the holy man is full of spiritual power." What prayers, what lofty contemplations, what sublime purposes, what self-renouncing beneficence, of which at last the seal had been set on the face and made it radiant with love. It is said of Stephen, arraigned before the Sanhedrin, that "all who sat in the Council, looking steadfastly on him, beheld his face as it had been the face of an angel." A noble life gradually imprints itself on the face and form, —

Till oft converse with heavenly habitants
Begins to cast a beam on the outward shape,
The unpolluted temple of the mind,
And turns it by degrees to the soul's essence.

MILTON, *Comus*.

For all these reasons a person must give out what there is in him; the influence of what he really is must ooze out from him.

No vigilance of dissimulation can watch all the avenues of expression; no perseverance in insincerity and hypocrisy can always be on the alert to suppress these signals of nature. Whatever a person professes, however he schools himself to a line of action in which his heart is not, it is inevitable that he will give out what is in him, that his real character will find expression. Whatever evil is in a man will in some way exhale and poison even his honest efforts to do good.

This does not mean that one can never exert any influence contrary to his inmost character; but only that his influence will at some point be in accordance with it. His character will in some way work itself into his influence and imbue it. A bad man may advocate a good cause. An infidel may advocate temperance or a political party, and may do good service in that particular. But, however he may try, he cannot avoid carrying with him the infection of his opposition to religion. So one having the smallpox may send a blanket from his bed to a poor person. It will keep the person warm as any other blanket would; and it will give him the smallpox. In like manner the influence of Christian character not only vitalizes and intensifies the influence of direct Christian effort to do good, but also reaches with its silent and benign efficacy beyond such efforts.

“How far that little candle sends its beams;
So shines a good deed in a naughty world.”

This is a legitimate encouragement to earnest Christians, who through the pressure of necessary care and business have little time for direct efforts to lead men from wrong-doing to Christ and who are therefore discouraged because they think they are doing so little good. Their Christian character is witnessing for Christ in everything they do and giving weight to every word and act designed directly to exert religious influence.

Therefore complete sincerity, the expression of the inmost soul in word and deed, is essential to the most effective influence. If one would do good he must first be good. The first requisite for exerting Christian influence is to be thoroughly Christian; to have the spirit of Christ breathing through all words and deeds; to have the character itself silently and unconsciously giving forth a Christian influence. The shadow of Peter passing by healed the sick. Every Christian ought so to live that his

shadow should bless every one on whom it may fall. As when a certain pastor recently became unable to preach, his parishioners said it was worth his whole salary only to have him walk the streets. A soldier in the hospital had his cot moved so that the shadow of Florence Nightingale might fall on him as she passed in her daily ministrations; and others were seen to kiss her shadow as it moved along the wall.

Insincerity, therefore, is enfeebling. It suppresses the vital force of character and prevents its natural outgrowth in vigorous and harmonious action; it destroys the unity and symmetry of the life; it substitutes the artificial for the natural; it compels the expenditure of one part of the energies in watching and suppressing the other part; it makes the soul suspicious of and antagonistic to itself. It thus makes it impossible for the person to realize his highest efficiency. To this, sincerity is essential.

To be sincere is to be one's self without trying to be another. It is acting out one's character and individuality. Let one's heart be full of love, and his words and actions will be vital with its throbbing life; let his soul be full of noble thoughts, purposes, and affections, and his life will be the spontaneous expression of them in noble words and deeds. Even if one is mean, unjust, and selfish, insincerity only adds sin to sin by making his whole life a lie in trying to pass himself off for what he is not. We sympathize with Dr. Johnson in liking a good hater; we like the heartiness, though we dislike the hate. Hence, imitation, so far as it is mere mechanical copying, is a form of insincerity and an evidence of weakness. It is not being one's self, but it is trying to act the part of another. The action is no longer the expression of one's own inward life, but of that of another. And imitation is often only of a superficial trait or even of a defect, and not of the real character and power; as the young men of Greece held their necks awry, like Alexander, and the young noblemen of England spoke thick, like Harry Percy. Hence, in art and literature, imitation is a mark of weakness; and it is not less so in moral life. It is right indeed to revere the greatly good and to aspire to be like them. But if, admiring a stately oak, you would have its like on your own grounds, you cannot manufacture its like by carpentry; you can get it only by the growth of a living oak from the acorn. So there is but one way to become like those who are great

in goodness, and that is to catch their spirit, to be possessed by their principles, motives and character; and to let this inward life unfold in action. Very different in your peculiar individuality and conditions may the outward history of your life be, but in spirit and character the same; as the gnarled and century old oak of the mountain is the same with the smooth young oak of the park. If one would live like Christ, he must love like Christ. All less than this is but imitation, copying the outward act but missing the inward nobleness. And if imitation is all, life is but a masked and buskined stage-scene.

Thus it appears that religion with its benign influence quickening spiritual life penetrates every sphere, condition, and action of human life, from the highest exaltation in immediate communion with God to the work needful to supply man's physical needs. The activity of the whole life becomes a loving service to man, ennobled by being a loving trust and service to God. Hegel says: "Religion must contain nothing but religion; as such it contains only eternal spiritual truth."¹ But religion is not of the intellect alone; it does not consist of spiritual truth alone, but is life in harmony with spiritual truth. It contains nothing but religion, but in its essence as religion it penetrates, vitalizes and renovates the entire life. God has revealed himself and the eternal spiritual truth historically under human limitations and conditions in Christ, and so presented the ideal of humanity. Religion which corresponds to this revelation of God and of spiritual truth, is to be manifested in all the details of every concrete human life, ennobling it by revealing its real relation to God, and progressively realizing in it the likeness of Christ, and therefore the likeness of God. "He that receiveth me, receiveth him who sent me."

VI. DUTIES TO THE GOOD AND TO THE BAD. — The distribution of duties to individuals is in part determined by the character of the persons to be served.

1. We owe peculiar duties to Christians because they are Christians. So Paul teaches: "As we have opportunity, let us do good to all men, especially to those who are of the household of faith" (Gal. vi. 10). Christ recognizes the same when he speaks of the reward of one who receives a righteous man in the name of a righteous man. And the same is shown in the scrip-

¹ Philosophie der Religion, Vol. I. p. 152.

tural requirement of brotherly love, as having peculiarities distinct from universal love to man. We have complacency in them on account of their Christian character, which we cannot have in the wicked. We can trust them as we cannot trust the wicked. And the kind of service rendered them is different, since, for example, we do not approach them as unbelievers and impenitent to persuade them to come to Christ, because they have already accepted him. As with us united with Christ, there is a peculiar intimacy of fellowship, a brotherhood in Christ. This love in Christ must prompt to a peculiar care of their good name and a peculiar readiness to help them in need; a church should take special care of its own poor.

2. Love to man includes love to the wicked, and involves peculiar duties to them. Christians are bound to make Christ and his gospel known to them, and to the utmost extent of ability and opportunity to endeavor to lead them to accept him as he is offered in the gospel, and so to return from their life of sin into union with God in the life of universal love. Christians are bound always to cherish good-will to the unchristian and wicked, desiring and seeking their true well-being. Paul classes hatred with the works of the flesh (Gal. v. 20), and universal love entirely excludes hatred or malignity towards any one. So Christ says, Love your enemies, and Paul commands, Overcome evil with good.

But good-will to the wicked must be regulated by righteousness. A Christian cannot have complacency in the character of the wicked; he must feel displacency toward him. In the exercise of reason and conscience he cannot approve him, he can only condemn him. And he cannot desire that he be blessed and attain well-being while continuing in sins, for that would be desiring the subversion of the law of love, the constitution of the universe, and the eternal character of God. The desire that the wicked be punished is not absolute but conditional. It presupposes the benevolent desire that they forsake sin, return to the normal life of trust in God, and be blessed in the life of universal love. If they do not, it is the desire that they be punished. And this is only the other side of the desire that all may be blessed who live the life of love. It is only the other side of the consent of the will to God's eternal law of love and the choice that it be universally obeyed. It is only the consent of the will to God's constitution and evolu-

tion of the universe in accordance with the eternal principles and laws of reason, so that only in accordance with them is well-being possible. Displacency toward sinners is only the reverse side of complacency in those who live the life of love. It is as impossible that there be complacency toward the latter without displacency toward the former, as it is that there be sunbeams which do not cast a shadow when obstructed. And it is equally impossible that one's will should fully consent to the law of love and choose that all who live the life of love be blessed, without equally choosing that all who live selfish lives, so long as they continue so to do, should miss all true well-being.

Dr. Bascom says: "There can be no perfect love except between perfect beings."¹ He probably had in mind the truth that love to the wicked cannot be accompanied by complacency in them. But this does not detract from the perfection of the love. If it did, God's love to sinners revealed in Christ would be an imperfect love. The scriptures, on the contrary, present God's love to sinners, as revealed in Christ, as the highest type of love. "Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins. God commendeth his love toward us in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us. While we were yet enemies we were reconciled to God through the death of his Son" (1 John iv. 10; Rom. v. 8, 10). It is the highest type of love, not so much in spite of his displacency toward the sinner and his condemnation of him, but in consequence of it; since it is a love seeking the sinner in all his alienation from God, while yet in the very manifestation of this love in Christ, the supreme and inviolable authority and sanctity of the law of love is most fully revealed, asserted, and maintained. And so the righteousness regulating all good-will finds in God's love in Christ its fullest expression. This Christlike love to sinners is the highest type of love among men, exemplified by the analogy of natural affection in a mother's undying love for a wayward son, and the anguish of soul with which she labors and prays to reclaim him. To feel such genuine sympathy for the stupid, the mean-minded, the vicious, as to enable us to seek their good in self-renouncing and righteous good-will like that of Christ, is the most divine exercise of Christian love.

¹ Words of Christ, p. 42.

It is often urged that we are to abhor the sin but not the sinner; that our displacency and condemnation should be directed against the character, not against the person. But sin or character separated from the person is a mere abstraction. O. B. Frothingham says truly: "It cannot be said of anybody that he has been able to discriminate between wrong-doers and wrong deeds."¹ The thought of sin cannot complete itself except by referring to the person as its subject. The truth for which they who use this form of expression are groping, is that which I have stated, that in all his righteous displacency toward the sinner and condemnation of him, the Christian exercises never-failing goodwill. He yearns for his conversion and salvation, and mourns his persistence in sin which insures his condemnation and his failure to attain true well-being. So Christ wept over Jerusalem and said, "How often would I have gathered you as a hen doth gather her chickens under her wings; and ye would not" (Matth. xxiii. 37; Luke xix. 41, 42).

VII. DUTIES TO ONE'S SELF AND TO ONE'S OWN. — The right distribution of duties requires the recognition of peculiar duties to one's self and to one's own. These must be taken into account in determining one's duty to others.

1. This must be so for the following reasons.

First, this is the doctrine of Christianity. One's self is recognized in the second great commandment as an object of trust and service in love equally with one's neighbor. Christ and the apostles as well as the prophets in the Old Testament appeal to men to recognize the nobler ends and higher possibilities of their being and to seek their true well-being; they enjoin the special duties of parents and children; they inculcate the prudential virtues; they require men to support themselves and their families. Paul exhorts men "that with quietness they work and eat their own bread"; "that ye study to be quiet and to do your own business and to work with your own hands, as I commanded you"; "that ye may walk honestly toward them who are without, and may have lack of nothing"; "for if any man will not work, neither let him eat"; "but if any provideth not for his own, and especially his own household, he hath denied the faith and is worse than an unbeliever."²

¹ Transcendentalism, p. 309.

² 2 Thess. iii. 11, 12; 1 Thess. iv. 11, 12; 1 Tim. v. 8.

Herbert Spencer argues against Christianity as if it were exclusive altruism, requiring every person in every case to prefer the good of others to his own. This is a gross misrepresentation which needs no further refutation. In fact, I am not aware that this doctrine, laboriously controverted by Mr. Spencer, was ever taught in any system of ethics or religion. The choice in which a person consents to the second great commandment of the law of love and comes into harmony with it, is not the choice of other people in preference to himself as the object of trust and service; it is the choice of all people including himself as objects of trust and service in their common relations in the moral system under the government of God, in preference to himself as the one supreme object of trust and service to the exclusion of all others.

Therefore, when I speak of Christian service to man, I do not mean service to others exclusive of myself, but service to man including myself. My service to myself is as really service to man as is my service to a neighbor. And Christianity requires peculiar services to self as an essential part of service to man.

Secondly, man's constitutional desires and affections necessitate an interest in himself and his own such as he cannot feel for others. To forbid it would be to require him to divest himself of his humanity and cease to be a man.

The objection is sometimes urged that it is impossible for one to love his neighbor as himself; and sincere Christians are sometimes troubled in conscience lest they are not obeying the law of love, because they cannot help feeling more interest in their own families and friends, both for their temporal and their spiritual welfare, than in those of others. This arises from not distinguishing between the love required by God's law and the natural and instinctive desires and affections. The love required by the law is not an instinctive affection, but a free choice of the will in the light of reason. One thus chooses himself as an object of trust and service so far as reason sees that he is entitled to this trust and service in accordance with his real relations to God and the moral system and with the law of universal love. This rational love which the law requires does not extinguish the natural and instinctive affections. It only regulates them, insures their moral development and vitalizes them in their exercise with its higher and spiritual life. The instinct of self-preservation, the desire of hap-

piness, of esteem, of acquisition, the conjugal, parental, and filial love, and all constitutional affections, desires, and appetites remain unchanged. These necessarily involve a peculiar interest in one's self and one's own, such as cannot be felt in another, and require peculiar services not due to another. This Christianity recognizes and sanctions. If it did not it would be antagonistic to humanity. It would dehumanize man instead of developing and ennobling him.

Thirdly, the putting forth of the energies under the stimulus of the natural egoistic desires and affections is an essential factor in the education and development of the man. The egoistic impulses are inherent in the constitution of man as really as are the altruistic. The necessity that a person support himself and his family, the desire successfully to carry out plans of work and life, the laudable ambition to make the most of himself, resoluteness in meeting and overcoming obstacles and opposition, perseverance under difficulties, are legitimate influences in the right conduct of life and the development of right character. The egoistic impulses stimulate the individual to put forth his energies and are an indispensable factor in the education and development of the man, in realizing his highest achievements, and in promoting the progress of society.

This is necessarily implied in the fact that the individual is the unit of society, and that the right education, development, and culture of the individual are essential to the education and development of mankind and to the progress of society in civilization, culture, and well-being. This is true, while we recognize the full significance of the unity of mankind through the race connection and the necessity that men live and act in society to the development of the individual. "It is not good that the man should be alone" (Gen. ii. 18). A person living from early infancy in solitary isolation from his fellow-men could not realize his normal development; he would grow up an imbecile.

Any system of ethics which is the development merely of self-love or the desire of happiness, is radically erroneous and in its practical influence incompatible with the normal development of the individual and the true progress of society. On the other hand, ethics which is the development only of the altruistic impulses of humanity would be equally one-sided and inadequate. Any system of communism or of extreme socialism, which would

extinguish all private ownership of property, and have all property owned, all work directed, and all persons supported by the state, would cut the spinal nerve of all human energy; every person would be tended, fed, clothed, and his whole action directed from without. The result would be a community of overgrown babies; human progress would cease, mankind would degenerate, civilization would decay, and barbarism would be the ultimate result.

True ethics must embrace both the egoistic and the altruistic in harmony and unity. This is the ethics of Christianity. It takes up both the egoistic and the altruistic in unity under the law of universal love. It recognizes self and all other persons in unity in their common relations to God, and the love of self and the love of others in unity under the supreme love to God. God in Christ, in his person, in his humiliation, in his earthly life and death, and in his verbal teaching, reveals the law of love in its negative or obverse significance as self-renouncing or self-sacrificing; and equally in its positive significance as the universal love in the exercise of which man realizes his union with God and his likeness to him, and thus his own highest dignity, perfection, and well-being. Accordingly, Christ and his apostles approach sinners, still living in self-sufficiency, self-will, self-seeking, and self-glorifying, appealing to the egoistic sentiments which dominate their lives, warning them of ruin and woe which by so living they are bringing on themselves, and inviting them to turn to God and participate in the glory and blessedness attained by those who serve him in love. Thus they seek to awaken the attention of sinners, to arouse their moral and spiritual natures, and so to lead them to see their need of Christ and of the Christian life of love in communion with God and to accept his proffered grace. And after the man has put his trust in God and begun the life of self-renouncing love, Christ and the apostles point out to him the perfection, blessedness, and glory of that life and its heavenly issues in the life everlasting. They themselves dwell on this glorious aspect of the Christian life in sustaining them under the difficulties, conflicts, and suffering of their lives. These are always legitimate motives. A rational person can never cease to be interested in his own welfare. If he no longer hopes to attain it, he sinks in pessimism, despair, and inaction, and decays like a crushed plant rotting on the ground.

The Christian religion is a reasonable service. In the light of reason, the Christian, enlightened by the revelation which God makes of himself in the constitution and evolution of the universe, in the constitution and history of man, and in Christ and the continued presence of the Holy Spirit, sees that the universe is constituted and evolved in accordance with the principles, laws, and ideals of reason eternal in God, the absolute Reason. In the exercise of free will he consents to reason; he chooses God revealed in Christ as the supreme object of all his energies receptive and productive in loving trust and service. Therein he also chooses his neighbor as equally with himself the object of love, of trust and service in good-will regulated in righteousness. In this supreme choice in harmony with reason and with God's revelation of himself, the Christian takes up both the egoistic and the altruistic sides of his constitution in the exercise of universal love. The man would be unmanned in becoming a Christian if he ceased to seek his own well-being and to hope to attain it, and could no longer rejoice in the glory, honor, and immortality in which he participates through his union with God, in his being like him both in his rational and spiritual constitution and his moral character, and in being forever a worker with God in progressively realizing all truth and right, all ideals of perfection and well-being possible in a finite universe and in finite rational free agents.

Here, however, we must make a distinction. The life of love to God and to our neighbor as ourselves insures the highest development, perfection, and well-being; and we rightly rejoice in it and are stimulated by it in the Christian life. But if the supposed Christian life is actuated solely by the desire of endless happiness, it is no longer the Christian life of universal love. The egoistic element remains dominant and the love and its trust and service are supremely devoted to self. This being so, the happiness and glory are necessarily missed, because these are simply the glow and outshining of the self-renouncing love to God and man, and because the universe is so constituted that in it perfection and well-being are possible only in conformity with the law of universal love. In this universal love both the egoistic and the altruistic elements are satisfied and unified.

Competition is inevitable. It is right so far as it consists in a person's concentrating his thought and energy on his work, devising the wisest methods of doing it successfully and overcoming

obstacles and opposition to its legitimate prosecution. It becomes wrong and pernicious only as it is one-sided in the spirit of selfishness, without righteous regard to the rights and freedom of others, and without the benevolent disposition to render them service. Accordingly there is no contradiction, but a far-reaching significance, in Paul's seemingly incompatible directions, "Bear ye one another's burdens," "Every man shall bear his own burden" (Gal. vi. 2-5).

The objection has recently been urged against Christian missions to uncivilized or partially civilized peoples, that they attempt to force on them an education and civilization which they are not sufficiently developed to bear; and that therefore the missions issue, not only in hindering the normal progress and development of the people, but also in positive injury. One writer says that he has known cases in Egypt in which teaching persons to read has issued, through over-straining of the brain, in making them imbeciles. This objection is answered by appealing to innumerable instances in the history of missions in which by missionary efforts individuals and tribes have been greatly developed and advanced toward civilization. At most the objection is not against missions but against injudicious methods of conducting them. Of course, we cannot present Christ and his religion to a child in the same way in which we would present them to a man, nor to an ignorant person as we would to one highly educated. The difference is not in the religion, but only in the way of presenting it. When it is rightly presented, a little child or an uneducated man may be a Christian, and if he is, his education and development will be quickened and guided thereby. Nor is there evidence in the history of missions that missionaries, as a rule, have been otherwise than judicious. Even in cases in which missionaries have first reduced the language of a savage people to writing, the result has been favorable to the education and development of the people. The truth underlying this objection is that a people can be developed and make progress no faster than the individuals composing the people are educated and developed. This is a fundamental principle in any true science of sociology and human progress. It is an individualism emphasized also in Christianity. The kingdom of Christ can be advanced only as individuals are born anew of the Spirit of God, and developed in Christian character and spiritual power

in the work of Christian love. The Christian religion is always the same; but the method of presenting it and the extent to which the ramified application of its principles should be insisted on must be adapted to the capacity and comprehension of the persons to whom it is presented. Mr. Huxley says truly, "the creation of a new habit of thought is a greater achievement than any material invention." God himself acted on this principle in the historical revelation of himself recorded in the Bible, adapting the method and degree of his revelation of himself to the existing development and civilization of the people. This fact is recognized by Christ (Matth. xix. 7-9). Imperfect knowledge and development, lack of civilization and peculiarities of civilization must be taken into account in presenting the gospel of Christ to any person or people. To urge on a people principles of character and conduct and features of civilization which they are not sufficiently developed to appreciate is useless and may be a positive hindrance to their acceptance of Christianity and progress under its influence. But the religion of Christ, rightly presented and received by savages or by men of any degree or type of civilization, is a powerful agency in their development and progress. History proves that since the coming of Christ the Christian religion has been the most powerful and beneficent agency in promoting the true progress of man. As Strauss says, "Never can any religious progress hope to rival the gigantic step which humanity made through the revolution effected by Jesus."¹ Nor can we more effectively promote the progress and development of the inferior races of men than by proclaiming to them the gospel of Christ in ways adapted to their capacity and development and to the degree and peculiarities of their civilization.

The truth underlying the objection confirms the doctrine that we rightly appeal to the egoistic impulses, inciting individuals to energetic action in the development of themselves and in attaining their noblest character, their greatest power, and their true well-being, while guiding them to the true conception of their own legitimate work, perfection, and well-being and the true methods of attaining true education, development and culture and of realizing in themselves the highest ideal.

Fourthly, when the question is considered by reason in the light of truth and facts, it is ascertained that this special service to

¹ Life of Jesus, vol. ii., p. 49, third English ed.

one's self and one's own, vitalized and regulated by love to all, is essential to the well-being of society and to the most effective work in accomplishing the ends of universal love. Mr. Spencer, in arguing against his chimaera that Christianity requires an isolated and exclusive altruism, dwells at some length on the fact that the constitutional love of one's self and one's own, the so-called egoistic affections, have been powerful factors in the progress of civilization. This is true and is a valid argument against any ethical theory of isolated and exclusive altruism, if such an ethical theory was ever advocated. But it is no argument against Christianity; for Christian ethics recognizes this fact as fully as Mr. Spencer does, and does not require an isolated and exclusive altruism. Mr. Spencer also argues that an exclusive altruistic beneficence is hurtful. He says: "Every one can remember cases where greediness for pleasures, reluctance to take trouble, and utter disregard of those around have been perpetually increased by unmeasured and ever ready kindnesses, while the unwise benefactor has shown by languid movements and pale face the debility consequent on disregard of self — the outcome of the policy being the destruction of the worthy in making worse the unworthy." But this is an argument merely against indiscriminate and unintelligent almsgiving. It is not an argument even against exclusive altruism. For the altruist would have as much reason as any other to study the wisest methods of helping men, and would be as likely as any other to ascertain and practise the wisest methods. Much less is it an argument against Christian ethics. For not only is this not exclusive altruism, but it also recognizes that all benevolence is required by law and therefore must be regulated by law. All beneficent action, therefore, must be done in righteousness, — it must be in accordance with truth and reality, it must be regulated by justice in conformity with law, and it must promote the perfection and well-being of man. All which Mr. Spencer's contention establishes is, what is little more than a truism, that all beneficent action must be wise as well as benevolent; the beneficent person must take care that his beneficence is accordant with truth and right, and will really promote and not hinder the well-being of the person whom he would aid, and will thereby promote the welfare of mankind. And no system of ethics recognizes this more clearly than Christian ethics.

Every one, therefore, owes special duties to himself which he does not owe to another. For himself he forms his own character, right or wrong, and shapes his own destiny for good or evil. "If thou be wise, thou shalt be wise for thyself, but if thou scornest thou alone shalt bear it" (Prov. ix. 12). Others may counsel and help, but no one can enter into another's personality to decide or act for him. No man can share his responsibility with another. Every one is under obligation to care for his own life and health, to educate and develop himself to his highest perfection and to make the most of his own powers and opportunities. And for similar reasons every one owes special service to his own family and friends, to his own town and country, to his own church, and any association or community of which he is a member.

2. These special duties to one's self are acts of trust and service expressing love to one's self as to one's neighbor in its two aspects of good-will regulated by righteousness. There is no difficulty in the conception that this is the duty owed to one's family, friends, or country. But it is not commonly seen so clearly that this description is applicable to duty to one's self. It is necessary, therefore, to make some explanations removing the confusion of thought from which this difficulty springs.

Self-reliance or trust in one's self is essential both to complete self-development and to the highest achievement. The true aim of every educator is to make himself needless to the pupil. Right education consists in informing, training, and developing the pupil to self-mastery, to the command of his powers and resources. Self-reliance is essential also to courage and enterprise; it prompts to attempt great things and to expect great things. Trust in self becomes sinful self-sufficiency only when one chooses self as the supreme object of trust, and so renounces God and disowns dependence on him. But trust in God does not annul trust in self. In the consciousness of his own rational free personality the person by his own free choice puts his trust in God. But in so trusting God he does not cease to be a person rational and free, nor cease to act in the exercise of those high powers of personality with which he is endowed. He has only returned to his normal condition of union with God, so that he can avail himself of all the resources of his spiritual environment and may use his own powers inspired and quickened by the divine influences upon and in him. Then he relies on himself as in his

normal union with God energizing in him and says with Paul, "I can do all things through Christ who strengtheneth me." God is the environment of his spirit. His spiritual power, available in its highest energy only in harmony and union with God, is analogous to his physical power, available only in harmony with his physical environment, only as the sunshine, air, electricity, and all physical forces act in and on him, and as he discovers ways in which he secures the aid of these mighty forces in doing his work. Yet it is he who acts with these forces on which he is dependent and effects results which they would never have effected without his agency.

It is also a man's duty to render service to himself; not as the supreme object of service, but in his real place in the moral system and in his real relations to men in that system under the government of God.

This must be a service of benevolence or good-will. An objection is sometimes urged that a person cannot be benevolent to himself but only to another. But benevolence is the choice of good or well-being for a person. One certainly can choose good or well-being for himself; and the choice is willing good, benevolence, or good-will to himself. The objection is a form of a wider error in ethical teaching, that there can be no duty or moral action of any kind except toward another. But a rational being is by virtue of his rationality a law to himself. Were there but one rational being in existence he would, nevertheless, know that he ought to act rationally, that is, to obey reason. Man as rational is himself an object to his own consciousness, to his own thought, and to his own voluntary action. He may, also, be an object to his own love, alike in its aspects of good-will and of righteousness.

A person owes to himself, also, all the duties of righteousness. His good-will to himself must be regulated by righteousness, in its three forms.

The love of the truth concerning himself will appear as candor in willingness to know himself as he really is, unbiased by any opposition of will through self-esteem or self-interest; and equally unbiased by false humility, as if it were a virtue for a person always to depreciate himself, and a sin to appreciate any excellence of character, acquisitions, or ability, or to esteem himself better than the vilest. The love of the truth invites one to attain

a true knowledge of himself. This is accordant with the maxim, "Know thyself," the inscription at the oracle of Delphi, with which the god greeted every one who came to consult the oracle; and to which the ancients attached so much importance that they believed it came down from heaven as a divine revelation. And so Paul commands: "For I say, through the grace that was given to me, to every man that is among you, not to think of himself more highly than he ought to think, but to think soberly, according as God hath dealt to each a measure of faith" (Rom. xii. 3). Love of the truth concerning one's self when known appears in the consent of the will to it, the resolute acceptance of the facts of one's own character, powers, and condition, the resolute rejection of insincerity with one's self, the resolute shutting out of all self-deception.

The second aspect of righteousness is justice, the consent of the will to the law. In its first form as the consent of the will to the authority of the law, justice to self is the consent of the will to the dictates of one's own reason and conscience as authoritative. It is the consent of the will to one's matured conclusions as to what is right. The man has the courage of his convictions, to proclaim them, to live by them, — if necessary, to die for them. It is a person's loyalty to his reason and conscience. It is self-respect which forbids a person to do anything dishonorable, anything unworthy of himself as a rational and free person, as a spiritual being in a spiritual environment, as redeemed from sin through God's love in Christ, made a child of God, capable of realizing the ideal of humanity and likeness to God as both are revealed in Christ, and participating in eternal life. Honesty is the exact rendering to all their dues. Honor is honesty inspired and ennobled by self-respect. Self-respect and the sense of what is honorable and of what is shameful never attain their full significance except as one recognizes his likeness and relations to God in the moral system and under his law of love, and by these measures his own dignity and worth and what pursuits, conduct, and character are worthy of him and honorable to him. So Paul presents the dignity and nobleness of Christian character: See that ye walk worthy of your high calling; see that ye walk worthy of God, who hath called you into his kingdom and glory. Justice in its second form is the consent of the will to the requirements of the law. Justice to others, in this form, is rendering to them

their dues, that is, doing all our duties to them. Justice, in this form, to ourselves is the assertion and maintenance of our rights against the encroachments of others. There is also a true sense in which a person may violate his own rights, and hence ought to assert and maintain his rights against himself. Every person has the right to live a rational and spiritual life, to develop the spiritual side of his being to its perfection, to possess the knowledge, perfection, and power, the privileges and blessedness of the disciples of Christ and the children of God. One does himself an immeasurable wrong when he uses the free will, which makes him capable of serving God, only in satisfying the desires of the flesh and in the service of self, thus robbing himself of the glory of the children of God and shutting himself up to sensual, earthly, and satanic interests and pleasures, "the husks which the swine did eat." Hence the life of sin is properly called a bondage and slavery, and men are called on to assert their rights as spiritual beings and by coming to Christ to attain the freedom wherewith Christ maketh free. Justice to self, in its third form as the consent of the will to the penalty of the law, appears in the sinner's recognition of his own ill-desert and submission to his condemnation as just, and also in his trust in Christ, who by his work of redeeming love in its atoning significance has fully asserted and maintained the authority, immutability, and inviolability of God's law in the forgiveness of sin, — "that thou mightest be justified when thou speakest and be clear when thou judgest" (Psalm li. 4).

Righteousness toward self, in its third aspect as complacency in excellence and perfection, will appear, so far as one is conscious of sin or imperfection, in displacency towards himself and in aspiration to attain perfection. It prompts to self-culture. As Christianity is comprehensive of all truth really known from whatever source, as bearing on and enlarging man's knowledge of God and of man's relations to him, so it is comprehensive of all the virtues as included or implied in love to God and man and essential to the complete exercise of Christian trust and service. This comprehensiveness of Christianity is declared by Paul: "Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honorable, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue and if there be any praise, think on these things" (Phil. iv. 8), that is, reckon them in as belonging to

Christian character. And Peter recognizes the same comprehensiveness: "Giving all diligence add to your faith virtue; and to virtue, knowledge, and to knowledge, self-control; and to self-control, patience; and to patience, godliness; and to godliness, brotherly kindness; and to brotherly kindness, (universal) love" (2 Peter, i. 5-7). Complacency towards self is also complacency in one's own character so far as conformed to the law of love, and in every worthy attainment, saying, with Paul, "By the grace of God I am what I am." We may thank God that we are not as some others are, drunkards, murderers, swindlers, atheists, idolaters, ignorant, provided the excellence for which we give thanks is real and we feel our indebtedness to God for it,—which indeed is implied in the very act of giving God thanks for it,—and recognize our superiority in love for those with whom we contrast ourselves, and compassionately endeavor, as much as in us is, to help them to attain the same excellence.

3. The particular service of duty due to one's self in any given case must be determined by every one according to his own best judgment in view of his own peculiar capacity and opportunity and his actual relation to others in the moral system.

A person is under obligation, to the extent of ability and opportunity, to attain his own highest education, culture, and development. He is bound, so far as possible, to make the most of himself, to develop all his powers and to furnish himself with knowledge and instruments and resources for work. But while personal education, culture, and development are a worthy end to be diligently sought, this must not be made the ultimate and supreme end. One must seek it for another end beyond himself, to enable himself to accomplish more for the advancement of the kingdom of God and to promote the progress and well-being of man. At a public dinner in New York in 1882, Herbert Spencer criticised a public address of John Stuart Mill, to which he once listened, as being erroneous, because through it "ran the tacit assumption that life is for working and learning." And he added, "I should have liked to contend that life is not for learning, nor is life for working, but learning and working are for life." But neither of these expresses the Christian conception, which is that neither the working, learning, nor living of the person himself is the ultimate and supreme end. Each reaches toward an end beyond itself, and beyond the person himself to the progress

and well-being of man. A person is to develop and cultivate himself to the utmost that he may be able to render more effective service to man in advancing the kingdom of God. As a benevolent person gives a poor boy an education in order that he may be a useful man, every one, to the extent of his ability and opportunity, must educate himself in order that he himself may be useful in rendering service to man, and therein may serve God and win his co-operation and blessing.

And it is only thus that the true and highest development and culture of the person himself can be attained. To attain this the action of the will in serving man, the drawing out of the desires and affections which interest one in humanity, the development of the spiritual side of our being which connects us with God and the moral system, and of which the normal action is love to God and man, are as indispensable as the training of the intellect and the acquisition of knowledge. Culture without the love which prompts to the service of God and man is one-sided. In such culture thought issues in empty speculation and logomachy, and art issues in dilettanteism, fastidiousness, and hypercriticism. It develops self-sufficiency and exclusiveness. Emerson said that if, riding in a stage-coach in Texas, he should see a man on the opposite side reading Horace, he should want to hug him. But that is a bond of fellowship which excludes almost all of mankind. All education, culture, and development, which make these the ultimate and supreme end and do not quicken the love which prompts to devote all the powers and acquisitions to the service of man, fail to be true education, culture, and development. And this is only an example of the broader law that whoever makes his own personal good the supreme and exclusive end misses the good. This has been well expressed by Cardinal Newman: "All virtue and goodness tend to make men powerful in this world; but they who aim at the power have not the virtue. Again: Virtue is its own reward and brings with it the truest and highest pleasures; but they who cultivate it for the pleasure's sake are selfish, not religious; and will never gain the pleasure because they can never have the virtue."¹

¹ The moral influence of culture divorced from the service of man, and the pessimism involved in it, is exemplified in Mr. Ruskin's description of himself in the "Contemporary Review": "I have bought for my own exclusive gratification the cottage in which I am writing, near the lake-beach on which I used to play when I was seven years old. Were I a public-spirited

A person is also under obligation to support himself and his own family.

Here let it be remembered that secular business is not necessarily worldliness, and that a man is not necessarily selfish or covetous in its prosecution. Nor is he proved to be covetous by any amount of diligence and earnestness in its prosecution. For his business is his life work and such concentration of energy is simply a condition of success in any line of action. Money is the representative of value and is indispensable in all enterprise whether secular or religious. It is not money, but the love of money, which Paul says is a root of all sorts of evil. The mere fact, therefore, that a man is diligent and successful in gaining money is no proof that he is covetous, worldly, or selfish. He is so only if he is gaining money exclusively for himself. Then he is like a steam-engine driven night and day only to produce fuel to feed its own fire.

And what a person expends on himself and his own family is not necessarily a selfish expenditure. Every such expenditure may be made in pure Christian benevolence. It is a real service to society if only that it relieves the public from the expense of supporting them. And what is a more effective service to society than to make a pure and happy Christian home, one of the many homes which make a pure and happy Christian people, and to train up children for Christian service? We must rid ourselves of the pernicious error that all which one spends on himself and his own family is spent in selfishness, and that money is used in benevolence only when it is given directly to the poor or to some missionary or reformatory association.²

It follows that the law of Christian service cannot be satisfied merely with setting apart to be given away in charity one-tenth

scientific person or a benevolently pious one, I should doubtless instead be surveying the geographical relations of the mountains of the moon, or translating the Athanasian creed into Tartar-Chinese. But I hate the very name of the public, and labor under no oppressive anxiety either for the advancement of science or the salvation of mankind. I, therefore, prefer amusing myself with the lake-pebbles, of which I know nothing but that they are pretty, and conversing with people whom I can understand without pains, and who, so far from needing to be converted, seem to me on the whole better than myself."

² I have known persons who insisted that money paid for the support of their own pastor and Sunday-school was merely a selfish use of money.

or any fixed proportion of the income. The Christian law of stewardship is that all our powers, property, and income are intrusted to us to be used for God in the Christian service of man. The whole business is to be prosecuted, all work to be done, all the income used, in the Christian service of man. Hence the definite proportion to be given away in charity cannot be prescribed for all; for a poor man with a large family and small earnings cannot in equity be required to give as large a proportion of his income as a rich man whose income largely exceeds his personal and family expenses even when living luxuriously. Every Christian must accept the Christian law of stewardship and in love to God as supreme and to his neighbor as himself determine in every question of investment, expenditure, and charitable gift how he can use the powers and possessions which God has given so as most effectively to advance his kingdom and promote the well-being of man.

Here the question arises, how far one is justified in expending money in personal enjoyment, in creating and gratifying the tastes and desires arising from culture and refinement, in satisfying a taste for the beautiful, or in supplying any want beyond the necessaries of life. The mass of human misery and need surpasses all individual resources for its relief. When one thinks of this and remembers that he is debtor to all men to help them as much as in him is, he may naturally think that he ought to divest himself of all beyond the simplest supply of his bare necessities and devote all the rest of his income in charity to the relief of others. But, in accordance with the principles already established, there is a question back of this; the question whether this would be the most effective way of promoting the progress and well-being of man. Canon Farrar thinks it desirable that there should be in the church an order of persons who, under vows of celibacy and poverty, should devote themselves wholly to the work of carrying the gospel to men and ministering to their spiritual needs. And it has been suggested that men and women who have taken on themselves such obligations would accomplish more in foreign missions than other missionaries, because they would be more in accord with the idea of a religious life very commonly held. It is conceivable that such persons might do good in peculiar circumstances and cases. But it would be at the risk of perpetuating and intensify-

ing the false notion of religion, as a life of asceticism, beggary, meditation, and separation from the humanities of life, as inculcated, for example, by Buddhism, but not in harmony with the teaching of Christ, who came eating and drinking, attracting attention because he did not teach his disciples to fast, and always mingling with men in kindly intercourse. And in Christendom it would tend to perpetuate and intensify the false conception of the religious and secular as separate and antagonistic which is already a great hindrance to the progress of Christ's kingdom. It is not necessary, however, to deny that God may call and inwardly move individuals to this asceticism for the better doing of specific work; for there are in his kingdom a great diversity of lines of Christian work and need for a great diversity of gifts. But it is evident that the limitation of expenditure to the bare necessities of life can never be the rule for all Christians. The development of man in the progress of civilization awakens to action the slumbering powers and susceptibilities of his many-sided being and so multiplies his conscious wants. If men must cease to satisfy these wants, immense numbers of persons engaged in supplying these wants would be thrown out of employment, machinery would lie idle, and men would relapse into barbarism.

It must also be considered that the beautiful has a place in the moral and spiritual system as real and legitimate as the true and the right. It is the ideally perfect, when manifested in any object of perception or thought, which awakens the emotion of beauty. But that only is perfect which is the expression of truth in accordance with law. Thus truth, duty, and beauty are but different aspects of reality as known in the light of reason. Beauty is non-didactic and non-moral, because it is an aspect of reality different from the true and the right as reason sees it. But it can never be untrue or immoral, because these would imply imperfection. Sidney Lanier, in his "English Novel," says: "From time immemorial wherever there is contest between artistic and moral beauty, unless the moral side prevail all is lost. Let any sculptor hew us out the most ravishing combination of tender curves and spheric softness that ever stood for woman; yet if the lip have a certain fulness that hints of the flesh, if the brow be insincere, if in the minutest particular the physical beauty suggests moral ugliness. that sculptor, unless

he be portraying a moral ugliness for a moral purpose, may as well give over his marble for paving stones. Time, whose judgments are inexorably moral, will not accept his work. For indeed we may say that he who has not yet perceived how artistic beauty and moral beauty are convergent lines which run back into a common ideal origin, and who therefore is not afire with moral beauty just as with artistic beauty, — that he, in short, who has not come to that stage of quiet and eternal frenzy in which the beauty of holiness and the holiness of beauty mean one thing, burn as one fire, shine as one light within him, he is not yet the great artist." In direct contradiction to this great principle is the realism of much recent fiction and poetry, which aims simply to describe whatever is real in human character, action or condition, without attempting to present any ideal, either æsthetic or moral, and justifies itself in presenting the most seductive as well as the most horrible pictures of vice, because such vice is real and such crimes are really committed. Because the highest literature and art are inseparable from moral ideals, an age that cherishes the æsthetic without the moral is inevitably an age of weakness and decay.

From this inseparable connection of the moral ideal with the artistic it follows that money spent in creating the beautiful, in surrounding one's self with beautiful objects and combinations, or in bringing beautiful objects to the view of others may be doing Christian service to man in the promotion of civilization and culture.

Christian civilization, when completely realized, will combine the intellectual, the moral, and the æsthetic, the true, the right, and the perfect, in unity in the religious, and thus will realize the true good; thus it will extrude the greed of personal gain, which is the rust corroding our present civilization, and all selfish indolence, luxury, ostentation, and sensual indulgence. But this unity is not yet fully attained.

When the intellectual is isolated and dominant it tends to speculative thought and to logomachy abstracted from the interests of man. If the intellectual activity thus is occupied with physical science it is liable to sink into materialism.

If the æsthetic predominates isolated from truth and right, civilization is marked by weakness, superficiality, and decay.

When the sense of moral obligation and duty enforced by the

sanctions of God's law predominates, duty and accountability occupy the thought; every act is done in the sense of responsibility under law, awaiting the dread awards of God's judgment. This develops intense earnestness of purpose, contempt for idleness, self-indulgence, and luxury, scrupulous regard for law, and consecration to high moral ends. It leads to efforts to reform abuses, to propagate good morals, and to realize moral ideals. It considers all human interests in relation to right and wrong; it enforces duty; it demands and maintains rights; it resists injustice and oppression; it expects progress; it looks on history as a grand panorama in which right struggles with wrong and moral ideals advance with ever greatening glory to their full realization. This is impossible in a predominantly æsthetic civilization. To such a civilization the moral earnestness of the Hebrew and Christian scriptures, of the Christian apostles and martyrs, of the reformers and the Puritans, would be incomprehensible. Accordingly, when preached in the gospel of Christ, it was to the Greeks foolishness.

But this type of character, in which the moral intensified by religion predominates, has often been narrow and one-sided, has taken on sometimes a certain moroseness and fierceness, has been intolerant and persecuting. These were exemplified in the fanaticism of Mohammedanism, propagating itself by the sword, in the Crusades, and the Inquisition. It also has taken on a peculiar gloom, — law supreme, universal, inexorable, law broken by all, penalty terrible and inevitable glooming and threatening over the world. Beneath its terror pleasure is an impertinence, beauty but vanity, the interests of this temporal life trivial, business a profane intrusion on sacred duties, the one great concern is preparation for death; "other-worldliness" is the necessary alternative to worldliness. The sunny cheerfulness of life fades beneath the intensity of the sense of duty and responsibility; weariness of life and of the world falls on the soul, and asceticism drives men to deserts and monasteries for the mortification of the flesh. And thus it comes to the extreme that its iconoclasm is directed against the pleasurable and the beautiful because they are such, and so by their very presence prove themselves earthly and idolatrous.

This one-sidedness appears in another form. Because men are sinners and must be born anew under the influence of

the Spirit of God, Christians often think that all Christian effort must be concentrated on the conversion of sinners, and so overlook the great interests of human progress and improvement; not undervaluing them, but suspending effort for those ends, because the first and paramount necessity is the saving of souls. In this way the idea of conversion is itself narrowed. It is no longer the beginning of a new life of love under the quickening of the Spirit, but an experience in which one obtains a hope that his peace is made with God; and thereafter a large part of his experience is his rejoicing that he at least is saved from hell and is safe in the fold of Christ. But the salvation of the soul is salvation from sin. The ruin of the soul is its own selfishness. It is withering, shriveling, wasting in the narrowness of selfish interest and the consumption by selfish lusts. Its salvation is its renovation to the life of faith and universal love, faith in God in Christ, the inspiration of a new life like Christ's, love to God and man glowing as enthusiasm for humanity and zeal to promote all its interests. And Christian interest in the progress of humanity, in the highest human culture, in all which pertains to human welfare, is itself an indispensable recommendation of Christianity, and a most effective influence in persuading men to become Christians. Men are repelled from Christianity when professed Christians turn away with indifference from the great practical interests of life and civilization. And since Christianity aims to transform human society into the kingdom of Christ, Christians have no right to postpone efforts for the full development of Christian character and the christianizing of civilization within the community in which they have influence, while waiting to convert individuals in that community, and to extend the superficial breadth of Christianity over all the earth. It is essential to the continued existence, power, and growth of Christianity that it prove itself to be the religion of civilization, competent to quicken savages to advance towards it, competent also in all the marvelous progress of civilization to prove itself always with and above it, with moral and spiritual influences adequate to elevate, purify, sweeten, and ennoble it. Christianity is not to repress the culture, the refinement, the energy, the manifold development of man, but to vitalize and christianize it.

But whatever the seeming indifference or antagonism to scientific or æsthetic progress which have at times characterized the

predominance of the moral element enforced by religion, it is merely an incident of a period of transition to a more comprehensive and harmonious unity, and may have arisen either from the seeming urgency of more directly moral and religious work, or from the incompleteness of moral and religious development at the time.

This more comprehensive unity Christianity, by virtue of its distinctive essence, is competent to effect. Christian civilization belongs to that type of civilization in which the moral forces predominate. But it brings these moral forces into action in a manner peculiar to itself.

It does not require primarily love to truth, nor love to the right, nor love to the perfect, nor love to the good. It requires primarily love to persons, to God, and to man. To this love of persons all love of truth, law, perfection, and good are subordinated, and under its inspiration and direction all scientific, moral, æsthetic, and prudential pursuits and interests are comprehended in an harmonious unity.

Christianity presents the inexorable law itself as requiring universal love, and reveals that God is love, that he has constituted the universe in accordance with that law, and that the penalty is the privation of good and the suffering of evil which must come on one who anywhere or anywhen in this universe lives a life of supreme selfishness.

Christianity does not put foremost to sinful men law, with its imperative and its penalties, but it puts foremost God in Christ redeeming men from sin and seeking to bring them back to their normal union with himself, and to the life of love in faith in him and the service of good-will in righteousness to God and men. This faith in God, under the influences of the indwelling Spirit, becomes the inspiration of the life of spontaneous love to God and man.

Here, then, in Christianity, is that which saves civilization of the moral type from the gloom, intolerance, and severity which have sometimes characterized it when its primary motive force has been zeal for truth and law. Vitalized by faith in the God in Christ, and acting in the enthusiasm of love to God and man, it retains all its earnestness, energy, and inflexible adherence to truth and right. It has even more, for fidelity to principles, fidelity to truth and law, is vitalized and strengthened by loyalty to a per-

sonal sovereign, to Christ, who has redeemed men by his blood, who has revealed in his own person and life at once the self-sacrificing love of God to men, the ideal moral perfection and beauty of man, his greatness in his moral likeness to God and as the object of his redeeming love, and the supremacy, inviolable authority and the unchangeableness of the law, which even in redeeming sinners and forgiving their sins, God himself obeys. But the moral and religious character is no longer one-sided and defective, but comprehends in harmonious unity all that belongs to the intellectual activity, the obedience to law, the perfection and moral beauty, and the true well-being of man.

The Christian life starts, it is true, from the sense of condemnation as a sinner. From this the Christian is delivered when he sees and trusts God's redeeming love in Jesus Christ. In that faith, which is the inspiration of the new life, the gloom of sin and condemnation passes away. Life becomes trustful, hopeful and full of joy. It is the old Greek brightness and joyousness made spiritual and divine; not the joy of carelessness and disregard of evil, but a joy following the full knowledge of sin and evil, and of the deepest spiritual realities of our being; the joy of acquaintance with God and reception of his universal and infinite love in Jesus Christ, renewing, receiving into union with himself, and forgiving sinners. Inspired by this faith, the predominance of the moral element no longer engenders indifference to the world and weariness of life; it is not stern, intolerant, persecuting in the consciousness of law and penalty. But its motive power is spontaneous love like that of Christ. It is not primarily love to truth, or law, or perfection or good, but love to God in Christ, and love to all men. Thus, like Christ, the Christian is able, not only to engage in great enterprises for the welfare of men, and to give his life if necessary in their behalf, teaching the principles and inspiring the progress of a higher and nobler civilization, — but also, like Christ, he is sensitive to every human interest, taking children in his arms and blessing them, weeping with those who weep, touched with the feeling of our infirmities, helping the fallen and sinful in their efforts to rise. Thus Christianity develops a civilization, not of selfish greed of gain and ambition for pre-eminence, manifested in the combative devices of reckless competition and combination, but of the mutual trust and service of universal love pervading all business and all domestic and

social life. Here, then, within the sphere of Christianity, is scope for the expenditure of money, time, talent, and genius on any work or object which satisfies personal tastes, desires and affection, and is accordant with righteousness and promotive of the culture, development and well-being of man.

Christian love, when complete as love, — and not merely one-sided, as duty done in mere obedience to law, — and when it has had time to develop its inmost nature, must bloom in beauty. When the gospel has free course it must be glorified. The limping god of work is to be wedded to the goddess of beauty. The moral and spiritual force, which Christianity has made a power in civilization, is essentially an energy of reform and progress. As love to man in manifestation of love to God it is diffusive, not restrictive, it is in its essence democratic, concerned with the interests of humanity, not conservative of any privileges of a class incompatible therewith. There is necessarily a certain revolutionary destructiveness in it, under some conditions, when the vital and spontaneous growth of Christ's kingdom is opposed and obstructed; and this in the imperfect development of man at the time may be vitiated by human passions. The sweeping away of despotism and of the debauchery of an ancient and corrupt régime may sweep away, for the time being, something of refinement and culture. The highest form in which a civilization founded on self-indulgence, on being ministered unto instead of ministering, can appear is that in which the self-indulgence and the corruption incident to it are concealed by a gilding of refinement and culture, and the luxuriousness delights in wit, literature, and art; a civilization like that of the French court under the old régime, epigrammatically but falsely described by Burke as a state of society in which vice lost half its evil by losing all its grossness. The grossness was there beneath all the gilding; of which the infamous *parc aux cerfs* of Louis XV. is only a single example out of many. In such a civilization the luxurious refinement can be only of the few at the expense of the debasement and misery of the many. When the culture and refinement of such corruption is swept away, it is only clearing the ground for the people as such to have their rights and to participate in the advantages of advancing Christian civilization. Thus, through Christian love, a true culture and refinement, not on the surface only but in the inmost character, will extend among the people

and beautify the rough and unsightly places of human society. Thus Christianity is progressively fulfilling the ancient prophecy: "The wilderness and the solitary place shall be glad for them and the desert shall rejoice and blossom as the rose. Instead of the thorn shall come up the fir-tree and instead of the briar shall come up the myrtle tree" (Isa. xxxv. 1; lv. 13).

There is then scope in Christian service of man for the satisfaction of wants beyond the mere necessities of life and for the gratification of taste and desire awakened by advancing civilization. But such gratification must not be in indolent and luxurious self-indulgence, but must be subject to the Christian law of universal good-will regulated by righteousness; and the expenditure of time, strength, and money in attaining such gratification must be approved by the reason and conscience as a Christian service of man. It is right to break the alabaster box of precious ointment; but one must see that he breaks it at the Saviour's feet.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE SANCTION OF THE LAW

THE sanction of the law is the punishment inflicted by the government on the transgressor. Blackstone defines it in the civil law: "The sanction or vindicatory branch of the law, whereby it is signified what evil or penalty shall be incurred by such as commit any public wrongs, and transgress or neglect their duty."¹ The sanction of the divine law has essentially the same significance. It is the punishment coming from God on the transgressors of his law.

Eschatology, the doctrine of the last things, considers questions of fact as to what will be the final destiny of man, and what will be the events attending the close of the earthly history of mankind. Man is not only under law, but also is a sinner already under condemnation as a transgressor of the law. As such he is the object of God's redeeming grace. The question arises, What will be the ultimate issue of redemption? Will it insure the salvation of all men or only of some men? Will any have the offers and influences of redemption after death, or will the destiny of every individual be decided in this life? These questions of eschatology are all questions of fact. They can be answered only from the revelation which God has made of himself as the redeemer of men from sin culminating in Christ, as recorded in the Bible. With these questions of fact we have no concern here. We consider punishment here only in its significance and necessity in its relation to the law as its sanction. This may be called the ethics of punishment.

I. DEFINITION. — Punishment is suffering or privation inflicted by a government on a transgressor, due to him in accordance with

¹ Commentaries on the Laws of England, Introd., sect. 2. Austin's definition is essentially the same; Jurisprudence, vol. i. pp. 6-8.

the law for his ill-deserts ; by it the government asserts, maintains, and vindicates the inviolable authority of itself and its law in the face of transgression, and thus preserves the constitution and order of society and protects the individual members of society from wrong-doers. This is a definition of punishment under any government, human or divine. To make it a definition distinctive of punishment under God's government we need only to substitute "the integrity and order of the moral system" for "the constitution and order of society ;" for God's government is not limited to any particular community, but extends over the entire moral system.

1. Punishment is privation of good or the positive suffering of evil. Liability to such privation and suffering is essential to the existence of a moral system and to the administration of moral government. I say liability, not the actual privation and suffering ; for if, in the exercise of free agency, no one should sin, no one would be punished. If there were no such liability, there would be no means of moral discipline nor of maintaining the authority of government against transgressors. If no loss of good and no positive suffering of evil followed wrong-doing, the selfish sinner would incur no loss of good and no positive suffering by his sin, but would attain all well-being as really as one who always lives the life of love. In any moral system it depends on the person's own free moral action and on the moral character which he forms for himself by his free action, whether he realizes good or only evil. Without this dependence of well-being or the contrary on a person's moral action and character a moral system and moral government would be impossible. This is a forcible argument in theodicy, that without the liability to privation and suffering a moral system would be impossible, because all discipline in the development of right character and all punishment for wrong-doing would be impossible.

We must not infer, however, that God created the liability to suffer solely that he might have the means of discipline and punishment. On the contrary, all finite persons, by virtue of the essential limitation of their powers, susceptibilities, and attainments, are liable to privation or loss of good and to positive suffering both mental and physical. If God creates, the universe created and all substances, beings, and powers in it must be finite, and his revelation of himself in it must be progressive. If he creates a

moral system, it must be composed of finite persons under the moral government of God. This liability inseparable from finiteness gives the conditions and means of moral discipline and of punishment.

2. Punishment is privation or suffering inflicted by the government on a transgressor in accordance with the law for his ill-deserts. It presupposes government having rightful authority, and law declaring obligation. It presupposes the possibility of the transgression of the law on account of free will, and the transgressor's guilt or desert of punishment. The necessity of the punishment of a transgressor, if any one does transgress, is involved in the idea of law and government. There can be no immutable distinction of right and wrong, and no inviolable and immutable authority of government and law, implying obligation to obedience, if the law is not sanctioned by any punishment of transgressors. There can be no law without a sanction. Without it law would fade into advice or entreaty. Whatever are the authority and obligation of the command of the law, the same are the authority and obligation of its sanction by punishment. A transgressor of the law forfeits his right to the good which would have followed obedience and has a right only to punishment in accordance with the law. In other words the punishment is due to him in accordance with the law; he is guilty and deserves the punishment. His punishment does not violate any right of the criminal, does not deprive him of any right. It is only rendering to him that which is his due, that which it is right he should receive, that which alone he has a right to or deserves. The law asserts its authority over all; over the obedient by the command which they obey; over the disobedient by inflicting the punishment which they deserve. As Augustine said, "Punishment is the justice due to the unjust."

3. It is inflicted by the government to assert, maintain, and vindicate the inviolable authority of the government and the immutable obligation of the law in the face of transgression. In the law itself the government proclaims its authoritative command and the obligation of all to obey. Some one transgresses the law. The government reasserts the authority of the law and the obligation to obedience by the punishment of the criminal, and thus asserts, maintains, and enforces the law and vindicates its authority.

This is the primary end for which punishment is inflicted. The action of the government in punishing is not revenge, inflicting evil for evil received. It is the dispassionate, judicial act of the government asserting, maintaining, and vindicating its authority and the immutable obligation of the law by inflicting privation or suffering on the transgressor according to his deserts. Theologians have used the phrase "vindictive justice," to denote that God's justice is distinctively punitive and not merely reformatory or disciplinary; and it is still sometimes used in this sense. But the word *vindictive* has an opprobrious meaning as denoting malignant revenge. The true meaning is that God's justice is vindicative or vindicatory. It vindicates the inviolable authority and immutable obligation of the law of love by bringing on the transgressor the privation of all true good or well-being and the suffering of evil which, according to the law of love itself, in a universe constituted according to the principles and laws of reason and for the realization of rational ideals, must come on every one who in transgression and defiance of the law lives a life of self-sufficiency, self-will, self-seeking, and self-glorifying.

4. The infliction of punishment is the prerogative of the government alone. This is involved in the very idea of punishment as asserting and vindicating the authority of the government and the law. In the nature of the case this can be done only by the government itself. If it does not by its own act punish the criminal, it fails to vindicate, in the presence of transgression, its own rightful authority and the immutable obligation of obedience to the law. If it never punished a transgressor it would thereby renounce its right to govern and would abdicate the government. If private individuals, in indignation at the crime, inflict privation or suffering on the criminal, this in itself would be a violation of the law, and would only make more conspicuous the weakness of the government in not punishing either the original criminal or the persons who, in violation of law, criminally subjected him to indignity and violence. And the criminal cannot make satisfaction for his crime by inflicting privation and suffering on himself. He may thus express his own sense of ill-desert; but he cannot accomplish the distinctive ends of punishment. Between private persons one who has done wrong to another may by his own act make satisfaction for the wrong done. This is because they stand on an equality, neither having authority to command

or govern the other. This, by abuse, may lead to the extreme of the duel or the vendetta, and so supersede the authority of government. The criminal cannot thus give satisfaction to the government whose law he has broken and whose authority he has spurned. The authority of the law and the government can be vindicated only by the government itself pronouncing judgment on the criminal as guilty, and imposing on him privation or suffering in punishment for his crime.

The same principle holds true of the government of God. Punishment is imposed on the sinner by the judgment and act of God. It expresses God's displacency toward him as a sinner and his condemnation of him as guilty; and in it God asserts, vindicates, and maintains the inviolable authority and immutable obligation of the law of love in the face of transgression.¹ When a church imposes privation or suffering on a sinner as a penance, it usurps the authority of civil government and of God. When a sinner inflicts on himself privation and suffering as a penance, — that is, as a satisfaction to the law for sin, — it avails nothing to insure merit, remove guilt or avert punishment.² Penitence, like penance, is derived etymologically from the Latin *poena*. Hence, those using the Latin language might easily identify penitence with penance. In the Douay version of the New Testament, *repent* is commonly translated *do penance*. But the Greek words in the New Testament translated *repent* and *repentance* are etymologically entirely different words, having no reference whatever to punishment, but denoting a change of mind. They imply sorrow for and renunciation of sin in beginning a new character and life. Penitence in this, its true meaning, being the act of the sinner, does nothing to maintain and vindicate the inviolable authority of the government and law, further than this private individual's consent and submission to it. When God forgives the penitent, he does it through Christ in a way in which he asserts, maintains, and vindicates the authority of the law as really as the punishment of the sinner persisting in impenitence would have done.

¹ Rom. xii. 19-21 and xiii. 1-7; Deut. xxxii. 35-43; Psalm xciv. 1.

² The Latin form of expression, *dare poenas*, seems to mean that the criminal gives an indemnification, expiation, or satisfaction for his crime. But in the actual administration of the government it was understood that the criminal gave satisfaction only as the punishment was imposed on him by the government.

5. The design of punishment is not primarily the reformation or well-being of the criminal. Punishment must be distinguished from discipline. The latter is privation, tasks, or suffering imposed on a person for his own education, development, and improvement. Discipline may be imposed on a person by himself, by an educator, by a parent, by the civil government, or by God. Privation, tasks, or suffering not designed to promote one's education and development, as the amputation of a limb by a surgeon, are not discipline. Yet the sufferer may use it as self-discipline, acquiring under it patience, submission to the will of God, strength under privation and suffering, self-development in many ways.

Discipline is distinguished from punishment in that it is primarily for the improvement of the recipient, while punishment is for the ends already specified in the definition, and not primarily nor essentially for the improvement or good of the person punished. Punishment may involve the sacrifice of the criminal's well-being.

An innocent person may be the subject of discipline, but not of punishment. A child or a soldier, who has committed no crime, may rightly be subjected to discipline, but not to punishment. God disciplines men in his providential dealing with them in the privations and afflictions of human life. "Whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth and scourgeth every son whom he receiveth" (Heb. xii. 6).

The theory has gained some currency that government has no right to inflict punishment in its distinctive meaning as I have defined it, but only to exercise discipline, inflicting on the criminal only such privation or suffering as is fitted and intended to promote his reformation and insure his good. This theory, if carried out in practice, would annihilate all law and government. Government would have no right to take life, for that could not be a discipline promoting the good of the person slain. Then every rebellion and even every local mob would have everything its own way, for government would have no right to suppress it by armed force. Thus government would be powerless to enforce any law or to maintain its authority. The theory is equally subversive of the law and government of God. If it were true, supreme selfishness in disobedience to God's law, if persisted in, could not prevent the sinner's attaining his highest good; for, according to this theory, God's law and government would be such that God

could not subject the sinner to any privation or suffering except such as would promote his highest good. Thus love and selfishness in their actual results would be the same ; each would alike insure a person's highest good ; and the law of love would no longer be of supreme and absolute authority and obligation, the moral system would fall into chaos, and the constitution of the universe would be subverted. If we look at it from a slightly different point of view, it is evident that if punishment is not allowed, but only discipline, then, when God foresees that any sinner will persist in sin incorrigibly, he will not bring on him any privation or suffering whatever, for he would see that discipline would be useless, and punishment is forbidden. Thus again moral government and law would be annihilated.

Punishment, however, does not exclude discipline, so far as compatible with punishment and subordinate to its distinctive idea and end. Hence civil government provides reform schools, and directs the arrangement and administration of prisons to prevent further corruption of the less criminal and to promote the reformation of all the prisoners.¹ Accordingly prison-discipline and the treatment of criminals have become subjects of earnest investigation to devise the best methods, while retaining punishment in its distinctive idea, so to order it as most effectively to promote the reformation of the corrigible and to seclude those who, by repeated convictions, have proved themselves incorrigible, so that they shall have no further opportunity to inflict injuries on society.

The same principle holds good in the divine government. The punishment of sinners, while it is distinctively punishment, is designed to be also disciplinary and to lead the sinner to repentance and to reunion with God in the life of love. Some theologians have taught that the evils consequent on sin in this life are disciplinary only ; and that punishment in its distinctive meaning is inflicted only after death. But this is certainly contrary to the scriptures, which continually represent evils brought on men by sin in this life as coming by judgments of God in punishment for sin. The same is the explicit doctrine of the Westminster Larger Cat-

¹ Clement XI. placed on the door of the prison of St. Michael the inscription ; " Parum est improbos coercere poena, nisi probos efficias disciplina ; " " it avails little to restrain the wicked by punishment unless you make them virtuous by discipline."

echism : "The punishments of sin in this world are either inward, as blindness of mind, a reprobate sense, strong delusions, hardness of heart, horror of conscience and vile affections ; or outward, as the curse of God upon the creatures for our sakes, and all other evils that befall us in our bodies, names, estates, relations, and employments, together with death itself."¹ Christ seems to teach that some even in this life commit the sin which hath never forgiveness.² But the privations and evils brought on men in this life by sin, while they are real punishments, are also disciplinary. This is intimated in many scriptural representations of God like that in Hosea : "My people are bent to backsliding from me ; though they call them to him who is on high, none at all will exalt him. How shall I give thee up, Ephraim? How shall I deliver thee, Israel? How shall I make thee as Admah? How shall I set thee as Zeboim?" (xi. 7-8). Thus in punishing sin God is seeking to turn the sinner from sin. In this sense there is truth in the poetical representation of God's judgment on sinners as "reluctant wrath." So Isaiah declares God's gracious disposition even in his righteous judgments : "Therefore will Jehovah wait that he may be gracious unto you, and therefore will he be exalted that he may have mercy upon you ; for Jehovah is a God of judgment ; blessed are all they who wait upon him" (xxx. 18). So Christ wept, foreseeing the rejection of Israel because, in the very consummation of God's gracious dealings with them, they were rejecting their long-expected Messiah, and exclaimed, "How often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not. Oh that thou hadst known, even thou, at least in this thy day, the things which belong unto thy peace ! But now they are hid from thine eyes" (Matth. xxiii. 37 ; Luke xix. 41, 42). But he did not avert the impending doom. In this, as in all his character and action, Christ is the exponent to us of the heart and thought of God, revealed under human limitations and conditions. He teaches further that the only unpardonable sin is the sin against the Holy Spirit. It is in the Spirit that God brings his gracious offers and influences in redemption to bear on sinners to induce them to turn from their sin. These

¹ The proof-texts cited are Eph. iv. 18 ; Rom. i. 26-28 ; ii. 5 ; vi. 21, 23 ; 2 Thess. ii. 11 ; Gen. iii. 17 ; Deut. xxviii. 15-68 ; Isa. xxxiii. 14.

² Matth. xii. 31, 32 ; Mark iii. 28-30 ; Luke xii. 10.

are, if I may use the expression, the last resort of God's wisdom and love in saving men from sin. The persistent rejection of these offers and resistance of these influences of God's redeeming grace exclude the sinner from forgiveness, and ultimately form a character so confirmed in selfishness and sin that no gracious moral influence will ever avail to induce him to return to God in self-renouncing love. Then "there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins, but a certain fearful looking-for of judgment and fiery indignation which shall devour the adversaries" (Heb. x. 26, 27). The sinner has put himself beyond the reach of redeeming grace, having chosen the evil as his good and made himself insensible to all the heavenly motives and influences attracting to the divine life of love. This Christ declares to be the only unpardonable sin, — unpardonable, not because God's grace is exhausted, but because the sinner has made himself unsusceptible and dead to the gracious influence.¹ Even the incorrigible sinner is still the object of God's good-will, encompassing him as an atmosphere or as the sunlight. All the influences which come from God upon him are the influences of good-will exercised in righteousness. As they issue from God they are only good. Whether they bring a blessing or a woe on the man on whom they fall, is determined by the reception given them by the man, yielding to them and returning to God in self-renouncing love, or resisting them and thereby hardening himself in sin. Accordingly, the punishment is represented in the Bible as the sinners reaping what they have sown, treasuring up unto themselves wrath against the day of wrath (Gal. vi. 7, 8, Rom. ii. 5) ; and as God giving them up to their own hearts' lust to walk in their own counsels (Psalm lxxxii. 12 ; Rom. i. 24, 26 ; Acts vii. 42 ; Eph. iv. 18, 19 ; 2 Thess. ii. 11, 12). "For that they hated knowledge and did not choose the fear of the Lord ; they would none of my counsel ; they despised all my reproofs. Therefore shall they eat of the fruit of their own way and be filled

¹ Augustine defines the unpardonable sin as "an obstinate stubbornness with distrust of pardon until death." Calvin justly criticises the phrase "until death," as incompatible with Christ's assertion that it shall not be forgiven "in this world," implying that the sin may be committed in this life. Calvin defines it as deliberate resistance of God's Spirit with clear knowledge that it is the Spirit ; and this, not in a single lapse, but in a universal defection from the known truth of God. He says men commit the unpardonable sin against the Holy Spirit "in hoc tantum ut resistent," in this only that they resist him." — Institutes, Bk. III. chap. iii. 22, 23.

with their own devices. For the turning away of the simple shall slay them and the prosperity of fools shall destroy them" (Prov. i. 29-32). God's good-will and his redeeming love change not; he, as revealed in Jesus Christ, is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever (Heb. xiii. 8). His compassion, even to the incorrigible, expressed by Christ under human limitations and conditions in tears, is as much greater than the weeping compassion of man, as the absolute is greater than the finite. If any sinner, after however long persistence in sin, would yield to the divine love encompassing him and return to God in penitential and loving trust, God would receive him with more than the joy with which the father in the parable received his prodigal son at his return.

6. Punishment is designed to promote the welfare of society and the protection of individuals from wrong-doers, not in all ways, but only in the ways specified in our definition of punishment.

First, in the punishment of criminals the government preserves the organization and order of society by asserting, maintaining, and vindicating the universal and immutable authority and obligation of just law after it has been transgressed. This is fundamental. Without affixing penalty to the transgression of the law, government and law would cease and anarchy would ensue; and anarchy is moral chaos. Thus it is by the assertion, maintenance, and vindication of the authority of government and law in affixing punishment to transgression that government preserves the constitution and order of society; and it is primarily by thus preserving the constitution and order of society that the government protects individuals in their rights against wrong-doers.

The same is true of the moral system. God maintains the integrity of the moral system, after any person has sinned, by the punishment that comes inevitably on every transgressor, and by which God asserts, maintains, and vindicates the supreme and universal authority and obligation of the law of love. Under that law a life of selfishness must miss all true good and must insure only evil to the selfish person. If it were not so, the law of love would no longer be the supreme and universal law of the moral system. Thus the fundamental law of the moral system would be subverted, the reign of moral law would cease, and the universe would be under the control either of blind force or of

lawless and resistless caprice. It is by thus asserting, maintaining, and vindicating the supreme and universal authority and obligation of the law of love that the integrity of the moral system is preserved, the reign of wisdom and love in accordance with the eternal principles, laws, ideals, and ends of reason is perpetuated, and a moral system continued in existence. And it is thus primarily and fundamentally that, after persons have sinned, God protects individuals from injury by wrong-doers.

Secondly, the fact that law affixes a penalty on transgression exerts a moral influence in deterring from crime. This moral influence will be proportional to the justice of the penalty and the certainty and promptness of its infliction on every criminal.

This moral influence is twofold. It consists in part of the fear of punishment which is a deterrent from crime. This, of course, has no immediate and conscious influence on the majority of persons in well-ordered society. Those whose characters are already formed in moral integrity abstain from cheating, stealing, and killing without ever thinking of the legal punishment. But persons of vicious proclivities may be restrained from crime by fear of punishment. Even persons of ordinary integrity, under great temptation, may be influenced in resisting by the knowledge that punishment will follow crime. If the government is efficient in detecting and punishing criminals, so as to insure a reasonable certainty that the penalty of the law will speedily follow crime, the fear of punishment will have a wide and powerful influence in deterring from crime and protecting individuals from wrong-doers.

A much more important moral influence in preventing crime is the educating power of law maintained and enforced by punishment. This is commonly overlooked. A government that enacts just laws and efficiently enforces them by the just punishment of criminals, is continually educating the people to respect for the government, reverence for law, and a healthy indignation against wrong-doers and condemnation of them. And confidence in the justice and efficiency of the government in punishing criminals will prevent lynch-law. If the government is inefficient in its administration of justice, it loses the respect and confidence of the people and becomes an object of disgust and contempt. By the efficient enforcement of just law by the punishment of transgressors, the government is educating the

people to a just estimate of the sacredness of human rights and of the wickedness and ill-desert of the person who violates them. The capital punishment of murderers educates the people to a just estimate of the worth and sacredness of human life. In former times when stealing a few shillings was equally with murder punished with death, it educated the people, not to a high estimate of the rights of property but to a low estimate of the right to life. Such legislation could only have originated in a lower stage of civilization, in which people had not been educated to Christian humanity and to a just estimate of the worth of human life. Should capital punishment be now abolished, government would be educating the people to regard crime against life as no more heinous than crime against property. It cannot be known what the influence of such legislation will be until time enough has elapsed to disclose the effects of its educating power on the people. Thus the suspension of just punishment would educate the people to contempt for government and law and to recklessness of the rights of men and of the criminality of violating them; and it would tend to blunt indignation against wrong-doing, and equally to blunt heroic enthusiasm in doing and suffering for truth and righteousness.

“For if the dead, as dust and nothing found,
Shall lie there in his woe,
And they shall fail to pay
The penalty of blood,
Then would all reverence from earth decay
And all religion prove a thing of nought.”¹

Similar beneficent moral influences are exerted by the connection of penalty with sin under the moral government of God. In the moral system under God's law of love it is impossible for any person living in selfishness to realize good or well-being at any time or in any place in the universe. And it is equally impossible for any person living in universal love to miss the true good and well-being. Thus all God's action in the constitution and evolution of the universe, being the continuous expression, maintenance, and enforcement of the law of love, is fitted to educate men to reverence God and his law, to estimate aright the true excellence and worth of the life of love and the wickedness, guilt, and misery of a life of selfishness, and so is bringing on them

¹ Sophocles, “Electra,” 244-250.

continual moral influences to lead them to the life of love and to confirm them in it.

Thirdly, by punishment government protects individuals from injury done by wrong-doers, by restraining criminals, temporarily or permanently, from the opportunity to do injury. It is desirable that there should be some legal method by which those, proved by repeated convictions to be incorrigible, may be permanently imprisoned, that so society may be protected from the continuance of their crimes. The Bible declares an analogous separation of the wicked from the righteous in the final judgment.

7. Punishment does not accomplish the design or end of the law in its requirement of universal love.

The ultimate end of the law is to bring all persons to love God with all their hearts and their neighbors as themselves. This is what it requires and is designed to promote. It aims to secure throughout the moral system the reign of universal love and the well-being involved therein. It requires obedience; and obedience is possible only in the exercise of the love which the law requires. Punishment is not the end or aim of the law, but the maintenance of the law and obedience to it are the end or aim of punishment. The law does not exist in order that sinners may be punished, but sinners are punished in order that law may exist and the constitution of the moral system dependent on the law may be maintained and perpetuated. The end or aim of the law is the realization of the universal love which it requires. The end or aim of punishment is to prevent transgression and to assert, maintain, and vindicate the law of love and the constitution, order, and integrity of the moral system after the law has been transgressed. "Love is the fulfilling of the law" (Rom. xiii. 10; 1 Tim. i. 5).

Punishment does not accomplish the end of the law for the person who has sinned and is punished. In defiance of the law of love he has renounced God and his neighbor and is making himself the supreme object of trust and service. For him the law has failed of its end; it has failed to restrain him from sin and to keep him in the life of love. In renouncing God and the life of love to all, he has renounced and lost his own true perfection, worth and well-being. Punishment cannot retrieve this loss. It cannot undo the act and remove it from his history, nor bring to him the perfection, worth and well-being which,

in defiance of the requirement of the law, he has wilfully thrown away. It is not the design of punishment to effect this retrieval. What the law failed to do for the sinner by its requirement, it cannot do for him by its penalty.

God, it is true, is in Christ reconciling the world unto himself. Under his redemptive action and influence the sinner may return to God in trust and penitence, may enter on the life of love and therein on his progress toward perfection and well-being, and so his past sinfulness may be forsaken by him and forgiven by God. But he is not brought to repentance by the law which he has violated nor by its penalty which he has incurred, but by God's gracious action redeeming him from condemnation under the law and from the dominion of sin.¹ And God forgives his sin because in the redemption of sinners through Christ he has wrought it in such a way that in it he asserts, maintains, and vindicates his righteous government and the supreme authority and immutable obligation of his law of love in the forgiveness of the trusting penitent as really as in the punishment of the persistent sinner. Even so God's forgiveness of a sinner does not annul the fact that he has sinned, nor the actual privation and suffering which he has experienced in his sin or may afterwards experience as a legitimate consequence of it. Even when at last his character shall be perfected in love, the loss in all the years of his sin remains an unalterable fact and an irreparable evil. At his conversion he is not what he would have been had he never sinned, but had lived in conformity with the law of love. In all his subsequent development and growth he will never at any point of time be what he would have been if he had not sinned. Sin, which is wilful refusal to conform to the law of love, which is selfishness displacing love, is evil and only evil continually, evil which can never be undone. There is no perfection or good in it and none can come out of it. In sinning the sinner does himself a wrong and brings on himself loss and evil absolutely irreparable.

Equally irreparable are the loss of good and the positive evil which by his evil influence he has brought on others. In suffering punishment the sinner does not make amends to society for the evil he has inflicted on it. If a thief is arrested and punished and what he had stolen is restored to the owner, this does

¹ Rom. vii. 10; viii. 3, 4; x. 4.

not undo or make amends for the manifold sufferings and evils caused by the criminal in committing the crime and for the disturbance of the peace and order of society by the violation of its law. A single burglary causes anxiety and fear in the homes in the vicinity. The assassin of President Lincoln suffered the supreme penalty of the law, but the evils resulting from the assassination have been felt to this day. When, recently, a judge of the supreme court was assaulted in revenge for a judicial decision, a quiver of fear and apprehension ran through all the people, as to the danger to the whole fabric of society indicated by such an assault unheard of before in all the history of the nation. The fact that the assailant was shot on the spot by an officer appointed to protect the judge does not undo the evil caused by the fact that the assailant's threats had rendered this unusual precaution necessary, and by all the shameful incidents and issues of the crime. The same is true of all punishment. It does not remove the evils brought on society by the sin nor make amends for the wrong done. The sin and its evil effects are facts of the past which cannot be annulled; and their pernicious results may be still stretching forward into the future. Even though the sinner has repented of his sin and forsaken it, its evil influences may still be active beyond the reach and knowledge of the sinner. There is a persistence of influence in the moral system analogous to the persistence of physical force, so that moral action and character widen and perpetuate their influence immeasurably.

We are brought here back to the essential principle that the government in punishing simply asserts, maintains, and vindicates its authority and the authority and obligation of law, and so preserves the constitution and order of society from anarchy, dissolution, and chaos in the presence of transgression. And God in the punishment of sinners asserts, maintains, and vindicates the authority and the universal and immutable obligation of the eternal law of love after persons have sinned, and thus maintains the integrity of the moral system under the law of love and the government of God. Punishment is the manifestation of the law of love as actually inviolable though violated. It may be disobeyed; it cannot be broken down, nor deprived of its authority and obligation, nor changed in its essential requirement; and throughout the whole universe the attainment

of true good or well-being is possible only in conformity with this law. So Christ declares, "Till heaven and earth pass away, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled" (Matth. v. 18).

From this point of view we again reach the conclusion that in punishment there is nothing of the nature of revenge. The law is not the law of retaliation, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a rendering of evil for evil. It is the law of universal love. In punishing sinners God is exercising the love which the law requires; and is asserting, maintaining, and vindicating its authority and obligation in his treatment of those who refuse to live in conformity with its requirement.

II. THE NECESSITY OF PUNISHMENT. — The reasons or grounds of the necessity of punishment have been already suggested in the definition. They must now be set forth more explicitly.

1. The first ground or reason of the necessity of the punishment of transgressors is the fact that the law of love is eternal in the absolute Reason.

An obvious reason why the sinner must be punished presents itself at once, that the sinner is guilty and deserves to be punished. This is true. But we must search deeper and ask what guilt is.

Guilt and ill-desert have no meaning except in relation to law. He who violates just law ought to be punished. This is a native and intuitive conviction of the human soul. And reason shows that it is true. It is implied in the very idea of law as command or categorical imperative. The command *Thou shalt, Thou shalt not*, cannot be resolved into *You may do as you like*. It is not a command if it is not enforced by penalty for disobedience. The law which commands love to God and to all men, involves in its essence as a command that whoever refuses to live the life of love shall be punished for his disobedience. It is involved in the very idea of law and government that law affix a penalty on disobedience. If no punishment is affixed by the law on transgression, — law, government, and the moral system would no longer exist. Here we must pursue our search still further, to find what is the ultimate ground of law itself.

This we find in the absolute Reason. The eternal and archetypal principles and truths of absolute Reason are laws to the

action of all rational persons. Law is immutable and eternal. It is not created by any fiat of will. It is not a constitution of things independent of God. It is eternal in God the all-perfect and absolute Reason; and he in all his action obeys this eternal law. If the universe is not grounded ultimately in absolute Reason, there is no law regulating either its physical or moral on-going. The only foundation of a moral system or of society ordered under law is the truths, laws, and ideals immutable and eternal in the absolute Reason, and the fact that man, in the likeness of God as a rational, personal spirit, participates in the light of the eternal Reason and is therefore able to "read God's thoughts after him" in the evolution of the physical universe and in the constitution of man and the development of the kingdom of God,—and pre-eminently in Christ, the revealer at once of God in his likeness to man and his love for him, and of man in the likeness of God and capable of affinity and union with him in the life of universal love. The theory of the universe, of the moral system, of human society, founded on this rock will stand. Any theory founded on any other foundation is like the house founded on the sand, and must fall.

Here, then, we reach the ultimate and absolute ground of the necessity of punishing transgressors. The demand that the law of love be sanctioned by the punishment of transgressors is the eternal, immutable, inexorable demand of absolute Reason. Sin is eternally condemned to punishment. As our Lord said of the sinner who believes not on him, he "is condemned already" (John iii. 18). Here we see the atoning significance of God's redemption of sinners through Christ, asserting, maintaining, and vindicating the authority of the law when the sinner, returning to God in penitential and loving trust, is accepted in the beloved, and receives the forgiveness of sins according to the riches of God's grace (Eph. i. 7, 8). When a sinner yields to God's redeeming grace in Christ, he is saved from his bondage in sin, he is no longer under condemnation, but is restored to the favor of God, and God, so far as is possible in the nature of things, remits the penalty of his sins. I say, so far as is possible, for, according to the very constitution of the universe, penalty is inseparable from sin. But God's own redemptive action in Christ reconciling sinners to himself, is such that it is as effectual in

asserting, maintaining, and vindicating the authority of the law of love in the redemption and forgiveness of the returning penitent as is his action in the continued condemnation and punishment of the persisting sinner.

2. The necessity that the law be sanctioned by the punishment of sinners is grounded in the righteousness of God. God's righteousness is the consent of his will in his own eternal free choice to the truths, laws, ideals, and ends of reason as regulative of all his action. It is the eternal harmony or conformity of his will with his reason in his eternal free choice or self-determination. God does not merely see all that is true, right, perfect, and good in the eternal light of his reason, but also in his eternal character as love he acts always in accord with this truth and law for the realization of this perfection and good. Thus both the categoric imperative of the law requiring love, and the condemnation of the guilty, who disobey it, to punishment, are alike grounded in the righteousness of God. If God affixes no penalty on transgression, he makes no discrimination between right and wrong, between the righteous and the unrighteous, between those who live the life of love and those who live in selfishness ; he makes no revelation of himself as the righteous God asserting, maintaining, and vindicating the law of love as of universal and inviolable authority and immutable obligation. He would, in fact, be no longer God. The denial that the law is sanctioned by punishment involves the denial that the universe is ultimately grounded in absolute reason, and that in it the righteous God is supreme. It really involves atheism.

3. The necessity of the punishment of sinners has its ground or reason in the constitution of the universe. We have seen that the principles and laws eternal in the divine Reason are regulative of the action of the divine power. Power, though almighty, cannot annul them or give reality to what is absurd. We have seen, also, that therefore these archetypal principles, laws, and ideals which God is progressively expressing and realizing in the finite universe, determine its constitution and development. Whoever disregards these eternal laws is not only fighting against God, but also against the constitution of the universe. All the powers of the universe, therefore, as it goes on in accordance with its unchanging laws, combine to oppose and frustrate the sinner in his evil designs, and to bring upon him privation of

good and the suffering of evil. There is no place or time in the universe in which it is possible for a person to live a life of selfishness and be blessed, or to live a life of universal love and miss his highest blessedness and well-being. "The inevitabilities are always sapping every seeming prosperity built on a wrong. No matter how you seem to fatten on a crime, that can never be good for the bee which is bad for the swarm. . . . Strength enters just as much as the moral element prevails. The strength of the animal to eat and to be luxurious and usurp, is rudeness and imbecility. The law is, as thou sowest, thou shalt reap. . . . If you love and serve men, you cannot, by any hiding or stratagem, escape the remuneration. Secret retributions are always restoring the level, when disturbed, of the divine justice. It is impossible to tilt the beam. All the tyrants and proprietors and monopolists of the world in vain set their shoulders to heave the bar. Settles forever the ponderous equator to its line, and man and mote and star and sun must range with it or be pulverized by the recoil."¹ Richard Hooker says: "Good doth follow unto all things by observing the course of their nature, and, on the contrary side, evil, by not observing it. And is it possible that, man being not only the noblest creature in the world but even a world in himself, his transgressing the law of his nature should draw no manner of harm after it? Yes; tribulation and anguish unto every soul that doeth evil."

4. The sanction of the law by the punishment of transgressors is demanded by the reason and conscience of man.

I use the word *conscience* to denote the moral constitution of man, — including both the intellectual power of judgment in the light of reason on character and conduct, approving it as right, or disapproving and condemning it as wrong, — and the moral sentiments or feelings. Conscience, in this comprehensive meaning, is essential and inherent in the constitution of man as rational. As a person endowed with reason, man is conscious of the universal truths and laws of reason, and of his obligation to act in accordance with them; also of ideals of perfection and good determined by rational norms, and of his obligation to act for the realization of these rational ends. And human reason cannot know itself in its full significance as reason, nor justify its trust in

¹ Ralph Waldo Emerson, "The Sovereignty of Ethics," N. Am. Rev. vol. 126, pp. 407, 409.

itself as such, without recognizing Reason absolute and universal, in whose light itself participates. In man's knowledge of truth shines the light of the eternal reason ; in his sense of duty sounds the voice of the eternal God ; in his love to God and man is the glow of the love that is eternal in God, the dawning in the soul of the light and glory of the eternal day. Thus, in the background of his knowledge of himself as a rational person, he finds God.¹ And the conscience thus essential in the constitution of man as rational, thus revealing the eternal Reason and speaking the command of God within the soul, declares the condemnation of sin and the demand for its punishment as clearly and forcibly as it declares the law of right and the obligation to obey it.

Through conscience a sinner judges himself as sinful and condemns himself as guilty ; that is, as deserving punishment ; and thus judging and condemning himself, his feelings respond in shame, remorse, and terror. These are among the most poignant and crushing of human feelings. They have made men crazy ; they have blighted their lives ; they have driven them to despair and suicide ; they have compelled them to confess and submit to the penalty. Criminals have even welcomed the punishment, and found in it relief from their anguish, as meeting the consciousness of guilt and the demand for punishment in their inmost souls. Thus, many a criminal, who never heard of Socrates, has seen the truth of his paradox in the "Gorgias," that even to the criminal it is better to be punished than to escape unpunished. On the other hand, when one does right or defends truth and righteousness against opposition, though he stand alone with God against the popular public sentiment, even though he be condemned to martyrdom, his conscience justifies and approves him and fills his soul with a peculiar satisfaction and joy, the noblest and most divine which can exalt the soul of man.

Conscience also discerns wrong-doing in another and condemns it as deserving punishment ; and in the moral feelings it responds to this judgment in indignation against the wrong-doer, in horror at the evil wrought by the crime, and in the desire that the wicked shall not go unpunished. Dr. Channing says, "We must not mistake Christian love as if it had but one voice, that of soft entreaty. It can speak in piercing and awful tones. There

¹ Socrates says that the soul of man partakes of the divine. (Xenophon, "Memorabilia," Bk. iv. chap. iii. 14.)

is constantly going on in our world a conflict between good and evil. . . . That deep feeling, which is necessary to effectual conflict with them and which marks God's most powerful messengers to mankind, cannot breathe itself in soft and tender accents. The deeply moved soul will speak strongly, and ought to speak so as to move and shake the nations."¹

Conscience, thus asserting the command of the law, the imperative obligation to obey it, and the just condemnation and punishment of the wrong-doer, is essential in the constitution of a rational person. Thus the rational constitution of man attests the reasonableness, justice, and necessity of the punishment of transgressors.

This is evident also from the whole history of humanity. It appears in the universal reverence of martyrs who have died in fidelity to truth and right, and of reformers who have faced the opposition of the highest human powers in exposing wickedness, have wrought great reformatations and delivered men from grievous oppressions and wrongs. It is evident in the fear of the wicked, the dread of impending evil, the "fearful looking-for of judgment and fiery indignation." There can be no eloquence in defence of injustice, oppression, and wrong-doing as such. The religions, the literature, the laws, and the whole history of mankind recognize the authority and power of conscience declaring the guilt and ill-desert of wrong-doers and condemning them to just punishment. This is strikingly exemplified in the Greek tragedians. "These set forth in immortal types and under the most pathetic forms all the sacred sorrows of the conscience and all its lofty hopes, tempering its dread of eternal justice by intuitions of the divine pity yearning to restore. Never upon pagan soil did the moral law shine with a lustre at once so pure and terrible. Never was the divine idea invested with such sanctity. Never were the need and hope of expiation expressed in nobler lyric strains, or in dramatic creations so grand and lifelike. Greek tragedy is the very drama of human destiny, with its mysteries, conflicts, terrors, and with its inspired intuition of a deliverance equal to its need."² In this condemnation of the sinner to deserved punishment the common sentiments of mankind concur. "Children always rejoice at the overthrow of Pharaoh and the punishment of Haman.

¹ Works, 1843, vol. i. pp. 24, 25.

² Pressensé, "The Ancient World and Christianity," Transl. p. 329.

The uncivilized inhabitants of Melita believed that the viper on Paul's hand was sent to punish him for murder. Philosophy, law, and religion, epics, lyrics, and tragedy teach the necessity of the punishment of the wicked. The source of perplexity through the ages has been the fact that in the actual course of human life God apparently does not uniformly punish sin; the wicked prosper and the good are in adversity. From the days of Job until now the anxious question has been, 'Wherefore do the wicked live, become old, yea, are mighty in power?' And always relief has been found when it has been made clear that God will award them just retribution. What a grand chorus of the ages is here; the voices of children, of savages, and of civilized men, of poets, philosophers, law-givers, and statesmen, of prophets and apostles, all generations standing with hands uplifted to God, crying that wickedness may not be committed with impunity; — 'for the crying of the needy, for the oppression of the poor, arise, O Lord, and render into the bosom of the wicked the reproach wherewith they have reproached thee.' And from the holy heaven opened to John issues the voice of the martyrs slain by triumphant wickedness: 'How long, O Lord, holy and true, dost thou not judge and avenge our blood on them who dwell on the earth?' How grand a chorus! How august a company! But here comes a solitary form, the pale offspring of modern sentimentality, its consumptive frame nursed on what John Randolph called the ass's milk of human kindness, and lifts alone its solitary hands and voice: 'To me the perplexity is that God does punish the wicked. Oh for a God who never punishes a transgressor! Oh for a God of indiscriminating tenderness and leniency, who leaves wickedness unscathed in its triumph, and gives it equal reward with righteousness!' " 1

Professor Alexander Bain teaches, as others had taught before, that conscience is not a constitutional characteristic of man as a rational person, but that it has been created by the infliction of punishment. "The imposition of punishment is the distinctive property of acts held to be morally wrong. . . . Morality is an Institution of Society maintained by the authority and punishments of Society. . . . Every one, not of himself disposed to follow the rules prescribed by the major part of the community, is subjected to some infliction of pain to supply the absence of

1 Prof. Samuel Harris, "The Kingdom of Christ on Earth," pp. 35, 36.

other motives, the infliction increasing in severity until obedience is attained. It is the familiarity with this régime of compulsion and of suffering constantly increasing, that plants in the infant and youthful mind the first germ of the sense of obligation. . . . The sense of obligation has no other universal property except the ideal and actual avoidance of conduct prohibited by penalties. . . . The imposition of penalties begets at once the sense and avoidance of the forbidden and the awe of authority, and this is retained through life as the basis of the individual conscience, the ever foremost motive to abstain from actions designated as wrong. . . . Instead of responsibility I shall substitute punishability.”¹ It follows that there is no essential difference between right and wrong; that there are no distinctively moral motives of action; that if a person obeys the law, it will not be done from any love to men or regard for their rights, or from any desire to promote the welfare of the community, but solely because the majority who have made the law will force him to submit by inflicting penalties more and more severe until he yields to the superior force; and that in all moral actions there is no motive more noble or more worthy of admiration than the fear of suffering inflicted by a superior force; the motive of a slave compelled by the whip. The further question arises, How came there to be a government enacting laws and inflicting penalties for disobedience? The supposition is that there are no moral principles regulating action until they have been gradually created by the infliction of punishment; that there is no conscience in any person, no sense of obligation, until it has been developed by punishment. Whence then came the government, the law, and the infliction of punishment? There can be but one answer. The origin of government, law, and punishment can be only in superior force. Thus comes the brutal theory that government and law are merely expedients of the stronger to keep from the weaker what by superior strength they have grasped. This overthrows all conception, not only of God’s government, but also of all just government and even of justice and right. The very idea of right and wrong becomes an illusion created by the successive blows of the strong, who have taken possession, smiting the weaker who try to participate in the advantages grasped by the strong. This must be so, for if any antecedent law, justice,

¹ “The Emotions and the Will,” pp. 254, 257, 481, 482, 483, 520.

or right is presupposed, the whole theory breaks down. There is no identity or resemblance of the rational sense of obligation or duty and the fear of punishment. On the contrary, a person of integrity and virtuous character does his duty and fulfils his obligations without even a thought of the punishment of transgressors.

If any Hedonistic theory of morals is accepted with Leslie Stephen's definition that "morality is a statement of the conditions of social welfare," then it is evident that there is no place for the distinctive ideas of duty, obligation, and law, and morality in its distinctive meaning is displaced by expediency. Then we may agree with Mr. Stephen in his teaching that conscience, as autonomic in the constitution of man as rational, is "part of an obsolete form of speculation."¹ If the theory is accepted that sin is essential to a person's discipline and development, sin ceases to be recognized as essential evil and must be regarded as relatively good, as good in its necessary process of development. If the materialistic theory is accepted, that sin is a disease and therefore the so-called sinner does not deserve punishment but needs only curative treatment, all distinct moral ideas are excluded. And so all theories which imply the denial of the ill-desert of transgressors, and of the just demand for their punishment, involve the total denial of moral distinctions and of all moral obligation, law, and government. Nevertheless the existence of moral distinctions is not derived from the fact of punishment, but the existence and necessity of punishment are derived from the eternal existence of law and of moral distinctions.

5. Punishment is necessary for the practical ends subserved by it, which have been already pointed out. While these are not the primary or only grounds of the necessity of the punishment of transgressors, they are real and important reasons which must be taken into account in justifying it.²

¹ "Science of Ethics," chap. vi. 41 ; chap. viii. 4 ; pp. 217, 314.

² "Punishment is a celestial being, created by the gods to insure to all the possession of their rights. . . . It is a king full of courage, of sombre hue but keen eye, that governs the human race, protecting the feeble against the strong. It would strike even the king if he strayed from the path of duty. . . . Justice strikes when it is wounded, and protects when it is maintained." (Laws of Manu, quoted by Pressensé, "The Ancient World and Christianity," Transl. p. 207.)

III. THE PENALTY. — We are now to consider in what the penalty consists which God inflicts on the sinner in punishing him for his sins. On this subject it becomes us to speak with profound consciousness of the limitations of our knowledge. Some points, however, seem to be clear and indisputable, and to these I confine my statements. We are not discussing here the facts of eschatology, but simply the ethics of punishment.

1. The penalty consists primarily of the sinner's alienation of himself from God and the privation and evil which this involves.

In the first place, in his renunciation of God as the supreme object of trust and service, the sinner puts himself in direct antagonism to God. The essence of his sinful character is his choice of self as the supreme object of trust and service. In this choice he is in his inmost character, which is selfishness, in direct antagonism to the character of God, which is universal love. He also renounces allegiance to God's authority, government, and law. His activity in getting, possessing, and using for self is the direct contrary of the activity of God, who opens his hand and all creatures are filled with good. And the selfish ends to which he directs his energies are contrary to the ends for which God acts in establishing his kingdom and the reign of wisdom and love. In renouncing God he renounces the absolute and perfect Reason as the guide of life and puts himself into antagonism to all rational truth and law and to the realization of all rational ends of perfection and well-being. It is the total revolt of the creature against the creator. The character developed is, as the scriptures describe it, "enmity against God" (Rom. viii. 7).

The sinner's alienation from God implies also that he excludes from within his soul all gracious influences of God's Spirit. The normal condition of a finite person is in union with God. As dependent on God he can realize the highest possibilities of his being only as he becomes receptive of God's gracious influences through faith or trust in him. God is man's spiritual environment; "in him we live and move and have our being." A finite person cannot be developed into right character nor attain his true perfection, power, and well-being, except as he continually receives spiritual quickening and nourishment from God. This he receives by his own willing faith or trust in God, in which he opens his soul to God, as a flower opens to the sun, to receive and assimilate all his divine and gracious influences. This is true

of all finite persons from the highest angel to the weakest child ; it is true of the holy ones in heaven not less than of sinners on earth ; their right character, perfection, and well-being are possible only as they willingly open their hearts to receive the divine influences in continuous trust or faith in God, and willingly follow the divine drawing. In the supreme choice of self, which is the essence of sinful character, the sinner renounces God as the supreme object of trust and service ; therein he repudiates his own condition as a creature and dependent on God, and sets himself up as the centre of all his interests, the supreme end of all his activity, and sufficient for himself in forming and executing all his plans. Thus he closes all the avenues through which the heavenly influences can enter his soul and separates himself from God. Then the divine Spirit is shut out from the soul. In biblical phrases, he is resisted, grieved, quenched, taken away. God's gracious disposition toward the sinner does not change. The same yesterday, to-day, and forever, he always " willeth that all men should be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth " (1 Tim. ii. 4). His heavenly influences press upon the resisting sinner, like water against an embankment, seeking at every point for some opening, entering every crevice however small, and working there to find its way through. They are like the sunshine and the atmosphere encompassing alike the living plants receptive of their quickening and nourishing influence, and the dead ones which reject them and by these same agencies are only hastened in their decay. But the heavenly influence is no longer within, quickening the spiritual life of love, but outside ; as the Bible represents the Spirit, he stands at the door and knocks, shut out by the sinner's wilful alienation of himself from God, in self-sufficiency, self-will, self-glorifying, and self-seeking. And because he has thus closed all avenues in his soul for the reception of the divine influences environing him, he must wither and decay in moral and religious character, as inevitably as a plant when pulled up by the roots. Its environment continues to encompass it, but the plant is no longer receptive of its quickening and nourishing influence. This is the very analogy which our Saviour used : " As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself except it abide in the vine, no more can ye except ye abide in me. If a man abide not in me, he is cast forth as a branch and is withered ; and they gather them and cast them into the fire and they are burned " (John xv. 1-8). The

result of this wilful alienation from God must be moral and spiritual corruption and decay, the failure to realize the true ends of existence, the loss of all that constitutes true perfection and well-being, — in a word, a lost soul.

By his wilful alienation from God the sinner is excluded from all access to God and communion with him. Prayer is the utterance of faith or trust in God. But the sinner in his self-sufficiency and self-will has renounced God and has no faith or trust in him. Therefore he cannot pray to God. On the other hand he resists and refuses all the gracious influences of God seeking to draw him to himself. Therefore God is shut out from fellowship and union with him. It is not that God is no longer graciously disposed toward the sinner. He is seeking the sinner to draw him to himself; he is waiting that he may be gracious (Isa. xxx. 18); he is ready to receive every sinner who yields to his gracious drawing, returns to him in penitence and trusts his grace; there is salvation to the uttermost unto all who return to God in Christ. But it is the sinner's wilful alienation of himself from God; and it is the impossibility of God's receiving any one who resists his gracious drawing, who will not come to him; the impossibility of God's dwelling in any soul and carrying on in it his work of renovation, purification, and development, while the man repudiates his dependence on God and his need of his grace and resists and excludes him from his soul when he approaches with his gracious influences. "Behold, the Lord's hand is not shortened that it cannot save; neither his ear heavy that it cannot hear; but your iniquities have separated between you and your God, and your sins have hid his face from you that he will not hear" (Isa. lix. 1). Here is a complete interruption of communion with God and a complete separation from him. Religion is in its essence communion with God; it is trust in God and service rendered to him. In renouncing God as the supreme object of trust and service, the sinner renounces all communion and fellowship with God, and therein all religion. Persisting in sin he is "having no hope and without God in the world" (Eph. ii. 12). The final sentence, "Depart," only declares the reality and perpetuity of that alienation and separation from God, and therein from all perfection and well-being, which the sinner by his own free and persistent choice has effected in his wilful renunciation of God and resistance of all his gracious influence, and has persisted in through all his life.

The sinner's alienation from God implies, further, that he is the object of God's condemnation and displacency. As the Bible expresses it, he is under the curse of the law, under the wrath of God which cometh on the children of disobedience and is revealed against all unrighteousness of men ; and the final doom is, Depart from me, ye cursed.¹ This is not a judgment pronounced merely once and ended. It is a continuous judgment and a continuous condemnation. So our Lord declared : " He who believeth not hath been judged already ; the wrath of God abideth on him " (John iii. 18, 36). And the gospel of Christ is represented as a winnowing fan, continuously separating the chaff from the wheat (Matth. iii. 12). On the sinner persisting in sin God in the exercise of his wisdom and love cannot bestow his approval or his blessing. God does not give or withhold blessings by decree of arbitrary sovereignty unregulated by law ; but only in harmony with the truth and law eternal in the absolute Reason, by which the constitution and evolution of the universe are determined. When a government, regardless of the laws of finance, arbitrarily decrees that slips of paper representing no real value shall be money, we call it in ridicule fiat money ; and history has shown again and again the impotence of the decree. And men demand fiat blessings, that God in his resistless almightiness should decree well-being to sinners persisting in sin. This is an idle imagination. The universe is constituted and goes on under law. All beings and powers in the universe, from the ultimate atoms to the highest order of rational persons, are under the eternal and immutable law of absolute Reason. In accordance with this law the universe is constituted, perpetuated, and developed. So Wordsworth represents it in his " Ode to Duty " : —

" Stern Lawgiver ! yet thou dost wear
 The Godhead's most benignant grace ;
 Nor know we anything so fair
 As is the smile upon thy face ;
 Flowers laugh before thee on their beds,
 And fragrance in thy footing treads ;
 Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong,
 And the most ancient heavens, through thee, are fresh and strong."

No power, though almighty, can annul these principles and laws. The whole moral system is constituted under the eternal and im-

¹ Gal. iii. 10 ; Eph. v. 6 ; Col. iii. 6 ; Rom. i. 18 ; Matth. xxv. 41.

mutable law of love. In a system thus constituted, no power, though almighty, can impart blessedness or well-being to a person persisting in selfishness, or avert evil from him. In all the resources of God's wisdom and love there is no blessing for such a person; but only the curse of the law, "indignation and wrath, tribulation, and anguish upon every soul of man who doeth evil" (Rom. ii. 8, 9).

Thus the penalty is primarily in the sinner's wilful alienation of himself from God and the privation of good and the positive evil which are involved in it. Here the difficulty is to name any real good of which the sinner is not deprived or any essential evil which he does not incur in his alienation of himself from God. As Augustine says: "To be lost out of the kingdom of God, to be an exile from the city of God, to be alienated from the life of God, to have no share in that great goodness of God which he hath laid up for them who fear him, is so great a punishment that, supposing it to be eternal, no torment that we know, though continued through as many ages as man's imagination can conceive, can be compared with it. There will, therefore, continue without end that eternal death of the wicked, that is, their alienation from God; and this will be common to all, whatever men, according to their human feelings, may imagine concerning variety of punishment or concerning relief or intermission of pain."²

2. The penalty consists also in the disorder and depravation of the man himself, and the privation and evil which come therein on the sinner in accordance with the constitution of man.

In the first place, as we have seen that sin brings a person into conflict with God, so it brings him also into conflict with himself. However completely he may give himself up to a life of sin, he will always be in conflict with his own reason and conscience. His sinful choices and volitions, his sinful desires and passions, his ruling purposes and plans, his character in its supreme bent, will be in direct conflict with these highest and authoritative powers of his spirit. However eagerly and successfully he may work in his sinful course of life, there is always in the background of his consciousness the overawing forms of these regents of the soul, authoritatively forbidding all which he is so eagerly doing, and condemning him as guilty. And in hours of solitude and reflection he may feel the bitterness of remorse. So Browning

² Enchiridion, chap. 112, 113.

has pictured a poor girl in the sense of sin crying in anguish, "There may be a heaven, there must be a hell."

Not only is there conflict between the sinful propensities and purposes and the conscience ; but also the appetites, desires, and passions, when not regulated by reason, are in conflict with each other. The gratifying of one requires the denial of many others. Hence, even in the life of self-seeking and self-indulgence, there must be continual self-conflict and continual self-denial, and always more desires must be denied and repressed than can be gratified. Thus the prophet's declaration is true for all time : "The wicked are like the troubled sea ; for it cannot rest, and its waters cast up mire and dirt. There is no peace, saith my God, to the wicked " (Isa. lvii. 20).

Selfishness also aims to obtain happiness by getting for self, by self-indulgence in the gratification of desires. But desire is an uneasiness in the sense of want, and it grows by what it feeds on. Therefore there are always restlessness and painfulness in their exercise, and either disappointment of their object, or disappointment in it if attained. The theory that this is the way to well-being issues in pessimism ; the actual living according to the theory involves continual restlessness and dissatisfaction, and issues in despair. Life is an illusion, and when the illusion is dispelled, life is seen to be not worth living. Man being spirit in the likeness of God, is made for the higher spiritual ends, for the life of love to God and man in trust and service. He can never be contented and satisfied with any attainment in the life of selfishness.

The life of sin issues also in the corruption, disorder, and depravation of the soul. Plato represents the soul after death appearing naked before the judge, Rhadamanthus, or Æacus, or Minos. There is nothing to indicate the rank, condition, or history of the person, whether a king or a beggar, when in the body. The judge simply examines the soul itself and pronounces judgment according as he sees it to be sound and healthy, or marred by sin, — normally developed, or perverted and degenerated.¹ This symbolizes a profound truth. The body of a child fair in face and form may become in later years, by dissipation and vice, bloated, gross, bestial, disgusting. An analogous depravation is wrought in the soul of a man by a life of sin. Could the soul suddenly

¹ Gorgias, 523.

make itself visible, so that we could see at a glance the scathing influence of a sinful life upon it, the spectacle would be more affecting than that of the ravages of sin on the body. The simplicity of the soul in childhood has been seamed with cunning, its credulity corrugated and stiffened into skepticism, its blushing modesty bronzed in impudence, its affections soured into misanthropy, and the whole soul seared and furrowed by manifold transgressions. Sin disorders it in all its susceptibilities and powers. It embitters the memory, defiles the imagination, troubles the conscience, inflames and disorders the desires, makes habits into chains and fetters, turns every faculty and susceptibility into an instrument of torture, and the sinful soul, by its own action, is deteriorated into moral corruption and rottenness. By action a person is always forming or confirming character. The soul of the miser is as really pinched and shrivelled by his penuriousness as is his body. The soul of the worldling, according to the terrible language of the Bible, is scathed by its worldliness, and the rust of his gold and silver eats as it were fire. The soul of the debauchee rivals his body in rottenness: "Their heart is as fat as grease"; "even their mind and conscience are defiled" (Psalm cxix. 70; Tit. i. 15). Could we see the sinner's soul, we should see it festering and gangrened with pride, impenitence, and selfishness, the vital powers of virtue decaying, pernicious desires eating like cancers, baleful passions swollen and inflamed, and "from the sole of the foot even unto the head, no soundness in it, but wounds and bruises and putrefying sores." Who can look on such a soul in contrast with the soul made perfect in love in the likeness of Christ without exclaiming, "How art thou fallen from heaven, O son of the morning!" And it is the sinner himself who, by his own chosen course of life, brings the woe and ruin on himself. By his own action through life in which he has been eagerly engaged, he has been, as Paul expresses it, treasuring up unto himself wrath against the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God, who will render to every man according to his deeds. So the ancient prophets express it: "They have rewarded evil unto themselves"; "thine own wickedness shall correct thee, and thy backslidings shall reprove thee" (Isa. iii. 9; Jerem. ii. 19).

This depravation of the soul issues in what is called death in sin. The higher powers and susceptibilities are enslaved to the

lower ; the spiritual is submerged and drowned in the sensual, smothered in the flesh ; some propensities are paralyzed, others fevered ; the intellect is beclouded by prejudice, the conscience seared as with a hot iron, the sinner's will has determined itself to the life of sin, choosing evil and refusing good. Thus he has become dead to the higher spiritual motives and interests, and alive to the sensual, worldly, and selfish. As our Saviour says, he cannot even see the kingdom of God. He sees nothing attractive in the life of love, in the service of God and man ; it is repulsive to him ; he has no desire for it as good, but shuns it as evil. Thus he is shut up to the life of selfishness and sin as his only portion, and to its pleasures as the only good ; as a caterpillar is shut up by the threads issuing from its own body to the perishing leaf on which it feeds, or the shell-fish to the rock beneath the water. His whole being is perverted. He chooses as good what is really evil, and refuses as evil what is the only true good. Were he in heaven, he would be miserable, and would flee from it, for "all that life is love." All good to him is lost ; evil is chosen as his only good.

Here we must notice the law of continuity of character in the moral system, analogous to the law of the persistence of force. By continued action in accordance with his character, whether right or wrong, a person is progressively confirming the character. Every act he does, every feeling he indulges, is strengthening invisible chains which bind him, and make it more necessary for him to continue in the same character. This confirmation of character sooner or later becomes so complete that the person becomes insensible to all moral motives to a change. When a sinner has brought himself to this decisive confirmation of character, he is separated finally and hopelessly from God ; he has excluded from himself susceptibility to the heavenly influences of God's redeeming grace and put himself beyond their reach.

" We shape ourselves the joy or fear,
Of which the coming life is made,
And fill our future's atmosphere
With sunshine or with shade."

Nor is there any reason to anticipate that this law of the confirmation of character by action in conformity with it will be suspended at death. It is part of a wider law which, throughout God's government, binds the future to the present and the pres-

ent to the past. It is not only, as Wordsworth says, "The child is father of the man," but throughout all moral action, the present is the child of the past and the parent of the future. In the transition from childhood to youth, from youth to manhood, and from manhood to old age, in intellectual and moral training, in social life, in the action of government, appears this indissoluble connection of the present with the past and of the future with the present. A person, a village, a church, a state, are what their past action has made them. The material world supplies numberless analogies to the same law, giving significance to the apostle's declaration, "Whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap" (Gal. vi. 7). It is in God's moral government the great law which, like the law of gravitation in the material world, binds the moral universe together. Annul this law, and it is inconceivable how the consciousness of personal identity can be retained; or how, ceasing to be conscious of any perpetuated results of past wrong-doing, the sinner can be conscious of guilt. Annul this law, and moral training becomes impossible; the cohesiveness and plasticity of character are destroyed, action can no more be moulded into character than dry sand into a statue, all the care with which a child is educated will be thrown away, the customs of early years will not grow into habits, and it is no longer true, "Train up a child in the way he should go and when he is old he will not depart from it." Annul this law, and the fact that a person has always been true, honest, and kind is no reason for expecting that he will continue to be so; all grounds of confidence in the perpetuity of character are destroyed, and the bonds of mutual confidence by which society is held together are dissolved. Annul this law, and it is no longer possible by living the life of Christian love to grow in the grace and knowledge of God, and all preparation for heaven is useless. Annul this law, and there is no danger in sipping the intoxicating glass or commencing any sinful indulgence, for the beginnings of sin are as likely to end in holiness as in greater sin. In short, annul this law, and God's moral government is at an end and the moral universe resolved into chaos.

W. S. Lilly says: "The eventual condition of every soul will be such as is best for that soul,—that is, the best possible for it as being what it is, what it has made itself to be."¹ It is some-

¹ "The Future of Religion," *Contemporary Review*, Feb. 1883, p. 20.

times said that God will never withhold from any sinner any enjoyment of which he is capable as a sinner in the course of life which he is pursuing. There is a truth in these sayings. God will not sunder the connections of cause and effect, of antecedent and consequent, which are involved in the constitution of things; whatever blessing or punishment he puts on men will be always in accordance with eternal truth and law, always in the exercise of both righteousness and benevolence, and always in accordance with the constitution of things. In punishing, God looks on the sinner, not with malignant wrath but with righteous indignation, with infinite disapproval but with infinite pity. The sinner will enjoy all which his character and what he has made himself to be by sin permit. Good is not withheld from him arbitrarily and revengefully, but in accordance with the immutable principles, laws, and ideals of eternal Reason, which determine the constitution and evolution of the universe. In the same manner God insures good to those who trust and serve him in love to him with all their hearts and to their neighbor as themselves. The constitution of the universe with its laws, progressively realizing the divine archetypal ideal of all perfection and well-being possible to be realized in a finite universe and a system of finite free moral agents, remains unchanged; and every person gets from it and from God in it whatever good he, his character and development being what they are, is capable of receiving. And the good or the evil which comes upon a person through the constitution of the universe, is as really the expression of the heart and thought of God, as it would be if God brought it on him directly by miraculous action. God's providential and moral action in the evolution of the universe, in harmony with the principles and laws in accordance with which the physical and the moral or spiritual systems are respectively constituted, is the continuous expression of his thought in progressive realization of his archetypal ideal or plan. It may be compared to the action of a man writing an essay, or delivering a discourse, or painting a picture, or inventing and constructing a steam-engine or an electric telegraph or a trolley railroad. The ideal which he has created in his mind is his plan. He is himself present actively engaged in constructing the realization of his ideal and so progressively expressing his thought and revealing his plan. Therefore, we are not to refer events to a system hard and fast and

apart from God. God is in it; his thought and its expression are not crystallized and finished, but continually crystallizing into reality in time and space.

It is said that if the sinner is punished by having his own way in sin, the punishment will be no motive to deter him from sin; for he will not feel it as privation or suffering. But if we leave out all other evils which come on the sinner in the punishment for his sin and confine our thought to the single point of the depravation of the soul itself by sin, it will be evident that it involves both privation and suffering; that it is a terrible punishment which sin inflicts by perpetuating itself and giving the sinner over to the realities of a soul leprous with sinful character. It is appalling to think of a person foaming everlastingly in anger, hatred, and revenge, lacerated with peevishness, anxiety, and discontent, pinched by eternal miserliness or covetousness, given up like a helpless deer, Actæon-like, to be hunted in full chase by his own open-mouthed and ravenous desires and passions. Napoleon spent his life in feeding his ambition with conquered principalities and kingdoms. He carried that gigantic ambition with him to the island to which he was banished. His discontent and misery there is an exhibition of the power of a single passion to fill the soul with anguish. It illustrates the case of the sinner driven from this life in his wickedness,—carrying with him his passions and desires intensified by long indulgence, to gnaw the naked soul itself,—carrying with him his dominant choice of self as his fixed and inmost character. Thus his own selfishness with its sharp-toothed desires and passions is itself the vulture devouring the ever living and growing heart of the Prometheus chained; or, as the scriptures picture it, the worm that never dies, the fire which can never be quenched. An aggravation of the woe is that by his own free and persistent choice and action he has not only brought it on, but inwrought it in himself. Because setting himself up as sufficient for himself he has alienated himself from God and excluded the divine guidance and help, he is left to the resources of his own self-sufficiency. He is driven by the restlessness of wants which he can never satisfy, attracted by hopes which always prove to be illusions; he toils for what seems to him the good and finds it only evil, getting only weariness in the toil and disappointment in the acquisition. So Bossuet exclaims: “Hell, it is the sin itself; hell, it is being alienated from God.”

It is not so much that the man is shut out of heaven as that he has shut heaven out of himself in renouncing God and shutting out the love in which the heavenly life and blessedness consist. It is not so much that the sinner is cast into hell, as that he kindles its fires in his own soul by his selfishness, his self-sufficiency, self-will, self-glorifying, and self-seeking. The question for every one is not so much, What will become of me? as, What shall I become?

Origen says that each one "kindled the flame of his own appropriate fire." Augustine says, "Because the sin was a despising of the authority of God . . . it was just that condemnation followed, and condemnation such that man, who by keeping the commandments should have been spiritual even in his flesh, became fleshly even in his spirit; and as in pride he had sought to be his own satisfaction, God in his justice abandoned him to himself, not to live in the absolute independence he affected, but instead of the liberty he desired, to live dissatisfied with himself in a hard and miserable bondage. . . . To say all in a word, what but disobedience was the punishment of disobedience in that sin (Adam's)? For what else is man's misery but his own disobedience, so that in consequence of his not being willing to do what he could, he now wills to do what he cannot?" ("Civitas Dei," Bk. xiv. chap. 15). "The holy man Fursey (A. D. 633), who believed himself to have been guided by an angel near the regions of the damned, related the vision. There were four fires, Falsehood, Covetousness, Discord, Injustice, which joined to form one great flame. When this drew near, Fursey in fear said, Lord, the fire draws near me. The angel answered, That which you did not kindle shall not burn you" (M. C. Conway "Demonology and Devil-lore," vol. ii. p. 421). Milton says of Satan:

Horror and doubt distract
His troubled thoughts, and from the bottom stir
The hell within him; for within him hell
He brings, and round about him, nor from hell
One step, no more than from himself, can fly.

Paradise Lost, B. iv.

Martensen says: "The proposition that sin is itself the punishment of sin embodies the truth that man by sin subjects himself to a moral fatality, a *misera necessitas mali*, expressed by our Lord in the words, Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of

sin" ("Dogmatics," p. 209, § 110). This moral fatality is simply the confirmed sinful character, making the man insensible to all motives to repentance and to all the gracious influences of God's Spirit. Julius Müller says: "The way of return to God is closed against no one who does not close it against himself." Dr. Norman McLeod says: "Let the fairest star be selected, like a beautiful island in the vast and shoreless sea of the azure heaven as the future home of the criminals from the earth; let them possess in this material paradise whatever they most love and all that it is possible for God to bestow," that is, upon them persisting in sin; ". . . let them exist there forever, smitten only by the leprosy of hatred to God, and with utter selfishness as their all-prevailing purpose; then, as sure as the law of righteousness exists, on which rests the throne of God and the government of the universe, a society so constituted must work out for itself a hell of solitary and bitter suffering to which no limit can be assigned except the capacity of a finite nature" (quoted by H. C. Haydn, "Death and Beyond," pp. 154, 159). Edwin Arnold ascribes a similar idea to Gautama Siddartha:

Showing how birth and death should be destroyed,
And how man hath no fate except past deeds,
No hell but what he makes, no heaven too high
For those to reach whose passions sleep subdued.

Light of Asia, Bk. viii. p. 27.

Byron describes this self-torment and exemplifies it:

And dost thou ask, what secret woe
I bear, corroding joy and youth? . . .
It is not love, it is not hate,
Nor low ambition's honors lost . . .
It is that weariness which springs
From all I meet, or hear, or see; . . .
It is that settled ceaseless gloom . . .
That will not look beyond the tomb,
But cannot hope to rest before . . .
What exile from himself can flee?
To zones, though more and more remote,
Still, still pursues; where'er I be,
The blight of life, the demon Thought.
. . . I've known the worst . . .
What is the worst? Nay, do not ask;
In pity from that search forbear;
Smile on, nor venture to unmask
Man's heart and view the Hell that's there.

Childe Harold, Canto i. (To Inez.)

Accordingly, as I have shown in Chapter VII., if a person's chief end in life is the gratification of selfish desires, Pessimism is the logical conception of human life and life is not worth living.

3. The penalty of sin consists, further, in the moral isolation of the sinner from his fellow-men, and the privation and evil which this brings on him in accordance with the constitution of the moral system. By selfishness a person isolates himself from his fellow-men in the moral system and thus puts himself into antagonism to them. It tends to division, alienation, and enmity between man and man as inevitably as it involves alienation from God and enmity against him. The selfish person wishes to use other persons for his own advantage, or at least to crowd them out of his way. The principle on which he acts is the principle of antagonism and enmity. Its tendency to this result has been manifested in all the history of the world. Poverty, the evils of selfish competition and of selfish combination, war, tyranny, fraud, injustice, and nearly all the evils which afflict society would cease if selfishness should cease and love to God and man reign in the hearts and regulate the lives of all.

Selfishness is also in direct revolt against the moral government of God. If it had power commensurate with its disposition, it would depose God, subvert the moral system and reign in God's stead.

But the selfish life, because it involves enmity against God, can issue only in frustration and defeat. The universe is constituted under the law of love. Every attempt to attain well-being in a life of selfishness must fail. According to the constitution of the universe all things in it work together for good to them who love God and man, and for evil to them who live in selfishness.

4. The penalty comprises also the privation of physical good and the suffering of physical evil which the sinner brings on himself by his sin through the physical constitution of the universe. The physical system is subordinate to the ends and uses of the spiritual and moral system. God uses its agencies both for the moral discipline of rational persons, and for the punishment of those who sin. It is not true that physical want and suffering are always penalties for sin. They may be incidental to the education and discipline of those who have not sinned. We can say that any particular physical privation or suffering is a penalty for sin only when we can trace the connection and know that sin has

occasioned the privation or suffering. Such are the physical effects of drunkenness and licentiousness, of luxurious self-indulgence, and the penury which results from idleness and improvidence. Here opens a wide range of facts in which it comes under our observation that sin is punished by physical evils coming on the sinner in accordance with the constitution of the physical system. And because we know that the physical system is constituted and evolved according to the truths and laws of Reason and for the realization of its archetypal and ideal ends of perfection and well-being, we must infer, what the scriptures also teach, that all the powers of the physical system, working together according to the constitution of the system, must tend, in their general scope and ultimate issues, to bring good on all persons who live lives of Christian love, and evil on all who live in selfishness.¹

5. The penalty for sin comprises exclusion from heaven, and the privation of good and the suffering of positive evil which this implies and which is set forth in the scriptures.

This is a necessary inference from the principles already established. There is nothing in the fact of death which changes the essential character of sin, nor the moral constitution of man, nor the constitution of the universe, nor the character of the person nor the law of its formation and development. Therefore there is nothing in death which can arrest the punishment of sin. The punishment is the necessary shadow of the sin as it obtrudes itself into the light of the eternal Reason and obstructs the rays of its eternal wisdom and love. As R. W. Emerson expresses it: "Crime and punishment grow out of one stem. Punishment is a fruit which unsuspected ripens in the flower of pleasure which concealed it." In accordance with these principles it is certain that every one who persists in sin without repentance till death will begin the life after death a sinner; that he will be punished in the future life so long as he persists impenitent in sin; that, according to the law of moral continuity, persisting in sin, he will come, if he has not reached it before death, to a character so confirmed in sin that no moral influence will induce him to change; that the penalty which I have indicated will continue

¹ "The essential good of a person is the perfection of his being, his consequent harmony with himself, with God the supreme Reason, and with the constitution of the universe; and the happiness necessarily resulting" ("The Philosophical Basis of Theism," Prof. S. Harris, p. 271.)

inseparable from the sinful character; and that this will be true, whatever privations and evils may be incurred in the life after death, transcending the limits of our present knowledge.

We can form no definite conception of the nature of the physical evil which may enter into the punishment of sin in the world to come, because we know so little of "that body which shall be" and of its environment. The significance of the biblical representations of unquenchable fire, the immortal worm, and the like, as emblems, need not be restricted to physical suffering, but may equally, or even only, denote the spiritual evil coming in and from sin. But we must infer that the physical environment, whatever it may be, must be there, as it is here, a medium for the education of the righteous and for the punishment of transgressors; that sin there as really as here will be in contradiction to the constitution of the universe, and that all the forces of the universe, there as here, in their unity as a system and in their ultimate tendency, will work together for the good of them who love God and their neighbors, and for evil to all who live in selfishness and sin.

The Bible teaches that some will never turn from selfishness to God in penitential trust and service. But as to the question of fact, what will be the actual results of God's gracious action redeeming men from sin, the attempt to answer it must be postponed till after we have studied the history of God's redemptive action and his revelation of himself therein as recorded in the Bible, and all the teachings of Christ, "who illuminated life and immortality through the gospel" (2 Tim. i. 10).¹

¹ Rev. Charles A. Allen, in the "Unitarian Review," quotes the words of another, "The insight of conscience and the sense of sin are the source, and not the fruit, of religious fear, and whatever is fabulous in the scene on which it looks is but a distorted shadow cast from the truest light"; and says: "It is the radiant light of this intense and holy ethical feeling of Christianity that casts the distorted shadow; and we must confess that this shadow was inevitable, simply because no other symbolic picture seemed adequate to express to the religious imagination the distinctive Christian feeling of the infinite and everlasting gulf between sin and holiness. . . . Any one who will look beneath the logical forms of statement which theologians have given to this popular doctrine and penetrate to the spiritual fact of human experience that is hid within, can read the deeper meaning of the doctrine. But, if the Unitarians, in dropping the doctrine, lose also the Christian sentiment which it was meant to express, they miss the central truth of the Christian Gospel."

IV. INFERENCES AND EXPLANATIONS. — This doctrine of the divine punishment of sinners corrects misconceptions, removes difficulties and objections and gives a clearer and deeper insight into its significance and its practical power.

1. It throws light on the nature and necessity of probation. Probation is inseparable from the education, disciplining, and development of finite persons in a moral system. God does not put men on probation simply for the sake of trying them, but because he is aiming to develop and perfect them by education and discipline ; and trial or probation is inseparable from the process. Because they are finite they must begin undeveloped and characterless, and must by their own free action form their own characters, right or wrong, in love or selfishness. God in giving them his law and in all his loving dealings with them aims to educate, discipline, and develop them to the formation of right characters of love like his own and to the realization of the highest possibilities of their being. In this process of education and development they are necessarily on probation. Under the gracious influences of God's teaching and discipline they must determine by their own free wills whether they will obey or disobey his law of love, whether they will trustfully follow his heavenly drawing, or resist it in self-sufficiency and self-will.

If any of them disobey and resist, and so alienate themselves from God, they are condemned. But God still remains gracious and seeks the sinners with heavenly influences to draw them back to trust and serve him in the life of love. Then they are necessarily again on probation under God's gracious seeking of them, and must decide either penitently to accept his grace and enter on the life of love, or to resist and reject it and persist in selfishness and disobedience.

Thus it is inseparable from the process of education, discipline, and development of a finite person in a moral system under the government of God, that he be on probation or trial. He must by his own free will determine his own action and form his own character.

And the probation or trial will continue till by persistence the person's character has become fixed so that moral influences will never induce him to change. If it is fixed in selfishness, he is no longer on probation but under final condemnation in fixed alienation from God. If his character is fixed in love,

he is no longer on probation, but secure in his love against all temptation to change. But this fixedness is not as Martensen represents it, a moral fatality, a miserable necessity of sinning. The sinner remains as completely as ever in the exercise of free will; only by his own free action he has so confirmed his own free choice or preference that the contrary presents no attractions. It is his own free choice or preference continuous and free at every moment in which he persists forever. The opinion often expressed in theology, that such persistence is incompatible with free will, rests on the false theory that the exercise of free will is possible only in indifference, or on some other erroneous theory. It is in no wise incompatible with free will rightly conceived as power enlightened by reason and therefore self-directive and self-exertive.

It may be asked, why God, since he is almighty, does not restrain the person from willing wrong; or, after the person has renounced God in the supreme choice of self, why does not God by almighty power change the sinner's will. The answer is that a free will cannot be determined by force or by another person, but only by the person himself in free determination under the influence of motives. If a person's will is determined by another, the determination would be no longer his own act, but the act of another. This supposition and the supposition that the will is determined by force are incompatible with the essential idea of free will. God cannot change a person's free choice by an act of resistless power. This would imply, not determining or changing the free will, but crushing and annihilating it, and with it the moral system itself and all moral government. God's drawing of a free agent to himself can be only by influence compatible with the constitution of a rational free agent. It is of the essence of free will that it can resist all the influence which God in wisdom and love can exert on it. "I drew them with cords of a man, with bands of love." "The love of Christ constraineth us" (Hos. xi. 4; 2 Cor. v. 14). The theological teaching that God regenerates the sinner by almighty and resistless power is totally incompatible with free will.

It may be asked why God did not create men with characters confirmed in love. The answer is the same. Every one must determine his own moral character. It can begin only in his own free choice in the exercise of his own free will. It can

be developed and confirmed only by his own free action in harmony with it, strengthening his determination of himself, forming habits and developing susceptibilities and capacities in the line of his supreme choice, suppressing and deadening all those impelling to the contrary. God can no more create a person with a moral character than he can create a person a hundred years old.

It is therefore inherent in the very idea of rational and responsible moral agents and of their existence in a moral system under the government of God, that they must all pass through a period of education, discipline, and development, in which they are on probation or trial and are severally forming their characters either in love to God and man or in wilful alienation from him and from men in supreme love to self. A moral system not under these conditions is impossible and absurd.

The doctrine has been familiar in theology that mankind was on probation collectively once for all and one for all in Adam; and that after his fall no person is personally on probation at the beginning of life, but all are already under condemnation. Augustine taught that man lost his free will in the Fall. In this he differs from the earlier fathers in the Christian church. These had taught that, whatever damage had come on man by the fall of Adam, his power of free choice remained, so that he could avail himself of whatever opportunities and influences God graciously offered him. Clement of Alexandria recognized capacity for good even in the heathen. Augustine's doctrine that free will was lost in the Fall has had wide prevalence in theology. It has been a basis for the doctrine of absolute unconditional election and reprobation. All human beings are born sinful, guilty and without free will. God's election becomes absolute and arbitrary, having no regard to the free action of man.¹ The only legitimate basis for this conception is the doctrine that the divine will is supreme and unregulated by law, above even the principles and laws of Reason, and that the regeneration of the sinner is simply an act of almighty power. These conclusions logically carried out are incompatible with the existence of rational free agents and of a moral system under the moral government of God. The Augustinian doctrine on this point is now giving way to the more scrip-

¹ See "Westminster Confession," chaps. iii., vi., ix., x.

tural and reasonable doctrine that every person under the government of God is on probation, and while dependent on God's grace determines his own character and destiny. This change is in great part the result of greater clearness and correctness of the conception of free will and moral responsibility, and of God as the absolute Reason freely determining all his action in conformity with its eternal principles and laws.

2. The doctrine which has been presented shows the reasonableness of punishment and the obligation of government to inflict it on transgressors. This appears in the fact that the principles of truth and of the moral law are eternally and immutably the constituent elements of absolute Reason, authoritatively commanding every rational will and imposing obligation to obedience. This is sometimes spoken of as the ethical necessity both of obedience and of the infliction of punishment. It is rather the supreme and inviolable authority of absolute Reason underlying the constitution of the universe, and the ethical and immutable obligation to obey it, which are the presupposition of moral action and responsibility.

Sir William Hamilton by his agnosticism shuts out all basis for the knowledge of the true, the right, the perfect, and the good as eternal in the mind of God and constituent elements of the eternal Reason. He teaches that we do not know what God is; we do not know that truth, right, perfection, well-being, love, are to God at all what we suppose them to be. Hence we cannot know that God's will is regulated by the law of love, or that it is not altogether above law and exempt from all rational control. Mansel goes even further and teaches that God has power to suspend the moral law for individuals in special cases, and that instances of such suspension are recorded in the history of Israel. He calls such a supposed suspension of law "a moral miracle." But a miracle, even in the physical world, never suspends a universal truth or law of reason, but only interrupts a uniform sequence by the intervention of another adequate cause; while both the sequence and its interruption accord with the principles and laws of reason. A miracle implies no suspension of the law of causation, or of the law that the same combination of causes always produces the same effect, or of the principles of mathematics or the laws of mechanics. In a miracle the sequence is interrupted only by a new cause

adequate to produce the new effect. No power in the universe or transcending it can annul or suspend a universal and eternal law of reason, as, for example, by producing an effect without an adequate cause. Equally impossible is the suspension in any case for an instant of the universal law of love. It would imply that law is created by the fiat of an almighty will; that there is no law except arbitrary rules now promulgated and then annulled by a capricious will itself unregulated by reason or by any eternal truth and law. Then there would be no eternal and immutable ground for the law of love, no absolute and universal obligation to obedience to it or to the punishment of transgressors, no need of atonement for sin. The supreme will that issued the command can revoke it when he will and can remit the punishment of a transgressor when he will without the transgressor's repentance and without atonement. The only conception which admits the rightfulness and the ethical obligation of punishment, or of atonement in order to the justification of sinners, is that which recognizes the law of love as eternal in God the absolute Reason, which he cannot rescind without annulling his own rationality; and also recognizes God, by his eternal free choice, acting in obedience to that law in all his righteousness and benevolence, constituting and evolving the universe in accordance with it; and Christ, the exponent to us, under human limitations and conditions, of God's love in the redemption of men from sin, obeying the law of love even unto death. Thus God reveals the inviolable authority, the universality and immutability of that law, the inevitableness of the persistent punishment of the persistent transgressor, and the impossibility of redeeming the sinner from sin to God, except in such way as asserts, maintains, and vindicates the supremacy of the law of love as effectually as does the punishment of the sinner persisting in sin,—and thus makes atonement for sin. If God in the exercise of his benevolence in the redemption of sinners is not himself obeying the law of love, then he is not asserting and maintaining it, and therefore is not making atonement for sinners; and he needs to make none, because, being above law in his benevolence, he can, at his mere lawless will, remit the penalty which the law imposes on transgressors. David sank the judge in the father. Brutus sank the father in the judge. God is both father and judge in every act, alike when commanding, condemning, redeeming, or justifying.

3. Our doctrine corrects misapprehensions as to God's agency in punishing and answers objections founded on them.

The objection is urged that, if evil comes on the sinner in consequence of his sin through the constitution of the universe, it is not inflicted immediately by God as an expression of his displacency and condemnation, and therefore is not punishment in the true meaning of the word.

It is admitted that it is essential to the idea of the divine punishment of sinners that it must be God who punishes, and that the punishment must express his condemnation of the sinner and his displacency toward him. Any theory that punishment is the natural consequence of sin, which means that it does not come on the sinner from God and is not the expression of God's condemnation and displacency, is necessarily false ; for it leaves out that which is of the essence of punishment, which distinguishes penalty from disease or misfortune, and which gives to it all its moral power. Such a theory, I admit, is "atheistic in its affinities and its theory of the moral universe." It excludes God from the constitution, evolution, and government of the universe. And it must be admitted also that theologians have stated the doctrine of moral continuity and punishment through the constitution of things so as to imply this exclusion of God, sometimes using language implying more than the writer intended. "Those consequences which seem to answer most truly to the ideas expressed by such words (punishment and reward) are nothing, as we have seen, but the fruit of natural development of the good or evil we have done, and are neither extrinsically superadded nor arbitrarily imposed." This writer gives a similar explanation of a sinner's conversion to God. He raises the question, how it is possible under this law of moral continuity for a bad man to change his character and enter on a right life. Of the Christian explanation of this by the gracious and renovating influence of God in redemption he says : "St. Paul was confident that the better will, when re-enforced by Christian influences, could and would triumph ; but to conceive of these influences as an exertion of supernatural grace, as he is generally supposed to do, is little else than to explain away the difficulty and really to deprive the process of conversion of all its value and of all mystery. We have rather to seek the explanation of it in the latent capacities of our nature ; in the balance of good and evil within us ; in the vitality

and spontaneousness of a spiritual force, of a higher nature within us to which the gospel appeals; and in the action of the divine idea, as the gospel presents it, upon the reason of man."¹ This seems to imply the exclusion of the presence and action of the personal God from government by law, from punishment and redemption, and every supernatural agency, and to resolve it all into the influence of abstract truth and law; thus implicitly agreeing with those who explicitly assert this exclusion. So Töllner says the punishment of sin would come on the sinner as the immediate consequence of sin just as certainly, even if there were no God. And Emerson speaks of the moral laws as executing themselves. Thus he falls into a very common mistake of identifying abstract laws with efficient causes. If these conceptions are correct, one is at a loss to see what need there is of God, or wherein man is dependent on him or needs to trust him, or what possibility there is for man of any religion above a morality which consists in his acting in accordance with his own "idea" of right. Such statements logically imply either atheism, or an epicurean or deistic conception of God as apart from the universe and inactive in it. In the latter case they logically imply that the constitution of the universe is foreign from God and the universe practically independent of him; that he acts and reveals himself in it only on rare occasions and then in contravention of its constitution, its laws, and its continuity and uniformity; so that his action can be only irruptive and interruptive.

If this were a true conception of the continuity of moral character and of punishment coming on the sinner through the constitution of things, the objection under consideration would be valid and the doctrine of moral continuity would be untenable. But the objection is of no force against the doctrine rightly understood. God in the light of his perfect Reason sees the archetypal plan of a finite universe, created in the forms of space, time, and conscious but finite personality, accordant with all rational truth and law, in which he will progressively realize the rational ideals of perfection and well-being so far as possible in a finite universe and in a system of finite free moral agents, and by the action of good-will regulated in wisdom and righteousness. He gives to the universe its constitution by expressing in it the archetypal thoughts of his wisdom in the acts of his love. He is

¹ Rev. Wm. Mackintosh, D. D., "Scotch Sermons," 1880, pp. 138, 149.

immanently active in it, progressively expressing and revealing his thought and character, realizing the ideals of his wisdom, and revealing his divine perfections. Thus in the constitution, evolution, and government of the universe he is continuously and progressively expressing his thought and purpose, his righteousness and good-will, what he is as God, and what are his relations to his creatures; thus in the constitution and on-going of the universe God is continuously revealing himself. If, then, through the constitution and evolution of the universe evil comes on sinners in consequence of their sins, this is all the more the expression of God's condemnation and displacency. Actions speak louder than words. God always acts in perfect sincerity, acting out what he is as God. In condemning and punishing sinners he simply acts out the divine in him. These are only the reverse side of his love, of his good-will regulated in righteousness. And because the punishment comes from God through the constitution of the universe and the normal action of its powers, it must be accordant with the law of love which is at the basis of the moral system, and with all the principles, laws, and ideals eternal in the absolute Reason in accordance with which the universe is constituted. Therefore it is impossible for any person living in selfishness in the universe thus constituted and evolved to realize perfection and well-being; and impossible for any person living in universal love to miss these blessings. Thus God has incorporated his law of love, its immutable obligation and inviolable authority, and the inevitableness of the punishment of transgressors, into the constitution of the universe and maintains and enforces the law through the normal action of all its powers. It is more emphatically the infliction of punishment by the hand of God and the expression of his condemnation and displeasure than any infliction transcending the constitution of the universe and breaking in on its continuity and uniformity. When God blesses a person, "underneath are the everlasting arms," strong with all the energies of the universe; and by the same his curse is laid upon the sinner.

This objection may sometimes arise from the misapprehension that the constitution of the universe denotes only the constitution of nature, that is, of the physical system. It should be understood that the constitution of the universe includes the constitution of personal free agents as well as of impersonal beings; of the moral system as well as of the physical.

Another needed explanation is that the doctrine is not that all privation and suffering which come on a person in accordance with the constitution of the universe are a punishment for his personal sin. The scriptures plainly teach the contrary.¹ Christ himself, the ideally perfect man, was also pre-eminently the man of sorrows. Privation and suffering are brought on men without regard to their personal character, by sins and crimes of others, and by cosmic agencies which the person had no way to avoid and no power to resist. Such privation and suffering, however, met and borne in Christian love, develop and strengthen the spiritual character and power, and, as the means of education, discipline, and development to true well-being, are not evil but relative good. Therefore of all privation and suffering coming on sinners according to the constitution of the universe we regard as punishment only that which comes on the sinner as the necessary consequence of his sin and which would have been avoided if he had not committed the sin.

We see in this life evils evidently brought on men through the constitution of things in consequence of their sins. In these cases no one who believes in God doubts that the evils are the punishment of sin expressing God's displacency and condemnation. Such are the anguish of remorse, self-condemnation, shame, and fear in the consciousness of guilt; diseases which are the avengers of drunkenness and licentiousness; poverty which follows idleness, negligence, and lack of frugality. There are also latent capacities which surprise us by awakening in extraordinary emergencies, revealing terrible possibilities of memory and remorse. This is exemplified in the many instances on record of the revival of memory in persons at the point of drowning or in violent disease.² It is sometimes argued, from the fact that sinners become

¹ Luke xiii. 1-5; John ix. 2, 3; Heb. ii. 10-18; iv. 15.

² Coleridge relates an instance: A young woman in violent illness repeated sentences and words of an unknown language. These were ascertained to be sentences and words of Hebrew which a former employer of the girl was accustomed to read aloud as he walked up and down a hall, the door of which opened into the kitchen. De Quincy says, near the end of his "Opium Eater": "A relative of mine, having in her childhood fallen into a river, and being on the verge of death, . . . saw in a moment her whole life, clothed in its forgotten incidents, arrayed before her as in a mirror, not successively but simultaneously; and she had a faculty developed as suddenly for comprehending the whole and every part." When California travel was mostly by the isthmus, a New York and Panama steamship foundered at sea and the crew

hardened by persistence in sin, that they will become incapable of remorse and that conscience will cease either to command or reprove them. Such a moral petrification would be in itself the loss from the soul of all that is highest and best, and so would be a terrific retribution. But these instances of the revival of long latent powers and susceptibilities admonish sinners that, however memory may slumber and conscience be seared, they are not dead but only sleeping, and may at any time awake with all their terrific energy.

We are not justified in declaring that any particular evil is the punishment of any particular sin, unless we can trace its connection with the sin as its consequence according to the constitution of things. But the many instances in which the evidence of the connection is undeniable exemplify the reality and illustrate the significance of punishment coming on the sinner as a consequence of his sin through his own constitution and that of the moral and of the physical system; and they thus answer the objections against this doctrine. Doubtless there are many punishments of sin thus coming on the sinner in this life, which through the limitation of our knowledge we cannot identify as such. And we may reasonably suppose that there will be punishments after death which will come in the same manner.

and passengers were thrown upon the water. A man returning from California was floating on a plank. As he was becoming exhausted he heard distinctly his mother's voice speaking from the air above him and saying, 'Johnny, did you take those grapes?' In telling of this after his rescue, he said that when he was a little boy a friend of the family had sent some rare and choice grapes for his sister, who was near death in consumption. Seeing them on a table in the hall, he ate them. Soon after, his mother, looking for the grapes, said to him the words which he heard when floating on the sea. As she pointed out his selfishness and unkindness in taking grapes sent for his suffering sister, he was greatly ashamed and distressed. But he said he had not thought of the event for twenty years. Oliver W. Holmes, in his "Mechanism in Thought and Morals," says: "A. had a bond against B. for several hundred dollars. When it became due, he searched for it but could not find it. He told the facts to B., who denied having given the bond, and intimated a fraudulent design on the part of A., who was compelled to submit to his loss and the charge against him. Years afterwards, A. was bathing in the Charles River, when he was seized with cramp and nearly drowned. On coming to his senses, he went to his book-case, took out a book and from between its leaves took the missing bond. In the sudden picture of his entire life, which flashed upon him as he was sinking, the act of putting the bond in the book and the book in the book-case had represented itself."

The conclusion is that the doctrine does not deny God's action in punishing nor lessen the significance of punishment as expressing God's displacency and condemnation, and as asserting, maintaining, and vindicating the authority of his law of love. And it demonstrates that God's action in punishing is not arbitrary, but is in accordance with the fundamental principles and ideals eternal in the divine Reason, with the constitution of personal beings, and with the constitution of the moral and of the physical system; and that it is effected through agencies in the universe acting in accordance with its constitution and laws. This doctrine is illustrated in our Saviour's parable of the branch and the vine. The branch torn from the vine ceases to bear fruit, withers, and becomes fit only to be burned, in accordance with the constitution and laws of the vine and its environment. So a person who has alienated himself from God in sin and so has shut out from his spirit all the quickening and nourishing influences of his heavenly environment, must become spiritually withered; there must be at once an end of all spiritual growth and well-being and of all fruitful productiveness of good for others. And as in the branch, when life has ceased, all the chemical and mechanical forces in it and its environment begin to act on it to hasten its decay, so when in alienation from God the life of love has ceased, all the natural powers, desires, and passions, freed from the love which has vitalized and directed them and now penetrated and directed by selfishness, begin to act in the soul to disorder, pervert, and corrupt it. And the sinner's environment also brings on him temptation to sin and hastens his corruption, while the same environment to one vigorous in the life of love would be no temptation to sin, but would repel from it; as, for example, a man enslaved under the appetite for intoxicating drink, if he passes the door of a grog-shop, is irresistibly tempted to go in, while to the temperate man the same is positively repulsive. The person by his own character, which he has freely formed, determines the influence of his environment on him. As the sunshine, the atmosphere, and other cosmic agencies, which had contributed to the growth of the branch while it was alive in the living vine, now hasten its decay, so the same outward influences, which hasten the sinner's corruption, act on one alive in union with the living God and vigorous in the life of love, to quicken and develop him in spiritual life, growth, and fruitfulness. The result comes

about in accordance with the constitution of things as really as does the growth or the withering of the branch. Accordingly Bishop Butler says: "We are at present actually under God's government in the strictest and most proper sense; in such a sense that he rewards and punishes us. . . . Whether the pleasure or pain which thus follows upon our behavior be owing to the Author of nature's acting upon us every moment in which we feel it, or to his having at once contrived and executed his own part in the plan of the world, makes no alteration as to the matter before us."¹ Even if God in punishing inflicted stripes on the sinner with his own hand or blew the wrathful fires with his own breath, still it would be only through the physical constitution of the sinner that the infliction could cause pain. Even if, with like directness, he tortured the sinner with spiritual anguish, it could be only through the sinner's constitution as spirit that the infliction could cause anguish. Even a miracle must be wrought within the universe and in harmony with the fundamental principles, laws, ideals, and ends of the absolute Reason, and therefore with the constitution of the universe which is determined by these principles, laws, and ends. A miracle, therefore, does not violate the fundamental constitution and laws of the universe nor interrupt its continuity. It interrupts only some factual sequence of cause and effect by the action of a new and sufficient cause. Even the coming of God in Christ is not contrary to the fundamental constitution and laws of the universe, but rather the consummation of the continuous action of God immanent in the universe and ever coming near to man in the courses of human history, revealing himself to men, seeking them in infinite love to bring them back into communion and union with himself, and continuing this consummate revelation through all ages in the Holy Spirit, "taking of the things of Christ and showing them unto us."

Another objection is that the punishment of sin by sin is meaningless; that it would not be punishment in any real significance of the word, and would not have any influence to deter from sin. This objection is founded on misapprehension of the doctrine objected to.

Some suppose the doctrine to be that the only punishment of sin is the remorse which the sin occasions. So Mr. Constable

¹ "Analogy," Part I., chap. ii.

says: "Imagine a house attacked by burglars and think of the effect of this remonstrance, 'Consider, my friends, how your consciences will sting you for this by and by.'" ¹

Others suppose it to mean that God by his own efficiency will punish a person for sin by causing him to commit more sin; as if the punishment of a thief would be simply by causing him to steal again. So Schleiermacher argues that a punishment must be something superadded to the sin and therefore cannot be the sin itself. But the doctrine is not that sin is in this sense punished by committing further acts of sin, but by the privation and evil which the person by his sin brings upon himself in accordance with the constitution of man and of the universe. In this, as well as in some other common forms of objection, there is the underlying error that sin consists in isolated volitions or intentional acts, without recognition of the continuity of character. If we recur to the psychological definition of character (Chap. XIX.), the objection is seen to be of no force. Sin is essentially the choice of self as the supreme object of trust and service; it is a free act of choice and yet abides as character; it is manifested in and strengthened by subordinate choices and volitional action; thereby it determines the formation of habits; it perverts the intellect and the feelings; it darkens and sears the conscience; it issues in moral impotence for seeking the true good, in moral incapacity even to appreciate it as good, in spiritual bondage to sin, in spiritual insensibility, and the death in trespasses and sin. In its essence as the supreme choice of self it is alienation from God and enmity against him; it involves the sinner's conflict with himself and with the moral system; it changes his relation to the physical system so that even in it for him all things work for evil. Here then we may distinguish between the sin as the person's free choice and action, and the consequences which the sin brings on him. And because these consequences come on him in accordance with the constitution of the person himself and of the universe and through the agencies therein acting according to the laws of their being, we recognize them as coming from God in the punishment of sin. And through it all, the character is fundamentally the sinner's own free abiding and supreme choice. Thus the person by his own sin brings his punishment on himself. This is the truth some-

¹ Duration and Nature of Future Punishment, p. 165.

times loosely expressed by saying that sin is its own punishment. The meaning is that the penalty consists in the corruption of the sinner's own being, in the perversion of his relations to the moral or spiritual, as well as to the physical system, in his alienation from God, and in all the privation, suffering, and evil which he brings on himself by his own sin, and which are inseparable from it according to the constitution of the universe. Because sinful action forms sinful habits and confirms sinful character, this deterioration of character and the consequent continued repetition of sinful acts are among the woes which men bring on themselves by sinning. In this sense we may say truly that sinfulness or deterioration of character is one of the penalties for sinful action. This accords with the teaching of the Bible, "Whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap." Paul here recognizes the connection between sin and its penalty as analogous to the natural connection between the seed and its growth and fruit. The harvest will be of the same kind with the seed. Our Lord declares that the blessing of those who hunger and thirst after righteousness is that they shall be filled with the righteousness. As a hungry child cannot be satisfied with a rattle, but only with the food for which it hungers, so they who hunger and thirst after righteousness can be satisfied only with the righteousness on which their hearts are set. It is equally impossible for those who hunger and thirst only for selfish acquisitions to be satisfied with righteousness. Their chosen selfish ends must be their only portion. The same is the teaching of the Old Testament: "Thine own wickedness shall correct thee and thy backsliding shall reprove thee: know, therefore, and see that it is an evil thing and a bitter that thou hast forsaken the Lord thy God and that my fear is not in thee"; "For that they hated knowledge and did not choose the fear of the Lord, they would none of my counsel and despised all my reproofs, therefore shall they eat of the fruit of their own way and be filled with their own devices; for the backsliding of the simple shall slay them and the prosperity of fools shall destroy them."¹

The distinction has been suggested that sin is its own punishment only so far as it is bondage or suffering,—not in so far as the sinner delights in his sin. But whatever truth there may be

¹ Gal. vi. 7, 8; Matth. v. 6; Jerem. ii. 19; Prov. i. 31; Psalm cvi. 15; Rom. i. 18-32; 2 Thess. ii. 10-12; Rev. xxii. 11.

in this distinction, it is still a fact that the pleasure which the sinner finds in sin is one of its most fatal characteristics. For the sinner has so drowned himself in selfishness that he has made himself incapable of enjoyment in acts of Christian trust, and finds his joy only in selfish pursuits and acquisitions. The very pleasure which he feels is itself a motive inflaming him to greater eagerness in his selfish pursuits and so intensifying the fever which is consuming him.¹

Nitzsch argues that the consequences of sin cannot be identified with its punishment, "because the eternal consequences of their sin exist even among the blessed, not as a punishment, but as a consciousness of grace and thankfulness."² It is true, as I have already explained, that if a person lives in supreme selfishness and sin during any period of his existence, he sustains an irretrievable loss. But when he yields to God's redeeming grace and returns to him, he is no longer under condemnation, but restored to the favor of God; and under the divine influences, and in union with God, his character no longer deteriorates, but is developed till he becomes perfected in the life of love. Even then, he remembers with penitence the fact of his sin, which can never be erased from his history, and adores God for the grace which has redeemed him, and rejoices in it. Joy and gratitude in the consciousness of God's graciousness are not privation or suffering, they are not evil, either essential or relative. They are not brought on the sinner by his sin, but by his forsaking sin in turning to God and accepting his grace. The joy which one feels in recovery from disease is not caused by the disease, but by his getting rid of the disease. There will be a peculiarity in the joy as occasioned by recovery from disease. But the person's enjoyment and well-being cannot be greater on the whole than if he

¹ Cicero says, "No greater pest was ever given by nature to man than sensual pleasure, greedy desires of which incite to rash and unbridled efforts to possess it. Hence arise treasons, revolts against the republic, clandestine conferences with its enemies; there is no crime, no scandalous action to which the desire of pleasure may not impel; adulteries and all shameful deeds of that kind are incited by nothing but the enticements of pleasure. While neither nature nor any god has given to man any more excellent gift than reason, nothing is more inimical to this divine endowment than pleasure. Under its reign there is no place for self-control (*temperantiae*) nor for any virtue. . . . If greater and longer continued it would extinguish the light of reason." (De Senectute, xii.)

² Christlichen Lehre, § 219, p. 402, note 3.

had remained in health, escaping all the pains and anxieties of the disease and enjoying, instead, life and work in all the vigor of health without interruption.

There has been discussion whether Christ saves primarily from punishment or from sin. But, according to the doctrine here presented, it is impossible to save from punishment without saving from sin in its fundamental character as alienation from God in the choice of self as the supreme object of trust and service.

It is properly said that sinners bring their own punishment on themselves. As free agents they are the responsible authors of their own sin; therefore, since sin and punishment are inseparable, they who sin are responsible as bringing on themselves their own punishment. Yet this does not exclude the action of God, nor make the punishment any less an expression of his righteous condemnation of sinners and his displacency toward them.¹

Here, it is asked, What do we gain by the fact that the penalty is brought on the sinner by his own sin in accordance with the constitution of things, since, after all, it comes through these agencies from God, and expresses his condemnation and displacency. When Mr. Spencer says that the cruelty of a Fiji god devouring the souls of the dead is "small compared with the cruelty of the God who condemns men to tortures that are eternal,"² what help does this doctrine give us in replying to him? The question assumes that the only way of vindicating God's righteousness in respect to the punishment of sinners, is to demonstrate that he has no hand in it directly or indirectly, — that is, by proving that

¹ Swedenborg expresses this doctrine in such a way as seemingly to exclude all divine agency from the infliction of punishment: "Should any of wicked character go to heaven, they would gasp there for breath and writhe like a fish out of water, or like an animal in an air-pump from which the air is exhausted. . . . Nothing of punishment, which evil spirits suffer in the other world, is from the Lord, but from evil itself; for evil is so connected with its own punishment that they cannot be separated. When men are in opposition to the Divine, and so prevent the influx of God's love and mercy into themselves, they cast themselves into the evil of punishment, that is, into hell. This appears like unmercifulness and revenge from the Divine on account of the evil sinners have done, when nothing of the sort is in the Divine, but is in the evil itself. . . . The man who is in evil is tied to hell and is actually there as to his spirit; and after death he desires nothing more than to be where his own evil is. Therefore, after death the man casts himself into hell, not the Lord." (Heaven and Hell, 54, 547, 548, 550.)

² "Religion, a Retrospect and a Prospect," *Nineteenth Century*, Jan. 1884, p. 6.

God does not punish sinners in any way whatever. It was shown in the outset that the doctrine is not designed to disprove God's agency in punishing, but to assert it, and to demonstrate its reasonableness and moral necessity, and the righteousness and benevolence of God in it. What we gain is to show that it is essential to the existence of a moral system that it be so constituted that, if any persons in it sin, they shall be punished. If God had constituted a universe in which no discrimination was made between those who live in universal love and those, if any, who live in selfishness, it could not be a moral system, for it would be under no moral law; well-being would be insured to the selfish and wicked as completely as to those who love God with all their hearts and their neighbor as themselves. We gain also the fact that punishment is not inflicted arbitrarily and capriciously by almighty power unregulated by law, but in accordance with the principles and laws of reason, in obedience to the law of love, and for the realization of the highest ideals and ends of wisdom and love. We gain also the knowledge that God has given to the universe a constitution and laws accordant with the principles, laws, and ends regulating his own action; that, therefore, it is not foreign to him, and does not shut him out so that his action in it can be only irruptive and interruptive, but that he is immanently active in it and progressively realizing the archetypal ideals of all perfection and well-being possible in a finite universe. His declaration of his law is, on the one hand, the declaration of the principles and laws regulative of all action, and of the ideals of wisdom and love which are to be progressively realized, all of which are eternal and archetypal in the divine Reason and obligatory in all action alike of God and man. On the other hand, it is the revelation of the actual concrete realities of the universe thus conditioned, and a command to all persons to take notice of these realities, and to conduct their lives with constant reference to them. A ship-owner provides his ship with nautical books and charts, with compass and instruments for making observations of the heavens. The captain accepts the command and the sailors embark, knowing that what these reveal to them as they use them are the imperative laws of the ship, which they can disregard only at their peril. On the one hand, these reveal the eternal principles of mathematics and the unchanging laws which guide the calculations and determine the significance and result

of the observations. On the other hand, they disclose the actual realities of the sea, its rocks, islands, and coast-lines, and the actual realities of the heavens, the positions of the sun and stars, which disclose the actual position and the right course of the ship. In neither aspect are they arbitrary or changeable commands. If the seamen fail to obey these laws, that is, to direct the ship in conformity with these principles and with these realities of the sea, the land, and the skies, and the ship is therefore wrecked, the penalty is brought on them according to the constitution of things, by their disobedience to the laws of the ship and her voyage. We properly say they brought it on themselves. And when they stand on a desert island, ready to perish, they cannot complain that the owner of the ship was unjust and cruel in imposing on them so rigid and immutable a law, with so terrible and unfailing a penalty, and with so tremendous risks. The owner provided the charts and all the nautical instruments in wisdom and good-will; his action was right and beneficent, but it was beneficence regulated by immutable law. God has constituted the universe in accordance with the immutable truths and laws of eternal Reason. He has constituted it thus in wisdom and love, in benevolence regulated by righteousness. In the universe thus constituted, the law of love declares both a fundamental and immutable principle of reason and a factual reality in the constitution and evolution of the universe. Every person must conduct his life in careful recognition of this great reality and in strict conformity with it, or be utterly wrecked. And no man can, without foolishness, complain that God is cruel for putting him under this law of love and rigorously bringing on him the full penalty of disobedience. The sinner must also acknowledge that by his disregard of the great realities of his own being and of his environment, he by his own action has brought the penalty on himself.

The principal difficulty which led John Foster to doubt the endlessness of the punishment of sinners was, that the punishment is too great for the offence; that it cannot be consistent with the righteousness and benevolence of God that endless suffering should be the penalty for the sins of a short human life. If, indeed, persons are to cease from sin at death, and the penalty is wholly external and unnatural, the objection may have weight. But the view which I have presented of the continuity of char-

acter and the inseparableness of punishment from sinful character takes away all the force of this objection. Archbishop Tillotson says: "The justice of God doth punish only the sins which men have committed in this life." This has been a common doctrine in theology. So Paley says that when Paul speaks of the punishment of hell inflicted "on every soul of man that doeth evil," he "means evidently the evil done by him in this life." Mr. Landis says of certain texts: "In all these, and in multitudes of other passages, there is a clear retrospective reference to sin perpetrated here as the sole ground of the judicial decision and the succeeding punishment."¹ But the texts, which declare the doom of sinners for their sins committed in this life, neither assert nor imply that the punishment is only for the sins of this life, or that they will cease to sin at death. If sinners are punished only for the sins committed in this life, then either they will cease to sin at death, or, if they continue to sin, they will not be punished for it, and in either case they are no longer in a moral system, nor under the moral government of God. Mr. Constable denies that the lost in hell are capable of sinning. He says, "Just fancy an earthly judge sentencing a criminal to a punishment too severe for the offence committed, and then gravely justifying his sentence by the observation that he would be sure to deserve it by his conduct in jail."² But the doctrine is not that God punishes a sinner for any sin before he has committed it, but only for sin of which he is already guilty; and that while undergoing the punishment he continues to sin, and for this he deserves further punishment. The argument from the analogy of human government, if it is to be used, confirms our doctrine instead of refuting it. The term of a criminal's imprisonment is often shortened for good behavior, and if the prisoner is convicted of a crime committed during his imprisonment, he is sentenced to further punishment for it.

The decisive refutation of the conception that punishment after death is for the sins of this life only, is that it implies a complete breach between this life and the life after death, a breach wholly artificial and magical, sundering all connection between them in

¹ Tillotson, Sermons, No. 35, "The Eternity of Hell Torments," vol. iii. p. 9; Paley, Sermon 31, "The Terror of the Lord," Works, p. 701, ed. London 1850; Landis, "Immortality of the Soul," 395.

² The Duration and Nature of Future Punishment, pp. 154, 156.

the constitution of things. It involves the abrogation of the law of the continuity of moral character, the abrogation even of the moral system and the moral government of God in any significance in which moral government is possible. It implies that sin consists of isolated volitional acts and overlooks the fact that acts of sin are expressions of the underlying character and continually confirm and develop it. It overlooks the fact that this sinful character is selfishness, that it involves in itself alienation from God, the depravation of the sinner's own soul, his conflict with himself, with God, with the moral system and even the physical system ; and that thus the punishment is in its essence inseparable from the sinful character. It implies the cessation of the sinful character at death and of the punishment involved in it ; and the punishment could be only some external and literal infliction of the fire and the worm for sins committed in this life. And if the sinner at death ceases to be selfish and sinful, by the same reasoning it must follow that the Christian at death ceases to love God with all his heart and his neighbor as himself. This conception implies also an analogous breach in the continuity of God's character. During this life God seeks the sinner before the sinner seeks God ; and through all his sinful career encompasses him with his love, waiting to be gracious to him ; the barrier to the sinner's return to God and acceptance by him is not in God's unwillingness to receive the returning penitent, but in the sinner's fixed unwillingness to return ; would he but yield to God's love and accept his offered grace, God would joyfully receive him. But the supposition is that at the instant of death God's attitude toward the sinner is totally changed ; he no longer looks on the sinner with compassion and encompasses him with his love ; even if a sinner for whom Christ died should repent and truly return to God in loving trust, God would not receive him, because, according to the theory, he must suffer endless punishment inflicted by God for the sins committed before death.¹

¹ "If but a single drop of the sweetness of God's goodness fell on the hopeless region of the lost, it would extinguish all its flames and change it into paradise in an instant." — Rev. J. J. O'Connor, D. D., "Conferences on the Blessed Trinity," 1882, p. 49. President Edwards says of lost sinners after death : "God has no love to them nor pity for them ; but they are the objects of God's eternal hatred. . . He will not only hate you, but he will have you in the utmost contempt ; no place shall be thought fit for you, but to be under his feet, to be trodden down as the mire of the street." To

Thus the theory implies that the whole moral system would be subverted. God and man and their reciprocal relations would be totally different in kind from anything of which we have knowledge as the moral system and the moral government of God. A sinner, who without any reformation of character has lost all power to sin, is bereft of the essential elements and potencies of personality. He is as one bereft of reason and free will. It would be as if a government should first reduce a person to idiocy or insanity and then continue to torture him for what he had done when sane. Then if a person had been a moral agent and had sinned but one hour and then had died, he would never sin again; but he would be punished everlastingly for the sin of that one hour; or else he would suffer under the punishment so severely and so long as to wear out his spirit and annihilate him.¹

The alternative supposition is that sinners continue to sin after death. But if so they are not punished for these sins, because, according to the theory in question, they are punished only for the sins committed in this life. This implies an analogous subversion of the moral order of the universe and of the righteous government of God. It supposes the continuance of sin forever with absolute impunity.

Another objection is, that, if punishment is brought on the sinner through the constitution of the universe, then the remission of penalty through the forgiveness of the sinner is impossible. The truth in this objection is that the consequences of sin are endless, as I have already shown. This is implied in the fact that sin is never better for the universe than love to God and man would be in its stead. A person lives in sin seventy years. If he then repents and lives ever afterwards the life of love, this can never undo the evil deeds of the seventy years, nor the fact of the evil influence which they actually exerted on the person himself and on others. But it does not follow that forgiveness is impossible. When a sinner under the renewing influence of

sinner still living he says, "The God who holds you over the pit of hell, much as one holds a spider or some loathsome insect over the fire, abhors you and is dreadfully provoked; his wrath toward you burns like fire; he looks upon you as worthy of nothing else but to be cast into the fire." ("The End of the Wicked Contemplated," sect. ii.; Sermon, "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God," Works, Ed., London, 1840, vol. ii. pp. 10, 209.)

¹ Constable, "Duration and Nature of Future Punishment," pp. 111-113, 205, 207.

the Spirit turns to God in Christ in faith and repentance, his punishment is remitted in the sense that he is no longer the object of God's condemnation and displacency. "There is now no condemnation to them who are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit" (Rom. viii. 1). The God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself accepts the penitent and trusting sinner, because he sees that his character is fundamentally changed; for in all finite persons trust in God is the beginning and the continuous vitality of all right character. The person is no longer living in self-sufficiency, self-will, self-seeking and self-glorifying, but is trusting and serving God. He has begun the life of love to God with all the heart and to his neighbor as himself. Though the man, thus beginning to "walk in newness of life," is not yet perfected and in the course of his spiritual and moral growth and development will have many a sorrow and many a conflict as consequences of his previous life of sin, yet God sees that his new character in its vitalizing principle is right, and that eventually he will be perfected in holiness, attaining the moral likeness of God as revealed under human limitations and conditions in Christ; therefore God condemns him no longer, but accepts him as justified freely through God's grace. But the expression of God's condemnation and displacency are of the essence of punishment. When these have ceased, punishment in its distinctive significance ceases also. There will be continued discipline, but no punishment. Besides this, the redeemed sinner is now reunited to God in faith and opens his soul to receive the quickening influences of God's love. Therefore his alienation from God, in which his punishment primarily consists, has ceased and he is re-established in his normal union with God. And further, the process of depravation of his own soul has been arrested and the process of purification, healing, restoration, and healthy development is going on. The bitterness of remorse has given place to the tenderness of penitence. By gaining the victory over his evil propensities he is advancing towards peace and harmony with himself. He is no longer in antagonism to the moral law and government of God, but is obeying them in love. He is already the object of God's special providence and all things are working together for his good because he loves God. Evidently, therefore, the fact that punishment comes from God on the sinner through the constitution of the universe is no bar

to God's remission of the penalty in forgiving sinners who penitently trust him. The objection has force only when the doctrine against which it is urged is falsely so presented as to imply the exclusion of all action of God and all expression of his condemnation from the punishment.

We must distinguish, however, between the cessation of punishment and the cessation of ill-desert. It will always remain true that the sinner was guilty and deserved punishment. Here it is objected that, if he deserved punishment and God did not inflict it, then God did not render to him what was due and therefore has not done him justice. This is merely the recognition of the necessity of atonement; in the redemption of the sinner and the forgiveness of sin, God must accomplish it in such a way as to assert, maintain, and vindicate his righteousness and the authority, imperativeness, and immutability of his law in accepting and forgiving the sinner who trusts him, as really as he does in punishing him who persists in sin. This he does in redemption as the God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself. The consciousness of redemption through Christ from sin and deserved penalty is perpetuated forever in the songs of the redeemed in heaven (Rev. v. 9; vii. 14). It should also be remembered that, if punishment comes through the constitution of things, it is inseparable from the sin and comes on the sinner in this life so long as he continues to sin.

4. The objection is urged that the fear of punishment is a selfish and debasing motive and that appeal to it develops selfishness rather than love. From this those who deny man's immortality have often inferred that their virtue is disinterested and therefore of a higher order than that of Christians, who, they assume, are actuated by the selfish desire to escape hell and win the blessedness of heaven.

So far as this objection is urged as an argument against punishment, it is refuted by the fact that the deterrent influence of punishment is only one of the reasons for its infliction. The necessity of the punishment of transgressors is involved in the idea of government under law and is essential to its existence and authority. Because the fear of punishment is not the highest of motives, government will not imperil its own existence and dissolve its laws into impotent advice by refusing to punish wrongdoers. No more will God abandon his government under law by

ceasing to discriminate between those who conform to the law in lives of universal love and those who disobey it in lives of supreme selfishness, and thus insuring to both the attainment of equal perfection and well-being. They who urge this objection against punishment after death must see that it is of equal force against the punishment of criminals in this life, and thus is subversive of all government under law, whether human or divine.

The objection rests on an exclusive altruism. It assumes that the law of love forbids all regard to one's own well-being. Whereas the law explicitly recognizes one's self as an object of love equally with one's own neighbor. It thus requires every one to seek wisely his own well-being, while respecting the rights of his neighbor equally with his own and benevolently seeking his good. And because they who urge this objection must believe that, even in this life, virtue is productive of more good than vice, they by their own argument convict themselves of acting virtuously from a selfish motive.

If a person has formed such a character that he is susceptible to no higher motive than the fear of punishment, we may properly urge that motive on him. This may awaken him to the fact that he is missing his true well-being and throwing away his life in the pursuit of unworthy ends. It may awaken his moral and spiritual susceptibilities and powers and lead him to see his sinfulness and to return in penitence to God. Thus the fear of punishment may be the occasion of a spiritual awakening which, by quickening the higher spiritual capacities and leading to the life of love, may entirely transcend the fear of punishment in the spontaneity of love to God and man.

To persons in the lower stages of development or in the debasement of vice the fear of punishment is itself an elevating motive, because, through the inseparable connection of punishment with the rightful authority of government and law, it calls attention to the reign of righteous law as distinguished from the reign of violence and force directed by arbitrary and lawless will. The objection regards punishment as mere privation or suffering inflicted by the violence of a stronger power. To work as a slave under the lash, to be robbed, imprisoned, tortured by lawless and despotic violence, is debasing; it gradually crushes the spirit and nobleness of true manhood. But this is not punishment in its true and distinctive significance. Punishment

is inflicted according to law by a government convicting the transgressor after solemn judicial investigation, and by the punishment asserting, maintaining and vindicating the righteousness of the government and the majesty and authority of the law. It is a long step forward in the development and progress of men when they are brought out, like Israel from Egypt, from the reign of despotic violence and overpowering force and placed under the reign of law enforced by penalties judicially imposed. Lynch law defeats itself and indicates and accelerates degeneracy toward barbarism, because it substitutes fear of mob-violence for reverence for law. Thus punishment judicially inflicted under just law educates the people to reverence for law and rightful authority, and is an important agency in promoting the civilization and progress of man. In like manner the fear of the divine punishment of sin calls attention to God's law and government. It awakens the moral and spiritual faculties and susceptibilities. A man who has been brutish, impelled by appetite, covetousness, or revenge, rises to a higher plane of thought, feeling, and purpose when he begins to look to God's law of love and to the inevitable punishment of transgressors, which no power can repeal and no cunning escape. This influence is recognized by Pindar :

“God, who o’ertakes the eagle’s wing
And leaves the dolphin’s speed behind
In the mid sea; whose chastening hand hath bowed
The lofty spirit of the proud,
And given to modest worth the unfading crown. . . .
Vain hope that guilt by time or place
Can shun the searching eye of God.”¹

Because punishment is thus inseparable from law, because it reveals the immutable distinction of right and wrong, the righteousness of God and the supremacy, universality, and inviolable authority of his law of love, the fear of punishment may touch and awaken the moral and spiritual capacities of the sinner and lead him to repentance. George Eliot says: “His mind was destitute of that dread which has been erroneously decried as if it were nothing higher than a man’s animal care for his own skin; that awe of the divine Nemesis which was felt by religious pagans and, though it took a more positive form under Christian-

¹ Olymp. ii. str. 2; i. str. 2.

ity, is still felt by the mass of mankind simply as a vague fear of anything which is called wrong-doing. Such terror of the unseen is so far above mere sensual cowardice that it will annihilate that cowardice. It is the initial recognition of a moral law restraining desires, and checks the hard bold scrutiny of imperfect thought into obligations which in the absence of feeling can never be proved to have any sanctity. It is good, sing the old Eumenides in Æschylus, that fear should sit as the guardian of the soul forcing it into wisdom, — good that men should carry a threatening shadow in their hearts under the full sunshine; else how will they learn to reverence the right? That guardianship may become needless; but only when all outward law has become needless, only when duty and love have united in one stream and made a common force.”¹ And so inseparable is this connection of punishment with the consciousness of moral obligation and of moral law that, while the fear of the divine punishment of sinners in the future life awakens the moral nature from slumber, it is also true that the sinner’s conscience and all his moral susceptibilities when aroused awaken the expectation of punishment. Leslie Stephen says: “Men are virtuous, it is sometimes said, because they believe in hell. Is not this an inversion of the proper order of thought? Should we not rather say that men believe in hell

¹ “Romola,” chap. xi. sub finem. A few days before I wrote this, two gentlemen in Virginia, having a private quarrel, met at the post-office. One was armed with a revolver, the other with a knife. They fought, and each inflicted mortal wounds on the other. Even newspapers that have condemned the act have spoken of the “splendid courage” of the combatants. It is more probable that the motive which actuated them was moral cowardice. Whatever the bull-dog ferocity, sometimes mistaken for courage, which they displayed, probably the motive at the bottom of all was their fear to meet the public sentiment then prevalent about them, which, if they had not fought, would have made them objects of sneers because they did not dare to revenge an insult. A judge in Kentucky who under similar circumstances killed himself, because his conscience forbade him to kill a man who had insulted him and he dared not face the sneers of his neighbors, showed a similar moral cowardice. If the fear of wrong-doing and of God’s judgment on it had been in the hearts of those men and had deterred them from their crimes, they would have shown a higher courage and a nobler character. Character is what a person is; reputation is what others think him to be. To sacrifice character for reputation is moral cowardice. The duellist’s sense of honor is a cowardly regard to the opinions of other people. The assertion of the honor of the nation ought to be the assertion of justice and equity in all national acts. It often is the pugnacious assertion of superior force, — a bully’s daring of another bully to fight.

because they are virtuous? There has been so general a belief that vice is degrading and is to be discouraged by the strongest possible motives, that even the semi-barbarous part of mankind have exhausted their fancy in devising most elaborate torments to express the horror with which they regard it.”¹

It must also be noticed that from the nature of the divine punishment, as I have unfolded it, the fear of it appeals to the highest moral and spiritual motives as well as to the susceptibility of suffering. The penalties for sin consist, not only nor primarily in physical privation and suffering, but much more in alienation from God, the depravation of the soul, conflict with one's self, antagonism to one's fellow-men, to the moral law, and to the constitution of the universe, and in all the privation and misery necessarily incidental to these. Certainly the fear of these spiritual evils desolating the soul in sin cannot be debasing. It must join with the awakening sense of law, duty, and guilt in rousing the sinner to the consciousness of his relations to God, of the possibility of a higher life and blessedness, of nobler ends which he has missed, of sin and the need of divine grace, and so may be the occasion of his returning to God in penitential trust. And the expectation of immortality is inseparable from the consciousness of likeness to God, of communion with him, and of working with him in forwarding the designs of his wisdom and love. When a person is once awakened to this consciousness of God, when he sees the divine ideal which he may realize in himself, the divine plans and ends in accomplishing which he may be a worker together with God, when he feels the aspirations thus awakened, he sees in contrast such nothingness in a life shut up in the sensual and vanishing like a morning vapor, that he must expect immortality. Goethe expressed a similar thought. He compared the soul, in its great powers and activity, to the sun, using the words of one of the ancients, “though the sun goes down, it is still the same sun.” And he proceeded to declare his full conviction that the human soul is indestructible, and at death, like the setting sun, only goes down from our sight to shine elsewhere.² And if man is not immortal, God's moral government is incomplete and meaningless. It accomplishes nothing beyond the limits of an earthly and sensual life, and yet

¹ Free Thinking and Plain Speaking, p. 105.

² Eckermann, “Conversations with Goethe,” p. 108, 270.

awakens in men by virtue of their constitution, thoughts, aspirations, and purposes reaching into eternity. As Plutarch says in his treatise on "God's Delay of Punishment": "God is a pursuer of trifles if he makes so much of creatures in whom there is nothing permanent and steadfast, nothing which resembles himself, but who are, as Homer says, only the withering leaves of a day. For God to spend his care on creatures such as these would be to imitate one who makes a garden in an oyster shell." The belief in immortality and the fear of future punishment would be neither inspiring nor ennobling, if immortality signifies only the continuance of a selfish and sensual life, if forever

"To-morrow, and to-morrow, and to-morrow
Creep in this petty pace from day to day."

But there are inspiration and quickening to the highest life and the noblest ends in the aspiration to live forever in the life of love in the likeness of God, in communion with him and working with him in the progressive accomplishment of his plan of perfect wisdom and love. And a sinner's awakening fear, that by persisting in selfishness and sin he may be shut up to that life of selfishness forever, and forever miss all these higher possibilities of his being, is not a debasing motive, but may be the first movement of his soul towards appreciating and seeking a better life.

A person at the beginning of his existence is without moral character or moral development. At the outset a babe's moral constitution is awakened to action by requiring or prohibiting specific acts within the limited sphere of infant life. Disapproval is indicated by the parent's frown or tone or attitude, or by some privation or some slight infliction of pain; approval is indicated by analogous expressions of gratification. When once the idea of right and wrong has arisen in the child's mind, and his moral and spiritual constitution has become developed into action, motives may be addressed directly to these. As the child advances in moral and spiritual development, these higher motives supersede the fear of punishment, and the child does right without ever thinking of chastisement for doing wrong. Analogous to this is God's dealing with his children. In the infantile stage of human society the fear of punishment may be the dominant motive to right conduct; and an analogous predominance of the fear of punishment, and that even by physical suffering, may be

necessary in awakening and developing the moral and spiritual powers.

The same may be necessary in dealing with those who have deadened themselves in continued sin. This gives way to higher motives as the uncultivated man is developed, and as the man deadened in sin repents and returns to God and afterwards grows in Christian character and in moral and spiritual strength and discernment.

The Bible gives much more prominence to the moral and spiritual than to the physical evils involved in punishment. It gives prominence to the sinner's alienation from God and enmity against him, to his moral impotence for good which he has brought on himself, to his death in trespasses and sin, his bondage in sin, his carnal or fleshly mind, the submergence of the spiritual in the sensual, the rust of riches eating the soul as fire, the inward conflict, the law of the members warring against the law of the mind, the works of the flesh contrary to the fruits of the spirit.

The physical emblems of God's punishment of sinners in the Bible are to a great extent figurative, as symbols of spiritual evil and privation. Physical suffering, however, as we have seen, is not excluded; it is recognized in the Bible, and we continually observe it as a fact in this life. In former times it has been insisted on too exclusively and presented in its most revolting forms. Such representations may, perhaps, be morally useful to savages. Le Jeune, a Jesuit missionary to the Indians in Canada, said to an Algonquin chief, in reference to their custom of torturing prisoners of war all night and then killing them: "You do good to your friends and you burn your enemies. God does the same." But we may well question whether this representation of God helped the right moral development even of so brutal a savage. To minds cultivated under Christian influences such representations give false ideas of God, they are repulsive and revolting, they may repel and harden sinners rather than move them to repentance, and may impart coarseness and roughness of character even to Christians. Mr. Lecky says: "If you make the detailed and exquisite torments of multitudes the habitual object of the thoughts and imaginations of men, you will necessarily produce in most of them a gradual indifference to human suffering and in some of them a disposition to regard it

with delight.”¹ Such was the influence of the gladiatorial conflicts in the amphitheatre at Rome; Nero exemplified the highest degree of the barbarizing influence, watching the torments of men and beasts with a sort of æsthetic delight. Similar are now the barbaric spirit and barbarizing influence of pugilistic conflicts.

It must be said, however, of many of those preachers and writers whose horrible picturing of the physical torments of hell are revolting to this generation, that in other parts of their writings are passages breathing the loftiest moral sentiments and the tenderness of Christian love to sinners. No passage has been oftener quoted than that of Tertullian in the “*De Spectaculis*,” expressing the triumph which Christians then under persecution will feel when they see their powerful and cruel persecutors condemned in the final judgment of God. But this same Tertullian, replying to the calumny of the heathen that to gain heaven the Christians committed the most horrible crimes in their assemblies for worship, declares that everlasting blessedness in heaven would not be worth having at such a price.²

It is evident, therefore, that the fear of the divine punishment of sinners is a legitimate and powerful motive to induce sinners to turn to God, and also to strengthen them in resisting temptation in their education and development in the earlier stages of the Christian life. But it is not of the essence of Christian character, and in the Christian’s growth in the grace and the knowledge of Christ it is superseded by love. The majority of persons are not influenced in the least by the fear of the penalties of the law in refraining from theft, murder, and other crimes. In the development of moral character they have entirely transcended this motive. So in the development of Christian character the fear of punishment is transcended in the spontaneity of love.

5. Here it is asked why the reward of the obedient is not included in the sanction of the law as well as the punishment of transgressors. An obvious answer is: When the command of the law is obeyed, its authority is acknowledged, and the end for which it was given is attained. Therefore it needs no further action of the government asserting, maintaining, and vindicating it. It is only when the law has been broken and thus its end, as to the transgressor, is defeated, that the government needs to make fur-

¹ “History of Rationalism in Europe,” vol. i. p. 326.

² *De Spectaculis*, chap. 30; *Apology*, chap. 3.

ther assertion and vindication of the law ; and this it does in the punishment of the law-breaker.

Another answer is, that it is of the essence of law that it declares the authority of the government to command and the imperative obligation of all persons to obey. Its language is only that of authoritative command. If it offered a specific reward for a specific act of obedience, it would abandon its attitude of authority as government and assume the attitude of making a bargain with an equal. It would be hiring or bribing persons to obey the law. Thus, instead of asserting, maintaining, and vindicating law, the government would abandon all law and authority in their distinctive significance. A mother who hires her child to obey with sugar-plums is not educating it to obey rightful authority and law nor to conscientiousness in doing right. Similar action on the part of the government would annul the very ideas of right, obligation, and law. This is attested by the common consciousness of men. No one thinks he is entitled to a reward for honestly paying his debt or thinks he owes his neighbor any thanks for not cheating, robbing, or murdering him, or thinks the government ought to reward his neighbor for not committing these crimes. So Christ teaches, in the parable of the master and servant, that duty is to be done because it is obligatory as duty without waiting to be hired to do it by the promise of a reward (Luke xvii. 7-10).

Human laws forbid overt acts and prescribe a specific penalty for each act of transgression. This is possible because the specific acts forbidden are comparatively few and transgressions are comparatively rare and can be investigated and condemned. But a good citizen never does anything forbidden by the civil law ; every act of his life is in harmony with that law. The immense majority of the people commit no crimes by violating any statute enacted by human government. It would be impossible for the government to enact laws specifically requiring every right act and prescribing for each act a specific reward. But human government protects all in their lawful pursuits and secures to them their rights. This equal protection every one may claim. This and participation in the good order, peace, and prosperity secured by good government are ordinarily the only reward of obedience to human law. Other rewards human government does not offer except in rare instances, as to a person mentioned by name for extraordinary

service already rendered, or as it offers a reward for some service to be rendered, as the detection of a criminal. These, however, come under the category of compensation for service rendered or to be rendered, and are not rewards for obeying the laws.

The law of God differs from the law of human government in that it is not confined to overt acts, but requires primarily love to God and man as the inmost character and as the vitalizing energy of all right action. Hence it does not primarily require or forbid specific acts and declare a specific penalty for each specific transgression. It requires universal love; and the penalty for transgression is privation of all well-being. Another difference between the law of God and human law is that the divine punishment is inflicted through the constitution of the sinner himself and through the constitution of the universe, as we have seen. Here, as in human government, the sanction of the law in its strictest meaning is limited to the punishment of the sinner, because so far as men love God and their neighbors the authority of the law is recognized and declared, and the end for which the law was given is attained. Hence, in these cases there is no occasion for a specific additional act of God asserting the authority and immutability of the law.

The well-being, which comes through the constitution of things on those who live in conformity with God's law of love, is analogous to the protection, order, and peace which civil government affords to those who obey the laws. These do not come by any special enactment as a prescribed reward, but in accordance with the constitution of human society under government. In a way analogous with this, the penalty for sin against God comes in accordance with the constitution of the universe physical and spiritual under the government of God. In writings on human law sanction is used to denote the punishment of transgressors, whereby the authority of the law is asserted, vindicated, and maintained in the face of transgression. Looking beyond this technical meaning of the sanction of the law, we may truly say that the peace, order, and prosperity which result from the obedience of the people to just and beneficent human law is itself a revelation and vindication of the rightful authority and obligation of the law. So it may be truly said that the perfection and well-being which, through the constitution of man and of the universe, come on those who live in conformity with God's law of love are a revela-

tion and vindication of the divine government and law as of rightful authority and imposing immutable and universal obligation to obedience ; for in this perfection and well-being the end of the law is attained. When the law is transgressed, the end of the law is not attained, and God asserts, maintains, and vindicates the law by the punishment of the transgressor.

The desire of reward, like the fear of punishment, may be a stimulus to awaken the moral and spiritual susceptibilities and may help in the education and discipline developing right character. But it is not of the essence of right character and can never be substituted for it. In fact the blessedness which is the reward of the righteous is primarily the blessedness of the love in which the right character consists. No one can enjoy this well-being or blessedness until he finds it in the actual exercise of the love. Then his desire for the reward is absorbed and lost in the love. The life of love insures the highest happiness. But if a person's supreme desire is for his own happiness, he misses the love, and the perfection, well-being, and happiness which the love alone makes possible.

6. Here arises the question as to merit, which has been much discussed in theology. The sinner deserves or merits punishment. Does one who obeys the law deserve or merit the blessedness which the obedience brings?

It has been held that a person merits only when he renders a service which the law does not require ; that consequently one merits nothing for doing his duty. Dr. Robert South says : " If that which is due may also merit, then, by paying what I owe, I make my creditors my debtors ; and every payment would not only clear but also transfer the debt."¹ It is true, as we have seen, that law does not hire or bribe by offering a specific reward for every act of obedience. But the error in question mistakes the nature of the reward. The payment of a debt gives the debtor no right to demand a specific reward from the creditor. What one merits for paying a debt is exemption from the creditor's just claim for payment and from all the liabilities incident to owing the debt. What one merits or deserves for obeying any human law is not a reward decreed by special enactment, but it is that protection by the government and that well-being in the discharge of obligations which are accordant with the constitution of

¹ Sermons, "The Doctrine of Merit Stated," vol. i. p. 408.

the person and of the government and so are due to him in accordance with law and justice. The error in question also errs in carrying the analogy of human government with the divine too far. Under human government it is possible for a person to do acts of beneficence which the civil law does not require. Thus we can discriminate between a gratuitous service which the law does not require and a service which is made obligatory by the law. But no such discrimination is possible as to obedience to God's law. It requires love as the fundamental character to be manifested in every action and toward all persons. It lays its demand for the service of love on all one's powers, possessions, and opportunities, according to the law of greatness for service. It is therefore impossible for any person to do any act of love more or other than the law requires and makes his duty. Because love is required by the law it includes both benevolence and righteousness. The two are inseparable in the life of Christian love. The exercise of benevolence in specific acts must be regulated by righteousness in accordance with law. The benevolent person must see to it that his action will promote that which the law determines to be the only true well-being and by acts which are righteous, doing no injustice to himself or to any other person. We are not permitted to do evil that good may come (Rom. iii. 8). The erroneous doctrine of merit to which I have referred implies that one has merit only for acts of supererogation, that is, rendering a service of love more than the law requires. But under God's law of universal love such acts are impossible. Therefore, instead of there being no merit in doing duty, there can be no merit in doing anything but duty. He who obeys the law merits,—that is, deserves,—the protection of the government and all the well-being which comes from obedience. A person who has always fully obeyed the law of love deserves or merits the favor of God and all the well-being which obedience to the law insures. It would be manifestly unjust to punish him; and just to allow to him the well-being which obedience in the life of love brings. A person has a right to whatever justice awards him and therefore deserves or merits it. And righteousness itself is one aspect of the love which the law requires.

When a person has sinned he certainly does not deserve or merit the graciousness with which God seeks him to draw him away from sin. God's grace as we have seen, is not called forth

by any right act or any merit of the sinner, but is self-moved, free, and sovereign.

When, under the gracious and renewing influences and agencies of God's redeeming love, a sinner has returned to God in penitential trust and is accepted and forgiven, this is clearly grace to the undeserving; it will remain forever historically true that this person had been a guilty undeserving sinner saved by God's free grace. But as this renewed person goes on obeying God's law of love, he may properly be said to deserve or merit the approval of God and all the blessings consequent on his continuous right action.

This enables us to answer some of the questions respecting human merit by which theologians have been perplexed. Sinners have no claim to God's mercy on the ground of their own merits. They deserve punishment, not mercy. Yet God owes it to himself as God, he owes it to his law of love as the supreme, inviolable, immutable law of eternal Reason, that he should seek these sinners to redeem them from their sin, and draw them back to allegiance to the law and to union with himself in the life of love. Thus God's action in the redemption of sinners is the manifestation both of his righteousness and of his benevolence. So Clement of Alexandria teaches, that God is just in his benevolence and benevolent in his justice.¹ He exercises good-will or benevolence in full measure towards all rational persons. He exhausts on them all the resources of wisdom and love to draw them to himself. If they resist and remain in sin, it is not because he has arbitrarily stinted his good-will, but because, conforming all his action with the eternal principles and laws of Reason and progressively realizing its wise, righteous, and benevolent ends, he cannot do more or otherwise than he does consistently with his perfect wisdom and righteousness. From this point of view it is evident that all God's action in the redemption of men from sin has atoning significance. He always so acts as to magnify the law and make it honorable. It is always the High and Holy One coming down to the low and sinful to lift them up, thus himself obeying the law of love, reclaiming men to conformity with it, and so asserting, maintaining, and vindicating its authority. It follows that even a sinner seeking mercy may be said to have a certain claim on God, a certain right to his

¹ Paidagogos, Bk. I. chap. viii.

compassion, not founded on any merit of his own, but on the eternal fulness of God's good-will as regulated in righteousness. The sinner's claim is not because he himself is good, but because God is good. "Have mercy upon me, O God, according to thy loving-kindness; according to the multitude of thy tender mercies blot out my transgressions" (Psalm li. 1). This is the significance of the prayer for mercy for Christ's sake or in Christ's name. It is in him that God has made the highest revelation of his good-will in righteousness, of his law, and of his love in obedience to the law. This gives the sinner a right to trust him and a claim to plead before him. In Christ, God declares his righteousness in the redemption of sinners and the justification of those who yield to his redeeming grace; in him he is just and the justifier of him who hath faith in Christ (Rom. iii. 25, 26).

Here we see the real significance of the old distinction of the merit of condignity (*meritum de condigno*) and the merit of congruity (*meritum de congruo*). A sinner has no merit of condignity, for this belongs only to one who has always freely and perfectly obeyed the law of love. But a sinner may have the merit of congruity; that is, God sees it congruous with his own perfection and with his righteousness in conformity with his law of love, that, in his compassion and good-will, he should seek sinners in the way of redemption, to draw them back to union and communion with himself in the life of love. It is not the sinner's merit in himself, but his claim for mercy on God as he has revealed the indissoluble union of his righteousness and good-will in Christ.

In conclusion, we see that the conception of the nature of the punishment of sinners, as it has been explained, enables us to see the real and awful significance of the tremendous scriptural representations of the character and destiny of sinners. The scriptures use the strongest terms and the most terrific imagery in declaring God's condemnation and abhorrence of sinners. They even represent him anthropomorphically as looking on them with contempt in their opposition to his law and his grace and to the progress of his kingdom: "He who sitteth in the heavens shall laugh; Jehovah shall have them in derision" (Psalm ii. 4). These scriptural representations express the real character of sin, its enormity and hatefulness as God sees it; and the horribleness

of the ruin which it brings on the sinner. No words are adequate to express the actual reality of the sinfulness of sin and the debasement and ruin of the sinner. The punishment of sin discloses what God sees that sinners really deserve, the woe which they bring on themselves, "vessels of wrath fitted for destruction" (Rom. ix. 22). And no one is consigned to this hopeless woe who is fitted or can be fitted for anything better. The more perfect in love a person's character is, the clearer is his conception of the wickedness of sin and the monstrosity and ill-desert of the sinner, and the more intense his abhorrence and repugnance. God's estimate of the wickedness and ill-desert and his repugnance and abhorrence surpass that of the holiest man as much as God surpasses man. The tremendousness of the evil of sin is also revealed in the coming of God in Christ to save men from it and its consequences. How great the evil that called forth so wondrous a divine work of redemption! And this exceeding sinfulness of sin was one element in the anguish of Christ in Gethsemane and in his whole life as the man of sorrows. He bore the sins of men, he saw the unworthiness and hatefulness and ruinousness of the sinful character. He saw it the more clearly and suffered the more intensely because, when in godlike compassion he had come in humiliation to save them, they only rejected, persecuted, and finally would crucify him who had come to save them.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT

I. THE PRIMARY GROUND OR ORIGIN OF THE AUTHORITY OF LAW AND GOVERNMENT. — I. Human government is a divine institution deriving its authority from God.

This is a legitimate and necessary demand of human reason. All universal principles and laws imperatively regulating human thought and action are principles and laws of reason. Every person knows that a rational being ought to act reasonably; that is, that what is true to reason is law to thought and action. Thus he recognizes himself as under law in virtue of his rationality and freedom. In thus recognizing reason as the source of principles and laws regulating thought and action, the recognition of it as of supreme and universal authority is implied. If they are laws to our thinking and acting and thus give us valid knowledge, they must be laws to thinking and acting throughout the universe. Science discovers that they are so. Then they must be principles and laws eternal in the absolute Reason, enlightening and regulating the power which manifests itself in the constitution and evolution of the universe. That Power energizing in the light of eternal Reason and in accordance with its principles and laws is God. In him, the absolute Reason, is the primary source of all authority and law. We have seen already that the existence of the absolute Reason, regulating by its eternal principles and laws the power that manifests itself in the constitution and evolution of the universe, is necessarily postulated as the basis of the validity of all empirical science, of all ethics and æsthetics, of all philosophy seeking to know the *rationale* of things and facts, of all religion, and, in fact, of the validity and reality of all human knowledge. All rest on the fact that Reason

is absolute, eternal, and immutable, and that man as rational in the light of his own reason sees principles, laws, and ideals that are eternal in the absolute Reason. In the same line of thought we see that all authority to proclaim and enforce laws that are to regulate human thought and action must rest ultimately on the same absolute Reason. Civil polity, jurisprudence, sociology, like all science and philosophy, rest on the fundamental postulate that God, the absolute Reason, exists and has constituted and is evolving the universe in accordance with immutable principles and laws of reason, the same in its essential principles with our own. All authority and law have their ultimate source and warrant in reason. Therefore all civil law and government derive their authority from God, the absolute Reason, in whom all principles, laws, and ideals of reason are eternal and immutable, and who himself in all his action acts in conformity with and obedience to those principles and laws.

In accordance with this legitimate and necessary demand of reason, it is revealed in the revelation of God recorded in the Bible that human government is a divine institution deriving its authority from God. "Let every soul be in subjection to the higher authorities (*ἐξουσίαις*); for there is no authority except from God; and the existing authorities are ordained of God. Therefore he who resisteth the authority, resisteth the ordinance of God. . . . Rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. . . . He is a minister of God to thee for good. . . . For this cause ye pay tribute also; for they are God's ministers, attending continually upon this very thing. Render to all their dues" (Rom. xiii. 1-7).

Jesus said and did nothing to encourage insurrection against the Roman government. On the contrary, throughout his public ministry he was correcting the erroneous expectation of the Jews that the Messiah would use his miraculous powers to subdue the Gentile nations and establish the supremacy of Israel, and himself would reign in person at Jerusalem over the conquered nations. During the forty days in the wilderness, before entering on his public ministry, he was considering this very question. He was tempted to accept the Jewish conception of his messianic work, and thus to insure at once their acknowledgment of him as the Messiah, and their co-operation in establishing his kingdom, instead of their deadly enmity. But he would not listen to the

suggestion, though by consenting to it he should attain all the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them. Afterwards, when Pharisees and Herodians combined to entangle him in seditious utterances, he said, "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's; and unto God the things that are God's." When arrested and condemned to death, he did not use his supernatural powers to save himself from the unjust infliction, not even when they said, taunting him, "If he be the King of Israel, let him now come down from the cross and we will believe on him."

In the history of Israel recorded in the Old Testament, the government of Israel was a theocracy. The judge or king was supposed to administer the government as the vicegerent of Jehovah, the real king. When Saul refused to recognize this conception of himself as king, he was rejected. David was chosen in his stead, as in this respect a man after God's own heart (1 Sam. xiii. 13, 14). Throughout the history of Israel, the prophets do not hesitate to rebuke the king and rulers, and to denounce judgments on them for not rendering due allegiance to Jehovah. It was a recognition, in a form adapted to the people and the time, of the fundamental basis of all government. No one has authority to give law to any rational person and to enforce obedience by penalty, unless that authority is grounded in and demanded by perfect reason, and so is derived ultimately from God the absolute Reason. Accordingly, we find that the government of Israel respected the rights of the people and sought to make just laws more than the governments of the ancient idolatrous nations. In the government of Greece and Rome the conception was of a city which ruled over the surrounding territory. None had the rights of citizens except the freemen of the ruling city; and these were a minority of the population, the rest being slaves or persons not admitted to the rights of citizenship. Even after Rome had subdued the whole civilized western world, the theory was still maintained that only citizens of Rome had the rights and privileges of citizenship. On the contrary, the people of Israel, divided into tribes and dwelling all over their country, had equal rights under the government. The history throughout discloses a high importance attached to laws just, equitable, and approved by God as the only basis of national prosperity. There is truth in Milton's lines: —

As men divinely taught and better teaching
 The solid rules of civil government,
 In their majestic unaffected style,
 Than all the oratory of Greece and Rome.
 In them is plainest taught and easiest learned
 What makes a nation happy and keeps it so,
 What ruins kingdoms and lays cities flat.

Paradise Regained, Bk. iv.

A third consideration confirming this view is the conclusion to which authors have come who are accepted as authorities in the science of religion, in anthropology, and the philosophy of history, — that religion has been a dominant force in affecting and preserving the union of peoples in nations and states. Professor Max Müller says: “What makes a people? How did men form themselves into a people before there were kings or shepherds of men? Was it through community of blood? I doubt it. Community of blood produces families, clans, possibly races, but it does not produce that higher and purely moral feeling which binds men together and makes them a people. It is language and religion that make a people; but religion is even a more powerful agent than language.”¹ He quotes with approval Schelling as saying, “A people exists only when it has determined itself with regard to its mythology. This mythology, therefore, cannot take its origin after a national separation has taken place; its origin must be referred to the period of transition, when the people is in the process of separating and constituting itself.” Hegel says, in his “Philosophy of History,” “The idea of God constitutes the general foundation of a people. . . . The state rests on religion. . . . In affirming that the state is based on religion, that it has its roots in it, we virtually assert that the former has proceeded from the latter, and that this derivation is going on now and will always continue; *i. e.*, the principles of the state must be regarded as valid in and for themselves, which can only be in so far as they are recognized as determinate manifestations of the divine nature. The form of religion, therefore, decides that of the state and its constitution.”² Not only has philosophy compelled the conclusion that the only reasonable conception of civil government is that it has its origin in the divine, and derives

¹ The Science of Religion, Lect. iii.

² “Philosophy of History,” Sibree’s Trans., Bohn’s ed., Introduction, pp. 52, 53.

its authority from God, but historical investigation shows that this conclusion has been widely recognized more or less clearly in fact. Mr. Maine says, "In early law and amid the rudiments of political thought, symptoms of this belief meet us on all sides. A supernatural presidency is supposed to consecrate and keep together all the cardinal institutions of those times, the State, the Race, and the Family."¹ To this must be added that, from the earliest times when a code of laws was issued as distinguished from the isolated and arbitrary commands of a despot, these laws have been recognized as coming down from God. Plato, speaking of the punishment of criminals after death, says that the laws of the state deliver them for punishment to their sisters, the laws of God. Similar was the common belief. Diodorus Siculus says, "The Egyptians believed their laws had been communicated to Mnevis by Hermes; the Cretans held that Minos received his laws from Zeus; the Lacedæmonians, that Lycurgus received his laws from Apollon. According to the Aryans, their lawgiver, Zathraustes, had received his laws from the Good Spirit; according to the Getae, Zamolxis received his laws from the goddess Hestia; and according to the Jews, Moses received his laws from the God Iao" (L. i. c. 94).

The divine origin of the authority of human law and government is tacitly acknowledged in the universal belief that human government ought to enact just laws and to adjudicate and execute them justly. This is the teaching of jurists and writers on jurisprudence, and is generally accepted by the people as an indisputable maxim. This belief necessarily implies a higher law above human law, and an authority above that of human government, to which human government itself is under obligation to conform its enactments and administration. This is the moral law of God, the eternal principles of reason, and the laws of right and wrong, in the light of which and in conformity with which the government, in the use of its best wisdom, is to determine what specific enactments and what administrative action will best subserve the true practical application of these rational and moral principles and laws. Evidently no human government by its enactments ever originated the fundamental principles and laws of reason, regulative of all human thought and action, and

¹ "Ancient Law," Scribner's ed., p. 6.

including the eternal and unchanging principles of the moral law.¹

2. The authority to govern the people is given by God to the people. Man, by his very constitution, is in union with men in society. He is in union with society by birth and race-connection. Men are also constituted for human society in virtue of their common constitution as rational, self-determining persons subject to the same universal principles of reason, and the same universal moral law requiring good-will regulated by righteousness in universal love. Men, therefore, are constituted both physically and spiritually for union in society, and without it the individual man and human society itself would be an abortion. Accordingly, Aristotle said that man is born a member of a state (*πολιτικός*). Judge McLean of the United States Supreme Court recognized the same unity of the people on their higher rational and personal side, when he said in one of his judicial decisions, that the public law is the expression of "the collective reason of the people." The people consist of rational free agents self-determining and self-governing. Therefore the people collectively are a rational, self-governing people.

Thus constituted, society or the community of men must have authority over the individual to prescribe the practical application of the supreme and universal moral law necessary to the well-being of the community. The exercise of this authority is essential to the existence and normal development of human society and of the individual man in it. The authority cannot be vested in every person, for that would issue in moral and political chaos, and the normal development alike of the individual and of society

¹ In the time of the anti-slavery movement, Mr. Seward, in the United States Senate, appealed to a law higher than human enactment. It caused a great excitement. Many insisted that there is no higher law, and some even intimated that it was treasonable to assert it. After a while this excitement died away, and the people generally returned to their usual sane belief that there is a higher law which human governments are bound to obey, the universal moral law which comes from God and never was originated by any human government, and which requires the government to enact just laws and to administer the government justly, having due regard to the rights of the individual and the well-being of society. A leading newspaper, which at first joined in the outcry against the Senator, afterwards declared that it had never denied the reality of the higher law to which human governments are bound to conform their enactments and administration.

would be impossible. It cannot be vested in any particular individual, unless appointed by consent of the people, because there is no basis in reason nor in the constitution of man determining why, apart from the consent of the people, any one should have authority to rule over all the others.

But it must be remembered that, while the people have authority and the right to rule, that authority does not originate with them, but comes from God the eternal and absolute Reason to men endowed with reason in the likeness of God's reason, and so capable of self-government. This authority, therefore, is given them in the very act of giving them being in the likeness of himself, the eternal Reason. Men are endowed with reason in the likeness of the divine Reason, and thus participate in the light of the divine Reason, that is the source of all rightful authority and sovereignty. Reason always speaks with authority, demanding the assent of the intellect, "This must be true," and requiring the consent and obedience of the will, "This ought to be done." Every man, therefore, is capable of self-determination and self-government in the light of reason. Every community of men, for the same reason, is capable of self-government. Since the individual must exist in society and society must be composed of individuals, there are two ever present factors which must adjust themselves to each other. The people or community must determine and require what is right for the community and promotive of its true development and well-being, but with strict regard to the rights of the individual. The individual in the light of reason and conscience must determine, what is right for him and promotive of his true well-being, but with strict regard to the authority and rights of the community. Both the community and the individual are bound to act in accordance with the supreme and universal moral law, which requires universal goodwill exercised in righteousness, that is, in accordance with the eternal truths and laws of reason and for the progressive realization of its ideals of perfection and well-being.

Therefore the ultimate source of authority is in Reason. It is not in principles and laws considered merely as speculative and abstract thought, but as constituent elements of reason in man and God and guiding them in the exercise of their energies. They are not principles, laws, and ideals in human reason alone, but also in God the absolute and eternal Reason. In

him these principles, laws, and ideals are eternal and immutable; in accordance with them he has constituted the universe and is evolving it in the progressive realization of his eternal and archetypal ideal. Thus in absolute Reason is the eternal and immutable source of all authority. This is the great truth which dawned on the psalmist when he said, "Forever, O Lord, thy word is settled in heaven" (Ps. cxix. 89).

Here we see that there is no place in the universe from its foundation to its capstone for any rightful authority or sovereignty resting on arbitrary and resistless will-power.

3. The people must be organized in a state or political community in which the government is administered by persons appointed by the people, or at least with the consent of the people, who enact, adjudicate, and execute the laws. This is necessary from the nature of the case. Only in a very small community can the people meet *en masse* as in a town-meeting. And even a small community, as a town or school district, must commit the administration of the government in its details to persons appointed to attend to the various lines of public business. The attempt to govern a city of one hundred thousand or five hundred thousand inhabitants by vote of the people assembled in a town-meeting is impracticable and absurd, and, instead of securing the rights of the people and their self-government, opens the way for all manner of selfish scheming and political corruption, sacrificing the rights of the many to the selfish scheming of a few. Government directly by the people in a nation like the United States, consisting of many millions of people and occupying a continent, is of course impossible. Government by the people is possible only through their representatives. Persons must be appointed by the people to represent them in the enactment, adjudication, and enforcement of laws and the administration of the government. The organization of the people under government in a state or political community is necessary also because man is by his very constitution an organizer. His constitution, physical, rational, moral, political, makes it impossible for him to live and attain his normal development otherwise than in society. A multitude of persons together is a mere crowd. It cannot voice its own will or purpose without some organization of itself through which to declare it.

The government as thus organized must be distinguished from

the people. The authority to govern comes from God primarily to the people. The persons appointed to administer the government derive their authority from the people, and from God only through the people and as authorized by them to govern. This authority reverts to the people at stated intervals in election; and the organized government can at any time ascertain the mind of the people on any specific subject through the referendum. Therefore we may properly say of the government thus organized, that it derives its authority from the people; it is "from the people, by the people, for the people." Its aim is to declare "the collective reason of the people," so far as that accords with the truths, laws, and ideals eternal in the absolute Reason of God. It is intended to be the impersonated reason of the people.

There are three divine institutions, the family, the state and the church. Each is essential to the normal development of man and must exist so long as human society exists and makes progress.

Of these three the family is closest to the race-connection. But even this is less primitive, less exclusively dependent on the race-connection than has commonly been supposed. Anthropologists have discovered that the family in its distinctive significance did not exist among primitive men; they find polyandria, the family determined, if at all, from the mother; they find tribal marriage; they find polygamy. The development of the monogamous family came only with much larger intellectual, moral, and religious development.

It is unnecessary for our present purpose to ascertain how the larger political unity of states and nations was developed. While we recognize their normal development through the influence of geographical conditions, of race, language, and religion, we must also recognize the historical fact that states have been developed and enlarged by conquest. In whatever way a people may have become united in a nation, we recognize the right to self-government and authority to exercise it coming to the people from God, and the necessity of political organization in which the people transmit their authority to an organized government representing the people and responsible to them.

In the history of the past we find families developing into clans, clans into tribes, and tribes into nations. The tendency has been

to a more comprehensive unity. In our century this tendency has manifested itself in the union of the states of Germany in the German empire, of the Italian states in the Italian kingdom, and in the extension of the British empire to all parts of the world. We may hope for a more comprehensive unity in the future. The practice of the old Saxons with their divisions into tens and hundreds, involved the far-reaching principle that, in seeking a more comprehensive political union, local interests must be committed to the local community, wider interests to the larger community, and the universal interests to the organized government of the whole. This is the principle underlying the constitution of the United States. Mr. Gladstone has said, "As the British constitution is the most subtile organization which has proceeded from progressive history, so the American constitution is the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man." Already nations are consulting the rights and interests of one another and seeking to settle questions by arbitration rather than by the sword. Already men are thinking and speaking of the confederation of all nations as possible to be realized and a legitimate object to labor for. Its realization is not chimerical, but practicable and reasonably to be hoped for, on the principle of leaving local affairs to local authorities and submitting only the general interests of all to the general government. But before this can be done the governments must understand that, as they derive their authority from God, so, as "ministers of God for good," they must abandon the Satanic attitude of seeking each to get advantage of the other nations for its own aggrandizement, and recognize themselves as under obligation to obey the eternal law of God from whom they derive their authority, and in universal good-will regulated in righteousness seek to promote the well-being of mankind. So all human society may be transformed into the kingdom of God and all human governments be brought into harmony and union.

The third divine institution is the church, the organization of men for mutual co-operation in promoting their own spiritual development and that of their fellowmen in the worship and service of God in the life of love ; or, in other words, in the progressive development of the kingdom of God and the transformation of all human society into it. This institution cannot be considered here. But in view of the essential importance of religion

in promoting the development and progress of man and the unity of nations under organized government, we see from our present point of view, what has previously been forced on our attention in another connection, — that a universal religion, the worship of the same God, is an essential prerequisite to the universal political union of mankind.

4. This doctrine of the divine authority of civil government must be distinguished from various current errors.

It must be distinguished from the doctrine of the divine right of kings. This probably originated in connection with patriarchal government in early times. The father of a family was regarded as having authority to rule the family, even to the extreme of taking the life of his child. At the father's death the eldest son or the heir nearest akin would succeed him as head of the family. As the family developed into a clan and the clan into a tribe, there would always be a patriarch who ruled; and, like the father, he was supposed to rule by divine right. As the people developed into a nation, in every generation there would still be the hereditary ruler. In later times, when the patriarchal government had been forgotten, the heir of the royal family was still supposed to reign by divine right. At this day, in the heart of Europe, the young emperor of Germany in several of his speeches has seemed to assert his own personal divine right to reign. On coins and elsewhere we read the name of a person as king or queen *Dei Gratia*, by the grace of God. This is true in the sense that every legitimate government derives its authority to rule ultimately from God and must depend on him for the successful administration of the government. But it is utterly false, if it implies that God has given to any person or family authority to rule over a people without their consent and to the extinction of their right to self-government.

Our doctrine of the divine origin of the authority of civil government is in sharp contrast with the theory that the authority of government originated in the Social Contract. This is the theory that men in the primitive state of nature were entirely free from all law and government, and every one did as he pleased, with no obligation or responsibility to any government under law and, therefore, owing no duty or obligation to any other person. In process of time, men, finding certain inconveniences and evils in this state of isolation and unrestricted freedom, entered into a

social contract. In this contract every individual surrendered certain of his personal rights to society in consideration of protection to be given by society through the government. From this surrender of rights in this contract by individuals society derives its authority to govern through the organized government. This theory was taught by the Jesuit Suarez. Cudworth says it was taught by Epicurus, "the frame of whose principles must needs lead him to deny justice and injustice to be natural things; therefore, he decides that they arise wholly from mutual pacts and covenants of men made for their own convenience and utility, and laws resulting from thence. . . . For there is no such thing as justice by itself, but only in the mutual congresses of men, wheresoever they have entered into covenant not to hurt one another."¹ Hobbes presents this theory as follows: "For where no contract hath preceded there hath no right been transferred, and every man has a right to everything; and, consequently, no action can be unjust; and the definition of injustice is no other than the non-performance of a covenant. . . . Therefore, before the names of just and unjust can have place there must be some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenant by the terror of some punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant."² In the latter part of the eighteenth century, in connection with the atheistic upheaval in the French revolution, the belief gained currency that this state of individual independence of all law and obligation was the primitive state of man; and that it was the happiest condition in which man has ever existed. St. Pierre's "Paul and Virginia" was written as setting forth this idea.

This theory of the Social Contract is a pure fiction of the imagination entirely unsupported by historical facts. Such a primitive state, in which every individual did just as he pleased free from subjection to any authority or law and with no distinction between right and wrong, never existed, and never could exist in a society of rational persons. There is no historical evidence that any such social contract was ever made. And such an origin of authority to govern and of justice and right is impossible and

¹ "Intellectual System of the Universe," Ed. Gould and Newman, Andover, 1838, vol. ii. p. 369.

² "Works," vol. iii. 129, 130, 131.

absurd. By the supposition every individual is absolutely free from all law and government and no one has any right to control any other. The individual could not surrender to society a right which he never had. Moreover, the supposition that as soon as the contract is made the persons are under obligation to live up to it, and that to break it becomes unjust, assumes the existence of a moral law supreme above all individual will and all personal contracts. Otherwise the question remains unanswered, How comes it to be wrong for the absolutely independent and lawless person to violate his contract?

The theory of the Social Contract also excludes Reason in God and man as the source of authority and law and rests on the absolute supremacy of arbitrary will. The theory, indeed, assumes the existence of rights in the so-called state of nature. But in this it contradicts itself. A right is correlative to duty. Both right and duty presuppose law, authority, and government already existing. Of course the surrender of a right cannot be the foundation of law and authority, since the existence of rights necessarily presupposes obligation and duty, law and authority.

Stripping the theory from the illusion arising from using the word *rights*, what is the state of nature which it presupposes? Simply a state of entire lawlessness, in which every man does what he will, hindered only by the resistance of others seeking also to have their own way; a reign of mere force, a struggle for supremacy won by the strongest. There remains nothing but will-force from which to develop the idea of government,—the reign of the strongest. If that is all, the idea of law and right as distinguished from might has no place. The ideas of law and right cannot be developed out of the idea of force. Might cannot make right. Rightful law and authority must exist above all the might of man, or they do not exist at all. The theory, therefore, necessarily implies that the source of all law and government is the will of the persons governed. Whatever they demand is right and must be enforced. It comes back to the old maxim of the despot, “*Sic volo, sic jubeo; sit pro ratione voluntas.*” One person, by mere force of will apart from reasonable grounds, has no right or authority to control another. If one has not, then a hundred, a thousand, a million, have not. The product of zero multiplied by any number however large, is always zero. John C. Calhoun, maintaining a theory of government essentially

the same with the Social Contract, argues that "by nature every individual has a right to govern himself." But self-government is merely self-control in obedience to a law already existing, and cannot itself be the origin or ground of all authority, law, and government.

The theory of the Social Contract is a futile attempt to bring up authority from beneath, to develop it out of that which does not contain it. It is an attempt to create the fountain from its streams.

The right of the majority to rule, so far as it is founded on the theory of Social Contract, rests on no appeal to reason and its principles and laws, but is simply the rule of the superior number, and so, closely analogous to the right to rule founded on superior force. The majority, then, may carry out its will, and the minority have no rights which the majority are bound to respect. Should the party in the minority at the next election become a majority, its will will be law and it may in like manner override all rights and interests of the minority. It is still the rule of arbitrary will enforced by superior power. It is substituting a myriad-headed despot, for the despotism of one. And the former would be more terrible than the latter. This false doctrine of the right of the majority, as vitiated by the theory of the Social Contract, is severely criticised by Herbert Spencer, who calls it *The Great Political Superstition*.¹

We find two indestructible factors, and the problem is to recognize each in its full significance and both in harmony. One is the sovereign authority of law and government. The other is the inalienable rights of man inherent in his rational personality and involving his right to self-government. The tendency has been to a one-sided theory of the authority of government, emphasizing one factor to the suppression of the other. Many nations have held to the divine right of kings, sometimes carrying it so far as to regard the king himself as a god and an object of worship. The prevalence of this belief shows at least that the belief in the divine origin of the authority of government is congenial to the human mind, as the worship of false gods shows that the human soul naturally cries out for God. On the other hand, the theory of popular government by vote of the majority has been pushed in a one-sided way to an equal extreme. But, held apart from the

¹ "The Contemporary Review," July, 1884, pp. 24-48.

recognition of God as the ultimate source of authority and law, it is in its issue self-contradictory and meaningless, bursting like a bubble into nothingness. Bentham speaks of government as "creating rights which it confers on individuals; rights of personal security, rights of protection for honor, rights of property," and others. This and every theory that the fundamental rights of man are artificially created by enactment of the government issues in contradiction and becomes meaningless. The people organize the government and confer on it authority to govern; the government, thus the creature of the people, proceeds to create rights and confer them on the individual members of the sovereign people that created the government and gave it its authority. Professor Jevons, in his work, "The State in Relation to Labor," says: "The first step must be to rid our minds of the idea that there are any such things as abstract rights." But every theory that the right of the people to sovereignty originates in the people themselves, must remain a mere abstraction. It is only as we go back of the people and of the finite universe to the Reason absolute and eternal in God, that we find the concrete and immutable basis of all principles of truth, laws of right, ideals of perfection and well-being, and of the authority of government. Even those who hold the theory that the authority of the people through their representatives to govern themselves is a natural right (*Natur-recht*), must explain what they mean by a natural right. If it rests solely on the fact that the individual is born a member of the race, that the race is composed of individuals and that it is natural for the individuals to be united in society, we do not reach a basis of authority. We remain in the sphere of nature only, and the same might be said of a race of wolves, a herd of deer, or a flock of crows. We find authority only as we penetrate to the rational, personal, and spiritual in man, wherein he is constituted self-determining in the light of reason and in the likeness of God, the absolute and eternal Reason. This carries us back to the truth that all authority to govern is from God. An examination of the theories evolved in discussing the ultimate foundation of authority to govern shows that they all dissolve into emptiness, they all rest at last on empty abstractions, unless we recognize God as the absolute Reason, in whom the fundamental principles of truth, laws of right, and ideals of perfection and well-being are eternal and immutable, — who has constituted and is evolving the universe

in accordance with these eternal principles and laws and for the progressive realization of these archetypal ideals, and who has constituted man rational like himself, and so participating in the light of the eternal reason and conscious of its supreme and inviolable authority. God has also revealed himself as sovereign and as the ultimate source of all human sovereignty in his historical action in the redemption of men from sin recorded in the Bible. The supreme law which he thus reveals is the law of love, of universal good-will exercised in righteousness toward all. Thus the basis of authority is at the farthest possible remove from a mere abstraction. It is in God, in whom all law and authority are eternal, and so at the very basis of the constitution of the universe and regulative of its evolution, and of the constitution of man and law to his action and development. Herbert Spencer says: "The root of all well-ordered social action is a sentiment of justice, which at once insists on personal freedom and is solicitous for the like freedom of others."¹ But this is so only because this sentiment of justice, incorporated in the law of love, is the supreme law of the moral universe eternal in God, the absolute Reason. No government, human or divine, has authority to enact and enforce an unjust law and thereby make it just. It is only as governments, as well as individuals, recognize the supremacy of the law of God and act in harmony with it, that the people attain their highest freedom and their most complete self-government; and all individuals and all nations attain their just rights and come into harmony and unity under the law of universal good-will exercised in righteousness toward all. Here is the fundamental distinction between the Red Republicanism of Europe and the conception of Republican government and of the rights and liberty of the people underlying the development of Republican government in the United States of America.

The true doctrine that civil government derives its authority from God must be distinguished from the medieval doctrine that the civil government derives its authority from God through the church. The church derives authority to rule directly from God; the civil government mediately through the church. Hence the church claimed the right to absolve the people from their allegiance to the civil government, to put the kingdom under a ban. This is

¹ From *Freedom to Bondage; Introduction to A Plea for Liberty; An Argument against Socialism and Socialistic Theories.*

directly contrary to the teaching and example of Christ. He declared, "My kingdom is not of this world"; he was often rebutting the false expectation of the Pharisees that the Messiah would establish a political kingdom; when requested to exercise a civil function, he refused, saying, "Who made me a judge or divider over you"? It is equally contrary to the teaching and example of the apostles. It recognizes the great truth that civil government derives its authority from God, but falls into a fatal error in practically applying it. It is interesting to notice, in the history of the medieval church, instances in which a great truth is recognized, sometimes in advance of the age, while its full practical significance is not apprehended, or it is vitiated in its application.

5. A government may be authorized by the people, either explicitly by vote, or implicitly by acquiescence. Many governments have been established by military force. But in the lapse of years the government is gradually modified into harmony with the will of the people, and the people consent to its continuance. The history of the government of Great Britain is a remarkable example, under which

Freedom broadens slowly down
From precedent to precedent. — TENNYSON.

The United States of America is a rare instance of a government instituted under a written constitution adopted by vote of the people. Sparks, in his "Life of Sir Henry Vane," says that it is the first written constitution that ever became practically effective as the constitution of a nation.

II. THE FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT. — We proceed to consider some principles determining the legitimate lines of the action of an organized government.

1. The function of government is to govern. The people choose their rulers. When thus chosen, their business is to rule; but to rule in recognition of the subjection of government itself to the principles of righteousness and good-will eternal in the supreme law of God. The rulers are to study what are the best ways of practically applying these principles. For this end they are to enact just laws, adjudicate and execute them justly, and administer the government for the protection of the rights of the indi-

vidual and the promotion of the well-being of society. Therefore those appointed to govern are not appointed as servants of the people, but as their rulers. The science of government involves many intricate problems, which the mass of the people cannot be expected to investigate and solve. The rulers are appointed for the very purpose of investigating these problems in order to enact wise and just laws and to administer the government wisely and righteously for the accomplishment of its legitimate ends. History shows that the people are liable to be led into popular delusions, like that of the populists, the silver craze, socialism, communism, and anarchy. It is the business of the rulers to study these questions impartially, above all considerations of personal popularity or partisan advantage; and by the adoption of just and wise laws and the just administration of government to educate the people in political knowledge and qualification for self-government. With all the defects of the administration of our government and all strifes for party supremacy, the education of the people is continually going on, so that there is ground for the confidence commonly expressed that the judgment of the American people on any political question will eventually be right. And government must always recognize the supremacy of the eternal law of good-will exercised in righteousness, which, as the law of God, has authority above all governments and all peoples. As Augustine says, "What are states without justice but great robberies?" It is therefore an error that rulers are the mere servants of the people, bound to carry out the popular will; for this implies that the will of the majority makes whatever it wills right. If this error is dominant and the true function of the rulers is forgotten, the government in every department becomes worm-eaten with corruption, laws are enacted and government administered to perpetuate the office-holders in office and to insure partisan success by catering to the mistakes of the people; a selfish bossism takes the place of statesmanlike leadership; and a United States senator declares that any attempt to introduce moral principles in control of political action is "an iridescent dream."

This doctrine that the will of the majority creates right is sometimes founded on the principle of Utilitarianism, — that the supreme law requires us to seek the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The majority is the greatest number, and therefore it is right that they seek their own highest happiness. If, then, the majority

believe that the enslaving of the minority or their destruction would promote their own highest happiness, it would be right to enslave or destroy them. There would be no principle to which the minority could appeal for protection from enslavement or extermination, if unable to convince the majority that by such action they would injure themselves.

Such are the general principles determining the functions of government. But in their application it is not always easy to determine the legitimate limits of governmental action. Such was the old question whether the general government of the United States should expend any money in internal improvements. It was argued in justification of the government in building a road, that it was a military necessity; and in aiding the Union Pacific Railroad that it was necessary to preserve the unity of the nation. This implies that the action of government must be for the interest and need of the whole people, not solely for the advantage of some favored class or interest. Therefore taxes, direct or by duties on imports or exports, must be imposed only to pay the necessary expenses of the government and assessed according to uniform principles applicable to all.

It was a maxim generally accepted by the American people in former years, that the less people are governed the better. The aim was to reduce governmental regulation to a minimum. There is a tendency now to the opposite extreme, to push governmental action into the regulation of the details of private business. This is a tendency towards socialism, and ultimately to communism. It is the principle of parental government. The people are regarded as helpless children, and the government must take care of them, doing everything for them and instead of them. It is to determine for every person the line of work, the number of hours of daily work, and what shall be done with the product of the labor; it provides for every one clothing and shelter, makes ready for each the daily meals, and provides whatever each needs. This swallowing up of the individual in the community is a characteristic of barbarism. Progress has always been away from it toward the recognition and development of the individual. In barbarism there is no private ownership of land. In times of tribal marriage the family itself was lost in the tribe, and the progress has been to monogamy. The individual was lost in the family, and, if one committed a crime, the whole family was held responsible and

punished, or even put to death. The individual was lost in the state, having no rights as related to the government, but only owing duties. The progress has always been in the direction of recognizing the rights and developing the powers of the individual. The individual is the unit of society and of the state; and only as thus recognized can the individual be developed or the state constituted and governed so as to secure the rights of all. It has always been found that the ownership of land in severalty has been a stimulus to the development and progress of the individual and of society. It is precisely what we are now endeavoring to establish among our Indians, as indispensable to their further civilization and development. To bring society back to communism or even to socialism would be a movement back towards barbarism. It would stop human progress and development, and occasion a degeneracy of men into weaklings. This was the demand of Jacobinism in the first French revolution, Bread or Blood. American democracy has nothing to do with such a conception of government. It accords rather with Napoleon's maxim, — a career open to talent. It is the function of government to protect the individual in his rights as he does his own work, forms and manages his own family, supports himself and his family, and so develops himself. It is the province of government, not to swallow up and extinguish the individual, but to protect him in the exertion of his own energies, and so in securing his own development. Hence it is no function of government to engage directly in farming, mining, manufacturing, commerce, and other lines of business, but to protect the rights of individuals and require their just and upright action in useful and legitimate work and business of every kind.

2. Government has the right, in the exercise of its legitimate functions for the legitimate ends of government, to take the property, liberty, or life of the citizen. Such is the right to impose taxes, the right of eminent domain, the right to command military service to repel invasion or repress insurrection and riot. But this authority must be exercised with strict regard for the rights of the individual, — as, for example, in the exercise of the right of eminent domain the government must pay the owner the full value of the private property appropriated to public use.

This right is essential to the existence of a government. If it

has no right to command the service of the people to resist invasion, any foreign power might crush and extinguish the nation. If it has no authority to deprive of property, liberty, or life, in the punishment of crime or the suppression of a mob, any band of criminals or any single criminal might defy it and any mob overthrow it. This right, however, is limited to the maintenance of the government in its legitimate functions and for its legitimate ends.

Under God the civil government alone has authority to take the property, liberty, or life of a person in the punishment of transgression. No individual has the right to inflict punishment in the strict meaning of the word. Parents have the right to control and discipline their children for their good, but not to punish. A voluntary association has no right to punish a member. Its utmost right is to exclude him from membership. The same is true of the church. The utmost it can do to an unworthy member is to withdraw fellowship from him and exclude him from the church.

Christianity positively forbids any private individual to inflict evil on another in revenge for an injury. The old *lex talionis* is entirely excluded. Moses modified it by providing cities of refuge, into which the avenger of blood should not come and execute his vengeance. Christ totally forbids it (Matth. v. 38-48). The same is the teaching of Paul: "Dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves, but rather give place unto wrath; for it is written, Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord." He proceeds immediately to say that God has given authority to the civil ruler to punish transgressors; "he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath on him who doeth evil" (Rom. xii. 19; xiii. 3, 4). Where dueling prevailed, it was usual to sneer at the custom in other parts of the land of appealing to the law: "I will have my rights, or, I will have satisfaction for the wrong done to me, if there is any law in the land." But this is precisely the Christian principle, as Jesus and Paul declare it, forbidding totally the application of the *lex talionis*, the appeal to the pistol or the sword for satisfaction and avenging, and sanctioning the appeal to law and government. As Shakespeare puts it, —

His faults lie open to the laws, let them,
Not you, correct them. — *Henry VIII.*

It must be noticed, however, that Christ and the apostles do not forbid one to defend himself against assault, or his rights against violation. They forbid only retaliation by the individual in revenge after the injury has been done. They imply that it is better to suffer injury than for a person to take vengeance into his own hands. The private citizen is also bound to do what is in his power to assist the government in detecting the criminal and bringing him to punishment. In his private relations to him the person is not to beat, torment, or kill him, inflicting punishment with his own hands, but to treat him with kindness, so far as is consistent with doing all in his power to aid the government in detecting him and inflicting the penalty prescribed by law.

3. Because the authority of civil government is derived from God, the rulers, in administering the government, are bound to recognize their dependence on God, the supreme authority of his eternal moral law, and their obligation to administer the government in conformity with it. While thus recognizing religion as an important interest of the people, and protecting all in their religious rights, it is not the function of government to prescribe the constitution and administration of the organized church or the particular forms of religious belief, worship, or service. The church is itself a divine institution, and determines its organization, worship, and service, in the light of God's revelation of himself and the teaching of the Spirit. Christ has given to the church the power of the keys, the power to determine whom it will receive into its fellowship (Matth. xvi. 15-19) ; but he has withheld the power of the sword, the authority to make and enforce civil law and to govern the state and its citizens. Christ has given to the state the power of the sword, and withheld from it the power of the keys, the authority to determine who shall be recognized as members of the church and as true servants and children of God. It is not the separation of the state and religion, but of the state and the organized church. This does not mean that the state is atheistic. The government recognizes and protects religion as essential to the welfare of the people. It simply leaves individuals to determine their own church associations and their forms of religious belief, worship, and service, provided they do not commit crime, as in inculcating and practising polygamy, human sacrifices, or persecution by fine, imprisonment, or death, for difference of

belief or forms of worship. The plea of religious liberty and freedom of conscience can never justify vice and crime, for this would be superseding the eternal and supreme moral law of God.

Both the general government of the United States and that of the several States from the beginning, have in various ways recognized God and the supreme authority of his law. Chaplains officially appointed by the government conduct religious services in Congress, in State legislatures, in the courts, and in the army and navy. God is recognized in proclamations of days of thanksgiving, and of fasting and prayer, in the recognition of Sunday as a day for religious worship, in oaths of office and of witnesses in courts, and in many official documents and acts of government. Until a comparatively recent period, God and religion were recognized in the public schools. The tendency now is to exclude all recognition of God and of religion from the schools, so that the name of God shall not be mentioned, the children shall not be taught that God's moral law of universal love is supreme, and that they are under obligation to reverence God and obey his commandments, nor ever hear the name of Jesus Christ, nor be pointed to his example of love to man, nor in the study of history hear any allusion to the power of Christianity in promoting the progress of man. This demand for the banishment of religion and all recognition of God from the schools, is in direct contrariety to the uniform official action of our government in all other departments from the beginning. It assumes that the state is atheistic. Its tendency is to train children to atheism, to put a stop to the uniform historical usage of our government in the recognition of God and the supreme authority of his law, to undermine reverence for the government as of divine authority, to bring in superficial conceptions of government and of the state tending to anarchy, and to arrest the normal development of the national life and character and the normal progress of the people. It is not only contrary to the whole historical course of our own government, but it is probable that there is no other nation on earth that has schools in which the recognition of God and religious instruction are excluded from them.

III. THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT. — The authority or right to govern must be distinguished from the particular form of the

organized government and the agencies and methods of its administration.

1. The particular form of government is not prescribed by Christ or the apostles, nor by the prophets of the Old Testament. We have no reason to suppose any particular form of government is of divine authority, any further than that it is the form most accordant with the eternal principles and laws of right and is the best fitted to protect the rights and promote the well-being of the people. On the contrary, the very fact that the authority to govern is given to the people implies that the people acting according to the best light they have at the time, are to determine the specific form of the government and the agencies through which it is to be administered. The state is a divine institution, and government, as essential to the existence of the state and of human society, is of divine authority. Whatever the form of the government in any particular time or country, so long as the people acquiesce in it, the individual is bound to obedience. For it is essential to the existence of society that government in some form should exist. Government in any form is better than anarchy.

2. The people have the right to modify the existing form of government. This may become necessary in the lapse of time from new conditions and circumstances. Acts of administration may become necessary and be acquiesced in by the people, which had not previously been provided for or even thought of. Examples in the history of our own country are the purchase of the Louisiana territory, the annexation of California, Texas, and Alaska, and the abolition of slavery. Formal change in the constitution itself rendered necessary by new conditions is exemplified in the amendments to the constitution adopted at the close of the civil war.

Changes become necessary also from the progress of political knowledge and the education and development of the people.

Changes are justifiable only in submission to the divine law of righteousness and with the design that government may more effectively accomplish its legitimate ends. A republican form of government provides a way for obtaining an expression of "the collective reason of the people." There is a truth in the maxim that all men are wiser than any one man. In the voice of all men we get the expression of opinion on any question from all

different points of view, which may check and balance each other and offset the narrowness and selfishness of individuals, cliques, and parties. But it is not true in respect to intricate and difficult questions of political economy and civil polity, which require the investigation of special students who can investigate them thoroughly. The collective wisdom of the people should lead them to commit the investigation and decision of such questions to men able to investigate and master them, and honest and honorable in rising above selfish and partisan interests in order to seek the truth and the real welfare of the people. Hence the aim should be to seek the rule of the wisest, ablest, and best. There is still truth in the words of Plato: "Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures which follow either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never cease from ill — no, nor the human race, as I believe — and then only will this our State have a possibility of life and behold the light of day."¹ This brings us back to the fundamental principles that the improvement of the constitution and the methods of administration is possible only by the progress and development of the people, and that republican government rightly administered is itself a continued education and development of the people in the capacity for self-government and for making wise and beneficent changes in the constitution and administration of the government. We see also the propriety of an educational qualification for the right to vote.

On account of human limitation and imperfection the powers of the government are distributed in different departments, not only for the necessary division of labor and responsibility, but also that the different departments may act as checks and balances on each other and so contribute to the prevention of maladministration through mistake or corruption.

A proper constitution of government provides methods for the peaceable change of the constitution by the people.

3. The character of the changes must be determined by the character of the government already existing and by the stage of development and progress already attained by the people. We are to recognize the fact that society is already organized

¹ The Republic, Bk. V. 473.

under government. The government is not like an Arab encampment, the tents pitched at night and struck the next morning. It is intended for stability. Whatever imperfections may exist in the form of organization and the methods of administration, the government is not to be lightly brushed away. It is a very simple but far-reaching maxim of Edmund Burke, "If you mean to go anywhere, you must start from where you are." So in the improvement of the constitution and modes of government the people must start from where they are. And the improvement must be commensurate with and preceded by the improvement and development of the people. We are not to begin with *a priori* principles and infer what a perfect form of government ought to be, and then attempt to raze existing institutions to their foundations and rebuild the State anew, aiming to establish at once an ideally perfect State. The people are not prepared for so great a change, but must be educated up to it. Otherwise the attempt to force on them a civilization to which they have not attained and ideas for which they are not prepared, is what Jesus describes as putting new wine into old wine-skins, which issues both in bursting and destroying the old skins and in spilling the wine. The people must be developed to see the need of changes and to know what the changes should be. In this process of progressive development important changes may be gradually made in the constitution of the government and the methods of its administration, either at the demand of the people or as a result of the progress of society and civilization, in which the people acquiesce. For example, a people may be conquered and the conquerors set up their government over them. But in process of time the two peoples may coalesce, the conquered may be admitted to citizenship and participation in the government, and all may acquiesce. The people of England from the time of the Magna Charta have won their political liberty by grants from the rulers in response to the demands of the people. The theory of government was wrong, but in fact the people gained successively their rights. In all wise attempts to improve the constitution and administration of the government, regard must be had to the existing government and the existing stage of the civilization, development, and progress of the people.

4. The people have the right of revolution when the organized

government has ceased to exist for the good of the governed and for the legitimate ends of government and by force prevents reform or change. In this case the divine authority of the government has ceased and reverts to the people. The right to revolution does not arise merely on the enactment of some bad laws or on occasion of some acts of maladministration or oppression, but only when the organized government has ceased to exist for the good of the governed and maintains its oppression by force. Such a government has no divine authority to govern.

The people are to judge when the right of revolution accrues. It is not a mere handful of the people rising in insurrection, but it is the general uprising of the people.

But revolution is a dangerous experiment. History shows that a great majority of attempted revolutions have been disastrous. Because the independent national existence of the United States was achieved in a revolution, the American people have fallen into the delusion that a revolution is always beneficial and glorious. When the war of secession began, an intelligent and educated man expressed to me his sorrow that the secessionists were the revolutionists, and therefore were on the popular side. Jefferson, speaking of the Shay rebellion, says, "The late rebellion in Massachusetts has given more alarm than I think it should have done. Calculate that one rebellion in thirteen States in the course of eleven years, is but one rebellion in each State in a century and a half. No country should be so long without a revolution."¹ The reformation of government and the securing of the rights of the people are more effectually promoted by the progressive education and development of the people and the progress of mankind, than by revolution, — by evolution rather than by revolution. And when a nation provides in its constitution, whether written or by precedent, the method of changing the constitution, there remains little occasion for revolution.

IV. THE RIGHTS OF MAN. — Rufus Choate speaks of "the glittering and sounding generalities of natural right which make up the Declaration of Independence."² This exemplifies a tendency of late to set aside as mere rhetorical flourish the grand propositions in that Declaration asserting the rights of man in

¹ Works, vol. ii. p. 331.

² Letter to the Maine Whigs, April 9, 1856, "Life," 2d ed., p. 306.

relation to government. The following propositions seem to me to present the truth on this subject, in respect to which there has been much confusion of thought.

1. There are inalienable rights of man inherent in his manhood or personality; that is, in his constitution as a rational self-determining person, in the likeness of God, the absolute Spirit. Man is like God in his constitution as a rational personal being, differing from him not in the essential elements of rational personality, but only as the finite and dependent differs from the absolute and unconditioned. These rights inherent in his personality are inalienable, and indestructible otherwise than by the annihilation of the person. A man is never to be acquired, possessed, and used by any other man, or by any association of men, or any government. No one may use him as a tool for accomplishing his purposes, or as a stepping-stone on which to mount to power. Man as a rational person is set apart as the object of trust and service in good-will, regulated in its exercise by wisdom and justice. "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." "Who-soever would be first among you, let him be your servant; even as the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister and to give his life a ransom for many."

The assertion of the Declaration of Independence that all men are born equal is true. All are born rational persons in the likeness of God; all have equal access to God on the same conditions; all have equal rights before God. It is true that all are not born equal in weight, or in physical constitution, or in outward surroundings. But this does not discredit the assertion in its real significance, that all men are born equal as personal beings in the likeness of God, and equal before him as having the dignity, rights, and obligations of rational beings.

2. Rights are correlative to duties. If a man owes me five dollars, I have a right to the payment of it. Always one person's duty to another implies the other person's right to have the duty done. Rights, therefore, are as inalienable as duties. Both must persist so long as God's law persists and is of supreme authority throughout the universe. Man's duties and their correlative rights are as indestructible as the law of God, and both duties and rights are inalienable. Human rights, therefore, are inherent in the raw material of humanity.

"The rank is but the guinea's stamp;
The man's the gold for all that."

Mr. Spencer says that a person's rights or freedom are restricted only by the rights or freedom of others. The true statement would be that a person's rights are correlative to the duties of others and restricted by his own duties to others. When organized government exists, it and the individual man are two parties or legal persons. The rights of the government are correlative to the duties of individuals, and the rights of individuals correlative to the duties of the government. There remains no place for the old theory of despotism, that the individual has no rights as related to the government, but only owes duties, and that the government owes no duties to the individual, but only exercises rights. Governments are subject to the eternal law of God not less than individuals.

A committee of the Legislature of Massachusetts, in 1875, on the system of taxation, say in their report, "The individual has no inalienable rights except that to his own righteousness." This is true. But it is an identical proposition, simply saying that a person has a right to do right, but no right to do wrong. Still it is a recognition of a law of right above all legislative enactments. It would have been more significant if it had said that a man has the right to the righteousness of other people; that is, a right that others should do their duty and fulfil their obligations to him. If these obligations are imposed by statute, the person can appeal to the courts, and government will enforce the fulfilment of the obligation. If it is not a statute, but a requirement of God's moral law, God will condemn the person who fails to meet his obligations, and so violates the rights of other persons.

Christ, the apostles, and the prophets of the Old Testament have comparatively little to say of man's rights, but insist strenuously on his duties. It would be helpful to human progress if every one would emphasize his own duties rather than his rights, and so work to insure the rights of others while not neglecting his own.

3. Here we see the real significance of the distinction between natural rights and positive. Natural rights are those which are inherent in the manhood or personality of man; positive rights are rights conferred by the explicit action of the government; and natural rights become also positive when recognized or declared in the action of the government. The natural rights of

the individual, or of man as man, are to be recognized and protected by the government, but they are not created, granted, or conferred by the government. The theory of the British government is that from the time of the Magna Charta the liberty and rights of the people have been gradually obtained by successive grants from the sovereign. They are privileges granted rather than rights. The rights of the individual are so far secured. But the underlying theory is that of despotism, that the people have no rights as related to the government, but only owe duties; and that the government owes no duties to the people, but only exercises rights, and that all rights are vested in the absolute sovereignty of the ruler, and all so-called rights of the people are mere privileges granted by the sovereign and continued during his good pleasure.

If a person transgresses the positive law of civil government, he forfeits his right to protection by the government and is condemned and punished. If he transgresses the eternal law of God, the law of love, and lives in selfishness, he forfeits his right to the favor of God and is condemned as a sinner. His rights are not taken from him, he forfeits them by his own free act.

4. The doctrine of the worth of man and the sacredness of his rights was made a power in the progress of civilization by Christianity. God's estimate of the worth and dignity of man is revealed in his creation. He gave him dominion over nature and made him but little lower than the angels (Gen. i. 26, 27; Ps. viii.; Heb. ii. 5-9). It is revealed pre-eminently in the Incarnation, God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself. Man is so in the likeness of God in his higher spiritual constitution that God can reveal himself acting in Christ under the limitations and conditions of humanity. God esteems man of so much worth that he comes in Christ to reconcile the world unto himself. And he abides among men in the Holy Spirit seeking to draw them to himself, accepting all who willingly accept the proffered grace, dwelling in them to enlighten and quicken them in the divine life and making them workers with him in the advancement of his kingdom. The command, Enter into thy closet and shut the door and pray to thy Father, discloses God's estimate of the greatness and worth of man, admitting every one who will to confidential intimacy with himself, the universal sovereign. The proclamation of Christianity is in itself the clearest

and fullest proclamation of the dignity and rights of man. Accordingly it is historical fact that the progress in recognizing and insuring the rights of man has been mostly, if not exclusively, in the Christian peoples.

Ungrateful country, if thou e'er forget
 The sons who for thy civil rights have bled . . .
 But these had fallen for profitless regret,
 Had not the holy church her champions bred,
 And claims from other worlds inspirited
 The star of liberty to rise. Nor yet
 (Grave this within thy heart) if spiritual things
 Be lost through apathy, or scorn, or fear,
 Shalt thou thy humbler franchises support,
 However hardly won or justly dear.
 What came from heaven to heaven by nature clings,
 And if dissevered thence, its course is short. — WORDSWORTH.

5. Political progress does not rest on the love of liberty but on righteousness. It rests on a sacred regard to men's duties and their correlative rights under the eternal law of God. The love of liberty is essentially the love of power, the desire to have one's own way unhindered and with little or no regard to the rights or liberty of others. It is stronger in the savage than in the civilized, — probably stronger in a wild beast than in a savage. It may be wholly selfish and reckless of the rights of others. It may be consistent with allegiance and service to one's own class, rank, or caste, while reckless of the rights of all others. The spirit of chivalry may coexist with the spirit of aristocracy, with holding slaves, or with oppressing all of inferior rank. Mivart mentions a "French lady of the *ancien régime*, who exclaimed, on learning the death of a profligate noble, 'God will think twice before he damns a man of the marquis's quality.'" ¹ The motto of the French revolution at the close of the last century was Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. Here is no recognition of righteousness, nor of the supreme and universal authority of God. Far more profound and far-reaching is the triad of a Hebrew prophet: "What doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?" (Micah vi. 8). The foundations of right government are three, — justice, and benevolence toward men, and reverential piety toward God.

¹ Mivart, "Lessons from Nature," p. 142.

6. When obedience to government is disobedience to God, the person is bound to disobey the government and submit to the penalty. A law commanding what is contrary to God's law is to the individual *in foro conscientiae* null and void. No human government can give authority to such a law or create obligation to obey it. Very soon after the day of Pentecost, Peter and John were called before the Council and forbidden to speak at all or to teach in the name of Jesus. But Peter and John answered, "Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you rather than unto God, judge ye" (Acts iv. 19). Thus at the very outset in the development of Christianity it was proclaimed that civil government cannot give authority to a law requiring violation of the law of God, or create obligation to obey it. And they appealed to the reason and conscience of the rulers themselves to acknowledge that they were right in refusing obedience. This grand principle had been recognized before Christ came, not only in the Old Testament, but also in the Gentile religions. Plutarch says, "The Egyptian kings, according to their laws, used to swear their judges that they should not obey the king when he commanded them to give an unjust sentence."¹ Sophocles in the "Antigone" recognizes the same grand principle.

"CREON: 'And darest thou, then, to disobey the law?'
 ANTIGONE: 'I had it not from Jove nor the just gods
 Who rule below; nor could I ever think
 A mortal's law of power or strength sufficient
 To abrogate th' unwritten law divine,
 Immutable, eternal; not like these
 Of yesterday, but made ere time began.
 Shall man persuade me, then, to violate
 Heaven's great command and make the gods my foes?'"

This right exists, not when a law is merely unwise, injudicious, or inexpedient; but only when obedience to the law is believed to be disobedience to God. Mere oppression and tyranny do not justify disobedience. The apostles and early Christians did not disobey government for these reasons, even under the reign of Nero and other Roman emperors.

Every person must judge for himself whether his disobedience to law would be disobedience to God.

¹ "Apophthegms of Kings and Great Commanders," *Morals*, vol. i. p. 189, Goodwin's Translation.

A person in such a case may disobey, but he may not resist the government. Resistance is justifiable only when revolution is justifiable in the uprising of the people to change the government. Resistance is of the nature of revolution. When offered by an individual it is futile. One who thus disobeys and is arrested, must submit to the penalty. Blackstone says that when laws require *natural* duties and forbid offences which are *mala in se*, there is no occasion for conscientious disobedience. But when laws require only *positive* duties and forbid only what are not *mala in se* but only *mala prohibita*, a person may disobey but must submit to the penalty which the law imposes on the transgressor.¹ Much more would a person have the right to conscientious disobedience when a *positive* enactment or law of the government requires what is contrary to the *natural* duties and rights required in the eternal law of God. In thus conscientiously disobeying and submitting to the penalty without resistance when arrested, the citizen keeps his own conscience clear and at the same time is submissive to the authority of the government. This submission to penalty is a safeguard against a rash and hasty judgment that obedience to the law would be disobedience to God.

Christ also teaches that if a person is liable to arrest for disobeying a law obedience to which he regards as disobedience to God, he has a right to make his escape: "When they persecute you in this city, flee ye into another" (Matth. x. 23). The apostles taught the same by their example, — as the Christians in Damascus rescued Paul from his persecutors, letting him down over the wall in a basket (Acts ix. 23–25).

This may be called the right to martyrdom. All the martyrs disobeyed the authorities and submitted to the penalty.

A person, however, has the right to proclaim the injustice of the law and to do all in his power to secure its repeal. This is permitted and encouraged in rightly constituted governments. It is the freedom of speech and of the press essential in the administration of popular government.

¹ "Commentaries on the Laws of England," Ed. N. York, 1852, vol. i. p. 38.

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